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In recent years new applications emerged on the Web which received the labels Web2.0, 
social software or social media. The terms were often used interchangeably for a wide 
variety of applications. Since a clear definition was lacking, examples of such 
applications would often be listed in lieu of such a definition. Such examples ranged 
from social networking sites like Facebook.com and MySpace.com to social 
bookmarking services, like Delicious.com, from online encyclopedias like Wikipedia to 
recommender systems embedded in commercial websites, from web fora to online photo 
management and sharing application, like Flickr.com, from prediction markets, like 
Iowa Electronic Markets, to open innovation systems like Innocentive.com.  
The starting point of this thesis was my observation that in many of these applications 
people are engaged in epistemic activities, such as the dissemination, organization or 
creation of knowledge. They collectively produce epistemic products: encyclopedias, 
classification systems, articles, link collections, calculations, databases, etc. More and 
more social software applications with such a decided epistemic focus emerged in the 
last years. They become ubiquitous and given this prevalence, they seem to pervade the 
epistemic practices of many people – in their everyday quests for information as well as 
in academia. My interest was sparked to analyze the epistemological relevance of these 
social software applications that have a decided epistemic focus; applications for which 
I conceived the label epistemic social software. From the above mentioned applications, 
Wikipedia, Delicious.com, recommender systems or Innocentive.com are all clear cases 
of epistemic social software. Despite their differences, they have one commonality: they 
are socio-technical systems in which multiple agents are involved in epistemic practices.  
To apprehend such systems from an epistemological perspective the first task consisted 
in finding an appropriate epistemological framework for such an analysis. One crucial 
characteristic of such systems, and the reason why the term social looms so large in their 
labels, is that multiple people are engaged in these epistemic processes together. For this 
reason, for the fact that the interaction and collaboration between multiple people seem 
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to be the key to understand the epistemic processes within such systems, I chose social 
epistemology as the framework to analyze epistemic social software.  
Social epistemology is the philosophical discipline exploring the ways and the extent to 
which knowledge and epistemic practices are social. As a term, social epistemology 
often refers to a quite specific and narrow field of discourse which evolved since the 
1980ies and is rooted primarily in Anglo-American epistemology and philosophy of 
science. Since the social nature of knowledge has been addressed within philosophy and 
beyond in numerous ways, broader understandings of social epistemology exist, and 
there is indeed a considerable overlap to other theoretical developments within and 
beyond philosophy. The two most notable examples are feminist epistemology as well 
as different historical and sociological accounts of knowledge and science. Social 
epistemology, as the mainly analytical, Anglo-American philosophical disciplines that 
has emerged in the late 1980ies, is at the core of this thesis. However, as shall become 
obvious in the course of this thesis, understanding the central arguments within social 
epistemology even in its most narrow conception is impossible without taking into 
account the broader field of discourse in which these arguments are embedded. Hence, it 
is rather the field of discourse around this core that forms the theoretical framework of 
this thesis. 
I have scrutinized different social epistemologies to see which one could serve best to 
analyze the socio-epistemic processes taking place within epistemic social software. In 
the course of these analyses, however, it soon became obvious that none of the existing 
comprehensive social epistemologies delivers a sufficient framework to analyze 
epistemic social software. One major reason for this is that many social epistemologies 
do not account for information and communication technologies (ICT) or technology 
altogether. And those social epistemologies which address ICT use a model of 
technology which seems inadequate to me. In particular, ICT is often perceived as a 
means to only distribute knowledge. Since many epistemic social software applications 
enable the collective creation of knowledge, such a narrow focus on distribution is 
inappropriate. Moreover, the sharp boundary that is drawn between human agents and 
technologies implies an understanding of technologies as mere tools in the hands of 
fully rational agents, which also seems inappropriate to understand socio-technical 
epistemic processes such as the ones characteristic of epistemic social software. 
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Indicating these shortcomings is less a critique of these social epistemologies per se – 
after all, they may not have been developed with social software applications in mind. 
However, it makes such theories insufficient for a more in-depth understanding of the 
epistemological relevance of epistemic social software. 
For these reasons, I started to develop a new socio-epistemological framework for this 
purpose. This framework crucially builds upon insights obtained from social 
epistemology. In particular, I have analyzed five major social epistemologies and 
assessed their merits for an analysis of epistemic social software. Most of them are 
relevant for certain aspects of socio-technical systems, but none of them offers a 
comprehensive framework to address the various epistemological issues that emerge in 
different types of epistemic social software. This is where the framework I propose goes 
beyond socio-epistemological literature.  
Due to the shortcomings of social epistemology indicated above, I have amended my 
own socio-epistemological framework by insights from other fields. To understand not 
only the role of technology, but also the relationship between the social, the technical 
and the epistemic, I rely crucially on literature from the field of Science and Technology 
Studies (STS). Based on my reception of different approaches within STS, I define 
epistemic social software as socio-technical epistemic systems consisting of multiple 
human and non-human agents who interact in different ways for various epistemic 
purposes.  
My framework is based on a tripartite classification of socio-technical epistemic system 
with respect to the mechanisms they employ to close socio-epistemic processes. Since 
every epistemic practice is a process, it consists of two temporal occurrences: its 
initiation and its closure. In this thesis, I argue that analyzing the moment of closure is 
sufficient for differentiating three important types of epistemic sociality.  
The term epistemic sociality refers to the fact that in all cases there is more than just one 
epistemic agent involved in the epistemic process. Different concepts have been 
introduced to label and describe the involvement of a multitude of epistemic agents for 
epistemic tasks: collective intelligence, wisdom of the crowds, team work, cooperation, 
collaboration, to name just a few examples. I use the term epistemic sociality as a 
generic term that encompasses all these notions. The reason for using a generic term 
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here is that each of the before mentioned terms already implies a specific way in which 
the multitude of epistemic agents is organized. Yet those specificities are neither always 
clear, nor consistent, nor used in the same way by different authors.  
Grounded on readings in social epistemology as well as my analyses of epistemic social 
software, I suggest a classification of three types of epistemic sociality based on the 








Most practices of this type of epistemic sociality are associated with the 
concept of collaboration. To initiate this type of epistemic sociality, 
epistemic tasks need to be modularized and distributed over different 
epistemic agents. Once these discrete tasks are accomplished, they need 







Many practices of this second type of epistemic sociality are associated 
with the concept of the wisdom of the crowd. Here, epistemic labor is 
again distributed over multiple agents, but the mechanism of closure is 
aggregation. I argue that this type of epistemic sociality has its roots in 
statistical reasoning and is getting reinforced on the Web. Although 
neither the statistical techniques nor this type of reasoning is new, it is 









Instead of integrating or aggregating epistemic results, in ES
S
 the main 
epistemic occurrence of closure is that of selection. Analyzing the 
distribution of cognitive labor over different, competing approaches, over 
different methods of reaching the same epistemic goal, is characteristic 
for this type of epistemic sociality. 
 
Table 1: Three Types of Epistemic Sociality. 
With this classification, I do not aim at reducing the differences between various types 
of epistemic sociality to their mechanisms of closure. However, I argue that the 
classification based on this indicator is heuristically fruitful. While each type of 
epistemic sociality has its own epistemic merits, they all depend on different social, 
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technical and epistemic prerequisites. For instance, while all forms of epistemic sociality 
depend on diversity, the relevance of independence differs between the three types. They 
have different strengths and weaknesses and are optimal for different epistemic tasks. 
These differences are outlined in detail in the third part of this thesis.  
1.1 Goals of this Thesis 
The initial goal of this thesis was to provide a comprehensive framework to analyze 
epistemic social software from a socio-epistemological perspective. Yet, the model I 
have developed goes beyond this initial goal. It is a new socio-epistemological 
framework to analyze socio-technical epistemic systems and practices in general. In 
particular, it is a new socio-epistemological approach that puts something into the focus 
that has so far been neglected in social epistemology: the technical and its relationship to 
the social and the epistemic. Since most epistemic practices, in science as much as in 
everyday-life, are nowadays pervaded by technologies, such a consideration of the role 
of technologies in these practices indeed seems to be indispensable for any social 
epistemology that aims at being not only normatively appropriate, but also empirically 
adequate.  
The utility of the socio-epistemological framework I propose is twofold. First, providing 
a schema to distinguish different modes of epistemic sociality is of theoretical interest 
for social epistemology by offering a more fine-grained and nuanced framework for 
analyzing socio-epistemic practices on the Web and beyond. Since most socio-
epistemological theories have been developed in the context of science, I frequently 
compare epistemic practices on the Web with those in science. That this comparison 
does not imply an equation of science and the Web2.0 goes without saying. Nonetheless, 
I argue that, when it comes to the basic socio-epistemic mechanisms they employ and to 
the central epistemological – and ethical – questions that have to be raised, they share 
many commonalities. These commonalities as well as the differences are a recurrent 
theme throughout this thesis. While the socio-epistemological framework I propose is 
explicitly developed for the analyses of epistemic social software, it is generic enough to 
be applied to socio-technical epistemic systems more broadly conceived; systems for 
which science and epistemic social software are just two very prominent examples.  
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Differentiating distinct forms of epistemic sociality, outlining their prerequisites as well 
as their strengths and weakness is crucial for understanding the ways in which 
knowledge is or can be created socially. However, and this is the second goal of this 
thesis, such a classification can also serve as the theoretical basis for improving socio-
epistemic practices and systems. Knowledge about the prerequisites, strengths and 
weaknesses of different social mechanism enables the design and development of socio-
technical systems that serve epistemic purposes in a rational, efficient and effective way.  
1.2 Methods of this Thesis 
The methods employed in this thesis were primarily literature review as well as an 
analysis of the functionalities of various types of epistemic social software. As a starting 
point, I have analyzed and described the functionalities of different types of epistemic 
social software primarily based on their self-description on the Web. Further, I have 
used additional literature from computer and information science on such systems as 
well as observations on their usage.  
Since social epistemology provides the theoretical core of this thesis, reviewing the 
major approaches in this field has been of prime importance. These major social 
epistemologies were Steve Fuller‘s Social Epistemology, Alvin Goldman‘s Veristic 
Social Epistemology, Miriam Solomon‘s Social Empiricism, Martin Kusch‘s 
Communitarian Epistemology as well as Helen Longino‘s Critical Contextual 
Empiricism.  
My analysis of these approaches has been twofold. First, I have critically assessed these 
social epistemologies as epistemological theories addressing the social nature of 
knowledge in general. Second, I have assessed their merits and shortcomings for 
providing a theoretical framework to analyze epistemic social software in particular. In 
doing this, I have developed a grid of important issues to make different social 
epistemologies comparable and expose their respective strengths and weaknesses. These 
topics relate to their concepts of knowledge and sociality, the types of epistemic 
processes that are in focus, as well as the consideration of technology. Beyond these 
major social epistemologies, I have examined further literature on central socio-
epistemological topics which are relevant to analyze epistemic social software. These 
topics were testimony and trust, consensus formation and distribution of cognitive labor. 
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Grounded on these readings I was able to provide a map of central debates within the 
field of social epistemology. I have positioned myself in this field and used this map to 
develop my own socio-epistemological framework.  
Given the interdisciplinary nature of this thesis, I have analyzed literature in various 
fields beyond social epistemology. The most important insights came from feminist 
epistemology and philosophy of science as well as from the field or Science and 
Technology Studies (STS). I have focused on approaches addressing information and 
communication technologies (ICT), and literature from the field Values in Design, a 
term that refers to the works on the analysis and design of ethically responsible 
information and communication technologies, has been particularly important.  
All these insights obtained from literature review found their way into the development 
of my socio-epistemological framework. In outlining this model and the three types of 
epistemic sociality that it distinguishes, I re-assess the examples of epistemic social 
software outlined at the beginning of the thesis in the light of this framework. I use 
different types of epistemic social software as support for the validity of my 
classification and the heuristic fertility of the model proposed. I conclude each chapter 
of the different types of epistemic sociality with recommendations concerning the 
analysis and design of epistemic social software conceived as socio-technical epistemic 
systems consisting of multiple entangled human and non-human epistemic agents.  
1.3 Structure of this Thesis 
The thesis is divided into three major parts. In the first part I apprehend my empirical 
object of analysis: epistemic social software.  
In Chapter 2, I explain why I introduce the term epistemic social software and discuss to 
what extent a distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic social software can be 
made. Defining epistemic social software is difficult in so far as the term social software 
itself is ill-defined. Hence, in lieu of a proper definition, I portray different examples of 
epistemic social software. Having screened the field of epistemic social software, I 
chose examples which prototypically depict different ways in which the social, the 
technical and the epistemic are entangled on the Web. These major examples are 
Wikipedia, Delicious.com, Innocentive.com, and Recommender Systems. While I refer 
to other examples of epistemic social software throughout the thesis, these four 
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examples serve as points of reference to which I return frequently. The portrayal of these 
applications in Chapter 2 is primarily based on their self-description on the Web and 
remains rather cursory, because they are reassessed in more detail in the light of my own 
socio-epistemological framework in Part 3 of the thesis. 
In Chapter 3 I argue that instead of understanding epistemic social software as mere 
tools or applications, they should be conceived as socio-technical epistemic systems 
consisting of multiple human and non-human agents who interact for various epistemic 
purposes. To support such a conception of epistemic social software I take a brief detour 
through the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS). I outline and assess the 
merits of the major STS-approaches for the analyses of epistemic social software. These 
approaches include the Social Shaping of Technology (SST), the Social Construction of 
Technology (SCOT) Actor-Network Theory (ANT)), the feminist approaches of Donna 
Haraway, Karen Barad and Lucy Suchman and finally different approaches within the 
more pragmatically oriented field of Values in Design. The key insights of this chapter 
for the analyses of epistemic social software conceived as socio-technical epistemic 
systems concern the following issues: the entanglement of the social, the technical and 
the epistemic; the relationship between human and non-human actors, a performative 
understanding of epistemic practices and systems, and the relationship between values 
and technologies. 
Chapter 4 completes the first part of this thesis with a summary of the main arguments 
and the conclusions to be drawn about epistemic social software conceived as socio-
technical epistemic systems in which multiple human and non-human agents interact for 
epistemic purposes.  
In the second part of this thesis, I introduce social epistemology as the major theoretical 
framework, outline central debates and position myself within this field of research. In 
Chapter 5 I delineate the field of social epistemology as conceived in this thesis. 
Although the term itself was coined in the library science in the 1950ies, social 
epistemology has later become to refer to a mainly Anglo-American, analytically 
oriented endeavor that emerged in the 1980ies. My field of reference is the discourse 
around this narrow conception of social epistemology forms. I then portray the five 
major comprehensive social epistemologies proposed by Steve Fuller, Alvin Goldman, 
Miriam Solomon, Martin Kusch and Helen Longino in some detail.  
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While in Chapter 5 I remain quite neutral in my portrayal of these different approaches, 
I scrutinize them in the next chapter. Thus, Chapter 6 is devoted to an assessment of 
social epistemology as a theoretical framework to analyze epistemic social software. In 
this chapter I analyze additional socio-epistemological literature on topics which are 
crucial for the assessment of epistemic social software. These topics of concern are 
testimony, trust, consensus formation and the distribution of cognitive labor. Based on 
analyses of the theories portrayed in Chapter 5 as well as this additional literature, I 
outline central debated in the field of social epistemology and position myself with 
respect to these debates. In a next step I outline initial attempts to analyze social 
software from a socio-epistemological perspective. There have been only few socio-
epistemological analyses of social software and although they deliver important insights, 
they can only be considered to be starting points for a more comprehensive assessment 
of the epistemic merits and shortcomings of different types of epistemic social software. 
In Chapter 7 I summarize the main arguments as well as my stance towards the issues 
raised and draw conclusions concerning the implications of my analyses for the 
development of a comprehensive socio-epistemological framework for the analysis of 
epistemic social software.  
In Part 3 of the thesis, I describe my socio-epistemological framework to analyze 
epistemic social software, i.e. social software whose primary purpose lies in the 
creation, dissemination or evaluation of knowledge. I argue that my framework goes 
beyond previous socio-epistemological analyses of ICT by emphasizing the processes of 
collective knowledge creation taking place in social software understood as socio-
technical epistemic systems instead of focusing on distribution of knowledge only. This 
framework is built upon the insights obtained from the different fields of research 
addressed throughout this thesis.  
In Chapter 8 I outline the basics of my framework. I show how the various insights are 
combined in my conception of epistemic social software as socio-technical epistemic 
systems and what implications this conception has for a socio-epistemological analysis 
of such systems. In particular, I make use of Helen Longino‘s tripartite notion of 
knowledge as content, practices and cognitive agency to show how knowledge as 
content is input and output of knowledge-productive practices conducted by entangled 
and situated epistemic agents. The production of knowledge depends on the temporary 
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closure of socio-epistemic processes. I distinguish three generic mechanisms of such 
closure, namely integration, aggregation and selection and use them to develop a 
comprehensive socio-epistemological framework based on this triple classification of 
socio-technical epistemic systems with respect to the mechanisms of closure they 





) and ES:Selection (ES
S
) in detail, I portray two additional sources 
of inspiration for my model: Yochai Benkler‘s analyses on commons-based peer 
production as well as James Surowiecki‘s thoughts on the wisdom of the crowds.  
In the next three chapters I outline these three types of epistemic sociality in detail. In 
each chapter I describe the key characteristics of each type, offer examples from science 
and the Web, outline key issues that need to be addressed for any socio-epistemological 
analyses of systems employing the respective mechanism of closure, draw conclusions 
concerning the strength, weaknesses and prerequisites for each type and conclude the 
description with recommendations concerning the analyses and design of such systems.  
Chapter 9 is devoted to the first type of epistemic sociality (ES) which I distinguish: 
ES:Integration (ES
I
). After epistemic tasks have been distributed over multiple epistemic 
agents, these tasks need to be integrated for the collective epistemic result. Using 
examples from the Web and from science, I outline socio-epistemological considerations 
of ES
I
 and emphasize several key issues that need to be addressed when analyzing or 
designing socio-technical epistemic systems that exploit ES
I
. These topics concern the 
structure of epistemic tasks, as well as diversity, trust, authority and reputation. The 
chapter ends with some conclusions concerning the socio-epistemological analysis and 
design of epistemic social software.  
In Chapter 10 I outline the second type of epistemic sociality, ES:Aggregation (ES
A
) 
following the same schema. I describe how ES
A
 differs from other types of epistemic 
sociality and provide different examples of systems exploiting ES
A
. I analyze socio-
epistemological perspectives on the epistemic merits of aggregational mechanisms and 
outline the key topics, before I draw some conclusions and provide recommendations 
concerning systems employing ES
A
.  
In Chapter 11 I outline the third and final type of epistemic sociality, ES:Selection 
(ES
S
). Instead of integrating or aggregation epistemic results provided by different 
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epistemic agents this type of epistemic sociality consists in a selection. ES
S 
hence differs 
from the other two types of epistemic sociality, because singular results do not have to 
be re-combined. Moreover, ES
S
 is particularly suited to elucidate a crucial aspect of my 
three types of epistemic sociality that has not been addressed so far: the possibility to 
combine and nest different types of epistemic sociality in socio-technical epistemic 
system and processes. After outlining the central characteristics of ES
S





, I refer to socio-epistemological analyses on diversity and the 
distribution of epistemic labor in science and outline different key topics which I 
elucidate with examples from the Web and from science. As was the case in the other 
chapters, I conclude my analyses with some conclusions and recommendations 
concerning the analysis and design of socio-technical epistemic system that employ 
selection as a mechanism of closing socio-epistemic processes.  
In Chapter 12 I conclude this thesis by summarizing the key insights, outlining its limits 
and open up new possibilities for future research. While I hope to have shown the merits 
of my interdisciplinary approach throughout this thesis, I highlight some of the problems 
that it entails. Interdisciplinary research, especially if conducted by a singular epistemic 
agent, always entails the risk of falling short of interdisciplinary standards, because it 
needs to suffice several disciplinary standards at once. The disciplines touched in this 
thesis are philosophy, science and technology studies, as well as computer and 
information science. Even within each discipline one can get easily lost. Not to get lost 
in all of them makes it necessary to rigorously omit the vast majority of research within 
each field. I hope to have made wise choices in what to include and what to omit. Yet 




2 Social Software: A Cursory Introduction 
In the last years, certain developments in information and communication technologies 
(ICT) have received a great deal of attention not only within technological communities, 
but also in economic (e.g. Benkler 2002; Benkler 2006, Tapscott and Williams 2006), 
legal (e.g.Lessig 2001, Lessig 2006, Koepsell 2003, Gasser 2006, Palfrey and Gasser 
2008), or political discourses. (e.g. Sunstein 2002). Those developments I am referring 
to have been labelled social software, Web2.0, social media, or social web. In the 
following the terms are used interchangeably. 
As Luciano Floridi has noted, no clear definition concerning the scope or nature of 
social media or Web2.0 has been proposed yet (Floridi 2009). Most portrayals of social 
software rather list applications considered prime examples instead of defining the term. 
Some of the most well-known examples of social software are Wikipedia, a 
collaborative online encyclopedia; Delicious and CiteULike, as social bookmarking 
services; flickr.com and youtube.com as tools to share photos and videos, facebook.com 
and myspace.com, as general social networking sites, LinkedIn and Academia.edu, as 
social networking sites for business or academia. Given their focus on networking, 
sharing or collaboration, the sociality of these tools and applications should be self-
evident. However, also other tools, which are less obviously ―social‖ fall into the 
category of Web2.0 or social software. Recommender systems, employed on 
commercial websites like amazon.com, which suggest interesting products to users also 
harvest some form of ―wisdom of the crowd‖ by generating recommendations based on 
information obtained from multiple users. Further tools for peer-to-peer sharing of 
information or music also fall into the category of social software, such as Napster, 
Gnutella or filestube.com to use a more recent example.  
Social software is omnipresent these days with more and more applications and tools 
being developed each week. In their ubiquity, social software applications have a 
profound effect on many societal domains and as a consequence, numerous theoreticians 
from economy, law, education and politics such as the ones introduced above, have 
analyzed the relevance of social software in their respective domains. In contrast to this 
excessive engagement in those fields, the epistemological relevance of social software 
has only quite recently started to receive any attention. This thesis aims at filling this 
gap by providing a comprehensive theoretical framework for analyzing social software 
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from a socio-epistemological perspective. Social epistemology is a philosophical 
discipline dealing with ways and the extent to which knowledge is social and it forms 
the theoretical frame of reference for my analyses. The field of social epistemology is 
outlined in the second part of this thesis, whereas my own model is developed in the 
third part, but before turning to the theoretical framework, I start by introducing the 
phenomena that have ignited these analyses in the first place in some detail.  
At first I introduce some definitions of the terms Web2.0, social media or social 
software. I argue that no clear definition of this phenomenon has been provided yet. 
Hence I follow a diametrical approach by given examples instead of a definition to 
introduce the field. Given the overabundance of tools and the fast pace of developments, 
I do not aim at giving an exhaustive list. Instead I use several maps of social software 
that I found on the Web: various visualizations of the magnitude and variety of social 
software have been created by different people and I use them to give an idea about the 
scope of applications that fall into this category of software. After having opened up the 
field I narrow it again by restricting my focus to epistemic social software, i.e. social 
software whose primary purpose is epistemic. I depict some examples of such epistemic 
social software in more detail, namely Wikipedia, Delicious, InnoCentive and 
Recommender Systems. I have chosen these examples, because these systems 
paradigmatically depict different ways in which the social, the technical and the 
epistemic are entangled on the Web. Since I return to these examples in detail in Part 3 
again, their portrayal in this chapter remains rather cursory and descriptive.  
2.1 An Ill-Defined Success  
In a comparison between Web2.0 and Web3.0, Floridi notes that while Web3.0, also 
known as Semantic Web is a well-defined mistake, Web2.0 – or social software is an ill-
defined success. He states that Web 2.0 refers to a ―loose gathering of a wide variety of 
family-resembling technologies, services, and products‖ (Floridi 2009: 31). Nonetheless, 
he uses the Wikipedia definition of Web2.0 as a starting point for his analyse. The 
definition he cites reads as follows: 
―Web 2.0 concepts have led to the development and evolution of web-based 
communities and its hosted services, such as social-networking sites, video 
sharing sites, wikis, blogs, and folksonomies. The term became notable after 
the first O‘Reilly Media Web 2.0 conference in 2004. Although the term 
suggests a new version of the World Wide Web, it does not refer to an 
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update to any technical specifications, but to changes in the ways software 
developers and end-users utilize the Web. According to Tim O‘Reilly: ―Web 
2.0 is the business revolution in the computer industry caused by the move 
to the Internet as platform, and an attempt to understand the rules for success 
on that new platform.‖‖1  
Further Floridi cites O‘Reilly in defining Web 2.0 as, 
―the network as platform, spanning all connected devices. Web 2.0 
applications are those that make the most of the intrinsic advantages of that 
platform: delivering software as a continually-updated service that gets 
better the more people use it, consuming and remixing data from multiple 
sources, including individual users, while providing their own data and 
services in a form that allows remixing by others, creating network effects 
through an ―architecture of participation‖, and going beyond the page 
metaphor of Web 1.0 to deliver rich user experiences‖ (Floridi 2009: 31).  
At the time of writing this chapter, the same entry in Wikipedia to which Floridi referred 
reads quite similarly, although certain shifts are recognizable:  
―The term "Web 2.0" (2004–present) is commonly associated with web 
applications that facilitate interactive information sharing, interoperability, 
user-centered design, and collaboration on the World Wide Web. Examples 
of Web 2.0 include web-based communities, hosted services, web 
applications, social-networking sites, video-sharing sites, wikis, blogs, 
mashups, and folksonomies. A Web 2.0 site allows its users to interact with 
other users or to change website content, in contrast to non-interactive 
websites where users are limited to the passive viewing of information that 
is provided to them.
2
 
Reference to interactive and collaborative processes was strengthened and the definition 
now entails numerous examples, such as wikis, blogs, etc. When looking up related 
notions of social software, social media or social web on Wikipedia, the following 
definitions can be found. 
―Social software encompasses a range of software systems that allow users 
to interact and share data. This computer-mediated communication has 
become very popular with social sites like MySpace and Facebook, media 
sites like Flickr and YouTube as well as commercial sites like Amazon.com 
and eBay.‖3  
In the article on social software, the following types of social software are listed: instant 
messaging, text chat, Internet forums, blogs, wikis, collaborative, real-time editors, 
prediction markets, social network services, social network search engines, deliberative 
social networks, commercial social networks, social guides, social bookmarking, social 
                                                 
1
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_2.0, [date of access: 31.10.2008], quoted from (Floridi 2009: 31). 
2
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_2.0, [date of access: 11.01.2010]. 
3
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_software [date of access: 11.01.2010]. 
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cataloguing, social libraries, social online storage, virtual worlds as well as other 
specialized social applications, such as Project management and e-learning applications.  
Social media in turn has been defined as "a group of Internet-based applications that 
build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the 
creation and exchange of user-generated content" (Kaplan and Haenlein 2010). And the 
Wikipedia entry on social media further states that it is―media designed to be 
disseminated through social interaction, created using highly accessible and scalable 
publishing techniques. Social media uses Internet and web-based technologies to 
transform broadcast media monologues (one to many) into social media dialogues 
(many to many). It supports the democratization of knowledge and information, 
transforming people from content consumers into content producers.‖4 
Even without offering more definitions of Web2.0, social media and social software 
three things should be obvious. First, the terms Web2.0, social media and social 
software are clearly related, although they are not always conceived congruently. 
Secondly, the terms refer to similar tools and applications, although the fringes of what 
is considered Web2.0, social media and social software are fuzzy. Third, not only the 
fringes, but also the core of Web2.0, social media and social software remains vague. 
The most that can be said is that it is usually a multitude of epistemic agents that is 
interacting, sharing or co-producing content.  
Hence, Floridi seems to be right in stating that Web2.0 is ill-defined. But he also states 
that it is a success story, an appraisal that many theoreticians from a diversity of 
backgrounds share. What is the reason for the success of social software? And can this 
reason give us a hint at the specificities of social media even if no ―watertight list of 
necessary and sufficient conditions that should qualify something as Web 2.0‖ may be 
possible (Floridi 2009: 31)?  
2.2 A Matter of Family Resemblance 
Siding with Floridi that finding necessary and sufficient conditions to define Web2.0 
might indeed be impossible, I take a diametrical approach by providing examples of 
applications that are usually considered to be social media, social software or Web2.0. 
Given the abundance of tools that are available already and the speed by which new 
                                                 
4
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_Media [date of access: 11.01.2010]. 
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tools are being developed, I cannot deliver an extensive lists of applications. Instead, I 
depict several maps of social software applications that I have found on the Web by 
using a search engine. In these visualization, which were posted on personal blogs or on 
Flickr.com, an online photo management and sharing applications, people aimed to 
either give an overview over different types and examples of social software or to 
describe their own idiosyncratic usage of social software as a personalized map.  
 
Figure 1: Conversation Prism by Brian Solis
5
 
The first map above is the Conversation Prism, provided by Brian Solis and JESS3. As 
indicated by the title, conversation, the art of listening, learning and sharing forms the 
core of this map. They have classified Web2.0 into 22 types of applications. Some of the 
classes are defined by the type of content (e.g. music, video, pictures), some by the type 
of technology (e.g. blogs, wikis) others by a combination of types of actions and types 
                                                 
5
 http://www.briansolis.com/2008/08/introducing-conversation-prism/ [date of access: 10.02.2010] 
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of content (e.g. video aggregation), still others refer to temporal aspects (e.g. 
LiveCasting). Within each of the classes numerous examples of Social software are 
listed, such as Facebook or Hi5 as two examples of social networks, last.fm and Pandora 
as music platforms, etc.  
Another visualization I have chosen because it gives an overview over available tools is 
provided by Fred Cavazza. He also lists numerous examples but uses different 
classification system. Listing different social platform, he distinguishes four major 
functions of social media for classification: expressing, networking, sharing and gaming. 
Each of the four functions is then subdivided: For instance, expressing involves 
publication, discussion and aggregation; networking involves search, niche, business-to-
business, mobile and tools; sharing concerns either content, products or places. For 
gaming finally also five classes of games are distinguished.  
 
Figure 2: Social Media Landscape by Fred Cavazza
6
 
                                                 
6
 http://www.flickr.com/photos/fredcavazza/3428921418/ [date of access 10.02.2010] 
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Another visualization provided by Laurel Papworth and Gary Hayes lists the same tools 
as already shown in the previous two displays, but sort them along the dimensions of 
involvement, creation, discussion, promotion and measurement. 
 
Figure 3: The Social Media Campaign by Laurel Papworth & Gary Hayes
7
 
The next examples provide rather idiosyncratic maps of usage, in which the user is in 
the center and sorts those social media that he uses along different criteria. Frank Da 
Silva‘s map is organized around content (photos, videos), functions (search, 
bookmarking, mircoblogging), and type of application (blog, email). 
                                                 
7




Figure 4: My Cyber Social Map by Frank Da Silva
8
 
In the final example of a personalized map in which the user is central social media is 
sorted along the four actions of create, communicate, consume and connect.  
 
Figure 5: Personalized Map of Social Media by Mark Krynsky
9
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There are several reasons why I have portrayed several of these maps. First of all, all 
maps have in common that they show a plenitude of social software or Web2.0- 
applications that are available. However, they also differ in numerous respects. While 
some of them are idiosyncratic views describing personalized usage of different tools 
where the user is in the center, others rather provide a general overview. Moreover, the 
maps show that different classifications of such social software are possible depending 
on the dimensions emphasized. These classifications do not only differ in their 
granularity, they also use - and often confound - different criteria for classification: type 
of content, functions, types of underlying software, etc. Hence, there are numerous ways 
in splitting the field of social software or social media. The criterion which I have 
chosen to distinguish different types of social software concerns the question of whether 
their primary purpose is epistemic or not. 
2.3 Epistemic Social Software 
After having outlined the plethora of tools and applications that have been labelled 
social software of Web2.0, in the following section I narrow the focus again. Social 
software is used for numerous purposes: to connect to people one either already knows 
or wants to get to know; to communicate; to share information, music, pictures, videos, 
to create content collectively. Many of the purposes listed above have an epistemic 
dimension. Sharing information, creating an encyclopedia, finding collaborators for a 
research project are among the purposes that are clearly related to knowledge creation 
and dissemination. In some applications, such as dating platform or p2p-networks to 
share music, epistemic purposes may be less relevant.  
The focus of this thesis lies on social software whose primary purpose is epistemic, i.e. 
in which knowledge creation, dissemination or evaluation loom large. I have labelled 
them epistemic social software. I have chosen different examples of epistemic social 
software, which I depict in same detail below. These examples were chosen because 
they emphasize different socio-epistemic practices, different possibilities in which a 
multitude of users in interaction with each other and the technological infrastructure 
engage in the creation, dissemination or evaluation of epistemic content.
10
  
                                                                                                                                               
9
 http://lifestreamblog.com/tag/social-media/ [date of access: 10.02.2010] 
10
 My epistemological foundations, the definition of knowledge adapted, etc. is outlined in the second part 
of this thesis. For the moment it suffices to know that knowledge is a success term that depends on being 
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Put differently, I do not focus on all other aspects of social software, such as meeting 
new people for the sake of meeting new people, listening to music for the sake of 
listening to music, etc. The specification ―for the sake of‖ implies a caveat. Of course 
the distinction between social software whose purpose is primarily epistemic as opposed 
to those whose primary purpose lies in communication or networking or entertainment is 
somewhat artificial. Just taking a look at my own usage of social software reveals the 
difficulty of this distinction. Although facebook.com may be a primarily non-epistemic 
application, I frequently use it to ask colleagues and friends for recommendations on 
literature, methods or technical advice. This is the case because a substantial percentage 
of my facebook-friends are indeed people I know from my research. Another example is 
Skype, a voice over IP software. I use it to stay in touch with my parents, my partner and 
friends but also to coordinate research activities and communicate with colleagues. I use 
Delicious, a social bookmarking service, to save links for entertainment and information 
about Paris, cooking and hiking as well as links that are related to my research. I use it 
to save information for me personally, but also to share it with my colleagues by using a 
shared tag for content related to our research.  
These examples of my own idiosyncratic practices show that the usage of social 
software is not entirely prescribed by the software itself. Social software is mostly not 
designed to be purely epistemic or purely non-epistemic. Rather, the extent to which 
they are used for epistemic purposes depends on the users. This aspect of social software 
can be grasped with the term interpretative flexibility Pinch and Bijker 1987: people use 
social software for different purposes, they can appropriate it according to their needs. 
Hence the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic social software resides in the 
usage and not primarily in the design of the applications. Clearly, design plays a role 
because it makes it more likely that applications are used for one or another purpose. 
But in the end, usage depends on the users – and there probably is considerable variance 
in the usage of different tools between different users.
11
  
Despite these caveats, I think the distinction between tools who are primarily epistemic 
and those who are not is a useful on for the purpose of this thesis, because it enables to 
                                                                                                                                               
acknowledged to be knowledge by a community of knowers. Hence, knowledge only starts to exist when 
at least two people are engaged in the process. Nonetheless, individuals can produce epistemic content, 
which is a general term for intellectual products that may or may not have been vetted as knowledge. 
11
 The issue of appropriation, interpretative flexibility and the role of designers are discussed in more 
detail in the next chapter.  
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narrow the field and focus on relevant questions. In the following I depict some 
exemplary cases of epistemic social software in some detail. The examples I have 
chosen are Wikipedia, Delicious, Innocentive.com, and recommender systems, because 
they elucidate paradigmatic cases in which the social, the technical and the epistemic are 
entangled on the Web. In the third part of this thesis I develop a model to classify 
different social software applications and provide a theoretical framework for their 
analyses. I then return to these examples again and therefore their portrayal in this 
chapter remains rather descriptive.  
2.4 Prime Examples of Epistemic Social Software 
2.4.1 Wikipedia: Creating Content Together 
Wikipedia is one of the greatest success stories of the Web - and it is a prime example of 
epistemic social software. An army of more than 85.000 volunteers
12
 has provided a 
source of information that millions of people trust and use regularly in order to acquire 
knowledge on all sorts of topics. Taking a look at its self-description reveals its 
magnitude and main characteristics.  
―Wikipedia [...] is a multilingual, web-based, free-content encyclopedia 
project based on an openly-editable model. The name "Wikipedia" is a 
portmanteau of the words wiki (a technology for creating collaborative 
websites, from the Hawaiian word wiki, meaning "quick") and encyclopedia. 
[...] Wikipedia is written collaboratively by an international group of 
volunteers. Anyone with Internet access can write and make changes to 
Wikipedia articles. Users can contribute anonymously, under a pseudonym, 
or with their real identity if they choose.‖13  
According to their self-description Wikipedia attracts about 65 million visitors a month. 
At the time of writing this chapter, English-language edition of Wikipedia has 
11.639.040 registered users and consisted of 3.190.515 content pages, (19.416.335 
pages including talk pages, redirects, etc.) and 867,850 uploaded files.
14
 However, the 
English-language edition of Wikipedia is only the largest edition. Wikipedia exists in 
272 languages.
15
 Below you can find a screenshot of the start page of Wikipedia and 
                                                 
12
 Unless otherwise noted the information on Wikipedia is taken from its self-description available at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:About [date of access: 12.02.2010] 
13
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:About [date of access: 11.02.2010] 
14
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:Statistics [date of access: 11.02.2010] 
15
 http://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/List_of_Wikipedias [date of access: 11.02.2010] 
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further below some information about the size of the ten largest Wikipedia editions 
based on data from 2007. 
 




Figure 7: Article Count for the Ten Largest Wikipedias until 2007
17
 
                                                 
16
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page [date of access: 11.02.2010] 
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The technical basis of Wikipedia is a wiki. A wiki basically is a website that allows 
users to collaboratively create and edit web pages using a web browser. The first wiki 
has been developed by Ward Cunningham in the mid-nineties as a tool to support 
collaboration between programmers.
18
 He defined a wiki as ―[t]he simplest online 
database that could possibly work. Wiki is a piece of server software that allows users to 
freely create and edit Web page content using any Web browser. Wiki supports 
hyperlinks and has a simple text syntax for creating new pages and crosslinks between 
internal pages on the fly.‖19 
By now numerous wiki software applications exist and MediaWiki, the basis of 
Wikipedia, is just one of them. A main characteristic of a wiki is that multiple users can 
use it simultaneously to add or change content. As opposed to the temporal structure of 
blogs, wikis do not have such an intrinsic structure, but can rather be formed according 
to specific purposes. Hence the structure of Wikipedia is just one instantiation of a wiki.  
Two important features of Wikipedia are the history and the discussion sites which are 
linked to each website. The discussion page is allows to have conversation around the 
creation of content. By displaying the amount of controversy around an article, it can be 
used as another indicator to assess the quality of the information provided in the article. 
Via the history page, all revisions can be tracked and attributed to either registered users 
or the IP-numbers of unregistered users. Moreover, every change can be undone by a 
simple mouse click. These features of the history page are of particular importance for 
quality control on Wikipedia. Not only can errors be attributed to users, the ease of 
revision is also intended as a tool to counter vandalism, i.e. the intentional distortion of 
information on Wikipedia. Both the history and the discussion pages are an attempt to 
increase transparency about the production processes in Wikipedia.  
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 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Size_of_Wikipedia [date of access: 11.02.2010] 
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 http://c2.com/cgi/wiki?WikiHistory [date of access: 12.02.2010] 
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Figure 8: Screenshots of the History Pages of the Entry on “Knowledge”20 
The overarching goal of Wikipedia to provide a free-content encyclopedia that covers 
existing knowledge of the world. Attached to this notion of an encyclopedia, there are 
restrictions and specifications with respect to content allowed on Wikipedia. In specific, 
there are three core content policies: Neutral Point of View, Verifiability and No 
Original Research. 
The neutral point of view policy implies that ―[a]ll Wikipedia articles and other 
encyclopedic content must be written from a neutral point of view, representing fairly, 
proportionately, and as far as possible without bias, all significant views that have been 
published by reliable sources.‖21 The emphasis on reliable sources leads to the second 
policy, which concerns the verifiability of information. All articles should provide 
sources for their information and link to this source via citation. From an 
epistemological perspective it is interesting to note that ―[t]he threshold for inclusion in 
Wikipedia is verifiability, not truth—what counts is whether readers can verify that 
material added to Wikipedia has already been published by a reliable source (see 
below), not whether we think it is true.‖22 
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 http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Knowledge&action=history [date of access: 11.02.2010] 
21
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Neutral_point_of_view [date of access: 12.02.2010] 
22
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Verifiability [date of access: 12.02.2010] 
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Another less straightforward implication concerns the omission of original research. 
This aspect however, is directly linked to requirement of verification. Since only 
knowledge which can be verified by other sources should be included in Wikipedia, it is 
stated that ―[a]rticles may not contain any unpublished theories, data, statements, 
concepts, arguments, or ideas; or any new interpretation, analysis, or synthesis of 
published data, statements, concepts, arguments, or ideas that,[...] would amount to a 
"novel narrative or historical interpretation."
23
 
Wikipedia can be described as a large-scale collaboration of volunteers. However, while 
it is often claimed that everybody can participate, this participation is bound to some 
prerequisites: access to a computer and the Internet, technical skills, etc., and these 
prerequisites are clearly neither equally distributed within countries nor between them. 
Moreover, the large majority of users rather absorb information without actively 
contributing to the encyclopedia. Hence, openness is a matter of degree and while the 
entrance barrier for Wikipedia certainly is low, there are prerequisites which have to be 
met; there are skills and technologies that one needs to possess to be able to participate. 
Despite these caveats, the idea of open participation is a central characteristic of 
Wikipedia and implies that there is no screening or selection based on competency (or 
honesty): anyone with Internet access and the necessary skills can add, change or delete 
content on Wikipedia.  
The task structure underlying the collaboration in Wikipedia is highly modular and 
granular, i.e. consists of various subtasks of varying size. That is, people can undertake 
tasks of varying sizes and types depending on their interests as well as the time and 
effort they are willing to spend. They can provide detailed articles on topics they care 
about, just correct grammar or spelling mistakes, add some references or links or draw 
attention to problematic content. As Yochai Benkler has argued in his analyses of large-
scale peer-production of information and culture on the Web, the modularity and 
granularity of tasks is an essential factor for the success or failure of large-scale 
collaborations on a voluntary basis (Benkler 2002; Benkler 2006: 101f).  
Concerning the quality control mechanisms, Wikipedia also differs from traditional 
encyclopedia. In Wikipedia, there is no editorial board or other forms of pre-publication 
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review. Content is not vetted before being published. Instead, quality assessment in 
Wikipedia happens after publication. Since anyone can correct content, this post-
publication quality control resides again in the hands of the community of all Wikipedia 
contributors and not in a pre-selected board. On the one hand this means that there is a 
multitude of watchful eyes, but on the other hand there is no guarantee that an entry has 
been reviewed for accuracy. Since any saved change is instantly visible it is just as well 
possible that at the time of reading one finds and excellent article – or just blunt 
misinformation. 
This concept of open contribution and post-publication reviews has not been the initial 
model of quality assessment. Wikipedia is the successor of Nupedia, a system which 
was also intended as a comprehensive online encyclopedia, but had an elaborate system 
of peer review and allowed only scholars, i.e. qualified contributors to participate.
24
 This 
rigid system of evaluation had the consequence that in the three years of its operation 
only 24 articles were produced on Nupedia. Compare this to the statistics above 
according to which after three years, the English-language Wikipedia alone almost hit 
the mark of 1.000.000 articles. Hence one initial conclusion to be drawn from this 
comparison between Nupedia and Wikipedia is that Wikipedia has produced much more 
content by involving more people.  
However, from an epistemological perspective, size it not the only crucial criterion for 
assessing the merits of an encyclopedia, accuracy, the quality of information matters just 
as much. A central question therefore is whether Wikipedia provides accurate 
information. There have been several comparisons between Wikipedia and traditional 
encyclopedia. The comparison conducted by the journal Nature for instance has stirred a 
lot of debate around the comparative merits of Wikipedia and the Encyclopedia 
Britannica. One of the most important statements probably consist in the following 
quote: ―The exercise revealed numerous errors in both encyclopaedias, but among 42 
entries tested, the difference in accuracy was not particularly great‖ (Giles 2005: 900).  
Nature‘s methodology for the comparison consisted in sending entries either from 
Wikipedia or Encyclopaedia Britannica covering a broad range of scientific topics to 
reviewers. The reviewers were not told whether the article they received was from 
Wikipedia or the Encyclopaedia Britannica and had to analyze the number of major and 
                                                 
24
 All information on Nupedia from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nupedia [date of access: 11.02.2010] 
39 
 
minor mistakes in the articles. All in all 42 reviews were obtained which formed the 
basis for the statement above that at least when it comes to scientific content the 
―difference in accuracy was not particularly great‖ ‖ (Giles 2005: 900). At this point I do 
not want to get into the details of comparing Wikipedia with the Encyclopaedia 
Britannica beyond stating that since both of them contain errors, one should always use 
any work of reference with caution. The results as well as the methodology of the study 
have been hotly debated not only between Nature and the Encyclopaedia Britannica.
 25
  
Nonetheless, a crucial insight to be obtained from this study concerns the fact that 
Wikipedia works well on average. That means that most articles at most points of time 
deliver quite accurate information. It has been argued that the older the articles are, the 
more mature and reliable they are (e.g Tollefsen 2009). Given the dynamic nature of 
Wikipedia, however, there is no guarantee that no one has inserted blunt misinformation 
just before I access the entry.  
From a socio-epistemological perspective, Wikipedia is an interesting example of 
epistemic social software. And indeed, as is outlined in the second part of this thesis 
Wikipedia has been the social software application that has received most attention from 
epistemologists. The most crucial question that has been addressed concerned the 
validity of Wikipedia as a source of knowledge. In other words: can one trust Wikipedia 
to know? And if so, for what reasons? Different answers have been given to these 
questions (Magnus 2009, Tollefsen 2009, Wray 2009)
26
 and some of Wikipedia‘s critics 
keep insisting that one should not trust it at all (Waters 2007, Keen 2008). And indeed, 
many of the proxies that we usually use to assess the trustworthiness of information are 
missing: due to its openness, people can edit who would not be considered experts on 
the topic. And due to the anonymity of contributions we can neither assess the 
competency nor the honesty of contributors. The reason for trusting Wikipedia must 
thus be a different one than trusting a person. Later on I argue that the reason why 
people trust the content of Wikipedia is that they trust the processes of Wikipedia. It is a 
form of procedural trust, not a trust in persons. Many people may not know how 
Wikipedia works and trust it blindly. They may simply use the information on 
Wikipedia, because it is the first information that appears in their Google search results. 
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However, if people know how Wikipedia works and trust it, then they trust it because 
they attribute some epistemic authority, some trustworthiness to the process by which 
Wikipedia generates information. They do not trust specific persons; they trust 
Wikipedia as a system that is based on a distinct process of information provision. This 
process is characterized by a multitude of users that can edit and change information 
immediately combined with a mechanism to undo revisions easily and quickly as well as 
a system for tracking these changes and making them visible. It is a system enforcing 
open access with minimal entry barriers combined with mechanism of making editing 
patterns transparent.  
The rationale behind this openness of Wikipedia is scale. More people can provide more 
information faster. However, a second point is crucial: the more people scrutinize and 
can easily change content, the less likely it is that error and bias remains undetected. But 
there is no guarantee that error or bias gets detected. It is only more likely if a multitude 
of diverse people participate in this process. This is a probabilistic statement. Wikipedia 
provides a lot of information on many topics due to the multitude of volunteers. But if 
Wikipedia had not provided good information it would not be used to the extent it is 
used. On average, Wikipedia works well as a source of information. However, the 
problem lies exactly in the term on average. Since Wikipedia is a dynamic system, 
information can be changed by anyone anytime. Hence, there is no guarantee that the 
information provided at the moment one accesses Wikipedia is correct or a blatant lie. 
While Wikipedia might be trusted as a system because of certain characteristics, this 
overall trustworthiness does not help us to assess the trustworthiness of a specific claim 
in Wikipedia. This is the crux of statistical reasoning: it works well on average, but we 
can never be certain about a specific instantiation.  
To conclude, the benefits of Wikipedia are to provide enormous amounts of information 
in a cost-efficient and very fast way by taking advantage of a multitude of volunteers 
equipped with diverse skills and knowledge. Due to this diversity not only a broad range 
of topics can be covered. It is also more likely that topics are portrayed from multiple 
perspectives, in particular if the Neutral Point of View-policy is followed. And due to 
certain social norms as well as technical features of the platform (e.g. the history pages), 
Wikipedia has a quite high level of accuracy as well. The average reliability of 
Wikipedia articles is quite high, but the term average also implies an important 
disadvantage of Wikipedia. The combination of the dynamic character of Wikipedia 
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with the absence of a centralized control mechanisms and pre-publication quality control 
implies that there is no guarantee that for the quality of a specific article at any given 
point of time. Moreover due to the low entrance barrier and the possibility of 
anonymous contributions the system easily grows in scale, which has been necessary for 
the success of Wikipedia. However, the same criteria make Wikipedia quite vulnerable 
to system attacks – be they unintentional or intentional.  
Users may unintentionally cause harm by deleting information by mistake or by adding 
content they think is correct, but actually is not. However, incompetence is not the only 
problem. Dishonesty and bias is a major threat to Wikipedia. In 2007, a tool called 
WikiScanner received quite a lot of attention and media coverage. WikiScanner is a 
search tool that traces IP addresses of those who change Wikipedia entries 
anonymously. The tool was developed by Virgil Griffith, a graduate student at CalTech. 
Griffith says that the inspiration for this tool has been the revelation that the offices of 
Congress members had been editing their own Wikipedia entries (Borland 2007). He 
wanted to find out whether other companies and organizations also edit entries in ways 
that served their interests. And indeed, by tracking the IP addresses of anonymous 
editors, this tool unveiled that numerous organizations were editing Wikipedia articles 
anonymously in a way that served their particular interests. On his website, Griffith 
concludes: ―Overall - especially for non-controversial topics - Wikipedia seems to work. 
For controversial topics, Wikipedia can be made more reliable through techniques like 
this one‖.27 I return to Wikipedia as a prime example of epistemic social software at 
various instances in this thesis.  
2.4.2 Social Bookmarking: Sharing Information and Co-Creating 
Folksonomies 
Another example of epistemic social software are social bookmarking services, 
applications to store and share links with others. By now, numerous applications exist 
for different types of content.
28





, some on blogs, e.g. Technorati
31
, some on micro-content, e.g. Twitter
32
, and 
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still others target scientific content. Connotea
33
, for instance is a free online reference 
management and social bookmarking service for scientists created by Nature Publishing 
Group. CiteULike
34
 is a similar system sponsored by Springer. Both systems offer 
additional features that are useful for scientific work, such as exportability into software 
tool for managing bibliographies via Bib TeX files. One of the most well-known and 
earliest examples of a social bookmarking system, however, is Delicious.
35
 Hence, I 
have chosen Delicious to outline the basic characteristics of social bookmarking 
services.  
Delicious 
Delicious is a social bookmarking service that enables users to tag, save, manage and 
share web pages. By installing an extension into their browser (e.g. Firefox) users can 
save bookmarks not only on their local hard disk, but also on the Delicious servers. As a 
consequence, those bookmarks saved on Delicious can be accessed from any computer 
with Internet access. The user only has to log into the Delicious website at 
http://Delicious.com/. While increasing the accessibility of information and the 
flexibility of users, this characteristic alone would not render Delicious of socio-
epistemological interest. However, there are indeed two features of Delicious which are 
of socio-epistemic relevance: sharing of links and social tagging. Users are invited to 
share interesting links with others by making them public or sending them via Twitter or 
email to others. Moreover, by tagging their links, i.e. by adding key words to a link for 
later retrieval, users also co-create a bottom-up classification system of content while 
saving their personal bookmarks. Finally tagging itself can be used as a means to share 
content. One the one hand users can search for content with specific tags, i.e. I can 
search the links of all Delicious users by using a certain tag, such as ―epistemology‖, 
―Paris‖, or ―knowledge‖. One the other hand, using a common tag can also be used to 
collaboratively set up shared, decentralized databases of content with colleagues or 
friends. In the following I explain these different socio-epistemic aspects of Delicious in 
some detail.  
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Figure 9: Delicious Embedded in a Firefox Browser, Basic Functionalities 
Explicitly Sociality: Sharing content with others 
Since Delicious is a social bookmarking service, the private and isolated user of this 
software is invited to publish his bookmarks, to make his personal selection of 
interesting information available and accessible to others. This can be done in different 
ways. On the one hand, user can decide for each link that they save whether they want to 
make this link public to the whole Delicious-community of users. Another possibility 
lies in sharing content just with selected other users. Delicious offers the possibility to 
share links with selected others by using twitter, email or by notifying other Delicious 
users on their Delicious accounts. To actively retrieve links saved by others, users can 
search the public database of links and they can use the subscriptions and network 
features of Delicious.  
Hence, a crucial socio-epistemic benefit of social bookmarking systems consists in the 
sharing of information. For instance, someone interested in a certain topic, let‘s say 
philosophy of mind, can benefit from the bookmarks of someone who is an expert in the 
field. Instead of testing and assessing all possible websites available on this topic, he can 
rely on the previous assessment of someone he considers to be competent in the field. 
This process is similar to deference to authorities encountered in other social fields, such 
as science. Another option consists in using a keyword to search for links saved with 
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this keyword. Here, one is making use of the link collections of all Delicious-users to 
find certain information instead of screening the links of one particular person. 
Nonetheless, in both cases, information is shared.  
 
Figure 10 Delicious: Tagging and Sharing Content 
Implicit Sociality: Social Tagging and the Co-Creation of Folksonomies 
In addition to this invitation to share information with others, Delicious is of socio-
epistemic interest for a second reason. In saving bookmarks on Delicious, users co-
create bottom-up classification systems, often referred to as folksonomies. Luciano 
Floridi defines and explains folksonomies as follows: 
―A folksonomy, from ‗folk‘ and ‗taxonomy‘, is the aggregated result of the 
social practice of producing information (metainformation, to be precise) 
about other information (e.g. a photograph) through collaborative 
classification, known as social tagging (e.g. the photograph receives the tags 
―New York‖, ―Winter‖, ―Statue of Liberty‖). It works bottom-up, since it is 
left to the single individual user or producer of the tagged target to choose 
what to classify, how to classify it, and what appropriate keywords to use in 
the classification‖ (Floridi 2009). 
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Hence folksonomies are bottom-up classification systems that emerge from a process 
labeled social tagging. In general tagging refers to adding key words to content of the 
Web. Social tagging then refers to systems in which multiple users tag material. There 
are innumerous things that can be tagged on the Web: books (Amazon.com), articles 
(CiteUlike.org), pictures (Flickr.com), videos (Youtube.com), blogs (Technorati.com), 
short text messages (Twitter.com), music (last.fm). Tagging provides a mean to classify 
and categorize information for later information retrieval. In contrast to top-down 
classifications where categories are predefined into which material can then be sorted, 
tagging is a bottom-up approach. It is the users who choose the tags not from a fixed set 
of possibilities, but creates a free-text terms that they think classifies the content to their 
requirements. These tags may be semantically totally unrelated to the content and may 
still be completely reasonable. For instance, if you wish to make certain pictures on 
Flickr.com available only to your friends you may add a tag of random symbols such as 
&hrqait@ and tell this string to your friends. This way, they can access the pictures by 
using the string for their search.
36
 
Folksonomies have received a lot of attention especially in information science since 
they deliver an antidote to ontologies as top-down classification systems designed by 
experts. A lot of research has been conducted on comparing the folksonomies with top-
down approaches and different authors have emphasized either the advantages or the 
disadvantages of top-down and bottom-up approaches. For instance, while flexibility 
and scalability are some of the major advantages of folksonomies, problems may arise 
with inaccurate descriptions. Recently, in the library and information sciences, there 
have been attempts to combine both approaches to combine their merits (e.g. Hidderley 
and Rafferty 2006). Comparing different classification systems goes beyond the scope 
of this thesis. For the moment it is sufficient to acknowledge that folksonomies are an 
epistemic product that is the result of a social process. They are socially created 
classification systems which provide the basis for later information retrieval not only of 
the individual user who tagged the content, but also of other users of the system.  
On Delicious users tag other websites, i.e. the links that they store. Whenever users save 
a bookmark on their Delicious-account, they are informed not only about how many 
other community members have also saved this link. If the items you are tagging are 
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already tagged by someone else, Delicious will propose different tags for this website. 
More specifically, Delicious offers its users recommended as well as popular tags to 
classify their links. While the recommended tags are inferred from a user‘s own tags 
used to classify other links on Delicious, the popular tags are aggregated from the tags 
other Delicious-users have used for tagging the same Website. This means, that tags 
used by other users are recommended to you as possibilities to classify your own link. 
This example shows one way in which tagging on Delicious is social even if it is used 
for private archiving of links only. The moment people use popular tags to classify their 
content they make use of aggregated social information provided by other users. And 
even if they do not use these popular tags, their own tags will find their way back into 
the collaborative repository by being part of the pool of tags that may end up being 
recommended as popular tags to other users. Thus, even in its most solitary usage, the 
use of tags to store content on Delicious is a socio-epistemic process.  
Combining Tagging and Sharing: Common Tags & Shared Databases 
While it is possible to use tagging as a private means to classify information, to always 
refrain from using popular tags and to always click on the ―mark as private‖-button 
when saving a bookmark, Delicious mostly is used in more social ways. We have seen 
before that Delicious encourages the sharing of information in various ways. Not only is 
it possible to make one‘s links public and by such add them to the collaborative 
repository of related information, driven by personal interests and creative 
organization‖37, one can also send links via email or twitter-messages to friends and 
collaborators or save it for them on their Delicious account.  
However, another possibility directly related to the process of tagging is to share content 
by using a common tag. I am taking part in a research project called LiquidPub. It 
addresses the question of how Web2.0 technologies change or should change the way 
scientific knowledge is produced, disseminated, evaluated, and consumed.
38
 In this 
project we use Delicious as a tool to share links to interesting material related to the 
research topics of the project. By adding the tag ―liquidpub‖ to links that any participant 
of the research project saves on her Delicious account and considers relevant for the 
project a shared de-centralized database of links is created. This database is not only 
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visible to the project member, but to every Delicious-user, who types ―liquidpub‖ into 
the search field of his Delicious-account. Moreover, if other users, who are not part of 
the project, use the same tag ―liquidpub‖ their links will also be added to the database. 
This may be beneficial as well as detrimental. It is beneficial if this user uses the tag 
―liquidpub‖ to classify similar content and by doing this adds new material to the virtual 
database. However, if he uses the same tag for a different purpose, for instance to save 
and share information about pubs offering good beer for reasonable prices in central 
London, the utility of the tag for the research group will diminish. Especially if many 
people start using the tag ―liquidpub‖ for other purposes, the information related to 
scientific publishing will be drowned by the noise, i.e. information about bars in 
London. This example is not only an example for the social use of tagging. It also 
emphasizes the relevance of the specificity of tags.  
To conclude, Delicious as a social bookmarking service can serve as a prime example of 
epistemic social software. To reach different epistemic purposes (such as sharing, 
generating meta-data, creating classifications, etc.) it uses and combines various social 
mechanisms. Delicious uses aggregational mechanisms to recommend tags to its users 
and encourages them to share information with others via various modes. And I argue 
later on that it is this intelligent combination of different types of epistemic sociality that 
is characteristic of the most successful Web2.0 applications. Delicious primarily is a tool 
for sharing existing content, such as websites, blogs, movies or music. But en passant, 
Delicious users also create new epistemic content: meta-data and folksonomies are 
forms of second-order information that emerge as a by-product of social tagging. The 
next example of epistemic social software, Innocentive.com, however, is an example of 
a website which focuses exclusively on the creation of new knowledge: it is an ―open 
innovation marketplace‖.  
2.4.3 Innocentive.com: Finding the Problem Solver 
―If You Have a Problem, Ask Everyone‖ (Dean 2008). 
In the case of Wikipedia numerous people collaborate in creating an encyclopedia by 
compiling existing knowledge. Creating new knowledge is explicitly not the goal of 





 Delicious, focuses on sharing existing content, but creates epistemic 
content in form of folksonomies. InnoCentive, by contrast, explicitly aims at eliciting 
the creation of new knowledge.  
Innocentive.com was founded in 2001 with financial help of the pharmaceutical 
company Eli Lilly. The goal of this start-up was to harvest the potential of the Web for 
research and development (R&D). While primarily targeted at companies, 
Innocentive.com added a non-profit area in 2007. The idea behind Innocentive.com is 
quite simple. According to them there are in principle four ingredients necessary for 
innovation: problem seekers, problem solvers, some regulations on the interaction 
between problem solvers and problem seekers and a space where they can meet. 
Innocentive.com intended to become exactly this place were solvers and seekers meet 
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The problem seekers, called InnoCentive Seekers can be corporations, non-profit 
organizations as well as government bodies who offer an award for those that can solve 
their problem. InnoCentive Solvers are people who can solve these problems and will be 
rewarded. According to InnoCentive, there are currently 200,000 people in more than 
200 countries registered at InnoCentive as potential solvers. The awards offered range 
from $5,000 to $1 million
41
, while most awards range between $10,000 and $25,000. 
Whoever finds the best solution will be awarded with a financial reward. Sometimes 
more than one solution will be rewarded and the money will be split. By the time of 
writing this thesis 539 submissions have been awarded adding up to prize money of 
more than $4 million.
42
 The amount of money offered for a challenge differs with its 
complexity, the tasks involved and the criteria for successful resolution. And given the 
price span of $5,000 to $1 million these differences are indeed profound. There are four 
types of challenges: InnoCentive Ideation Challenges, InnoCentive Theoretical 
Challenges, InnoCentive RTP (Reduction to Practice) Challenges and InnoCentive 
eRFPs (electronic Request-for-Partners) Challenges.
43
  
An Ideation Challenge is a broad question formulated to gain new ideas, i.e. it functions 
similarly to a brainstorming and the submissions are usually only about two written 
pages. Examples of such Ideation Challenges were to find ideas for increasing the 
public transportation use to reduce greenhouse gases in Chicago or ideas to improve 
banking processes in the developing world. 
Theoretical Challenges are more complex and require a detailed solution of a problem. 
One example of a Theoretical Challenge for instance consisted in finding new methods 
to analyze consumer emotions, another one in developing a statistical approach to deal 
with the variability in blood glucose data collected during continuous glucose 
monitoring. For the analysis of consumer emotions only a detailed description of the 
solution was required, whereas for the statistical method a written proposal had to be 
amended by a source code.  
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Reduction to Practice Challenges are even more detailed and the problem solver needs 
to provide empirical data or physical samples to support his claims. Hence, an idea for a 
solution is not enough. Instead the solution must be validated by the problem solver and 
must succeed possible replication through the problem seekers. An example is the 
InnoCentive Challenge 9150435 ―Seeking a Stable Micro-structured System in High 
Ionic Strength Aqueous Pesticide Solution‖.44 To achieve the reward of $30,000 USD 
solvers need to provide a prototype that can be tested by the seekers before they release 
the reward.  
InnoCentive eRFPs (electronic Request-for-Partners) Challenges finally allow problem 
seekers to search for partners in solving a challenge. An example for such an eRFP 
Challenge is the InnoCentive Challenge 9028671 in which the problem seeker is 
―looking for a partner to purify an enzymatically active recombinant human protease‖45. 
Here solvers need to submit a proposal and after evaluation the seekers will decide 
whether they want to establish a collaborative partnership. 
The R&D focus of InnoCentive becomes obvious when taking a look at the disciplinary 
classification of challenges. Besides business & entrepreneurship challenges are 
classified into the categories of chemistry, computer science & IT, engineering and 
design, food & agriculture, life sciences, mathematics and statistics as well as physical 
sciences. Moreover, different partners offer Pavillons that are either named after these 
partners or after more general topics that they address. At the time of writing this thesis 
the following Pavillons were open: SAP Innovation & Technology, NASA Innovation, 
Nature.com Open Innovation, Developing Countries, Clean Tech and Renewable 
Energy, Global Health, Public Good and Citizens in Action.
46
  
But how and why does InnoCentive work? What is its socio-epistemological relevance? 
According to its self-description ―InnoCentive is a prime example of open innovation‘s 
crowd sourcing model, where product development costs shift from the enterprise to the 
market to benefit both.‖47 Hence, from a financial perspective InnoCentive is successful, 
because it saves companies costs. Since InnoCentive is based on a ―pay for 
performance‖-model this is a very low-risk environment for companies. It is the problem 
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solvers who have to advance the funds as well as their work power – and it entirely 
unclear whether they will earn any money from it. Such a model externalizes costs from 
the corporations - it shifts them from the seekers to the solvers. If that were the only 
market model, this would be a problematic development, especially if the preparatory 
effort is high. Nonetheless, since the participation is voluntary and given that economic 




What are the socio-epistemological reasons for the success of InnoCentive? What type 
of epistemic sociality is tapped with systems like Innocentive.com? That InnoCentive is 
involved in epistemic processes is obvious, even more obvious than in the previous 
cases. From all Web2.0 examples provided so far, InnoCentive is most directly related 
to epistemic questions, because it supports the creation of new knowledge. And in its 
focus on research and development, on science and engineering, InnoCentive is a 
platform that supports epistemic processes most closely related to those prevalent in 
science.  
But in what ways is InnoCentive socio-epistemic? As noted above, InnoCentive 
describes itself as a crowd sourcing model of innovation and clearly, some sort of 
wisdom of the crowds is used here to solve epistemic problems. In Part 3 of this thesis, I 
outline a comprehensive socio-epistemological model of epistemic social software and I 
return to InnoCentive in some detail. For the moment it should suffice to note that there 
are several characteristics of InnoCentive that are relevant from a socio-epistemological 
perspective because they shape the ways in which knowledge is created with 
InnoCentive.  
First of all, InnoCentive is a price-based system, in the sense that the winner takes it all. 
Although there may be several winners, it is necessary to come first to be rewarded. 
Once someone else has solved the problem, those come second to go away empty-
handed. This process inserts an element of competition into the epistemic process. 
Secondly, despite this focus on competition, it is in principle sufficient if one person or 
one team can come up with a solution to the problem posed. In that sense one may argue 
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 For the moment I also neglect the copyright and patenting issues involved in InnoCentive. Copyright 
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systems as many legal scholars have convincingly argued (e.g. Benkler 2006, Koepsell 2003) However, 
they go beyond the scope of this thesis.  
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that InnoCentive is not really an example of social software, because in the end, 
problems can be solved by individuals: cooperation and collaboration is possible, but it 
is not needed. Only InnoCentive eRFPs are explicitly targeted at enabling and 
supporting collaborations. If their scopes allow for it, all other challenges can, at least in 
principle be solved by individuals if a single person possesses all the skills necessary for 
solving the challenge. Especially for the less complex problem, such as the InnoCentive 
Ideation Challenges, individuals can participate and win the rewards on their own.  
However, even in this case InnoCentive is social, albeit social not in the sense of 
collaborative. It makes use of a pool of differently skilled people to find the one person 
that can solve a problem like a needle in a haystack. Taking another look at the statistics 
may reveal the sheer number and diversity of potential solvers that InnoCentive can tap: 
In February 2010 InnoCentive had more that 200.000 registered problem solvers from 
more than 200 countries. That the number is continuously growing becomes obvious in 
comparison to the data of December 2009, when they had ―only‖ registered 160.000 
solvers from 175 countries.
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Being able to tap such a large pool of people, means being able to solicit an incredible 
amount of abilities, skills and work power. Problems can be solved faster, if different 
people work simultaneously in different directions instead of one person trying out one 
alternative after the other. Moreover, the more people, the more perspectives on a 
problem are possible. Sometimes the initial framing of a problem may indeed hinder its 
solution, an effect known as incubation in psychological literature (e.g. Smith and 
Blankenship 1989). Indeed, finding someone who looks at a problem from a different 
angle is one of the main success factors of InnoCentive. If someone from a different 
background, with a different perspective approaches the same problem, it is quite 
unlikely that he will use the same methods. When organizations and companies open up 
their research problems to outsiders and offer money for this solution, they have 
probably already tried to solve the problem themselves and failed.
50
 One of the reasons 
                                                 
49
 These data were available on http://www.Innocentive.com/about-us-open-innovation.php in December 
2009. 
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 Of course they may also just have figured that it is cheaper to make a competition instead paying their 
own R&D department. Netflix, a DVD-rental service, for instance, opened up a competition for the best 
collaborative filtering algorithm to predict user ratings for films. They offered $1.000.000 for the best 
algorithm. While this sounds like a lot of money – and probably was for the team who won the prize, it is 
nonetheless nothing compared to Netflix‘s profit. For further information confer 
http://www.netflixprize.com/ [date of access: 15.02.2010].  
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for this continuous failure might be wrong starting assumptions, a wrong framing of the 
problem at hand. By contrast someone new, who is not polluted by this erroneous 
framing, might come up easily with a solution to the problem, simply by following an 
entirely different strategy. She might come up with a new idea, propose a different 
method, change different parameters and an insurmountable problem might turn out to 
be pretty simple. Or it might be still hard, but solvable.  
The insight that diversity can enhance creativity, problem solving and innovation is not 
new. It has been discussed endlessly in literature on knowledge and innovation 
management, in creativity classes and it is also the rationale behind interdisciplinarity in 
academia and elsewhere. It has even been argued that many scientific breakthroughs 
have been caused by a change of perspective, but looking at things differently, by using 
―novel methods of representation" (Toulmin 1953: 35). One of the most interesting 
recent accounts of diversity is Scott Page‘s formal analysis concerning the power of 
diversity in problem solving (Page 2007). The bottom-line of his argument is that 
cognitive diversity trumps ability when it comes to problem solving. Looking at things 
from a different angle, making use of different perspectives, heuristics, interpretations 
and predictive models makes problem solving easier. The main conclusion from this is 
that one should foster and encourage diversity. Cognitive diversity, different ways of 
seeing, interpreting and approaching problems are often crucial for innovation, for the 
creation of new knowledge, for the solving of epistemic problems. I return to these 
issues in Part 3 of this thesis. For the moment it suffices to know that systems such as 
InnoCentive make use of a multitude of diverse epistemic agents, some technical 
infrastructure and a rewards system to create new knowledge in a highly successful way. 
Hence, systems such as InnoCentive have a clear socio-epistemological relevance.  
2.4.4 Recommender Systems: Navigation Based on Advice 
―We are leaving the age of information and entering the age of 
recommendation‖ (Anderson 2006). 
In contrast to my previous three examples, Wikipedia, Delicious and InnoCentive, 
recommender systems are not a specific example of epistemic social software, but rather 
denote a type of technology embedded in many Web2.0 technologies. Recommender 
systems are currently a vivid field of research and there are numerous special issues, 
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conferences and workshops devoted to the topic.
51
 Hence, giving an overview over the 
field in just a short section is a futile task. However, given the ubiquity and socio-
epistemic relevance of recommender systems, they cannot be omitted from any socio-
epistemological analysis of the Web2.0. In the following I therefore outline some major 
aspects of recommender systems to the extent to which they are relevant for this thesis. I 
return to the topic in some detail in Part 3 of this thesis, therefore this section should 
only be considered as a primer to outline some basics of Recommender Systems (RSs). 
In defining what RSs are I turn to description offered on the website of the AMC 
Conference on Recommender Systems, one of the major conferences in the field. They 
describe RSs as ―software applications that aim to support users in their decision-
making while interacting with large information spaces. They recommend items of 
interest to users based on preferences they have expressed, either explicitly or 
implicitly.‖52 Recommender Systems are used on numerous commercial websites and 
are employed in various ways. The emails from Amazon.com reading ―Amazon.com has 
new recommendations for you based on items you purchased or told us you own‖ - are 
just one well-known example. Indeed, Amazon.com is not only one of the most well-
known examples, it has also been among the first Websites that has employed 
recommender systems quite soon after its establishment in 1995 (Schrage 2008).  
Given the increasing volume and complexity of information on the Web there seems to 
be an increasing need for tools that support the navigation through the information 
space, tools that offer advice on how to chose and distinguish the important from the 
unimportant, on how to search and find what is needed (Resnick and Varian 1997). 
Indeed, one of the strengths of recommender systems may lie in serendipity – in finding 
something one was not even aware that one needed it. As Jeffrey M. O'Brien notes, 
―[t]he Web, they say, is leaving the era of search and entering one of discovery. What's 
the difference? Search is what you do when you're looking for something. Discovery is 
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 There have been workshops at the European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI) 
(http://www.eccai.org/ecai.shtml), as well as different ACM Conferences on Recommender Systems 
(http://recsys.acm.org/2010/). Special Issues on Recommender Systems have for instance been provided 
by ACM Transactions (e.g. http://tweb.acm.org/RecSysSpecialIssue.html; 
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the International Journal of Electronic Commerce (http://portal.acm.org/toc.cfm?id=1278152). [date of 
access: 14.02.2010] 
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when something wonderful that you didn't know existed, or didn't know how to ask for, 
finds you.‖ (O'brien 2006).  
Types of Recommender Systems 
In an state-of-the-art report on recommender systems, Adomavicius and Tuzhilin note 
that two of the reasons why there has been so much work on recommender systems in 
industry as well as in academia during the last years is that it not only is a problem-rich 
research area, but also a field with numerous practical applications (Adomavicius and 
Tuzhilin 2005). Being aware that the field has flourished since then, their basic 
classification of recommender systems into content-based, collaborative filtering and 
hybrid approaches nonetheless seems still valid. However, in addition to this 
classification, there is one more recent development in the field of recommender 
systems that is of crucial relevance for this thesis: trust-based or trust-aware 
recommender systems. Before I turn to those RSs that exploit trust relationships between 
users, let‘s first take a brief look at the basic features of classical RSs. 
As noted before, RSs suggest items to users of a system that he or she might be 
interested in. The problem that RSs therefore face consists in estimating the he utility of 
items for users that they have not yet assessed. Sticking to the example of Amazon.com, 
RSs should suggest a book to a user that she has not read yet, but will like. The utility of 
items is mostly represented by ratings: a much liked book is a book that has received 
high ratings from a user; a book that should be recommended is one that would receive 
high ratings had the reader read it already. RSs then extrapolate from a user‘s ratings of 
items he knows to items he does not know. Selecting the highest-rated items from those 
unknown items then results in the list of recommendations.  
This extrapolation can be done in various ways and numerous different algorithms have 
been proposed. One classic classification of different methods of RSs distinguishes 
content-based from collaborative filtering methods. While in content-based RSs users 
are recommended items similar to the ones the user preferred in the past; collaborative 
filtering techniques recommended items that people with similar tastes and preferences 
liked in the past (Adomavicius and Tuzhilin 2005, Balabanovi and Shoham 1997). 
Hence, content-based methods calculate similarities between items, whereas 
collaborative filtering techniques calculate similarities between users.  
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As the name states, content-based RSs depend on a characterisation of the content of 
items and of user profiles expressing interests in specific content. The users preferences 
can either be learned explicitly, e.g. by a questionnaire asking for favorite books, or 
implicitly by tracking the behaviour of the user, e.g. which books she has bought, which 
articles she has read, downloaded, forwarded, etc.. The users profile is then compared to 
the characteristics of items the user does not know yet and those items with the highest 
degree of similarity are then recommended to the user. Since this match is calculated 
based on the features of an item, RSs need a representation of these items. For textual 
material, this representation can be created automatically.
53
 However, for non-textual 
material, such as video or music, this representation needs to be created manually and is 
therefore ―expensive, time-consuming, error-prone and highly subjective‖ as (Massa and 
Bhattacharjee 2004) summarize. Besides these limitations concerning non-textual 
material, content-based mechanisms are characterized by two additional problems: 
overspecialization and the new user problem – also known as the cold start problem. 
Overspecialization refers to the fact that one of the main benefits is one of the main 
limits of content-based recommendations: the focus on similarity. Users can only get 
recommended things that are similar to those they have already assessed. Hence the 
chance of useful serendipity tends towards zero. And if similarity is the main criterion, 
the recommendations may also be too close to the originally rated items, a problem 
which becomes obvious when considering its application to similar news articles 
featuring the exact same incident. Hence, the aspect of newsworthiness gets neglected in 
such systems. A final problem concerns the so-called cold start problem: for new users 
the system has difficulties making good recommendations because the user‘s 
preferences are not yet learned by the system. However, this last problem also exists 
with collaborative-filtering RSs. 
Collaborative filtering techniques form the core of this section not only because they are 
more widespread by now. The term collaborative also indicates that they may be of even 
greater socio-epistemological interest. And indeed, since collaborative filtering 
techniques predict the utility of items for a user based on items rated by other users, they 
exploit of social mechanism for epistemic purpose and are therefore an important 
example of epistemic social software. The term filtering in collaborative filtering RS 
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refers to the process of making predictions and as such filter information whereas the 
term collaboration refers to the fact that the filtering is based on information (ratings of 
items) obtained from many users. Collaborative filtering techniques do not consider the 
content of items, but only the ratings they have received from a community of users. 
Hence, they are not confined to textual content, but can just as well be applied to music, 
videos, pictures, etc. The basic process consists in two steps. neighbours formation and 
ratings prediction (Massa and Avesani 2006). That means that in order to make 
predictions for a user, collaborative filtering algorithms first need to find like-minded 
users with similar tastes as the targeted user. These like-minded users are called 
neighbours and the algorithm has to compute a similarity coefficient, i.e. a quantitative 
indicator of the degree of similarity between the users. In a second step the rating that a 
user would give to an unknown item are predicted using the ratings of her neighbours 
weighted by the similarity coefficient. The more similar a user is the higher is his weight 
in the calculation of the prediction.  
As noted before, collaborative filtering techniques have the advantage of being 
applicable to non-textual material. Moreover, they do not suffer from the problem of 
overspecialization (Adomavicius and Tuzhilin 2005). However, they come with some 
problems of their own. First of all, collaborative filtering techniques share the cold-start 
problem with content-based systems: when a new user enters the system and the systems 
does not know anything about the user‘s preference no useful predictions can be made. 
The same problem occurs when a new item is introduced into a system: as long as it has 
not been evaluated by some users it cannot be recommended. Two additional problems 
are sparseness and vulnerability to attacks (e.g. Massa and Bhattacharjee 2004). 
Sparseness refers to the percentage of empty cells, the lack of overlap between users that 
is particularly high in newly established databases. Vulnerability to attacks refers to the 
question of how easy it is for malicious users to sabotage the recommender systems. 
Numerous hybrid RSs have been proposed that try to combine the benefits from both 
content-based and collaborative filtering technologies while trying to minimize the 
technical pitfalls of both. (Adomavicius and Tuzhilin 2005: 740) distinguish four ways 
in which content-based and collaborative filtering techniques can be combined:  
―1. implementing collaborative and content-based methods separately and 
combining their predictions, 
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2. incorporating some content-based characteristics into a collaborative 
approach, 
3. incorporating some collaborative characteristics into a content-based 
approach, and 
4. constructing a general unifying model that incorporates both content-
based and collaborative characteristics.‖54 
Trust-Aware Recommender Systems 
Hybrid RSs, combining content-based and collaborative filtering techniques in various 
ways are one possibility to counter shortcomings of each type. However, there are other 
possibilities as well. One line of development that is of particular interest from a socio-
epistemological perspective are RSs that make use of interpersonal trust-relationships 
between users. Different models have been proposed on how to incorporate 
interpersonal trust into recommender systems. In a tutorial on ―Using Social Trust for 
Recommender Systems‖ 55 delivered for the ACM Recommender Systems conference in 
2009 Jennifer Golbeck portrays four trust-based algorithms: Advogato by Levien 
(Levien and Aiken 1998), Appleseed by Ziegler and Lausen (Ziegler and Lausen 2004), 
MoleTrust by Massa and Avesani (Avesani, Massa et al. 2005, Massa and Bhattacharjee 
2004) and TidalTrust, Golbeck‘s own model (Golbeck 2006; Golbeck and Hendler 
2006). In the following I focus on the works of Paolo Avesani, Bobby Bhattachcharjee 
and Paolo Massa to briefly explain the basic ideas behind trust-based recommender 
systems.  
Trust-based or trust-aware recommender systems change one crucial aspect: instead of 
letting users rate items, users have to rate other users to bootstrap the system. This 
seemingly minor change indeed has a major impact on guidelines of recommender 
systems design. To elucidate the characteristics of trust-aware RSs, I focus on the 
process of bootstrapping, a term used to describe procedures to counter the cold start 
problem. When a new user enters a system the system does not ―know‖ anything about 
this new user and this ignorance makes it difficult to generate appropriate 
recommendations for her. To counteract this problem, traditionally new users were 
asked to rate a few items so that the system can ―learn‖ something about the user in 
order to provide personalized information on interesting items for her. However, 
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especially in large databases necessary correlations are scarce and thus, this procedure 
often turns out to be quite ineffective. In consequence, Paolo Massa and Bobby 
Bhattachasjee developed an algorithm for ―Trust-aware Recommender Systems‖ and 
argue that the before mentioned problems ―can effectively be solved by incorporating a 
notion of trust between users into the base CF [collaborative filtering] system‖ (Massa 
and Bhattacharjee 2004). The difference between traditional RSs and trust-aware RSs is 
quite simple: ―[w]hile traditional RSs exploit only ratings provided by users about items, 
Trust-aware Recommender Systems let the user express also trust statements, i.e. their 
subjective opinions about the usefulness of other users‖ (Massa and Avesani 2006). This 
seemingly minor change proves to be highly effective to remedy the shortcomings of 
traditional RSs especially with respect to the cold start problem because ―it is able to 
exploit trust propagation over the trust network by means of a trust metric‖ (Massa and 
Avesani 2006).  
From a socio-epistemological perspective, this shift from rating items to rating users is 
highly significant: instead of rating content directly, users use evaluative social 
information about other users as a filter to predict the quality of content. In other words, 
content information (the quality or interestingness of an item) is predicted by making 
use of social information about the competency of other epistemic agents. I argue that 
this entanglement of social and content information is a crucial characteristic of many 
Web2.0 applications, an insight that is instrumental for the development of my socio-
epistemological framework in Part 3.  
2.5 Conclusions  
In this chapter I have very briefly introduced the empirical basis of this thesis: epistemic 
social software. I have depicted different examples of such epistemic social software in 
some detail: Wikipedia, Delicious, InnoCentive and Recommender Systems. The 
commonality between the different systems portrayed is that in each case a multitude of 
epistemic agents is involved in epistemic tasks: users create an encyclopedia or 
classifications systems, they search for information, share links or references, they even 
create scientific knowledge. Each system exploits epistemic sociality; it utilizes a 
multitude of users for epistemic purposes and goals. But as I argue in Part 3 in more 
detail, the systems exploit different types of epistemic sociality.  
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This introduction was necessary to give an overview over the types of applications 
addressed in this thesis, to introduce the empirical occurrences that have stirred the 
analyses which are depicted in the next chapters. However, this introduction has been 
rather cursory. I have remained rather descriptive and only hinted at the socio-
epistemological relevance of epistemic social software. There are the following reasons 
for this proceeding. First of all, to apprehend epistemic social software in a form that 
goes beyond a mere description of functionalities, a theoretical framework is needed. I 
have proposed to use social epistemology as a frame of reference. Hence, I need to 
introduce the field of social epistemology before being able to provide a socio-
epistemological analysis of epistemic social software. This task is fulfilled in the second 
part of this thesis, where I outline major theories within social epistemology and assess 
their utility for the assessment of epistemic social software. However, one result of these 
analyses can be forestalled: so far social epistemology has only insufficiently addressed 
the role of technologies for socio-epistemic practices. Hence, to analyze epistemic social 
software, I need to augment my theoretical framework with insights from a different 
field to shed some light on the interplay between the social, the technical and the 
epistemic, which is so characteristic for epistemic social software. The field that 
appeared to be most appropriate to this respect are Science and Technology Studies 
(STS). Hence, before turning to social epistemology, I make a brief detour through the 
field of STS. Insights from both STS and social epistemology are fed into the 
development of my own socio-epistemological model for analyzing epistemic social 
software in Part 3. 
61 
 
3 Epistemic Social Software as Socio-Technical Epistemic 
Systems 
In the previous chapter I have introduced various examples of social software and 
outlined my focus on epistemic social software. Consistent with ordinary language 
usage, I have often talked about software, tools or applications when referring to 
Wikipedia, InnoCentive, social bookmarking services or recommender systems. In this 
chapter, I want to correct my own terminology. I argue that instead of tools, applications 
or software, the examples I have depicted should better be understood as socio-technical 
epistemic systems consisting of multiple human and non-human agents who interact for 
various epistemic purposes. To support such an understanding of social software as 
socio-technical system comprising of entangled, heterogeneous agents I take a brief 
detour through the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS). After outlining the 
field and depicting some of the main approaches I draw some conclusions on the status 
of epistemic social software. The insights I take from STS to characterize epistemic 
social software as socio-technical epistemic systems are clustered around the following 
topics: the entanglement of the social, the technical and the epistemic; the relationship 
between human and non-human actors; a performative understanding of epistemic 
practices and systems; the relationship between values and technologies. In particular, I 
argue that epistemic social software is a term to denote systems in which social, 
technical and epistemic aspects are deeply entangled. These systems consist in networks 
of human and non-human agents. Both human and non-human agents are of equal 
importance for the functioning of the systems, but they differ with respect to the 
question of intentionality and reflexivity. In other words, only human agents can be 
made responsible and accountable for their actions and hence a difference between 
human and non-human agents needs to be made. During their development of socio-
technical epistemic systems different values are necessarily inscribed into them. Such a 
valuing of systems in unavoidable, because each decision in developing systems in based 
on certain epistemic and societal background assumptions. Despite their unavoidability, 
such processes need to be made transparent and monitored because such embedded 
values can retroact on societal values in general by either reinforcing or degrading them. 
Finally, socio-technical epistemic systems are not closed systems. Instead they develop 
and change through practices. Despite the relevance of programming decisions, users 
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can to varying degrees appropriate and change systems through their own practices. 
From a normative perspective, these insights imply that although to varying degrees, 
designers and developers as well as users need to be made responsible and accountable 
for the decision they make and the actions that take. 
3.1 STS: A Very Brief Overview 
STS is used as the abbreviation for different terms. It sometimes stands for ―Science and 
Technology Studies‖, but is also used for ―Science, Technology and Society‖, or ―Social 
Studies of Science and Technology‖ (Van House 2003). In the following I do not 
differentiate between these notions, since it is the abbreviation STS which is most 
commonly used to describe the field of research analyzing the intersection between 
science, technology and society. 
The roots of STS lie in various fields, such as history, philosophy and sociology of 
science and technology, anthropology, cultural studies, critical theory, feminist theory 
and gender studies, with each discipline approaching the field of science and technology 
in its relation to society with its own methodological and theoretical toolkits. STS is 
often considered to be a part of the more general term science studies, which focus on 
the analysis of scientific knowledge, i.e. theories, methods, evidence, etc as social 
phenomena. In doing this, science studies put emphasis on practices and artifacts as 
opposed to a history of ideas or reflection of theoretical concepts as characteristic of 
many approaches in philosophy of science. Moreover, science studies primarily focuses 
on scientific content as opposed to the institutions, processes, the norms and 
participants in science, which were of central interest for the sociology of science as 
exemplified by the works of Karl Mannheim (Mannheim 1936) or Robert K. Merton 
(Merton 1973). 
In an extensive review about the state of the art of STS and its relevance for information 
studies, Nancy van House states that STS‘s ―primary concern is the mutual constitution 
of the technical and the social‖ (Van House 2003: 4). She argues that STS might be 
instructive for information studies in understanding two major issues. One the one hand, 
STS according to Van House can be a ―[...] source of generative understandings of 
knowledge and knowledge communities, processes, practices, artifacts, and 
machineries‖, in which knowledge is considered to be ―[...] situated, social, shared, 
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multiple, distributed, and embodied‖ (Van House 2003: 70). On the other hand, STS is 
useful in understanding information systems and technology as ―[...] socio-technical 
systems, ensembles of materials, machines, people (users, designers, operators, 
contributors, and others), practices, representations, understandings, categorizations, and 
other components , interacting with and mutually constituted by one another‖ (Van 
House 2003: 72).  
These quotes should be sufficient to explain my interest into STS given the topics of this 
thesis. Considering the goal of this thesis to analyze the epistemic relevance of epistemic 
social software any theory that stresses the relationship between the social, the technical 
and the epistemic is clearly of high relevance. And since van House connects STS even 
directly to information and communication technologies, her review has served as a 
great starting point for my explorations concerning the relevance of STS for the 
questions of my thesis. However, in my portrayal I go beyond the approaches introduced 
by van House. Hence, in the following I briefly portray the major approaches in the field 
of STS as well as two extrapolations with crucial relevance for my analyses: feminist 
STS as well as research on Values in Design (VID).  
In this section I do not aim at providing any comprehensive introduction to the field of 
STS. Rather I focus on crucial insights concerning the relationship between the social, 
the technical and the epistemic to the extent to which they are relevant for the question 
of my thesis. For those interested in more in-depth portrayals of STS and related fields, I 
can only link to some central publications. A good starting point for any analysis on the 
intersection between the social, the technical and the epistemic is ―The Science Studies 
Reader‖ edited by Mario Biagioli (Biaglioli 1998), which comprises numerous 
important articles in the broader field. Two seminal edited books, which mark the birth 
of STS as a field, are Bijker, Hughes et al. (Bijker, Hughes et al. 1987) and Mackenyie 
and Judy Wajcman (Mackenzie and Wajcman 1999). Specifically for Actor-Network-
Theory (ANT), please confer Latour‘s introduction to Actor-Network-Theory 
―Reassembling the Social‖ (Latour 2005) as well as (Law and Hassard 1999). John Law 
also provides an extensive amount of information on ANT on the 
Web[http://www.lancs.ac.uk/fass/centres/css/ant/antres.htm]. Ilyes has provided an 
extensive overview of the current state of the art of the international STS debate (Ilyes 
2006). For possible applications to information studies the ARIST chapter by Nancy von 
House is invaluable (Van House 2003).  
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3.1.1 Social Shaping of Technology (SST) 
One of the first approaches to assess the relationship between society and technology 
within what later was construed as STS was labeled Social Shaping of Technology 
(SST). As seemingly is the case for all abbreviations and labels in STS, there are 
different understandings and interpretations of the label SST. Some authors conceive 
SST as an umbrella term for all social studies of science and technology, which includes 
also the Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) and Actor-Network Theory (ANT) 
(Williams and Edge 1996). Others clearly separate SST from SCOT and ANT and 
depict it as a distinct approach (Van House 2003). In the following, I continue using STS 
as the umbrella term for studies on the relationship between science, technology and 
society. SST is used as the abbreviation for ―Social Shaping of Technology‖ as a distinct 
approach which was instantiated with MacKenzie and Wajcman‘s book ―The Social 
Shaping of Technology: How the Refrigerator got its hum‖ (Mackenzie and Wajcman 
1999). In the following I briefly portray the some main characteristics of SST and draw 
some conclusions concerning the topics of this thesis. I then introduce SCOT and ANT 
in the next two sections, assuming that they can best be regarded as extrapolations or 
critical responses to central claims in SST.  
SST as introduced by MacKenzie and Wajcman (Mackenzie and Wajcman 1999) set out 
to undermine two prevalent assumptions about technology: the value neutrality of 
technological artifacts and technological determinism. A classical example of such 
assumed value-neutrality of technology would be to argue that it is not weapons that kill 
people, but those who use the weapons. Accordingly, it is argued, the weapon itself is 




Technological determinism usually refers to two claims. First, it describes the conviction 
that technology develops from forces within technology, that it follows an inner-
technological teleology. Such a view has been predominant not only in sociological 
analyses of technology, but also in the field of technology assessment as well as in 
popular literature on technology for a long time (Wajcman 2002, cited from Van House 
2003). Secondly, if such technological determinism is embraced, any social analysis of 
technology can only be an analysis of the impact of technology on society. Since 
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technology unfolds according to its own inner rationale, society simply has to deal with 
these technological changes and the role of any analysis of technology is to prepare 
society do deal with those changes in the best possible ways.
57
  
Hansen and Clausen argue that SST was a response to such ―[...] techno-economic 
deterministic understandings of the relations between technology and society‖ and that 
instead of buying into economic or technological determinism SST stressed the ―[...] 
social choices involved in the co-evolution of technology and society‖ (Hansen and 
Clausen 2003: 431). Thus, instead of considering technology development and 
technological change as of being driven by technology itself, SST views technology as 
the outcome of social negotiations between a diversity of different agents and 
stakeholders. As Williams and Edge argue, ―SST studies show that technology does not 
develop according to an inner technical logic but is instead a social product, patterned by 
the conditions of its creation and use. Every stage in the generation and implementation 
of new technologies involves a set of choices between different technical options.‖ 
(Williams and Edge 1996: 366). In denying technological determinism, SST also tried to 
change the exclusive focus on the social impact of technology. Instead, by disclosing the 
social forces which played a role in technology development, SST shows, that it is 
possible to change the course of technology through negotiations instead of fatalistically 
just dealing with consequences of uncontrollable technological progress. 
Despite many criticisms around early forms of SST, which have been discussed in the 
last about three decades, there are four major points, I consider important to understand 
the relationship between the technical and the social. First of all, SST has to be 
applauded for disclosing and criticizing technological determinism and for remedying 
the exclusive focus on the impact of technology onto society by highlighting 
negotiations that take place during the development of technological artifacts. Thus, 
society is not only understood as something to be influenced by technology, but 
something that has an impact onto technology as well. In the course of technology 
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design and development, decisions have to be made at various stages. For instance, 
when developing recommender systems, different algorithms are possible and different 
algorithms have different effects. Hence, putting emphasis on the different societal 
values that are embedded into technologies and the interactions that take place in the 
course of their development surely is a crucial insight to be obtained from SST. 
However, SST, especially in its early forms was often accused of just having replaced 
one form of determinism -technological determinism - by another one, namely social or 
political determinism.
58
 In their effort to show that technologies do not develop 
according to some inner-technological trajectories, proponents of SST have neglected if 
not negated any dynamics of technology development from within or some form of 
technological momentum (Hughes 1983). However, certain technological changes can 
indeed trigger other technological developments, even if this process might be mediated 
by economic or political forces. Thus, analyses of technology development should 
always take into account that what gets developed, by which means and to which ends 
always depends on a complicated arrangement of social, political, economic and 
technological forces instead of being purely technologically or socially determined.  
A second, related criticism concerns SST‘s almost exclusive focus on the process of 
technology development as opposed to its usage. This view overemphasized the role 
developers and designers play in deciding upon the usage of artifacts and tools, while 
neglecting the possibility of re-interpretation and appropriation through users. It is 
especially this issue of interpretative flexibility that is a central point of critique brought 
forward by proponents of the social construction of technology (SCOT) (Pinch and 
Bijker 1984). However, I think that SST‘s focus on the process of technology 
development and the role of designers and developers remains crucial, even if 
appropriation and re-interpretation is possible and an important topic for analysis as 
well. After all, technologies come with affordances and limits of use. Thus, even though 
you might use a gun as a hammer or a club, firearms undeniably have changed the terms 
of lethal combat (cf. Kling 1992, quoted after Williams and Edge 1996). 
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 Langdon Winner‘s statement that "[w]hat matters is not the technology itself, but the social or economic 
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This issue of affordances and the possibility of unintended usage is also crucial for my 
analyses of different software algorithms later on. Although I am not denying the 
possibility of appropriation, this process not only becomes harder the more hidden 
technological decisions are (as often is the case for algorithms). Moreover, 
overemphasizing the possibility of appropriation takes away the responsibility from 
technology designers and software developers to think about the possible consequences 
their tools may have for different social groups. And this impact might indeed differ 
significantly. For instance, while it might be easy for someone who is technologically 
literate to bypass defaults set by information system developers, other users who are less 
experienced are much less likely able to subvert the software and hence are much more 
affected by decisions made by others. These users may not even be aware that there are 
different ways of writing a search algorithm, leading to different results and that some 
programmer – or a team of them, must have made a decision about the algorithms they 
employ.  
Hence, one of the major lessons to learn from SST is that technologies are not neutral in 
the sense that all depends only on usage. Tools and artifacts come with affordances and 
limits and this is where the developers play a crucial role. In the development process, 
developers intentionally or unintentionally inscribe their epistemic as well as other 
societal values into the systems. And those values have impacts on the users, for 
instance by filtering information for users. Even if tools can be used in completely 
differently ways than intended by their developers, it would surely go too far to assume 
that engineering decision are without consequences.  
I return to these thoughts below in the section devoted to Values in Design. For the 
moment it suffices to note that if all was a matter of usage and programming decisions 
were irrelevant, there would be no use in providing normative standards for the 
development of software. And in this extreme sense, talking about appropriation and 
interpretative flexibility certainly does not make sense and leads to serious problems for 
normative approaches. Thus, although other approaches rightly insist on the role of the 
users (e.g. Oudshoorn and Pinch 2005a) and on the possibility of appropriation and even 
guerilla tactics, SST might remind us that programming decision and thus the role of the 
developers are crucial for pre-selection, for making choices, for drawing the boundaries, 
for defining the limits and affordances of technologies.  
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This leads us to a third important aspect of SST. Opening up the black-box of 
technology development by showing that choices were made and that different social 
agents played a role in this process, opens up the possibility that different technologies 
could have been developed if other decisions had been made. And this also means that 
for future technological developments different directions are possible depending on 
who is in the position to decide upon them.  
Finally, SST has been relevant in its attempt to overcome a dichotomous understanding 
of technology and society, an insight also crucial for my own analyses. Social and 
technological elements are understood as intertwined in their development and usage. 
However, this dissolution of the technical-social dichotomy is not unique to SST, but 
also characteristic of other STS approaches. While Bijker refers to socio-technical 
ensembles (Bijker 1995 242), John Law uses the term heterogenous networks (Law 
1992/2001), and the actor-network consisting of multiple human and non-human actants 
is the main unit of analysis in ANT (Latour 2005).  
3.1.2 Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) 
The ―Social Construction of Technology‖ (SCOT) approach can be regarded as an 
extension of Social Shaping of Technology as portrayed in the last section. Thus SCOT 
shares many of the claims of SST as well as much of the received criticism. Together 
with Actor-Network-Theory (ANT), SCOT is one of the two most prolific successors of 
SST. SCOT shares SST‘s critique of a linear model of technology development, which 
starts from basic research and then sequentially continues through applied research, 
development and commercialisation. Furthermore, it also stressed the processes of 
negotiations that take place between various social agents in the process of technology 
development. 
As indicated by its name, SCOT is a social constructivist theory about technology 
development. It was introduced by Trevor J. Pinch and Wiebe E. Bijker in their seminal 
paper ―The Social Construction of Facts and Artifacts: Or How the Sociology of Science 
and the Sociology of Technology Might Benefit Each Other‖ (Pinch and Bijker 1987). 
In this paper, the authors show their proximity to the sociology of scientific knowledge 
(SSK), especially the Strong Programme of the Edinburgh School as well as Collin‘s 
(Collins 1981a) programme of empirical relativism. In effect, they are trying to make the 
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claims and insights of the sociology of scientific knowledge fruitful for the analyses of 
technology.  
One of the central claims of the Strong Programme is the symmetry principle, which 
holds that successful theories have to be accounted for socially just as much as 
unsuccessful scientific theories. This view has stirred a lot of debate within philosophy 
of science, because it contravenes the quite prevalent idea, that social factors are only 
relevant in the case of error. That is, social factors can only be made responsible if 
wrong scientific theories have been mistaken to be true or if true theories have been 
ignored by the scientific community for a considerable period of time. From such a point 
of view, social factors are understood as biases that hinder rational processes in science 
and should better be overcome.
59
 SCOT applies the symmetry principle to technology 
and argues that successful innovations cannot be explained by assuming that they work 
better than failed innovations. Rather failure and success depend on the social context 
and on whether an innovation was promoted successfully or not (Pinch and Bijker 1987; 
Bijker and Law 1992b).  
In the same article, Pinch and Bijker (Pinch and Bijker 1987) also introduce the key 
concepts of SCOT: relevant social groups, interpretative flexibility and closure. Any 
SCOT analysis starts off with identifying different relevant social groups that hold 
stakes in the development of a technological artifact. These social groups are 
characterized by the fact that all their members ―[...] share the same set of meanings, 
attached to a specific artifact‖ (Pinch and Bijker 1987 30). Between different relevant 
social groups, the meaning of an artifact might differ profoundly, which is accounted for 
by the concept of interpretative flexibility. Any technological artifact is developed while 
members of these different social groups negotiate the form and meaning of the artifact. 
The process by which this phase of negotiation comes to an end is labeled closure or 
stabilization.  
This closure can be compared to the process of consensus formation in science. 
However, while in science it would be sufficient that the community of scientists agrees 
upon something, closure in technology depends upon the stabilization of an artifact 
amongst different groups. This stabilization is brought about by different mechanisms, 
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70 
 
which include rhetorical maneuvers just as much as redefinition of the problem. In both 
cases, the problem neither needs to be solved, nor do other groups have to be convinced 
for the artifact to be closed (Pinch and Bijker 1987). The result of different stabilization 
procedures is the same: After a while, the negotiations that have taken place during the 
construction period of technologies become black-boxed and the artifact seems to be 
given. Alternatives, which might have existed in the course of the development, become 
invisible – and eventually even unthinkable. Thus, by showing that negotiations and 
different perspectives on the form, meaning and potential usage of an artifact have 
shaped its final form, SCOT is helping to open up the black boxes of technology 
development and innovation. This insight that things could have developed quite 
differently raises the awareness about the relevance of social negotiations and the role of 
different stakeholder in technology development.  
Several insights from SCOT are relevant for the analysis of epistemic social software 
which lies at the heart of this thesis. First of all, by opening up the black boxes, which 
have been closed around existing technologies, SCOT stresses the fact that technology 
design and development involve numerous stages of decision making in which multiple 
agents are involved. This insight defeats simple forms of technological determinism. 
Even if their critical stance does not go far enough and SCOT avoids drawing any 
normative conclusions from the roles different agents play in this process, SCOT has to 
be applauded for uncovering the role of different social actors in the development 
process. SCOT also helped to understand that the same technological artifact might have 
completely different meaning for different social groups, by introducing the concept of 
interpretative flexibility. Moreover, this opening of the black boxes of technology 
development also shows, that technological artifacts are not just a given, but have been 
shaped by different social agents – and that they could look very differently had they 
been developed by other agents. 
However, as was the case for the Social Shaping of Technology (SST), SCOT also has 
received a lot of criticism. And since both approaches share many claims their criticism 
is also quite similar. This is particularly true for early forms on SCOT, while later 
reformulations tried to account for various points of critique. One point of critique that 
has already been raised in the assessment of SST concerns SCOT‘s focus on the 
development of artifacts rather than their later usage and possible appropriation. SCOT 
as SST was also accused of social determinism and of not taking into account 
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technological dynamics and material conditions. Moreover, it was argued that SCOT 
considers society as apart from technology and rather as the environment in which 
technology develops as opposed to ideas concerning the mutual constitution of the social 
and the technical (Van House 2003).  
Other major problems which are targeted more directly at SCOT are related its core 
concepts. The first problem concerns the concept of relevant social groups. By focusing 
on relevant social groups in the development process, SCOT almost by definition only 
takes into account, those social groups who did take part in the developmental process 
while those, who were left out – intentionally or unintentionally – are ignored. This 
neglect was especially criticized by feminist scholars, who argued that this view 
structurally discriminates against women, who are mostly underrepresented in the 
developmental process and the construction phases of technologies (cf. Bath 2009). 
More generally, taking a look at what or who is left out, can often be at least as 
instructive as taking a look at the participants, as was later also recognized by 
proponents of SCOT themselves (e.g. Wyatt 2005; Oudshoorn and Pinch 2005a; 
Oudshoorn and Pinch 2005b). The notions of closure or stabilization also received 
criticism for being overly rigid and not accounting for the fact that artifacts can be 
appropriated by their users and might continue to develop after their release to the 
market (Van House 2003).  
Another central criticism, which was especially raised by Langdon Winner (Winner 
1993) concerns SCOT‘s neglect of power relations in technology development and the 
voluntary omission of normative concerns. This refusal to become normative seems to 
be more of a general problem of purely descriptive social constructivist approaches and 
it poses serious problems for critical approaches in technology design. Thus, while it is 
acknowledged that social groups play a role in technology development, the question 
which groups have how much power is just as much ignored as the question of just or 
optimal distribution of power over different actors and stakeholders. Put differently 
while SCOT shows the crucial role that different stakeholders play in the design and 
development of technologies, they refrain from making normative claims about how 
such a process should ideally look like. How much power should be reserved for whom? 
These normative issues are not addressed within SCOT and had to be tackled by mostly 
feminist scholars in STS (cf. Bath 2009) as well as those working in the field of values 
in design (Flanagan, Howe et al. 2008). And drawing normative conclusions from the 
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insights obtained from analyses of technology development and usage is also crucial for 
this thesis.  
Moreover, as a result of the exclusive focus on the development of technologies, the 
impact, i.e. the societal consequences of technologies have been mostly ignored within 
SCOT as originally conceived. While SCOT analyzes the relevance of the social for the 
technological by focusing on the role of social negotiations in the development of 
technology, they ignore the question of how these technologies retroact on societal and 
cultural values. This blind spot might be explained by SST and SCOT‘s initial attempt 
to provide an alternative to the prevalent impact models of technology assessment. 
However, a total neglect of the question of impact is surely not justifiable, especially 
since different decisions leading to different technological artifacts might indeed have 
different social, ethical and epistemological consequences for different agents and social 
groups.  
3.1.3 Actor-Network Theory (ANT) 
One of the most successful and influential developments in STS is Actor-Network-
Theory (ANT). Even though the word ―theory‖ occurs in its title, ANT is not a uniform 
theory, but rather a method (Latour 1999), a range of practices (Law 1992/2001) or an 
―inspirational framework [rather] than a constraining theoretical system‖(Callon 2004: 
65). It tries to provide a way of approaching the relationship between the technological 
and the social – or rather the socio-technical - that does not fall victim to the different 
forms of social or technological determinisms displayed in or characterized by the 
approaches before. ANT was developed from the 1980ies onwards by Michael Callon, 
Bruno Latour, John Law and others. Despite originating in the same background as other 
STS approaches and using similar methodologies ANT departs strongly from the 
accounts portrayed before by considering any ―[...] social explanation of scientific facts 
and technological artifacts [to be] a dead end‖ (Callon 2004: 62). Instead of showing the 
impact of society on technology – or vice versa, ANT sets on to criticize essentialist 
concepts such as ―society‖ altogether. The proponents of ANT argue that society instead 
of being an agent that can exert influence or can be influenced is an ―ongoing 
achievement‖(Callon 2004: 62). Similarly, by stating that ―[...] social structure is not a 
noun, but a verb‖, Law (Law 1992/2001) stresses the performative character of what are 
considered to be core concepts in the social sciences. That these core concepts exist is 
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the result of the blackboxing of the actual processes taking place. And one of the major 
goals of ANT is to open up these black boxes (Latour 1987). According to Callon it is 
exactly by ―[...] jettisoning the idea of a society defined a priori, and replacing it by 
sociotechnical networks that ANT avoids the choice between sociological reductionism, 
on the one hand and positing a great divide between techniques and societies, on the 
other‖ (Callon 2004: 63, italics in the original).  
As most STS approaches, ANT is following a strictly empirical, ethno-methodological 
approach that aims at learning from actors by following them through the actor-network 
(Latour 1999). The roots of ANT lie within laboratory studies in which social scientists 
with the help of ethnographic methods analyzes the creation and development of 
scientific fact and technological artifacts in the making (e.g. Knorr-Cetina 1981, Latour 
and Woolgar 1986, Latour 1987).  
The main ontological unit and object of analysis is the actor-network. The actor-network 
is conceived as a heterogeneous ensemble of different agents, of human and non-human 
actants
60
, which take part in some collective endeavor. ANT analyses how these 
different nodes of the network are held together temporarily, how they change over time, 
which translations they undergo. In doing this it focuses on the activities and processes 
by which power relations in the actor-network are created, stabilized and changed and 
how different relations within the actor-network are being transformed throughout time. 
Power is a network effect rather than an external factor exerting influence. 
There are several key concepts by which these processes are characterized. One central 
concept is that of translation. Since actor-networks consist of such heterogeneous 
elements, multiple and continuous translation processes are taking place between 
different elements of the actor-network. This task of translating is conducted by various 
intermediaries, which can be human or non-human. The most obvious translation 
process might concern translation processes between different human agents, who 
participate in the collective endeavor, but who might have diverging interests and 
understanding of this collective activity. However, translation does also occur between 
human and non-human actants as well as between non-human actants. The central 
notion to describe these processes is inscription. Inscriptions can be anything from 
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photos, notes, diagrams, text, PET-Scans, etc., and they are constantly being 
transformed during the research and development processes (Callon 2004). 
However, these transformations, the negotiations and adjustments, the different 
contributions of different actors become black-boxed after the artifact is closed or after a 
fact is consented upon. Thus, one similarity between ANT and the previous accounts 
concerns the notion of black-boxing. Just as much as methods or claims that have been 
consented on in science become black-boxed, transformations and adjustments are 
becoming black-boxed in technology. There are two instances however, in which the 
black boxes are open: One occasion is during the construction and development phase 
itself. The other is, when catastrophes occur, or when things are not working the way 
they are supposed to work (Bowker and Star 1999,Bijker and Law 1992a). Thus it is 
exactly these two instances, the developments as well as the occurrence of failures that 
ANT has particularly focused on in their attempt to show what is in the black boxes of 
science and technology (Latour 1987, Akrich 1992, Akrich and Latour 1992).  
Of particular interest for this thesis is the concept of knowledge employed in ANT, since 
it is quite distinct from concepts of knowledge in social epistemology. Instead of 
treating knowledge as propositional or mental, ANT considers knowledge – or rather 
information - to exist only in materialized form (Latour 2005: 221ff). This focus on 
inscriptions and materialized forms of knowledge as opposed to a focus on ―the 
scientists thinking hard in their offices‖ (Latour 1987: 237) has been captured by 
Latour‘s concept immutable mobiles (Latour 1987). Immutable mobiles are the 
inscriptions which ―make it possible to record, combine, compare, summarize, link, and 
manipulate work performed in a variety of places to create new inscriptions and 
understandings out of existing ones and coordinate work across space and time (Van 
House 2003: 14). Knowledge in this sense is either materialized in physical objects, 
such as scientific articles, or embodied in skills scientists possess. While the latter 
instance of knowledge corresponds to what is labeled implicit knowledge in other fields 
(Polanyi 1985, Nonaka and Toyama 2003), the former would be an externalized form of 
explicit knowledge. This duality of knowledge explains the dictum ―Follow the actors! 
Follow the text!‖ (Spinuzzi 2003). 
Such a view on knowledge and the focus on its materiality is quite uncommon and often 
in sharp contrast with philosophical understandings of knowledge. In mainstream 
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epistemology, especially in its analytic form, as is shown later on, knowledge is 
considered to be primarily or only propositional and often defined as justified true belief, 
with lots of discussions around whether these three terms are sufficient or all 
necessary.
61
 Thus, ANT, just as much as analytic epistemology holds an exclusionary 
view on what knowledge is. Both seem to consider their views on knowledge, either as 
embodied and materialized or as propositional, to be the only relevant forms of 
knowledge. However, as Helen Longino (Longino 2002c) has pointed out, at least three 
different senses of knowledge exist and get frequently mixed up in academic debates. 
And at times this leads not only to a lot of confusion, but also to fruitless discussion and 
hostile misrepresentations between proponents of different approaches. Knowledge as 
content, she argues exists in materialized form. It has to be differentiated from 
knowledge as knowledge production, i.e. the practices of constructing, assessing and 
evaluating knowledge claims and from knowledge as knowing, i.e. as a state of a person 
towards and object which relates to philosophical debates around knowledge as justified 
true belief (Longino 2002c: 77ff).
62
 In this sense, the concept of knowledge employed in 
ANT is primarily related to Longino‘s knowledge as content. And while knowledge as 
knowledge-production also plays a role in the recent more performative turn in ANT 
(Law 2004), knowledge as cognitive agency gets largely ignored.  
This focus on knowledge in its materialized form, however, serves a certain purpose 
within the analytic framework of ANT. ANT considers text and the production of papers 
to be the primary goal of science, as opposed to maybe the attainment or approximation 
of truth, which many philosophers of science would assume to be a primary goal of 
science.
63
 Text as embodied knowledge and scientific knowledge objects as ―immutable 
and combinable mobiles‖ play a crucial role not only for the accumulation and 
distribution of knowledge, but also for enrolling allies (Latour 1987: 227).  
Enrollment is another key concept in ANT. From its beginnings, ANT was concerned 
with the ways in which consensus and agreement on scientific facts is achieved in 
science. For this process of consensus formation, scientists had to convince their peers 
of their approaches, methods and results. And publications play a crucial role in this 
                                                 
61
 Many philosophers acknowledge that other types of knowledge may exist, yet frequently these are not 
considered central for philosophical analyses (e.g. Baumann 2006).  
62
 Longino‘s approach is portrayed in detail in the second part of this thesis. 
63
 The utility of truth as a concept of appraisal in science has however been challenged even within 




process of winning allies for one‘s position. However, the process of enrollment does 
not only target scientists and other human agents (e.g. policy maker, funding agencies, 
etc.), but is also applied to non-human actants. The most famous example would be 
Michael Callon‘s study on the domestication of the sea scallops (Callon 1986). In this 
process, not only other researcher or the fisherman had to be enrolled, but also the 
scallops.  
This example leads us to the most radical and controversial claim of ANT: the principle 
of generalized symmetry. This principle states that all actants in an actor-network should 
be treated and can be described in the same terms. All differences between them are an 
effect of the relations in the actor-network and not given a priori. This bold statement of 
equating human and non-human actants has stirred a lot of debate. There are some 
serious problems concerning accountability and responsibility in heterogeneous 
networks, if you drop any difference between the human and the non-human, as I argue 
below. However, to my mind much of the discussion around the symmetry principle has 
been triggered by some misunderstandings about what is meant by agency and whether 
agency implies intentionality. While it might be possible and analytically fruitful to 
ascribe agency to the scallop, only few people would probably want to ascribe 
intentionality to the scallop in the process of its domestication. However one does not 
need to ascribe intentionality to the scallop in order to consider it to be an actant in 
epistemic processes. And without introducing the notion of intentionality when talking 




There is however, a more profound problem related to the principle of general symmetry 
and it concerns issues of accountability and responsibility in heterogeneous networks. 
These issues become particularly worrisome when applied to information systems. The 
main question here is the following: If human and non-human actants both are 
considered active agents in an actor-network and no difference between the two is 
assumed, who is to blame if things go wrong? Put differently if the ―Waffen-Bürger‖ 
oder the ―Bürger-Waffe‖, Latour‘s citizen-gun-hybrid is responsible for killing 
someone, to what extent can the citizen himself be made accountable for his action 
(Latour 2000: 218)? Is not the gun just as responsible? And what are the consequences 
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of this distributed agency concerning the attribution of accountability? Does the 
rejection of any dualism between human and non-human actors imply that no-one can be 
held responsible for his or her actions anymore? Such blurring of analytical distinction 
concerning agency, as useful as it may be to counter trivializations or simplifications can 
have serious side effects. Leaving ANT-idiom for a moment, I would argue that since 
the attribution of accountability and the localization of responsibility is a major issue in 
our networked society. We have to be very explicit whether, when and to what purpose, 
we want to blur or abolish analytic categories and what the price is we are willing to pay 
for this. If the price is losing the possibility to take a critical stance towards existing 
socio-technical networks or not being able to localize responsibility anymore in case 
things go wrong, then I would argue that we pay too much. It might be very well, that 
ANT itself does not strive for such normative or critical goals anyway. But then each 
and everyone doing research has to decide how important these issues are for herself and 
where one has to depart from major claims of ANT for better reasons.  
This issue relates to a more general point of critique concerning ANT‘s lack of 
normativity, i.e. its unwillingness to take any normative stance. Remaining at a purely 
descriptive level of analyses has been strongly criticized primarily by feminist scholars. 
They argue that when analyzing socio-technical systems with respect to inherent power 
relations, a normative standpoint has to be taken. This critique in combination with the 
uptake of many other claims of ANT, such as its anti-essentialist tendencies, has lead to 
a variety of feminist extensions and extrapolations of ANT within STS (cf. Bath 2009, 
Ilyes 2006) as well as to receptions within other fields of research (Longino 2002c). 
Despite these points of critique, ANT has provided numerous important insights which 
are relevant for the questions of this thesis. First of all, by dropping the distinction 
between the social and the technical, the human and the non-human, ANT has helped 
exposing existing essentialisms with all their - possibly unintended - consequences. 
Further, ANT clearly has succeeded in the first anthropological dictum of ―making the 
familiar strange‖, be it in their initial laboratory studies or in their deconstruction of 
familiar terms such as ―society‖. Moreover by de-centering human agents ANT has put 
technologies, non-human living agents and materiality more generally into the spotlight. 
Even if this de-centering of humans may cause problems for locating responsibility if 
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taken to an extreme, it has nonetheless been an instructive move that shed some light on 
actants that have been neglected by previous STS approaches.
65
  
Another important insight of ANT concerns the delegation of social control to 
technology, as was famously demonstrated by Latour‘s accounts of the ―Berliner 
Schluessel‖ (Latour 1996) and the door closer (Latour 1992). By showing how social 
control was substituted by technological artifacts, Latour and his colleagues have 
opened up a whole new way of looking at issues of power and their continuation in 
socio-technical networks. This issue of delegating control to technologies becomes 
relevant in Part 3 of this thesis, for instance when discussing the idea of ―algorithmic 
authority‖ in the Web (Shirky 2009).  
A further instructive aspect of ANT concerns its focus on the processual character of the 
actor-network, the performativity of socio-technical ensembles. Especially in relation to 
the major social epistemologies, which is depicted in Part 2, this acknowledgement of 
constant transformation and provisionality is illuminating and helps avoiding static 
conceptions of knowledge. Indeed Helen Longino, one of the social epistemologists who 
has been most sympathetic of certain insights of ANT, has also stressed the constant 
provisionality, partiality and plurality of knowledge (Longino 2002c). In the last years 
ANT has been used as an analytical framework to analyze many aspects and instances of 
information systems (e.g. Langlois 2005, Mager 2009 Tatnall 2003, Walsham 1997). 
One topic of particular importance has concerned the politics of search engines (c.f. 
Röhle 2009, as well as the seminal paper by Introna and Nissenbaum 2000). This 
fertility for the analysis of information systems should be another reason to take insights 
from ANT serious for analyzing epistemic social software. 
3.1.4 Feminist STS 
In the previous sections I have already indicated some of the major concerns various 
feminist have raised about central claims of ANT and the other STS approaches 
portrayed before. Thus, in the following, I focus on some of the conclusion they have 
drawn from this critique and sketch some of the decidedly feminist approaches to STS. 
Feminist concerns remain relevant throughout this thesis. However, in this section I 
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concentrate only on feminist responses to STS specifically and not on feminist 
epistemologies or feminist philosophical theories more generally.
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According to Nancy van House ―[f]eminist STS is concerned with the daily, embodied 
practices of knowledge construction within historically changing structures and with 
power relations‖ (Van House 2003: 30). This quote renders the relevance of feminist 
STS for this thesis obvious. However, since the focus on practices, the 
acknowledgement of historical change as well as the focus on materialized and 
embodied forms of knowledge are also depicted in other approaches within STS, it is 
especially the critical analyses of the relationship between power and technology which 
strikes me as a crucial merit of feminist STS. Despite ANT‘s intention of analyzing 
power within actor-networks, ANT has been accused of being too uncritical towards 
unjust social structures by many feminist scholars. Thus, in contrast to other STS 
approaches, it has been mostly the feminist scholars who have problematized the 
relationship between power and technology. While early approaches often followed the 
simplified inscription-model of social structures being imparted onto technology, later 
approaches have also assumed more mutual relations between technologies and social 
structures (Van House 2003).  
As becomes obvious from this focus on injustices, most feminist approaches are 
characterized by a distinctively normative – or even political stance. Instead of simply 
analyzing the ways in which social injustices are being inscribed into technology and 
reinforced or maybe rather undermined by technology, feminist scholars have been very 
creative and prolific in developing more constructive methods of how to design and 
develop socio-technical systems in more responsible and power-sensitive ways. This 
normative orientation is crucial for my own analyses and considerations on appropriate 
frameworks for analyzing and designing epistemic social software.  
In the following I briefly introduce some aspects of the works of three feminist STS 
scholars who have been particularly influential: Donna Haraway, Karen Barad and Lucy 
Suchman.
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 I do not aim at giving any comprehensive overview over their works. 
Instead I highlight some of their crucial claims in so far as they are relevant for the 
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 I would like to thank Corinna Bath for bringing the works of Karen Barad to my attention as well as for 
sharing her knowledge on feminist STS and ICT in general.  
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topics of this thesis and have been neglected by other STS approaches. Beyond the 
relationships between power and technology these include issues of responsibility and 
accountability in entangled systems as well as performative understandings of socio-
technological systems.  
Donna Haraway: Networks, Dichotomies & Situated Knowledges 
Donna Haraway has been among the first feminist scholars who have made ANT fruitful 
for gender studies. Criticizing ANT for its neglect of social inequalities and injustices 
rooted in existing power structures and being perpetuated by or even reinforced through 
socio-technical system design, she has developed her own network model. This model 
focuses on who and what gets excluded, by what means and for whose benefits. 
Haraway uses the reference to the string game ―Cat‘s Cradle‖ to explicate her network 
model of knowledge and theory construction as a collective endeveaour, which is both 
―local and global, distributed and knotted together― (Haraway 1994, 70), hoping that it 
will help feminist scholars to ―learn something about how worlds get made and unmade, 
and for whom‖ (Haraway 1994, 70).  
According to Nancy van House (Van House 2003), there are two central issues that 
Donna Haraway has raised, which have been instrumental for STS and for the social 
studies of information and communication technologies in particular. One of them 
concerns her notion of situated knowledges, the other relates to her deconstruction of 
several classical dualisms. Such dualisms include mind and body, animal and machine, 
idealism and materialism, organism and machine, public and private, nature and culture, 
primitive and civilized (Haraway 1991b) and they all are easily relatable to another 
major dualism: female-male. Of central interest for this thesis is again the dualism of 
machine and organism, of humans and technologies. Many have seen the figure of the 
cyborg to be the central metaphor for the deconstruction of boundaries between humans 
and non-humans. Van House argues that this deconstruction of boundaries between us as 
human agents and the technologies and tools we use for knowledge construction and 
related epistemic practices can deliver new insights for information studies (Van House 
2003). Concerning the goals and topics of this thesis, I would argue that dissolving a 
dichotomous understanding of us as human epistemic agents and them as technological 
tools is necessary to analyze and understand knowledge productive practices not only in 
science, but also in the socio-technical epistemic systems usually referred to as Web2.0 
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Haraway‘s concept of situated knowledges has clearly been among the most influential 
concepts in feminist epistemology. In her seminal paper ―Situated knowledges: the 
science question in feminism and the privilege of partial perspective‖ (Haraway 1996). 
Haraway uses the metaphor of vision to delineate a feminist version of objectivity, that 
is able to remedy the shortcoming of previous feminist replies to claims of objectivity 
(Haraway 1996). According to Haraway most feminists including herself have either 
successively or even simultaneously attached themselves to two poles of feminist 
critique on prevalent accounts of objectivity: radical constructivism or feminist critical 
empiricism. Trying to avoid the pitfalls of both, in Haraway‘s definition, ―[...] 
objectivity turns out to be about particular and specific embodiment and definitely not 
about the false vision promising transcendence of all limits and responsibility [...] only 
partial perspective promises objective vision‖ (Haraway 1996): 254). The concept of 
situated knowledges is thus indicative of the locality, plurality, particularity and 
embodiment (technical just as much as organic) of knowledge. A plurality, that 
technologically already get contested by my proof-reading software, whose red wiggly 
lines constantly reminds me that knowledge should better be used in its singular form.  
The previous quote also introduces the notion of responsibility which is crucial in 
Donna Haraway‘s approach for two reasons. First, Haraway argues that proclaimed 
transcendence can be regarded as an effective way of shirking responsibility for one‘s 
epistemic practices. By contrast, acknowledging and disclosing locality enables the 
attribution of responsibility and accountability, a task that becomes all the more 
important, the more networked and computerized our society gets (Nissenbaum 1997). 
Haraway emphasizes this relationship between locality, responsibility and accountability 
in her essay on situated knowledges, which is ―[...] an argument for situated and 
embodied knowledges and an argument against various forms of unlocatable, and so 
irresponsible, knowledge claims. Irresponsible means unable to be called into account.‖ 
(Haraway 1996: 255).  
However, there is a second way in which the notion of responsibility is crucial for 
Donna Haraway. Responsibility is not only something we want to ascribe to others, it is 
not only about making others responsible or blaming them. Rather Haraway insists on 
feminists‘ duty of taking ―[...] responsibility for the social relations of science and 
technology‖ (Haraway 1991b: 181) Instead of a simple rejection or even demonization 
of technology, we have to take stakes at and participate in creating socio-technical 
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worlds to live in. Remaining in a detached, analytic position of just revealing how social 
inequalities get inscribed into the techno-scientific is not sufficient. Rather, in her effort 
to take responsibility for the world we live in and to make them more livable, Haraway 
argues for an active political stance towards societal, resp. socio-technical change.  
It is in this normative orientation that Haraway departs most clearly from ANT. This 
decidedly political stance, which does not retain itself to pure analysis and description is 
exemplified by her assertion that as interesting as it might be to analyze the human-non-
human hybrids, her concern lies rather in the question ―for whom and how these hybrids 
work‖ (Haraway 1997: 280, quoted after Bath 2009: 57). And this assertion can to a 
certain extent be read as a direct critique of Latour‘s work.  
Moreover, by analyzing knowledge technologies with respect to issues of power, 
inequality and injustice, Haraway, as many other feminist epistemologists, relates her 
epistemology to ethics as well as social and political theory. And it is also one of the 
conclusions of this thesis that epistemology has to meet ethics and political theory when 
it comes to analyzing and amending socio-epistemic practices on the web.  
Another normative consequence of Haraway‘s concept of situated knowledges concerns 
the necessity to include multiple voices into science and technology development. Since 
each and every perspective, each view is only partial, collaboration and the inclusion of 
many different, partial perspectives is an imperative, because it can provide a richer 
picture. However, this collaboration should not take the form of fusion nor does it imply 
that one could simply change one‘s perspective by lifting or dropping Rawls‘ veil of 
ignorance (Rawls 1971). It is rather the ideal of ―[...] solidarity in politics and shared 
conversations in epistemology‖, that Haraway considers to be the alternative to 
relativism and totalization that a feminist account of objectivity could offer.  
Despite her high appraisal, Donna Haraway has also received substantial criticism even 
within feminist theory. First of all, the Luddites amongst feminist theoreticians consider 
Haraway‘s stance towards technology not to be critical enough. The refusal of a stronger 
rejection of technology has led to frequent accusations by some feminist theoreticians 
that Haraway embraces technological developments too easily. However, this critique 
was probably a misinterpretation of Haraway, since she asserts that her writings are 
more concerned than optimistic and notes that it might be instructive to distrust our fears 
just as much as our hopes (Haraway 1996: 368f). 
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Another major point of critique that was raised against Donna Haraway is more crucial 
for the goals of this thesis however. It concerns the accusation that Haraway stays too 
abstract and narrative, that she refrains from making any concrete normative proposals 
about how exactly the technoscientific should be changed, how such more livable lives 
might look like and by which means they could be achieved. Her argument seems to be 
that any recommendation for system design would necessarily lead to exclusions. And 
since exclusions are what she trying to criticize and highlight, she remains rather silent 
on the practical implications of her analyses. Put differently, one of the major points of 
critique directed at Donna Haraway is that she is too much focused on text and too little 
on concrete action. As Wajcman phrases it: „At times, Haraway loses sense of how 
feminists could act to change, or at least redirect technologies, rather than reconfiguring 
them in our writings― (Wajcman 2004: 101).  
Karen Barad: Performativity, Matter & Responsibility 
Another feminist theoretician, who has offered an interesting and original approach that 
shares certain core assumptions of STS, while reworking others is Karen Barad. Reading 
their frequent reference to each other, it becomes obvious that Haraway and Barad have 
been mutually influencing each other and share certain core assumptions. Such overlap 
concerns specific concepts, such as a posthumanism as opposed to anthropocentrism; 
shared focal points, such as hybridity and performativity; as well as certain goals, the 
most important of which are to take a critical stance and to take responsibility for the 
worlds we live in. As was case for Donna Haraway, Karen Barad‘s contribution to STS 
goes beyond an empirical assessment of the technoscientific and offers a new theoretical 
reflection, or rather a diffraction to use Barad‘s preferred term, on the processes 
involved in knowing, being and, acting (Barad 2007: 71ff).  
More specifically, Barad‘s approach, which she labels agential realism (Barad 1998, 
Barad 2007), delivers an ―[...] epistemological-ontological-ethical framework that 
provides an understanding of the role of human and nonhuman, material and discursive, 
and natural and cultural factors in scientific and other social-material practices‖ (Barad 
2007: 26).  
Agential realism offers a new way of understanding the relationship between the 
technical and the social, the discursive and the material, based on quantum physic, resp. 
a critical reception of Niels Bohr‘s philosophy-physics. Criticizing many popular 
84 
 
truncations and misreadings of quantum mechanics, she argues for a more nuanced 
analysis of its possible philosophical implications (Barad 2007). According to Barad, 
one crucial point of Bohr‘s departure from classical mechanics concerns the unmaking 
of the Cartesian dualism of object and subject. In the process of physical measurement, 
the object and the observer, Barad‘s ―agencies of observation‖, get constituted by and 
within the process itself and are not pre-defined entities. The results of measurements 
are thus neither fully constituted by any reality that is independent of its observation, nor 
by the methods or agents of observation alone. Rather, all of them, the observed, the 
observer and the practices, methods and instruments of observation are entangled in the 
process of what we call reality. For Barad, reality itself is nothing pre-defined, but 
something that develops and changes through epistemic practices, through the 
interactions of objects and agents of observation in the process of observation and 
measurement. Reality in this sense is a verb and not a noun.  
However, interaction might be the wrong word to describe this entangled process, 
because interaction presupposes two separate entities to interact. Thus, to avoid this 
presupposed dualism, she introduces the neologism of ―intra-action‖, to denote the 
processes taking place within the object-observer-compound, the entanglement of object 
and observer in the process of observation. This terminological innovation is meant to 
discursively challenge the prevalent dualisms of subject-object, nature-culture, human-
technology and aims at opening up alternative, non-dichotomous understandings of 
technoscientific practices. Moreover, one of her major claims is that all those binary 
assumptions concerning the human versus the nonhuman, the material versus the 
discursive, and natural versus the cultural are fostered and hardened by prevalent, but 
misguided understandings of what matter, discourse, agency, objectivity, etc. mean. 
Thus, in developing her agential realism and to understand the relationship between 
matter and meaning, the material-discursive practices in science, she feels the need to 
rework many of these fundamental concepts - a challenge which she accepts in her most 
recent book (Barad 2007).  
What should have become obvious from the previous portrayal is that Barad advances a 
performative view on the relationship between language and world as opposed to 
classical representationalism. Referring to Rouse (Rouse 1996), she argues that both, 
scientific realism and social constructivism share some basic assumptions concerning 
the relationship between reality and discourse and that those should be overcome by 
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such a performative alternative, which focuses on practices and actions as opposed to 
correspondence (Barad 2003)). Barad‘s own posthumanist performativity is based on a 
critical reception of Judith Butler‘s concept of performativity (Butler 1993), which itself 
is inspired by Derrida reinterpretation of Austin‘s original differentiation between 
performatives and constatives. For Butler and others, performativity relates to the ability 
of discourse to produce materiality. She argues that social norms as well as categories 
such as sex or gender are pre-existent, but rather that they are continuously produced 
through processes of repetition and recitation (Butler 1993).  
There is however, a crucial difference between Barad‘s and Butler‘s accounts. Barad 
accuses Butler of failing to show how ―matter matters‖ and of granting language too 
much power (Barad 2003: 801ff). Moreover, she asserts that by concentrating too 
exclusively on the social or discursive, Butler is falling back into the Cartesian dualism 
of subject and object, in which matter is condemned to passivity. Thus, Barad‘s own 
performative account can be considered to be a materialist, naturalist and post-humanist 
transformation of Butler‘s original concept.  
Taking matter serious and describing it as active, means to allow for non-human or 
hybrid forms of agency, a step that has been taken already with ANT‘s principle of 
general symmetry. However, in ―Meeting the Universe Halfway‖, Barad sets off a 
section on agency and causality, with two quite illuminating quotes. At first Barad cites 
Haraway‘s stance towards the agency of the world by asserting that ―[the world neither 
speaks itself nor disappears in favour of a master decoder. [...] Acknowledging the 
agency of the world in knowledge makes room for some unsettling possibilities, 
including a sense of the world‘s independent sense of humour. ― (Haraway 1991a, cited 
from Barad 2003: 212). However, this quote is directly followed by a quote by Monica 
Casper, which criticizes that ―[n]onhuman agency deflects attention from human 
accountability to other entities, whether human, nonhuman, cyborg, or 
what/whomever.‖(Casper 1994, cited from (Barad 2007: 213).  
So here is the problem: If we attribute agency to non-human entities, can and should 
they be held responsible and accountable? Isn‘t that an invitation, a carte blanche to 
shirk responsibility? Do we let ourselves off the hook to easily and throw away any 
hopes for responsible and accountable actions?  
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My impression is that Barad‘s view on non-human agency and her stance towards 
ontological asymmetry has changed from earlier articulations (Barad 1996) to later ones 
(Barad 2007). In 1996, she still underscores the human role in representing, by stating 
that „[n]ature has agency, but it does not speak itself to the patient, unobstrusive 
observer listening for its cries – there is an important asymmetry with respect to agency: 
we do the representing and yet nature is not a passive blank slate awaiting our 
inscriptions, and to privilege the material or discursive is to forget the inseparability that 
characterizes phenomena‖ (Barad 1996: 181).  
However, it seems that this special treatment of humans and especially the notion of 
representing does not well match her posthumanist performativity, as depicted some 
years later (Barad 2003). Finally, in ―Meeting the Universe Halfway‖ ontological 
asymmetry is not even in the index and her answer to the question of non-human agency 
does not correspond to those earlier claims, but is a more nuanced dissolution of the 
distinction between human and non-human agency. By stating that ―[a]gency is a matter 
of intra-acting; it is an enactment, not something that someone or something has‖ (Barad 
2007: 216), Barad moves the locus of agency from singular entities to entangled 
material-discursive apparatuses. But even if agency is not tied to individual entities, it is 
bound with responsibility and accountability, as Barad makes very explicit in the 
following quote that can also be read as a response to Monica Casper‘s quote from 
before. ―Learning how to intra-act responsibly within and as part of the world means 
understanding that we are not the only active beings— though this is never justification 
for deflecting that responsibility onto other entities. The acknowledgment of ―nonhuman 
agency‖ does not lessen human accountability; on the contrary, it means that 
accountability requires that much more attentiveness to existing power 
asymmetries‖(Barad 2007: 218f). 
Thus, acknowledging that agency is not a human characteristic, but an attribution to 
certain phenomena within entangled networks could be seen as a carte blanche to shirk 
of responsibility. But this is clearly not the case for Barad. When developing her 
posthumanist ethics, Barad concludes that even if we are not the only ones who are or 
can be held responsible, our responsibility even greater than it would be if it were ours 
alone. She states ―We (but not only ―we humans‖) are always already responsible to the 
others with whom or which we are entangled, not through conscious intent but through 
the various ontological entanglements that materiality entails. What is on the other side 
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of the agential cut is not separate from us—agential separability is not individuation. 
Ethics is therefore not about right response to a radically exterio/ized (sic!) other, but 
about responsibility and accountability for the lively relationalities of becoming of 
which we are a part.‖(Barad 2007: 393).  
This focus on responsibility and accountability relates back to Barad‘s initial framing of 
agential realism as an ―epistemological-ontological-ethical framework‖, a term by which 
she stresses the ―[...] fundamental inseparability of epistemological, ontological, and 
ethical considerations‖ (Barad 2007: 26). Barad insists that we are responsible for what 
we know, and – as a consequence of her onto-epistemology for what is (Barad 2003: 
829). Accountability and responsibility must be thought of in terms of what matters and 
what is excluded from mattering, what is known and what is not, what is and what is 
not.  
This acknowledgement that knowledge always implies responsibility, not only renders 
issues of ethics and politics of such knowledge- and reality-creating processes 
indispensable. It also relates directly back to Barad‘s performativity. Epistemic practices 
are productive and different practices produce different phenomena. If our practices of 
knowing do not merely represent what is there, but shape and create what is and what 
will be there, talking about the extent to which knowledge is power or entails 
responsibility gets a whole different flavor.  
For the purpose of this thesis, there are two aspects of Barad‘s work, which are highly 
relevant: Barad‘s notion of performativity on the one hand and her conclusions 
concerning agency, responsibility and accountability on the other. And these two aspects 
are indeed related. As Barad‘s states, ―[a]gential realism is not about representations of 
an independent reality but about the real consequences, interventions, creative 
possibilities, and responsibilities of intra-acting within the world.‖(Barad 1998: 8). This 
concept of responsibility does not only enable the attribution of responsibility and 
accountability, it also is a request to take active part in science, in technology design and 
development, in those entangles processes that are characteristic of technoscience. It is 
our duty to watch out for power imbalances, injustices and the processes of silencing 
and exclusion in the agential cuts we make and we observe others making. We are to be 
held responsible and accountable for the consequences of our own practices and for 
those of others – human or non-human; we can be held responsible where we could have 
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interfered, but did not. We may be held responsible and accountable for our practices 
and neglects even if we cannot guarantee or foresee how exactly they will affect the 
material-discursive apparatuses they are entangled in. 
Finally, with respect to the analyses of epistemic social software, I would argue that 
Barad‘s posthumanist performativity might indeed be a useful tool for understanding not 
only how gender or reality materialize, but also of how different epistemic and social 
norms, ideas and practices get reinforced and re-enacted through practices.
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 Using a 
performative understanding of mattering also sheds a different light onto the questions 
of whether and why direct inscriptions of values into technology are impossible and why 
we do not have control over the acceptance, further development or the possible 
appropriations or even guerilla usages of the technologies developed. Any value-
sensitive or explicitly feminist intention alone does not guarantee that structures of 
inequality are not still sustained or perpetuated in socio-technical systems.  
Lucy Suchman: Expanding Frames & Accountable Cuts 
The third feminist researcher in the broader field of STS, who has been particularly 
influential for analyses of information and communication technologies, is Lucy 
Suchman. As was the case for Donna Haraway and Karen Barad, there is considerable 
mutual influence between these three authors and despite certain differences, they share 
certain values, views and goals, such as a performative understanding of the socio-
technical, the necessity for critical intervention and the relatedness of agency, 
responsibility and accountability. Suchman (Suchman 2007/2009) lists the major themes 
of her work in the preface to ―Human-Machine-Reconfigurations‖, a reprint of her 
seminal book ―Plans and Situated Actions‖ (Suchman 1987), amended by new footnotes 
and some additional chapters that account for theoretical and empirical developments 
that have taken place in the 20 years in between these two publications. These major 
themes are: ―the irreducibility of lived practice, embodied and enacted; the value of 
empirical investigation over categorical debate; the displacement of reason from a 
position of supremacy to one among many ways of knowing in acting; the 
heterogeneous socio-materiality and real-time contingency of performance; and the new 
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notion of performative testimony (Kusch 2002), which is be portrayed in Chapter 5.  
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agencies and accountabilities effected through reconfigured relations of human and 
machine‖ (Suchman 2007/2009: xii).  
Suchman‘s work is of particular interest for this thesis, because she applies feminist STS 
and also explicitly Karen Barad‘s agential realism to the design and development of 
information technology. Suchman is now professor of anthropology of science and 
technology, but before turning to academia, she has worked as a researcher for 20 years 
at XEROX PARC. As a trained anthropologist, whose approach is characterized by 
ethnomethodology and conversation analyses, Suchman is a decided empiricists in the 
sense that she values empirical analyses over abstract conceptual debates (Suchman 
2007/2009: xii). Since this thesis is rather conceptual, it seems to be at odds with 
Suchman‘s own focus on empirical analyses. However, I take Suchman‘s focus on 
empirical analyses not to be an argument against conceptual work per se but rather as a 
critique of those conceptual approaches that simply ignore empirical evidence, a critique 
that I share with her. Moreover, since my goal is that some of the conceptual insights 
from this thesis will find their way back into practice, i.e. into technology design and 
development, I take the methodological conclusions that she draws from her own 
analyses to be crucial. I return to this at the end of the section. And finally, there also is 
a clear link between the empirical and the conceptual in Lucy Suchman‘s own work. At 
PARC, she empirically investigated human-computer interaction (HCI) based on 
ethnomethodology and conversation analysis. But the results she obtained with her 
anthropological, empirical research made her question and criticize some of the key 
concepts in the field of HCI itself, namely the notion of the interface itself, the role of 
plans and the cognitive foundations of HCI. Thus, in her seminal ―Plans and Situated 
Action‖, Suchman re-conceptualized the conceptual basis of HCI through her empirical 
analyses (Suchman 1987).  
To being with, Suchman questions the common understanding one of the most 
important concepts in HCI, namely the interface. Instead of regarding the interface as a 
fixed and stable border between humans and machines, through which messages have to 
be sent, Suchman takes ―[...] the boundaries between persons and machines to be 
discursively and materially enacted rather than naturally effected‖ (Suchman 2007/2009: 
12). This means that first of all, she is also proposing a performative view on the socio-
technical. In referring back to Judith Butler‘s argument that sexed and gendered bodies 
are materializations of repeated and recited gender norms, she argues that 
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―[t]echnologies, like bodies, are both produced and destabilized in the course of these 
reiterations‖ (Suchman 2007/2009: 272).  
Moreover, such a view on the interface as being enacted also challenges any radical 
boundary setting between humans and machines. Instead of dwelling on the proposed 
differences or similarities between humans and machines, the question for Suchman has 
turned out to be rather ―[...] how and when the categories of human or machine become 
relevant, how relations of sameness or difference between them are enacted on particular 
occasions, and with what discursive and material consequences‖ (Suchman 2007/2009: 
2). Thus instead of sharply separating the human and the machine and discussing issues 
of agency and responsibility within this dichotomous framework, Suchman joins Barad 
and Haraway in understanding the socio-material as entangled (Barad 2007), as a 
material-semiotic compound with distributed agency, that gets re-enacted through 
repetition and re-citation.  
What is crucial about this emphasis on the performative, dynamic and entangled nature 
of the sociotechnical is that Suchman does not equate humans and machines. Quite on 
the contrary, she criticizes that the whole language of interactivity in HCI conceals the 
crucial differences between humans and machines, differences which people experience 
in their encounters with machines. Her emphasis on the asymmetry between humans and 
computer however, is not based on some presupposed ideology of human supremacy. 
Rather, this difference is a conclusion drawn from her empirical investigation of the 
interaction patterns between users and technological artifacts. The empirical basis of 
her book ―Plans and Situated Action‖ (Suchman 1987) were analyses of the interaction 
between employees at PARC with a new multi-function photocopier. In the analysis of 
such videotaped encounters between the photocopier and the PARC employees, who 
were probably not the most technically illiterate test group, Suchman made out crucial 
differences between human-computer interaction and human-human interaction.  
One of the key insights that she transferred from anthropological conversation analyses 
to HCI was that communication and interaction among humans does not follow a simple 
sender-receiver model of information transfer. However, during the early 1980ies, such 
a model was a common framework for many conceptualizations in HCI as well as in 
Artificial intelligence (AI). Opposing such a simplified model of communication, she 
argued that ―humans dynamically construct the mutual intelligibility of a conversation 
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through an extraordinarily rich array of embodied interactional competencies, strongly 
situated in the circumstances at hand [...]‖ (Suchman 2007/2009: 10). If one adopts such 
a model of communication, it becomes obvious that machines by contrast, have access 
to much more limited information about humans as their interaction partners. This 
observation clearly becomes vivid if one only thinks about the reduction of available 
information that already occurs when human-to-human interactions are conducted via 
email or SMS and a lot of information, including all the non-verbal signals gets lost. 
Thus, Suchman argues, there is no such thing as interaction between humans and 
machines achieved yet, especially not if one considers interaction in a stronger sense to 
be ―[...] a name for the ongoing, contingent coproduction of a shared sociomaterial 
world‖ (Suchman 2007/2009: 23, italics in original). She concludes that, interface 
design has to adopt different strategies to accommodate for these insights. The crucial 
twist she proposed was to reframe ―[...] the problem from creating a self-evident 
machine (or one able to engage in interaction with its user), to writing a user interface 
that is readable, with all the problematics that reading and writing imply‖ (Suchman, 
Blomberg et al. 1999: 395, quoted from Van House 2003: 35). 
The second crucial theoretical shift of Suchman‘s analyses is indicated by the title of her 
book ―Plans and Situated Action‖ (Suchman 1987). It concerns the reconceptualization 
of the role of plans in reasoning and action, which entails a critique of the standard 
model of human reasoning and action. By considering plans to be tools and parts of 
human action rather than ―cognitive control structures that universally precede and 
determine actions‖ (Suchman 2007/2009: 13), Suchman has stressed the embodied and 
enacted character of knowing in action. Despite frequent misinterpretations, Suchman 
clarifies that she never argued that plans are not important for action or that they are in 
oppositions to (contingent) action. Rather she considers plans to be a special kind of 
action and is interested in ―[...] the relation between the activity of planning and the 
conduct of actions-according-to-plan‖ (Suchman 2007/2009: 21).  
This shift in understanding a) rational action not to be the result of a plan developed and 
then carried out by a secluded reasoner, and b) considering this reasoner not as a 
―bounded, rational entity but [rather] as an unfolding, shifting biography of culturally 
specific experience and relations, inflected for each of us in uniquely particular ways‖ 
(Suchman 2007/2009: 23) challenged some of the cognitive, or cognitivistic foundations 
of HCI as well as AI at that time. Such a model of intelligent action is in opposition to a 
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classical model of a detached reasoner who has escaped the contingencies of time, 
space, technology, materiality or discourse, the ―the heterogeneous sociomateriality and 
real-time contingency of performance‖, as she calls it (Suchman 2007/2009: xii).  
Given the socio-epistemological framework of this thesis, this proposal is a particular 
relevance, because this picture of a reasoner as an autonomous, rational being that 
ponders in solitude, outside of time and space was not only characteristic of AI and HIC, 
but has also been the standard model of a reasoner in philosophy. Although, social 
epistemology aims at correcting this picture many authors even within social 
epistemology are still in the grip of this individualistic view, as is shown in the next 
chapters. Thus, a crucial insight to be obtained from Lucy Suchmans‘s work concerns 
this departure from a monadic view of reasoning and the embrace of a more situated, 
relational view on cognition and reasoning.  
As noted before Human-Machine-Reconfigurations (Suchman 2007/2009) amends the 
original publications of Plans and Situated Actions (Suchman 1987) by some additional 
chapters. In these chapters Suchman takes into account the work that has been done in 
the twenty years between those two publications. For Suchman, taking these insights 
from STS, especially feminist STS, but also from other fields within the social science 
and humanities serious has two important consequences for studying the socio-technical. 
And these methodological consequences culminate in two research imperatives: expand 
frames and make accountable cuts (Suchman 2007/2009)! 
What does Suchman mean by cutting and framing? Suchman‘s usage of the term cut 
refers back to Barad agential cuts introduced in the previous section. Focusing on cuts, 
Suchman points our attention to how objects of analysis are created by being cut out of 
entangled networks. Consistent with her critique of individualistic ontologies, she argues 
that objects of analyses or intervention are not given, but made by different cuts into the 
socio-material assemblages. Such boundary work, the making of differences, is a basic 
foundation of reasoning. There is no sense-making without making differences, without 
separating some and joining others, an insight well documented in cognitive science and 
psychology. However, as necessary and unavoidable, as implicit and unnoticed this 
process of differentiating and cutting is – it is always also a political act. Every cut, 
every distinction includes some and excludes others – and every inclusion and exclusion 
is consequential for the socio-material assemblage as a whole. Referring back to Karen 
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Barad‘s agential realism, Suchman notes that ―because boundaries have real 
consequences, accountability is mandatory‖ Suchman 2007/2009: 285, quoting Barad 
2007: 187).  
However, acknowledging the relational and entangled nature of the sociomaterial, 
implies that agency cannot be localized in individual entities, but rather is distributed 
within socio-material assemblages. As Suchman notes, again resonating Barad ―[...] 
agencies – and associated accountabilities – reside neither in us nor in our artifacts but in 
our intra-actions‖ (Suchman 2007/2009: 285). The question, however, remains how 
exactly to be responsible, how to hold or to be held accountable if agency is distributed. 
How can we maintain responsibility and accountability in such a networked, dynamic 
and relational matrix? Although I think that Suchman goes into the right direction, she 
remains quite vague about this in her concluding remarks of Human-Machine-
Reconfigurations. She states that ―[r]esponsibility on this view is met neither through 
control nor abdication but in ongoing practical, critical, and generative acts of 
engagement. The point in the end is not to assign agency either to persons or to things 
but to identify the materialization of subjects, objects, and the relations between them as 
an effect, more and less durable and contestable, of ongoing sociomaterial practices‖ 
(Suchman 2007/2009: 286). And one of the crucial tasks in this enterprise consists in 
extending the frames of analysis ―[...] to metaphorically zoom out to a wider view that at 
once acknowledges the magic of the effects created while explicating the hidden labors 
and unruly contingencies that exceed its bounds‖(Suchman 2007/2009: 283f).  
Suchman‘s work is instructive for this thesis for several reasons. First of all, Suchman‘s 
performative, dynamic and relational understanding of the socio-technical can help to 
understand the ways in which certain epistemic methods, values and norms are being 
reinforced through repeated socio-technical epistemic practices. Moreover, Suchman‘s 
treats socio-material assemblages as objects of analysis and intervention. That is she 
focuses on critical analyses just as much as on conclusions concerning the design and 
development of technologies. In line with her explicit request for critical technology 
design, she offers conclusions on how to accommodate for these insights for technology 
design and development. In particular this refers to her request to expand frames, to 
reflect and question frameworks of modeling, to develop new alternative models, to 
open up new perspectives and enable re-configurations of the socio-material.  
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Another crucial aspect concerns the difference between humans and machines. Suchman 
acknowledges that it has been important to tear down the proclaimed boundaries 
between humans and machines and that this has opened up new ways of thinking about 
their relationship in a more performative and dynamic way. However, the time for her 
seems to be ready to go a step further, to make another ―agential cut‖ in order to get a 
grip on the consequences of these differences. Her notion of accountable cuts is a 
reminder that even if making cuts is unavoidable, boundaries have consequences and 
that accordingly we are responsible and accountable for the cuts we make. Crucially, for 
Suchman being aware of one‘s cuts and frames as well as the duty to expand frames and 
make accountable cuts is not only the task for some critical social scientists or feminist 
scholars. Rather it is the technology designers and developers themselves who have to 
expand their frames and be accountable for the cuts they make. Drawing lines, making 
boundaries are basic tasks in our daily acting in the world just as much as they are basic 
tasks for designers of technologies. But those cuts are never innocent, they have 
consequences, they include and exclude, and we are to be held accountable for the 
consequences of our actions even if we cannot foresee them.  
Adopting such a dynamic and entangled view on socio-material assemblages may lead 
to the conclusion that since consequences of our interventions are not controllable, there 
is no need for critical intervention. After all, one of the lessons learned from Suchman, 
but also from other feminist STS approaches portrayed before is that if we take 
performativity and relationality into account, it is futile to assume that we could directly 
inscribe certain values to achieve certain effects. However, this insight does not mean 
that we can let ourselves off the hook too easily. On the one hand, the critical analytic 
tasks of analyzing effects of certain interventions, of expanding the frames, of opening 
black boxes and conceiving alternative models for technology design remains. 
Moreover, as Suchman reminds us, the solution for this dilemma of distributed agency 
in entangled socio-material assemblages can only lie in ―[...] the processes ongoing 
practical, critical, and generative acts of engagement‖ (Suchman 2007/2009, 286) with 
the world we live in. Thus, there is room for critical analysis and critical technology 
development – and a request to join this endeavor.  
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3.2 Values and the Politics of Technology 
In this chapter I have briefly sketched the major approaches in STS as well as some 
feminist critiques and extensions of STS that appeared particularly relevant for this 
thesis. To conclude this chapter I would like to return to one major issue that has been 
underlying many previously outlined debates. It is the relationship between the societal 
values and technologies. The guiding questions for this section are: What do we mean 
by saying that societal values are inscribed into technology? Or looking the other way: 
What do we mean by saying that technology might influence and change societal 
values?  
To approach these issues, we first of all have to address the question of what values are. 
The second crucial question concerns the procedural character of this relationship 
between the technical and the societal. Taking claims about the performativity of the 
socio-technical serious we have to ask whether the notion of inscription might not be 
misleading in suggesting the existence and interaction of two disparate entities, thus 
fostering a dichotomy that should rather be abandoned. Besides such constitutive 
questions around the relationship between technologies and societal values, there are 
also questions concerning the consequences of any such conceptualization. For instance, 
can the inscription of values, the role values play in technology design be avoided? 
Should they be avoided? Is it even possible to promote a responsible and accountable 
design that takes the insights from STS serious? To open up this debate on the 
relationship between values and technologies I return to the beginning of STS, to one of 
its funding texts: Langdon Winner‘s ―Do artifacts have politics?‖ (Winner 1980).  
3.2.1 Inscription and The Politics of Artifacts 
The Starting Point: Winner’s Bridges 
In this widely cited article, Winner argues that technologies are by no means neutral, but 
that they have political properties by embodying ―[...] specific forms of power and 
authority‖ (Winner 1980 121). Referring back to Lewis Mumford‘s differentiation 
between authoritarian and democratic technologies, Winner offers a diversity of 
examples to support his claim that artifacts have politics. While the political nature of 
the atom bomb may be straightforward, Winner‘s other examples appear much more 
innocent at first sight: the mechanical tomato harvester, cotton-spinning mills, 
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automobile assembly teams, and Baron Haussmann‘s re-structuring of Paris. Given the 
number of examples in a quite short article, it should not come as a surprise that all 
those examples are only briefly introduced and none of them reaches the level of a full 
case study – and neither does his most famous - or infamous – example: Robert Moses‘s 
parkway bridges in New York.  
Winner‘s empirical starting point for his analyses on the politics of artifacts has been the 
observation that the parkway bridges in New York are ―extraordinarily low‖ (Winner 
1980: 123). The person in charge of building those bridges was Robert Moses, ―[...] 
legendary political entrepreneur, who has shaped the physical form of New York in this 
century and beyond as no other person‖ (Joerges 1999: 412). Departing from this 
seemingly innocent empirical observation about the height of the parkway bridges, 
Winner argues that Moses intentionally had those bridges built that low to ―discourage 
the presence of buses on his parkways‖. By this trick he was able to ―[...] limit access of 
racial minorities and low-income groups to Jones Beach, Moses's widely acclaimed 
public park‖ (Winner 1980: 124). Winner argues that the design of those parkway 
bridges reflects ―[...] Moses's social-class bias and racial prejudice‖ (Winner 1980 123) 
and concludes: ―Many of his monumental structures of concrete and steel embody a 
systematic social inequality, a way of engineering relationships among people that, after 
a time, becomes just another part of the landscape.‖(Winner 1980: 124).  
Winner argues that due to his social and political power as a city planner, Moses was 
able to inscribe his race and class related prejudices into the design of parkway bridges. 
By making them too low for buses to drive through, he was able to prevent black people 
as well as other low-income groups dependent on public transportation, from accessing 
these most scenic routes and the places where they led. To put it in a nutshell, Winner 
argues that Moses intentionally inscribed his values and prejudices into technology in 
order to achieve certain societal effects.  
The Refutation Which Did Not Matter 
Almost 20 years later, this seemingly straightforward story was refuted by Bernward 
Joerges, who claimed that Winner‘s story about the parkway bridges while being a 
―highly successful parable‖ (Joerges 1999: 416), unfortunately is counterfactual. Based 
on correspondences with US civil engineers Joerges asserts that commercial traffic was 
forbidden on the parkways in general and that since the transport situation on Long 
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Island was already good, there was no reason to waste the money on building higher 
bridges. Hence, Joerges concludes that ―Moses could hardly have let buses on his 
parkways, even if he had wanted differently‖(Joerges 1999: 419, italics in original).  
Irrespective of these methodological flaws and the questionable conclusions, Winner‘s 
example is a success story. It‘s been recited in almost all account of STS, including this 
thesis and keeps inspiring research until nowadays. How is that possible? Despite his 
thorough critique and his analyses of Winner‘s story as a rhetorical device, Joerges 
himself already concludes that Winner‘s story serves a purpose: ― to resituate positions 
in the old debate about the control of social processes via buildings and other technical 
artifacts – or more generally, about material form and social content‖(Joerges 1999: 
411).  
To understand how Winner‘s story – for better or worse – has become so successful, one 
has to contextualize the story itself. Originally published in 1980, this simple, 
rhetorically brilliant, short and easily transferrable parable about technologies in society 
was very seductive for many reasons. As Joerges summarizes: ―Enormous interpretive 
flexibility, unambiguous empirical reference, elegant theoretical formula. And all that 
coupled with an urgent political-moral message. Not bad.‖ (Joerges 1999 420f). 
What was so promising and inspiring about Winner‘s case is that he delivered a simple 
and strong case for the inscription of societal values into technology and the societal 
effects of such biased technologies. It is this insistence on the political character of 
artifacts and the possibility of social engineering through technology that hit the 
Zeitgeist of critical science and technology scholars. Winner initiated a discussion about 
the politics of artifacts by refuting the assumption that technologies are neutral or follow 
some inner-technological rationality. Instead he stressed the societal environment with 
all its values, prejudices and assumptions that get inscribed into these artifacts. In Moses 
case – and that makes this specific example even more seductive, there seemed to have 
been this powerful man who intentionally inscribed his views into technology, who 
quite literally carved his racial prejudices and societal inequalities into stone, made them 
durable and solidified them in artifacts, and ensured their enduring societal impact. 
Hence, it is not the validity of the claims of the article itself that explain its continued 
relevance, but the resonance that it caused. This is the reason why especially feminist 
scholars in STS still relate back to Winner‘s article, despite the refutation of the 
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particular case of Moses through Joerges. Winner‘s article has been and remains to be a 
starting point for considering artifacts to be potentially or actually political by showing 
how certain values get inscribed into technology and how such biased technologies have 
societal consequences. Almost all crucial issues of STS can be found in this short 
parable of the New York parkway bridges: social inequalities and injustices, inscription 
of societal values into technological artifacts, subsequent blackboxing and concrete 
societal effects of technologies. Thus, irrespective of its counterfactuality, Winner‘s 
article offered all ingredients for a perfect case study. And the notion of inscription in 
particular has been thoroughly influential.  
Inscription: From Winner to ANT and Feminist STS 
Despite many pronounced differences between Winner and ANT, the concept of 
inscription itself is a central concept in ANT as well (Akrich and Latour 1992). It has 
been employed in particular in Madeleine Akrich‘s analyses. Her script model has made 
the concept of inscription, as well as the processes of de-scription, transcription and re-
inscription fruitful (Akrich 1992). Akrich argues that ―[a] large part of the work of 
innovators is that of ―inscribing‖ their vision of (or prediction about) the world in the 
technical content of a new object" (Akrich 1992: 208). She calls the end product of this 
work a script and argues that ―[...] like a film script, technical objects define a 
framework of action together with the actors and the space in which they are supposed 
to act‖ (Akrich 1992: 208).  
Both Akrich and Winner claim to avoid social determinism as much as technological 
determinism, but they follow different lines of reasoning for this. One crucial difference 
between Winner and Akrich, is that while Winner stresses the intentions and actions of 
the master designers, such as Robert Moses, Akrich emphasizes the interplay between 
designers‘ plans and the users‘ actions, the interaction between ―[...] the world inscribed 
in the object and the world described by its displacement (Akrich 1992: 209). Thus, by 
focusing on the possibilities of adjustment and appropriation through the users, Akrich 
offers a more nuanced version of the respective relevance of designers and users. 
One may read Akrich‘s case studies about the appropriation of technological artifacts, 
such as the photoelectric lighting, as arguments that the innovators visions and 
intentions should not be overrated, because the outcome depends on usage in the end. 
However, I think this interpretation goes too far, because Akrich herself notes that it is 
99 
 
only in usage contexts which are quite different from the developmental contexts that 
such appropriation occurs. In the majority of cases, namely those situations in which 
the context of development and the context of usage are more similar however, the 
scripts of technical objects remain crucial, because they set the limits and affordances of 
the usage of the technical objects. This means that although usage is relevant and 
appropriation possible, design decisions remain important, or in Akrich‘s own words: 
―[...] although users add their own interpretations, so long as the circumstances in which 
the device is used do not diverge too radically from those predicted by the designers, it 
is likely that the script will become a major element for interpreting interaction between 
the object and its users‖ (Akrich 1992: 216).  
After this inscription has taken place, the artifacts are closed and the processes of 
development are blackboxed. Reminiscent of Winner, Akrich concludes her analyses 
with the following remark concerning the politics of artifacts: ―This is why it makes 
sense to say that technical objects have political strength. They may change social 
relations, but they also stabilize, naturalize, depoliticize, and translate these into other 
media. After the event, the processes involved in building up technical objects are 
concealed. The causal links they established are naturalized. There was, or so it seems, 
never any possibility that it could have been otherwise‖ (Akrich 1992: 222).  
It should not come as a surprise that feminist scholars have adopted the idea of an 
inscription of societal values into technologies and their influence back onto society and 
societal values. More specifically, feminist scholars appropriated Winner‘s claims as 
well as Akrich‘s script model to analyze and show how gender stereotypes and related 
inequalities and injustices are inscribed into and reinforced through technology. One of 
the most influential extensions of Akrich‘s script model is the concept of gender scripts, 
with Ellen van Oost, Nelly Oudshoorn and Els Rommes as the main proponents (cf. 
Bath 2009). The gender script model allows analyzing how gender stereotypes get into 
technologies and in contrast to Akrich‘s original model does not only focus on the 
designers and the users of technologies. Rather it puts the broader societal environment 
into perspective and highlights other stakeholders as well as non-users. With the 
reference to non-users is becomes obvious that the gender script model focuses on 
inclusions and exclusions, a move that has been argued for in other feminist approaches 
portrayed before. Another crucial point about the gender script model, in which it 
explicitly departs from Winner concerns the intentionality of designers. As Els Rommes 
100 
 
notes, ―[...] a gender script will rarely be the result of conscious attempts of designers to 
exclude certain users. Rather, it will be the result of unconscious repetitions and 
reiterations of the hegemonic masculine norm‖ (Rommes 2002: 19, quoted from Bath 
2009: 83).  
What conclusions can be drawn from Winner, Akrich‘s and their feminist extension 
concerning the inscription of values or the role values play for the socio-technical? What 
are the consequences for this thesis? First of all, we should acknowledge the political 
character of technological artifacts. Decisions made in technological design and 
development have consequences that go beyond the look-and-feel of technological 
artifacts. Such decisions set affordances and limits. Even if artifacts can be used in ways 
other than intended by the designers, if defaults can be changed or subverted, they 
deliver the keys for interpretation, which have to be actively circumvented to be undone. 
Further, we have seen that the intentionality of the designer is not a necessary 
prerequisite for the politics of technologies. Indeed, this may even be the exception and 
most inscriptions of values and stereotypes may occur rather implicit. Finally, the term 
inscription should be used with caution, since it implies not only intentionality, but also 
a directness of societal values implemented in technologies leading to societal effects 
that contradicts insights concerning the entangled nature of the socio-technical.  
3.3 The Pragmatic Turn: Values in Design 
If these are the analytical insights from Winner and STS more generally, what 
constructive conclusions can be drawn from them? If we consider technologies to be in 
principle and possibly ineluctably political, what are the consequences to be drawn from 
this observation? Do we have to remain on the analytical and critical side, disclosing in 
what ways and with which consequences, artifacts are biased? Are we confined to the 
role of those crying ―wolf!‖ if some questionable values are being inscribed into 
technology, which might have detrimental effects for different groups users and non-
users?  
Despite my deep conviction, that such a watchdog role, will remain crucial for critical 
scholars of technologies, this is not the only imaginable role. One at least equally 
important task will be to develop guidelines and recommendations of how to develop 
value-sensitive technologies, i.e. technologies that not only function well, but that take 
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the insights obtained from critical STS serious. Thus, instead of only revealing, which 
biases and prejudices have been inscribed into technologies and demonstrating their 
negative consequences different agents, it should be possible to play a more constructive 
role within the process of technology design and development. According to Flanagan, 
Howe et al. such a ―[...] pragmatic turn [...] sets forth values as a design aspiration, 
exhorting designers and producers to include values, purposively, in the set of criteria by 
which the excellence of technologies is judged‖ (Flanagan, Howe et al. 2008: 322). 
Accordingly, in the remaining part of this chapter, I focus on approaches that try to 
bridge the gap between critical analysis and reflection and the development of 
technological artifacts. To describe these approaches I use the label Values in Design. 
Values in Design as conceived here is not a clear-cut program with a distinct set of 
methods, theories or scholars. Its roots lie in STS, just as much as in applied ethics and 
critical design practices within computer science and the term is rather meant to refer to 
a broader set of approaches that twists the insights obtained from STS and critical 
technology studies into developing guidelines or recommendations for technology 
design. 
The publication of the seminal book “Human Values and the Design of Computer 
Technology‖ edited by Batya Friedman can surely be seen as a catalyst for the 
pragmatic or constructive turn in debates around values in design and may thus serve as 
a vantage point for this portrayal (Friedman 1997a). For this anthology, which marks 
one of the major points of departure for any systematic analysis of values in design in 
the field of computer science itself, Friedman brought together an interdisciplinary 
group of acclaimed scholars tackling the issues around values in computer and 
information system design. In her introduction, she asserts that although designers 
hardly think about values in their daily business, they ―[...] necessarily impart social and 
moral values‖ (Friedman 1997b: 1). But if that‘s the case, she further asks: ―Yet how? 
What values? Whose values? For if human values – such as freedom of speech, rights to 
property, accountability, privacy, and autonomy- are controversial, then on what basis 
do some values override others in the design of, say, hardware, algorithms, and 
databases?‖ (Friedman 1997b: 1).  
In her anthology, Friedman focuses on moral values, which she sets aside from personal 
and conventional values. She grounds this distinction between moral values and 
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conventional values in certain psychological literature, where moral knowledge is 
distinguished from conventional and personal knowledge (e.g. Nucci 1996; Smetana 
1983, both cited from Friedman 1997b). To my mind, this distinction is problematic 
taking into account that moral values can be considered to be societal conventions 
themselves. Moreover, even the briefest look at information systems design reveals that 
how values are effectively introduced and stabilized through standardization, a 
paradigmatic case of societal conventions. Indeed, within Friedman‘s anthology, the 
debate between Lucy Suchman, Terry Winograd, and Thomas W. Malone is a clear 
indicator of the import and ―value-laddenness‖ of standardization, classification and the 
definition of categories (Suchman 1997, Malone 1997, Winograd 1997). More 
generally, it has been particularly the works of Geoffrey Bowker and Susan Leigh Star 
that have clearly shown the import classification and standardization and the values at 
play in them (Bowker and Star 1999). Hence before getting into the details of how to 
make use of values for information systems design, it may be necessary to take a closer 
look at what is meant by values.  
3.3.1 Approaching Values  
Throughout this whole chapter I have implicitly talked about values. Different STS 
scholars have emphasized the inscription of certain societal values into technologies, the 
ways in which such values get reinforced by technologies, how they are recitated and 
stabilized in socio-technical systems, the ways in which technologies might change 
societal values, etc.. Despite its manifold appearance, the term value did never get 
properly introduced in this chapter. Before the hopes get too high, let me interject, that I 
do not deliver any substantial let alone any comprehensive introduction to the topic of 
values. The reason for this – again – is that the topic is too broad to be just slipped into a 
subsection of this thesis. Even if only applied to the fields of science or technology, the 
discussions around the topic of values are broad, deep and diverse.  
What are values? The Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary offers seven different 
definitions of value, ranging from a ―fair return or equivalent in goods, services, or 
money for something exchanged‖, over the monetary or relative worth of something as 
well as the concepts of value in mathematics and music all the way to an understanding 
of value as ―something (as a principle or quality) intrinsically valuable or desirable‖ 
(Merriam-Webster-Online-Dictionary 2009).  
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As should become obvious from the definition above, the concept of values is not only 
widely, but also diversely used in our society. Philosophers have discussed the intension 
as well as the extension of values, the differences between shared values and personal 
values, between values as norms and values as feelings to name just a few examples 
(Mitcham 2005). Despite such philosophical debates around values, there are also other 
disciplinary perspectives on values. In an article on values and valuing in the 
Encyclopedia of Science, Technology, and Ethics, Mitcham differentiates between 
economic, social scientific and philosophical perspectives on values (Mitcham 2005). 
Accordingly, although people use the notion of values frequently in their daily life, what 
is meant by values is far from clear and differs profoundly between and even within 
disciplines.  
Clearly, not all of these issues can be dealt with in this thesis, so some focusing is 
necessary here. Given the topic of this thesis, I focus on definitions of values within the 
field of Values in Design itself, which also sets the frame for this section. For their 
analyses and methodological recommendations concerning value sensitive design of 
information systems, Friedman and her colleagues, for instance, define values quite 
broadly as something that ―[...] a person or group of people consider important in life‖ 
(Friedman, Kahn et al. 2006: 349). They relate their definition to the Oxford English 
Dictionary definition of value as ―[...] the principles or standards of a person or society, 
the personal or societal judgement of what is valuable and important in life‖ (Simpson 
and Weiner 1989, quoted after Friedman, Kahn et al. 2006: 349). In many articles on 
values and technologies, authors suspend from giving definitions of values altogether 
and confine themselves to giving some examples or to list those values they consider 
relevant for information systems.  
For this thesis, the following specifications are made. First of all, while one might 
clearly argue that economic values also play a role for social software, it is rather the 
social science and philosophical perspectives that is be relevant for this thesis. More 
concisely, it is the sociological concepts of shared societal values as well as the ethical 
examination of values that are most relevant in this section. Moreover, despite the role 
that personal values of designer might play in the development of technologies, the 
focus of this thesis is on societal values, i.e. values as socially shared judgments about 
what and who is how important. This understanding of societal values as shared 
judgments does not imply that values are universally shared - quite on the contrary. 
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Values are always someone‘s values, the shared judgments of some group and not 
another. And indeed, the fact that values differ between groups explains why despite the 
fact that values are predominantly considered to be a positive notion, they have been the 
introduced as something to be avoided in science as well as in technology design and 
development.  
If values are shared judgments about what is important in life, it is clear that such 
judgments might differ between different people. And then the question arises whose 
values are talked about, whose values are relevant and whose values get ignored or even 
antagonized. When values are inscribed – irrespective of good or bad intentions, it is 
always a process of imposing one‘s view on others. And in the case of technology, these 
values are not only made invisible, they are also solidified in the artifacts. Hence, it is 
this combination of invisibility and enduring impact, which makes a proper analysis of 
values in technologies all the more relevant.  
With respect to science, Mitcham indicates that there is a bidirectional relationship 
between values and science, by stating that ―[v]alues and valuing are as much a 
challenge to science as science is to values‖ (Mitcham 2005). In adopting the same view 
on technology, this would mean that not only do societal values influence technology 
design. Technologies themselves also influence and may change societal values. Thus, 
the moment we take part in technology design, we are to be held responsible and 
accountable for the decision we make, because they might have societal consequences. 
The crucial question therefore has to be how we can account for the critical insights 
obtained from science and technology studies while also accounting for and taking part 
in the nitty-gritty of technology design and development. In the following I give two 
examples of analyses of information and communication technologies with respect to 
the values of accountability and freedom from bias. I also portray two methodological 
approaches of how to consider values in the process of technology design developed by 
Batya Friedman as well as Helen Nissenbaum and her colleagues. But before turning to 
the examples I want to return the topic of intentionality and its relation to values.  
3.3.2 Intentionality Revisited 
In the previous sections, I have argued that intentionality is not necessary for values to 
be inscribed into technology. However, the opposite claim, that the intentional 
inscription of values is impossible does not hold true. Although intentionality is not 
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necessary for values to be inscribed into technological artifacts, it clearly is possible to 
inscribe one‘s values intentionally into technologies. Thus, it is of course imaginable 
that some racist, sexist programmer develops a tool that discriminates systematically 
against women and people of different race. But if we grant that some evil designer 
might use his or her technological artifact for some evil social engineering, we must also 
allow for the possibility to inscribe desirable values into technologies.  
However, one of the lessons learned from the previous sections of this chapter is that the 
results of any attempt of social engineering by explicitly inscribing certain values into 
technology are far from clear. Taking the role of the users, the possibilities of 
appropriation and subversion serious, we have to acknowledge that there is no direct 
link between technology design and societal effects. If this is true for the negative 
examples of biases and prejudices, of the inscription of societal inequalities and 
injustices into technologies, then the same must be true for any attempt to change the 
world for the better with the help of technologies. As critical scholars just as much as 
designers it is our duty to reflect upon the values we wish to inscribe into the 
technologies we develop. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that even our best 
intention cannot be subverted. But, as insisted before, this recognition of the 
performative and entangled character of the socio-technical does not diminish the 
responsibility of designers – it just puts this accountability and responsibility into 
context. And the field that I consider to be most promising in that respect is Values in 
Design. Let‘s have a look how scholars in the field of values and design have tackled 
that task of being critical analysts and constructive designers at the same time.  
3.3.3 Which Values? Two Examples for Socio-Technical Systems 
In this section I want to give two examples of values that play a role in computer 
technology and information systems design. The two values that I focus on are 
accountability and freedom from bias, because I consider them to be among the most 
relevant ones for this thesis. 
Accountability was chosen, because in the previous sections, most notably in those on 
the feminist approaches in STS, accountability and responsibility have been identified as 
crucial aspects for critical analyses of socio-technical systems. Moreover, it has been 
argued that in entangled and networked environments, finding the locus of 
accountability and responsibility is not only more important, but unfortunately also more 
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difficult. Since the examples of epistemic social software depicted in the previous 
chapter are a clear case of such entangled networks with distributed agency, issues of 
accountability and responsibility are of particular concern. 
Similar reasons made me chose freedom from bias as the second values I want to put 
stress on. Analyses conducted by feminist scholars in particular have emphasized that in 
many socio-technical systems, different groups of people are affected differently, that 
design decision have different consequences for people depending on the groups to 
which they belong. As has been noted before, it might not be possible to ensure that no-
one is ever treated unfairly and even with the best intentions, discrimination against 
some people or others can occur. However, this does not diminish the duty to watch out 
for such injustices and to propose ideas of how to avoid them.  
Accountability 
In an early essay on values and computer technology, Helen Nissenbaum warns from the 
danger that in a society as pervaded by computer technology as ours, problems of 
accountability occur. More specifically, she identifies four barriers to ensure 
―accountability in a computerized society‖69 (Nissenbaum 1997). These four barriers 
are:  
―1) the problem of many hands, (2) the problem of bugs, (3) blaming the computer, and 
(4) software ownership without liability‖ (Nissenbaum 1997: 41). Nissenbaum suggests 
that once a society is entrenched with computer technology, two related issues come to 
the fore: reliability and safety of technologies on the one hand and accountability in case 
of malfunctioning on the other. It is especially when systems are not highly reliable, that 
accountability becomes crucial. However, she argues that due to the before mentioned 
four barriers accountability in a computerized society is eroding, while reliability is still 
limited. In short, she argues that the more computerized a society gets, the harder 
accountability is to maintain and at the same time the need for accountability rises. 
Drawing on the concept of moral blame (Feinberg 1985, cited from Nissenbaum 1997), 
she analyses how these four barriers might threaten accountability in computerized 
societies.  
The example of the problem of many hands serves as a good starting point because this 
problem if of special relevance for the analysis of epistemic social software, those socio-
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 This is also the title of the essay (Nissenbaum 1997). 
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technical epistemic systems which form the center of this thesis. Nissenbaum argues that 
since most software solutions are not only produced in different settings, by a variety of 
people, but also often modular and integrated into other systems and applications, it 
becomes more and more difficult to target the source of error, to find the ones 
responsible and make them accountable for their actions and the consequences they have 
caused. By referring to one of the major examples of socio-technical epistemic systems 
used in this thesis, Wikipedia, the problem (but of course also the benefits) of many 
hands soon becomes obvious. The errors, for which you might want to make people 
responsible, could be severe misinformation or libel on the Wikipedia pages. Despite the 
constant reminder of the ease of revision to counter errors in Wikipedia, flamewars have 
not been rare, especially not on politically controversial entries. A tool that has been 
explicitly developed to improve the accountability of Wikipedia is the Wikiscanner, now 
labeled WikiWatcher.
70
 With the help of this tool it is possible to track the institution 
behind the IP-numbers of the contributors. Due to the tracking of IP-numbers it was 
possible to show which organizations made which changes to Wikipedia. And of 
particular interest here are of course the changes that served the organizational, 
institutional or political interest of those making such changes in Wikipedia.  
Using the computer as a scapegoat is another barrier Nissenbaum acknowledges 
(Nissenbaum 1997) and it should be seen as a way of shirking responsibility that should 
simply be avoided. The problem of bugs, however, may deserve more attention. Bugs 
are software errors that seem inevitable in programming. The problem with bugs as a 
threat to accountability is that they are clearly not intentionally inserted into software, 
but quite to the contrary a result of ignorance or neglect. The only way to amend for the 
threat of bugs to accountability lies in ensuring quality standards in software design that 
minimize the risk of major bugs. And this task must be considered an ongoing effort. 
The final barrier that Nissenbaum enlists is ownership without liability and it refers to 
current property right regulation over software. She criticizes that while traditionally, 
ownership not only comes with rights, but also with responsibilities, there is a recent 
trend in software copyright law to allow software companies to have rights without 
being responsible anymore.  
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To restore accountability, Nissenbaum offers three possible strategies. ―Explicit 
standards of care‖ are guidelines of good practice or measure of excellence, that will be 
especially relevant to distinguish negligence from failures despite best efforts. With her 
request to ―distinguish accountability from liability‖ Nissenbaum wants to stress that 
while ―[...] appraisals of liability are grounded in the plight of a victim, [...] appraisals of 
accountability are grounded in the relationship of an agent to an outcome‖(Nissenbaum 
1997: 59). She argues that particularly with respect to the problem of many hands, 
differentiating between those two concepts might help to assure that no one who is 
accountable gets let off the hook too easily. With her final recommendation, she aims at 
enforcing ―strict reliability and producer responsibility‖, because ―[w]ell-articulated 
policies on liability would serve the practical purpose of protecting public interests 
against some of the risks of computer system failure which are further amplified by a 
reluctance on the part of producers and owners of systems-in-use to be accountable for 
them‖ (Nissenbaum 1997: 60f).  
Freedom from Bias 
Freedom from bias is a crucial goal for the development of any socio-technical system 
and much of the work in STS, as well as in feminist STS has focused on detecting and 
remedying bias in such systems. In their article on ―Bias in Computer Systems‖ 
Friedman and Nissenbaum offer a taxonomy of biases that appears useful not only for 
future analyses of existing socio-technical system, but also as a guideline for the 
development of new tools (Friedman and Nissenbaum 1997). 
First of all, what is bias in computer systems? The two authors use bias ―[...] to refer to 
computer systems that systematically and unfairly discriminate against certain 
individuals or groups of individuals in favor of others‖ (Friedman and Nissenbaum 
1997: 23). Two notions are crucial: for bias to occur it is not sufficient that people are 
treated unfairly, this treatment has to be systematic be called bias. Moreover, the 
systematic distortion alone is also not considered to be bias, the distortion must also lead 
to unfair results. (Friedman and Nissenbaum 1997) then identify three different 
categories of bias of relevance for computer systems: preexisting bias, technical bias and 
emergent bias.  
Preexisting bias refers to ―bias [which] has its roots in social institutions, practices, and 
attitudes‖ (Friedman and Nissenbaum 1997: 24). This is the type of bias that has stirred 
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most analyses in STS. This form of bias is a classic example of all those societal 
injustices or personal prejudices that get inscribed into technology, be it intentionally or 
unintentionally.  
Technical bias however is something different. This type of bias is not rooted in societal 
values, but rather arises within the process of technology design, when designers make 
technical decisions in certain ways and not in others, when they opt for one algorithm as 
opposed to another. The sources of technical bias that (Friedman and Nissenbaum 1997) 
list are limitations of computer tools, decontextualized algorithms, methods of 
randomization, and the biases that occur then human concepts have to be formalized to 
match the formats needed for computing.  
Finally, the notion of emergent bias accounts for the fact that biases might occur later on 
through usage and appropriation of computer systems. Typically, such bias occurs when 
either the society in which the system is used changes, a process which Friedman and 
Nissenbaum describe as ―new societal knowledge‖. The second reason for emergent bias 
has its roots in a mismatch between users and system design with respect to different 
expertise or values. This aspect is reminiscent of Madeleine Akrich‘s analyses of 
technologies that are used in contexts other than the ones where they have been 
developed (Akrich 1992).  
Based on this taxonomy and the case studies they analyze, (Friedman and Nissenbaum 
1997) draw several conclusions concerning the necessity to avoid bias in computer 
systems and define tasks for designers involved in the creation of computer systems. 
First of all, to avoid pre-existing bias, designers have to be aware of such pre-existing 
biases and be sensitive to what they possible inscribe into their systems. More precisely, 
the propose rapid prototyping, the inclusion of different users groups into the design 
process, formative evaluation and field testing as tasks that should minimize this type of 
bias. For technical and even more so for emergent bias, designers moreover have to 
envision they consequences and possible appropriations of their systems in different 
contexts. In order to achieve this, the authors propose the anticipation of probable 
contexts of usage, the articulation of constraints and the possibility to take corrective 
action once emergent bias becomes obvious.  
They conclude their article with the following sentence, which I fully agree with: 
―Because biased computer systems are instruments of injustice – though admittedly, 
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their degree of seriousness can vary considerably – we believe that Freedom from bias 
should be counted among the select set of criteria accord; to which the quality of 
systems in use in society should be judged‖ (Friedman and Nissenbaum 1997: 39). And 
despite the fact that freedom from bias can only be held out as an ideal, it is nonetheless 
the duty of designers to strive for this ideal.  
3.3.4 Developing Methodologies: Two Examples 
In the following two approaches are briefly portrayed that have explicitly tried to 
provide methodologies and guidelines for computer and information systems design, 
that account for insights from STS, computer ethics and other critical approaches. These 
two approaches are Batya Friedman‘s Value Sensitive Design as well as a the approach 
developed by Mary Flanagan, Daniel C. Howe and Helen Nissenbaum in the context of 
the project Values at Play.  
Friedman ‘s Value Sensitive Design  
The central role of Batya Friedman for the broader field of Values in Design has been 
indicated before. In this section, I want to depict her methodological approach, which 
she labels Value Sensitive Design. In a recent article on ―Value Sensitive Design and 
Information Systems‖ Friedman and her colleagues describe their account in great detail 
and show how it takes insights Computer Ethics, as well as more empirical and technical 
fields, such as Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW), Social Informatics and 
Participatory Design serious to develop methods and guidelines of technology design 
(Friedman, Kahn et al. 2006).
71
 They define Value Sensitive Design as a ―[...] 
theoretically grounded approach to the design of technology that accounts for human 
values in a principled and comprehensive manner throughout the design process. It 
employs an integrative and iterative tripartite methodology, consisting of conceptual, 
empirical, and technical investigations‖ (Friedman, Kahn et al. 2006: 348).  
As noted before, Friedman and her colleagues define values quite broadly as that which 
people consider important in their lives. Clearly, such a broad concept leaves room for a 
variety of values of different degrees of abstractness. In their decidedly non-
comprehensive list of values that may play a role in information system design, they 
include the following examples: human welfare, ownership and property, privacy, 
                                                 
71
 The description of their approach in this section is primarily based on this article of not noted otherwise. 
111 
 
freedom from bias, universal usability, trust, autonomy, informed consent, and 
accountability. With respect to systems design, they complement this list with those 
other values: courtesy, identity, calmness, and environmental sustainability (Friedman, 
Kahn et al. 2006).  
Their methodology consists in an iterative integration of three parts: conceptual, 
empirical and technical investigations. Conceptual investigations encompass not only 
the identification of relevant values, but also the identification of different direct and 
indirect stakeholders. By including indirect stakeholders into the arena of analyses, they 
amend for the frequent neglect of non-users, of groups which may not be considered 
relevant but which are nonetheless affected by technologies (Wyatt 2005, Oudshoorn 
and Pinch 2005b). Relevant questions at this stage are concern the different stakeholders 
and the ways in which they are affected; the relative importance of different values as 
well as the trade-offs between conflicting values, etc.  
The empirical part makes use of a diversity of quantitative and qualitative research 
methods from the social sciences to analyze how people actually conceive and prioritize 
different values, which role they play in the actual actions, etc. It is in this stage, that a 
performative understanding of socio-technical systems is taken serious, because in such 
an iterative, empirical methodology, usage and appropriation of technological artifacts 
can be observed and it can be analyzed whether the values intended in the design 
process were fulfilled, amended, subverted, etc.  
The technical investigations as described by Friedman, Kahn et al. (Friedman, Kahn et 
al. 2006) consist of two parts. The first one focuses on the role values play in existing 
technologies and is in principle similar to analytic approaches portrayed in the sections 
before only with a decided focus on the technology itself. The second aspect is more 
interesting and innovative, since it concerns the ―[...] proactive design of systems to 
support values identified in the conceptual investigation‖ (Friedman, Kahn et al. 2006: 
352). 
Friedman and her colleagues offer three case studies to show how their approach of 
Value Sensitive Design can be applied and indicate its points of originality. The case 
studies they offer concern cookies and informed consent in web browsers; the use of 
plasma displays to simulate windows in window-less offices; and UrbanSim, a 
simulation tool to predict patterns of urban development. Instead of depicting the details 
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of these case studies, I conclude this description of Value Sensitive Design with the 
points of originality that they claim.
72
  
First of all and crucially, Value Sensitive Design aims at being proactive in bringing 
forward the design of new value-sensitive artifacts instead of only analyzing existing 
technologies. With respect to values, they include a wide variety of moral values, 
usually not inherent in technology design. More precisely, they differentiate between 
moral values and functional values, such as usability and open up the possibility to 
weigh some values against others. Such value conflicts can not only occur between 
functional and moral values, but clearly also between different moral values, such as 
privacy versus security, accountability versus privacy, etc. They also take a useful stance 
in the debate of whether there is such a thing as universal values. They argue that the 
question of global or local values depends in the level of abstractness. For instance, the 
value of privacy in its most abstract form might be universally valid. However, what is 
meant by privacy, the extent to which is it needed varies in different settings.  
Most crucially, they consider Value Sensitive Design be an interactional theory, in the 
sense that ―[...] values are viewed neither as inscribed into technology (an endogenous 
theory), nor as simply transmitted by social forces (an exogenous theory). Rather, the 
interactional position holds that while the features or properties that people design into 
technologies more readily support certain values and hinder others, the technology‘s 
actual use depends on the goals of the people interacting with it‖ (Friedman, Kahn et al. 
2006: 361). This stance clearly resonates with performative notions of the socio-
technical described in the previous sections in that it allows for the possibility of 
appropriation, while considering design decisions to be relevant nonetheless.  
In comparison to fields such as Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW), they 
also have a broader set of applications in mind, which goes beyond the setting of 
workplaces. Moreover, they also broaden the scope of analysis by allowing not only for 
direct, but also for indirect stakeholder, and by doing provided a remedy for an overly 
exclusive focus on those stakeholders involved in the design and development of the 
artifacts. It is especially here, where power issues come into play, because as has been 
shown by various STS researchers, different stakeholder groups usually have different 
amounts of power. And finally, instead of remaining purely descriptive or analytic, they 
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offer a clear methodology and practical suggestion and heuristics that can serve as a 
guideline for designing and developing value-sensitive artifacts.  
Many of these points of originality resonate with approaches portrayed throughout this 
chapter. However, this should not come as a surprise given that Value Sensitive Design 
builds upon insights obtained in STS, Computer Ethics, Computer Supported 
Cooperative Work, Social Informatics and Participatory Design. Hence I would argue 
that it is not the single items that they list, which makes their approach unique. Rather it 
is the combination and their application to design practice that makes this approach so 
valuable. 
Flanagan, Howe & Nissenbaum’s Approach and “Values at Play” 
Another interesting methodology in the field of Values in Design has been proposed by 
Mary Flanagan, Daniel C. Howe and Helen Nissenbaum (Flanagan, Howe et al. 2008). 
Since their proposal is partly informed by insights obtained from the project ―Values at 
Play‖ (http://www.valuesatplay.org/), I shall briefly introduce it. According to its 
website, the project Values at Play ―[...] was conceived with the intent of investigating 
how video game designers consciously and unconsciously embed social values into 
video games through narratives and game mechanics [...]‖ and aims at introducing ―[...] 
designers to a systematic method for discovering, analyzing, and integrating values into 
their design work‖.73 That is, the project not only attempts to make designers more 
conscious about the values they inscribe into the games they develop and the 
consequences this might have. It also delivers guidelines of how to promote certain 
values, such as equity, creativity or diversity. Hence, Flanagan and her colleagues 
develop their own pragmatic turn of insights obtained from STS to make them 
instructive not only for detecting values embodied in existing technology, but also to 
incorporate values willingly into technology. They propose that social values should be 
an integral part of the evaluation of technological artifacts in addition to other functional 
values, such as efficiency, reliability, usability, etc, by which technologies are usually 
assessed. The social values they have in mind are as diverse as privacy, trust, friendship, 
autonomy or transparency (Nissenbaum 2005). Their approach takes up the thread of 
Value Sensitive Design and combines it with others approaches, such as Reflective 
Practice (cf. Schön 1983, cited from Flanagan, Howe et al. 2008) and Critical Technical 
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Practice (cf. Agre 1997, Dourish, Finlay et al. 2004, both cited from Flanagan, Howe et 
al. 2005; Flanagan, Howe et al. 2008). 
They use another research project, Rapunsel, which focuses on teaching girls 
programming, as a case study to elucidate their claims. Indeed, it is instructive to take a 
closer look at the case study of Rapunsel, because the interaction of and possible 
conflicts between values become visible only within the design and development 
process. First of all in the process of game design, there is a diversity of sources of 
values: there are values in definition of project, which in the case of Rapunsel centered 
on gender equity. However, other values emerge in the course of design, for instance 
when implementing the reward systems guerdoning cooperative or competitive action. 
The other two types of values that play a role are more implicit and consist in the values 
and implicit assumption of the designers on the one hand and the users on the other. 
Especially when the implicit values between designers and users differ profoundly, 
appropriation and subversion can occur and it is here where empirical methods are 
needed to analyze the development of values in technologies.  
In developing their account, they highlight some of the problems that might arise when 
trying to incorporate value considerations into the design process. These challenges are 
of epistemological as well as of practical nature. I shall address the epistemological 
challenges first. According to the authors, different forms of knowledge - or modes of 
knowing - need to be combined in value-sensitive design and development of 
technologies. The different modes they identify are the philosophical, the empirical and 
the technical mode.  
The philosophical mode consists in reflecting upon the nature, the extension and 
intension of values, etc. Moreover, it has to offer some normative orientation in ―[...] 
providing rationale or justification for commitments to particular values in a given 
device‖ (Nissenbaum 2005: xvii). The technical mode by contrast consists in bringing 
―[...] to bear state-of-the-art scientific knowledge and technical know-how on particular 
design specifications that realize given values in an overarching design project‖ 
(Nissenbaum 2005: xvii). And finally in the empirical mode two additional tasks have to 
be fulfilled. First it has to be empirically determined which values are relevant for 
different relevant groups in comparison to those that have been normatively set in the 
philosophical mode. Secondly, empirical methods have to be employed to assess 
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whether a technology actually does embody the values it was intended to embody. The 
crucial question here is: did we succeed in embodying the desired values? Such an 
evaluation should rather be formative than summative in order to allow for the discovery 
and tracking of emergent bias (Friedman and Nissenbaum 1997). Similar to Friedman, 
Kahn et al. (Friedman, Kahn et al. 2006) they also propose an iterative process of 
integrating the philosophical, empirical and technical knowledge. To indicate the 
necessity of interaction and feedback between these different modes of inquiry, they use 
the metaphor of keeping ―balls in the air‖ (Nissenbaum 2005 lxvii), resp. of keeping 
―balls in play‖ (Flanagan, Howe et al. 2008). And this request can also be read as a 
request for more and better interdisciplinary collaboration between those focusing on 
theoretical, empirical or technical issues.  
The practical challenge concerns the lack or at least scarcity of concrete guidelines and 
methodologies for such an interaction. Their own guideline consists in iteratively 
making use of the following three activities.  
―1) Discovery, in which a list of values relevant to a project are compiled;  
2) Translation, in which values are operationalized and implemented in 
material design features corresponding to these values; and  
3) Verification, in which implementations are tested using variety of 
methods in order to ascertain whether designers‘ intentions have been met.‖ 
(Flanagan, Howe et al. 2008: 347).  
By applying the issue of Values in Design constructively to the field of game design, 
Flanagan and her colleagues propose an intentional inscription of values into design and 
they conclude their methodological proposal with the request for designers to ―[...] 
embrace this dimension of their work, even if they are not always able to prevail against 
the tide of countervailing forces‖ (Flanagan, Howe et al. 2008: 350). 
3.3.5 Conclusions 
What conclusions can be drawn from this section on Values in Design? First of all, the 
fact that inscribing values into design is probably unavoidable is not a reason to despair. 
If evil designers can inscribe their disvalues into technologies, then those designers who 
aim at making our societies more just can also use technologies to reach their goals. 
However, a performative caveat has to me made: We cannot fully control the 
consequences of our (technical) decisions. Even the best intentions and the most rigid 
testing cannot safeguard us from negative consequences of our decisions. Such an 
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acknowledgement of the entangled and complex nature of the socio-technical 
environment we live in cannot and should not be equated with shirking off 
responsibility. Despite the difficulty of the task, the constant need for cross-checking, 
reformulations and the lack of security that the decision we make will turn out well, we 
have to take stances. Resonant of the requests by feminist STS scholars I would like to 
conclude that in order to make our worlds more livable, we have to take active part in 
the design of our socio-technical environment, we have to make sure that frames get 
expanded and the necessary cuts are made in accountable ways.  
In the concluding remarks of the introduction to her seminal edition Batya Friedman 
urges her community to ―[...] embrace the value-sensitive design as part of the culture of 
computer science‖ and argues that this step may lead to ―[...] the conceptualizations 
needed to identify shortcomings in current designs and to seek remedies which prompt 
human well-being. It moves us toward the language needed to discuss the often 
immense social consequences of our work with the public at large. And it moves us 
toward holding out value-sensitive design as a criterion – along with the traditional 
criteria of reliability, efficiency, and correctness – by which systems may be judged poor 
and designers negligent. As with the traditional criteria, we need not require perfection, 
but commitment [...]‖(Friedman 1997b 13).  
I would like to add that we should not leave all the work for the computer scientists, but 
rather join them in this endeavor. Since no one can do all the tasks necessary in critical 
technology design on one‘s own, this is also a request for more interdisciplinary 
collaboration. For the topics of this thesis, this collaboration especially refers to a 
desirable collaboration between science and technology scholars, epistemologists and 
software designers.  
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4 Summary and Conclusions of Part 1 
In the previous chapters I have introduced the topic and the empirical basis of this thesis: 
epistemic social software defined as socio-technical epistemic systems in which multiple 
human and non-human agents interact to create epistemic products.  
In Chapter 2 I gave a brief and very cursory introduction into the ill-defined success of 
Web2.0, also referred to as social web, social media or social software. These last three 
terms refer to a crucial characteristic of this phenomenon, which formed the empirical 
starting point of this thesis: its sociality. In social software applications usually multiple 
users interact with a technological infrastructure or with each other through this 
infrastructure for various purposes. The focus of this thesis was set on social software 
application whose purpose is decidedly epistemic. Because of this focus on epistemic 
results I have dubbed these applications epistemic social software to distinguish them 
from other social software applications with different foci. While arguing for the 
analytic utility of the distinction between epistemic social software and other social 
software, I have nonetheless acknowledged that this distinction depends on usage and 
may indeed be permeable and fuzzy.  
I have focused on four examples of epistemic social software: the Web-encyclopedia 
Wikipedia, the social bookmarking services Delicious, the open nnovation platform 
InnoCentive and finally recommender systems as a more embedded form of epistemic 
social software. I have chosen these examples not only for their explicit epistemic focus, 
but also because they are characterized by very different forms of epistemic sociality. I 
return to these examples in more detail in Part 3 of this thesis and argue that different 
socio-epistemic mechanisms are employed and combined in each of these systems.  
In the 3
rd
 Chapter, I have argued that instead of referring to tools or applications, 
epistemic social software should better be understood as socio-technical epistemic 
systems consisting of multiple human and non-human agents who interact for various 
epistemic purposes. To support such an understanding of epistemic social software as 
socio-technical system comprising of entangled, heterogeneous agents I took a brief 
detour through the field of Science and Technology Studies and some neighbouring 
disciplines. The main insights I took from the various approaches portrayed can be 
clustered around the following topics: the entanglement of the social, the technical and 
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the epistemic; the relationship between human and non-human actors, the relationship 
between values and technologies as well as a performative understanding of epistemic 
practices and systems.  
I have argued that epistemic social software is a term to denote systems in which social, 
technical and epistemic aspects are deeply entangled. More specifically, epistemic social 
software, such as Wikipedia, Delicious, InnoCentive or Recommender Systems are 
socio-technical epistemic systems in which human and non-human agents interact on 
multiple levels and in different forms. Conceiving the technological components of 
these systems as non-human agents emphasizes the crucial and active role they play 
within the systems. However, this emphasis should not conceal the crucial differences 
between human and non-human agents. Since the attribution of responsibility and 
accountability is bound to intentional agents, a distinction between human and non-
human agents has to be kept up. Within entangled socio-technical epistemic systems 
accountability and responsibility may be hard to track. Indeed, it has been argued that 
the necessity and the difficulty to locate accountability rise simultaneously in 
computerized societies.  
During the development of socio-technical epistemic systems different values are 
necessarily inscribed into them. Such a valuing of systems in unavoidable, because each 
decision in developing systems in based on certain epistemic and societal background 
assumptions. These inscriptions may be unavoidable, but they need to be monitored 
because such embedded values can retroact on societal values in general by either 
reinforcing or degrading them.  
Finally, socio-technical epistemic systems are not closed systems. Instead they develop 
and change through practices. Despite the relevance of programming decisions, users 
can to varying degrees appropriate and change systems through their own practices. 
Indeed, if technological artifacts can be appropriated, changed and subverted through 
usage, this is all the more true for socio-technical epistemic systems. The performativity 
of these systems is much more profound: epistemic social software exists only through 
usage and practice. Without the processes and interactions between human and non-
human agents within these systems, epistemic social software, such as Wikipedia, 
Delicious, InnoCentive or Recommender Systems cease to exist. Hence, this 
fundamental process-dependence has to be acknowledged in any analysis of such socio-
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technical epistemic systems. It may be harder to address and tackle such dynamic, 
performative and entangled systems, more difficult to locate accountability and 
responsibility within them. But there is no way in avoiding this complexity.  
One of the primary consequences of these insights is that transparency should be a 
crucial value in assessing socio-technical epistemic systems. Transparency is needed to 
understand how systems function, to comprehend their strengths and weaknesses. It is 
needed to uncover and understand which values are promoted or undermined in such 
systems. Further, transparency is necessary to locate accountability and responsibility 
within such systems, especially in cases of misconduct and error. But transparency is not 
only needed to attribute accountability and responsibility to others. It is also needed to 
act responsibly oneself. Only if I understand how socio-technical epistemic systems 
function, I can act as a responsible knower. Only if I understand the modes of operation, 
the benefits and shortcomings of different systems, can I become a responsible, 
accountable and empowered knower myself. The knowers in socio-technical epistemic 
systems are the crucial figures in the next part of this thesis, in which I introduce social 






5 Social Epistemology  
5.1 From Socio-Technical Epistemic Systems to Social 
Epistemology 
In the previous chapters I have introduced the notion of epistemic social software and 
argued that understanding them as socio-technical epistemic systems consisting of 
multiple epistemic agents in interaction provides a more fruitful framework for 
analyzing them than simply referring to them as tools or applications. Observing the 
different socio-epistemic mechanisms employed in such systems, the relationships and 
interactions between different epistemic agents, I became interested in the ways in 
which knowledge in general can be conceptualized a result of processes which are 
social, technical and epistemic at the same time. While the technical has been the 
starting point and core of the previous chapters, I shift the focus now and take a closer 
look at the relationship between the social and the epistemic. A key characteristic of the 
systems portrayed before is the utilization of multiple agents for epistemic purposes: 
several people are engaged in the creation or distribution of knowledge in various ways. 
Shedding some light on how these agents interact, communicate, are coordinated and 
orchestrated within these socio-epistemic processes is the central task of the following 
chapters. The field I have chosen as a theoretical framework to analyze these processes 
and the roles of different epistemic agents within them is social epistemology.  
5.2 Addressing the Social Dimensions of Knowledge 
―Social epistemology is the study of the social dimensions of knowledge or 
information. There is little consensus, however, on what the term 
"knowledge" comprehends, what is the scope of the "social", or what the 
style or purpose of the study should be.‖ (Goldman 2006). 
Social epistemology is the philosophical discipline exploring the ways and the extent to 
which knowledge and epistemic practices are social. As a term, social epistemology 
often refers to a quite specific field of discourse which ―dates from the 1980ies, is 
primarily a philosophical enterprise, and has its roots in Anglo-American epistemology, 
122 
 
in feminist theory, as well as in the philosophy of science‖ (Kusch to appear: 1). This is 
what Martin Kusch, one of the philosophers whose approach is depicted below in some 
detail, considers to be the narrow understanding of social epistemology - and it forms 
the theoretic core of this thesis.  
Talking about a narrow understanding of social epistemology implies that broader 
understandings of social epistemology are possible. And indeed the ways and the extent 
to which knowledge is social have been addressed within philosophy as well as within 
other disciplines in numerous ways. Throughout the history of philosophical thought 
philosophers have addressed different social dimensions of knowledge. In encyclopedic 
articles and introductions to social epistemology (e.g. Goldman 2006, Goldman 2009a, 
Kusch to appear) reference is given to a diversity of predecessors. Plato‘s explorations 
of how laypersons can determine expertise in Charmides is often used as one of the 
earliest examples (cf. Goldman 2006).  
The label under which the social nature of knowledge has been primarily discussed 
within Western philosophy is testimony. Testimony ususally refers to the ―assertion of a 
declarative sentence by a speaker to a hearer or to an audience‖ (Adler 2006) and it is 
considered to be the fourth route to knowledge besides memory, perception and 
inference. One of the main epistemological questions around testimony concerns the 
status of knowledge acquired through testimony: Does knowledge received through the 
words of others have a different quality than knowledge obtained via one‘s own 
cognitive resources, i.e. perception, memory or inference? Given that many philosophers 
nowadays acknowledge that we acquire far more knowledge through testimony than 
through our own onboard resources, indeed that some of them even state that (almost) 
everything we know depends on interaction with others, it might come as a surprise that 
knowledge obtained from testimony has long been considered to be of secondary status. 
Knowledge received from testimony was considered to be less valuable, less reliable 
than knowledge obtained from memory, perception or inference. Indeed, sometimes 
knowledge obtained via testimony was denied the status of knowledge altogether. The 
reason for this depreciation of testimony is often seen in the epistemic individualism, i.e. 
in an individualistic bias within Western philosophy. This inferior epistemic status of 
testimony combined with a focus on one‘s own onboard cognitive resources is most 
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clearly stated in Locke‘s famous dictum that ―[w]hat in them was science is in us but 
opiniatrety.‖ (Locke 1961: 58, quoted from Coady 1992: 14).74 
Beyond classical epistemology other predecessors of social epistemology exist within 
philosophy. Martin Kusch has argued that if one understands social epistemology 
broadly as ―[...] all systematic reflection on the social dimension or nature of cognitive 
achievements such as knowledge, true belief, justified belief, understanding, or wisdom‖ 
(Kusch to appear: 1), then many contributions from Marxism, Critical Theory or 
Hermeneutics also qualify as socio-epistemological.  
Considerable overlap exists between social epistemology and many feminist 
epistemologies. Indeed, according to Grasswick ―the significant body of work of 
feminist social epistemologists has provided key theoretical resources for understanding 
the social dimensions of knowing‖ (Grasswick 2006: 1). She argues that feminist 
epistemologists have been particularly important in revealing and criticizing the 
individualism of contemporary (analytic) philosophy and in developing alternative 
models of knowers as social beings that are situated in different contexts (e.g. Code 
1991, Code 2001, Harding 1991), that are in interaction with each other (Alcoff 2001, 
Scheman 2001) and that depend on the communities they are part of (Longino 2002c, 
Nelson 1993). Moreover, several feminist epistemologists have developed social models 
of knowledge and objectivity (Haraway 1996, Harding 2003, Longino 2002c, and 
stressed the relationship between epistemology and ethics (e.g. Fricker 1998; Fricker 
2007).  
Many social epistemologists have also acknowledged the relevance of different 
sociological and historical approaches for understanding the ways in which knowledge 
is social. Within sociology, particular emphasis has been placed on the sociology of 
knowledge (e.g. Mannheim 1936), the sociology of science (e.g. Merton 1973), the 
sociology of scientific knowledge (e.g. Barnes and Bloor 1982, Collins 1981b; Collins 
1985), as well as different approaches within the field of Science and Technology 
Studies, such as the works of Bruno Latour (Latour and Woolgar 1986, Latour 1987) or 
Karin Knorr Cetina (Knorr-Cetina 1984; Knorr-Cetina 1999). Among the historical 
approaches, some of the most received works are Thomas Kuhn‘s ―The Structure of 
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Scientific Revolutions‖ (Kuhn 1962/1970); Steven Shapin‘s ―A Social History of Truth‖ 
(Shapin 1994) as well as ―Leviathan and the Air-Pump‖ (Shapin and Schaffer 1985); 
Michel Foucault‘s analyses on the relationship between knowledge and power 
(e.g.Foucault 1970; Foucault 1971; Foucault 1980 ), and finally the works that fall under 
the label of historical epistemology, most notably the works of Ian Hacking (e.g. 
Hacking 1992a; Hacking 2004), Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison (e.g Daston 1993; 
Daston and Galison 2007).  
Finally, different social epistemologists have proposed directions into which social 
epistemology should be heading. Kusch has proposed a differentiation into five different 
directions and listed philosophers whose work could be instrumental for the future of 
social epistemology (Kusch to appear): analytic social epistemology (with reference to 
the works of Donald Davidson (Davidson 1991/2001), genealogical social epistemology 
(Craig 1990), historical social epistemology (Shapin 1994), political social epistemology 
(Harding 1991) and naturalistic social epistemology (Hardwig 1985; Hardwig 1991). 
Alvin Goldman, one of the most central figures in social epistemology, finally has 
proposed a new perspective for the future of social epistemology which he labels 
systems-oriented social epistemology understood as ―a flexible form of epistemological 
consequentialism that evaluates social epistemic systems in terms of their impact on 
epistemic outcomes‖ (Goldman 2009c). 
5.3 Social Epistemology: Delineating the Field 
Clearly, this multitude of approaches allows for different ways of apprehending the 
sociality of knowledge, different ways of cutting the field, different ways of asking 
different questions. In the previous chapter, we have learned that objects of analysis are 
not given, but made by decisions. Each decision to include or ignore something comes 
with consequences and one can be held accountable for one‘s decisions. Nonetheless, 
decisions – and omissions - are unavoidable.  
I have chosen what Kusch considers to be the narrow conception of social epistemology 
as the theoretical nucleus of this thesis: an inquiry which ―dates from the 1980ies, is 
primarily a philosophical enterprise, and has its roots in Anglo-American epistemology, 
in feminist theory, as well as in the philosophy of science (Kusch to appear: 1). 
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However, neither is this core indivisible nor completely unrelated to other fields of 
reasoning investigating the social nature of knowledge outlined before.  
More specifically, within this narrow understanding of social epistemology there are 
several major lines of demarcation and numerous classifications of social epistemologies 
have been proposed (e.g. Goldman 2009a; Goldman 2009b; Goldman 2009c, Goldman 
2006, Kusch to appear, Kusch 2002, Quinton 2004, Kitcher 1994, Fuller 2004, 
Kornblith 1994, Schmitt 1994a). Instead of listing and explaining all the different labels 
that have been proposed to classify social epistemologies beforehand (e.g. critical versus 
analytical social epistemology, classical versus anti-classical approaches, etc.), I have 
decided to address these differences in next chapter after having introduced five major 
social epistemologies. Some of the most important differences concern the adherence 
versus rejection of the classical analytic definition of knowledge as justified true belief; 
the question of whether social epistemology is complementary to individual 
epistemology or rather its successor; as well as the question what the goals of social 
epistemology should be. My hope is that different stances towards these issues will 
become clearer through my portrayal of the different socio-epistemological approaches.  
With respect to the exoteric relationships, different approaches beyond classic 
epistemology are often used as background foils for the development of social 
epistemologies. That is, many social epistemologists sharpen their approaches with 
reference to and often against various theories from the sociology of scientific 
knowledge, against feminist standpoint theories, etc. Sometimes theories on the sociality 
of knowledge that are not rooted in an analytic philosophical tradition have received 
extremely critical or even hostile reactions from certain social epistemologists (e.g. 
Goldman 2003, Kitcher 1994). Other social epistemologists, however, have stressed the 
importance of alternative philosophical positions as well as sociological and historical 
analyses for the development of their social epistemologies (e.g. Kusch 2002, Longino 
2002c). In any case, an understanding of the central arguments within social 
epistemology even in its most narrow understanding is impossible without seeing the 
broader field of discourse in which these arguments are embedded. Thus, although a 
narrow conception of social epistemology as the mainly analytical, Anglo-American 
philosophical disciplines that has emerged in the late 1980ies is the core, it is rather the 
field of discourse around this core that forms the theoretical framework of this thesis.  
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In the following I outline five major socio-epistemological theories: Steve Fuller‘s 
Social Epistemology, Alvin Goldman‘s Veristic Social Epistemology, Miriam Solomon‘s 
Social Empiricism, Martin Kusch‘s Communitarian Epistemology and Helen Longino‘s 
Critical Contextual Empiricism. I have decided to depict these approaches in some 
detail, because of their importance for the field and their comprehensiveness. All of 
them have been developed in monographs and describe themselves either explicitly as 
social epistemologies or situate themselves in the discourse field of social epistemology.  
Numerous other authors have addressed certain social aspects or dimension of 
knowledge in articles, but to my knowledge no other comprehensive social 
epistemology has been proposed in monographic length. To give an overview over the 
field, I portray the different theories in some detail in this chapter in a rather neutral 
way, i.e. without critical assessment. I offer such a critical evaluation as well as an 
analysis of the merits of the different social epistemologies for the questions of this 
thesis in the next chapter. Instead of critically assessing the approaches individually 
directly after portraying them, I use my critique to delineate the major topics, debates 
and controversies within the field of social epistemology. In this analysis other 
theoreticians, who have made important contributions to specific social aspects of 
knowledge and epistemic practices only are also included.  
My analyses in the next chapter also serve as the basis for the development of my own 
approach, which will be outlined in the third part of this thesis. I offer a new, systematic 
perspective for understanding and analyzing socio-epistemic practices on the Web and 
beyond that is based on my critical reception of the different social epistemologies to be 
portrayed. Before heading into the details of the five before-mentioned comprehensive 
social epistemologies, I take a brief look at the coining of the term ‗social epistemology‘ 
– a dual occurrence which is of interest for this thesis.  
5.3.1 Social Epistemology: The Coining of the Term 
Social Epistemology in the Library Science 
It was in 1987 that the term social epistemology was first introduced into the 
philosophical debate by a special issue of the journal Synthese. But the term had already 
been used in the early fifties in a quite different context. Despite its philosophical ring 
and the subsequent philosophical occupation of it, the term social epistemology was 
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initially coined in the library sciences by Mary Egan and Jesse Shera. They introduced 
the term in trying to formulate an epistemological foundation for library science (Egan 
and Shera 1949; Egan and Shera 1952). In a paper on ―Classification as the Basis of 
Bibliographic Organization‖ Egan and Shera write:  
―Even a cursory examination of the history of the classification of the 
sciences emphasized the extent to which any attempt to organize knowledge 
is conditioned by the social epistemology of the age in which it was 
produced. This dependence of classification theory upon the state of the 
sociology of knowledge will doubtless be even more strongly confirmed in 
the future.‖ (Shera 1950: 82).  
Although the tasks of librarians in classifying and providing information probably exists 
as long as knowledge was recorded, the field of library science went through process of 
professionalization at the end of 19
th
 and the beginning of the 20
th
 century (Zandonade 
2004). And while the usage of the term social epistemology in the quote above seems to 
refer rather to a descriptive and retrospective analysis of the ways in which the social 
environment has shaped the organization of knowledge through classifications, there 
were also more normative and prescriptive concerns related to the field of library 
science. Egan and Shera therefore intended social epistemology to be ―[...] a new 
discipline [...] that will provide a framework for the effective investigation of the whole 
complex problem of the intellectual processes of society‖ (Egan and Shera 1952: 132, 
cited from Fallis 2006: 476). Information science according to Shera should focus on the 
―production, flow, integration, and consumption of all forms of communicated thought 
throughout the entire social fabric‖ (Shera 1970: 86, quoted from Fallis 2006: 482f), 
which is why a broader socio-epistemological perspective was required. Social 
epistemology understood in those terms was meant to provide empirical data about the 
sociality of epistemic content (such as classification) and epistemic practices. And the 
normative aspiration was to feed this empirical information back into library science in 
order to improve epistemic practices.  
For the purpose of this thesis, these roots of social epistemology in the field of 
information science, or rather its predecessor library science, is clearly striking. Given 
my aim of analyzing the epistemological relevance of new socio-technical systems, 
often referred to as Web2.0, my thesis can also be regarded as an attempt to resuscitate 
this relationship between information science and epistemology as two fields, which are 
crucially related to knowledge and epistemic practices, albeit in different ways. In 
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arguing for an applied social epistemology, that not only takes into account actual 
epistemic practices of humans for its theorizing, but also seeks to make 
recommendations of how to improve socio-technical systems for epistemic purposes, I 
do attempt to pick up the thread where Egan and Shera‘s have left it off.  
Social Epistemology: Emergence as a Philosophical Discipline 
Within philosophy, there are two – albeit related - funding acts that mark the beginning 
of the field of social epistemology as conceived in this thesis, one accomplished by 
Frederick F. Schmitt, the other by Steve Fuller. In 1987, Frederick F. Schmitt‘s edited a 
special issue of the journal Synthese, in which several authors emphasize social aspects 
of knowledge, cognition and belief (Schmitt 1987). This special issue was entitled 
―Social Epistemology‖ and included contributions on social features of cognition 
(Kornblith 1987), social standards (Cohen 1987), justification and sociality (Schmitt 
1987b), personal and social knowledge (Lehrer 1987), collective belief (Gilbert 1987). 
Moreover, it featured an article by Alvin Goldman on social epistemics (Goldman 1987) 
and one by Steve Fuller (Fuller 1987) on the regulation of scientific knowledge creation.  
These early articles by Fuller and Goldman already contain the seeds of the two social 
epistemologies later to be developed in greater detail by both authors. Goldman and 
Fuller moreover, emerged to be two central figures in the field of social epistemology. 
Not only have both of them provided monographs and numerous articles on social 
epistemology themselves. Both of them have also been long lasting editors of the two 
major journals devoted to social epistemology. While Fuller established his journal 
Social Epistemology already in the following year, 1988, Goldman became the editor of 
Episteme one year after its founding in 2005. Goldman‘s Veristic Social Epistemology is 
depicted in more detail later on, and I continue with a summary of Steve Fuller‘s social 
epistemology right below.  
In 1994, Schmitt also edited a seminal book on social epistemology entitled ―Socializing 
Epistemology: The Social Dimensions of Knowledge‖ (Schmitt 1994d). In this 
anthology, many social epistemologists, whose work is portrayed in this thesis are 
already gathered. In addition to the before mentioned authors, this refers in particular to 
Helen Longino, Miriam Solomon, Philip Kitcher and C.A.J. Coady.  
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5.4 Major Social Epistemologies 
5.4.1 Steve Fuller’s Social Epistemology 
In his article in the 1987 Synthese special issue on social epistemology (Fuller 1987), 
Steve Fuller introduces the term ―social epistemology‖ - still in quotation marks – as the 
label for his account of the sociality of knowledge and science. In 1987 Fuller also 
funded a journal and a year later published a book with the same title ―Social 
Epistemology‖ (Fuller 1988), in which he depicts his approach in greater length. For 
these reasons and the fact that he has been the first philosopher using the label social 
epistemology for a distinct approach, his approach has to be depicted, although it is not 
of major relevance for the rest of this thesis.  
From a theoretical and a less institutional - or rather institutionalizing - point of view an 
important contribution of Fuller consist in the identification of certain blind spots or 
shortcomings of many accounts of science within philosophy of science and 
epistemology as well as in the social studies of science (Fuller 2004, Fuller 2006, Fuller 
1994). In particular, he has emphasized the neglect of the political, institutional and 
organizational, economic contexts of philosophical accounts of science and the lack of 
normative concerns in their sociological counterparts. Fuller further insists that, both the 
philosophers and the sociologists should take a more critical stance towards science 
instead of assuming that science has to be measured by its own standards and that it is in 
principle working just fine.  
Fullers‘ own approach focuses explicitly on taking such a critical stance and aims at 
changing science. His social epistemology in principle is an epistemologically informed 
science policy that sets on to change science by changing its social structures and those 
it is embedded in. The hope that is related to this macro-approach is that by changing the 
structure of science, the content of science, the kinds and types of knowledge that get 
produced, could be changed accordingly. Thus, Fuller argues against an ―invisible hand‖ 
model of scientific rationality, according to which science is at best left alone in 
regulating itself. Instead he installs the social epistemologists as a science policy maker, 
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It is in the before mentioned special issue of the journal Synthese where Steve Fuller 
offers a first sketch of his social epistemology. He considers its major question to be the 
following:  
―How should the pursuit of knowledge be organized, given that under 
normal circumstances knowledge is pursued by many human beings, each 
working on a more or less well defined body of knowledge and each 
equipped with roughly the same imperfect cognitive capacities, albeit with 
varying degrees of access to one another's activities?‖(Fuller 1987: 145) 
Fuller delineates his social epistemology as normative and naturalist social 
epistemology and conceptualizes the social epistemologist as an ―ideal epistemic policy 
maker‖ (Fuller 1987: 145). His social epistemology is normative in that it aims at 
arriving at an optimal distribution of cognitive labor, an interest that he shares with 
many other social epistemologists, such as Miriam Solomon (Solomon 2001), Philip 
Kitcher (Kitcher 1993) and Alvin Goldman (Goldman 2003). Moreover, the theory is 
also normative in the sense of changing the content of science by changing the social 
structure of science. Fuller asserts to be a naturalist by focusing on the normal contexts 
in which knowledge is produced. And since these contexts are mostly social contexts 
and not the Cartesian lonesome thinker, he concludes that his epistemology has to 
account for this sociality.  
Let‘s take a look at how, by what means and to what ends Fuller thinks science should 
be changed. To begin with, Fuller argues that while philosophers and sociologists of 
science might differ in whether it is methodology or interests that steer science, both 
camps seem to take for granted that science runs quite well either way (Fuller 1992: 
392). That is not the case, Fuller announces and argues that there is a ―[...] big difference 
between claiming that science works well enough to sustain itself and claiming that it 
works optimally toward a desired outcome‖ (Fuller 1992: 394). Two interpretations of 
this quote are possible. Fuller may refer to the prospect of improving the efficiency of 
science. The other reading concerns the dependence of this evaluation on the desired 
outcomes. Let‘s start with how to improve efficiency.  
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How could we ensure that science lives up to its full potential, that is does not merely 
function well enough, but well? In principle, Fuller argues that the best way to improve 
science is by applying scientific reasoning to the evaluation and subsequent 
improvement of scientific practice itself. More specifically, Fuller argues for an 
experimental analysis and correction of scientific practice in the spirit of Taylor‘s 
Scientific Management (Fuller 1992: 413ff). He argues that ―[...] there is a pressing need 
to examine not merely how science works but whether science is working as well as it 
could, especially given the ever-changing and ever-more-important roles that science 
plays in society (Fuller 1992: 395). The first step in improving science according to 
Fuller has to consist in a decomposition of the different scientific tasks and sub-tasks 
instead of treating science as an ―organic skill‖ over which only the scientists 
themselves have complete authority (Fuller 1992: 414). In treating scientific practices in 
the same way in which Taylor treats his workers‘ coal shoveling practices, namely by 
decomposing it into more minute sub-tasks and improving them separately, such a 
holistic view of science is overcome and the possibility to improve scientific efficiency 
is opened up.  
The social epistemologist would be the external observer of science, who due to having 
analyzed scientific practices is in the best position to improve science by improving the 
conduction of individual subtasks and their distribution over multiple people. Since the 
social epistemologist has analyzed the minute tasks, he is in a better position than the 
scientists themselves to make science more efficient. Therefore, the social 
epistemologist revokes the scientists‘ authority of how science should best be conducted 
in much the same way in which Taylor revoked the coal workers‘ authority over how 
coal is best shoveled.  
The second change that Fuller‘s social epistemology imposes on science does not refer 
to its practices, but to its goals. In contrast to many philosophers of science, Fuller 
argues for a science in which ―[...] the ―ends of science‖ [...] are not given by science 
itself but by something else to which science is held accountable‖ (Fuller 1992: 395). 
Science should be more accountable to the public, which implies that science and the 
public need to get back into a dialogue. This means that on the one hand, the public 
needs to be made more scientifically literate (Fuller 1992: 396) and on the other hand, 
scientists need to be made more publicly accountable. While the former seems to evoke 
some form of science education, similar to the ―public understanding of science‖ 
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program (Bodmer 1985, Wynne 1995), the latter seems to refer to some "personnel 
development measure" in which scientists are taught ―how to deal with people‖ (Fuller 
1992: 397).  
Moreover, once science is aligned with societal needs, science has to be evaluated with 
respect to the fulfillment of these societal needs. This implies that one cannot change the 
goals on the run, but that one has to stick to them – unless otherwise consented upon. 
Unfortunately, Fuller argues that ―a crucial way in which a discipline maintains its status 
as ―science‖ is by manipulating the historical record so that it appears to be the 
inevitable outcome of the course of inquiry up to that point‖ (Fuller 1987: 145). This 
would have to be changed according to Fuller‘s social epistemology: science has to be 
accountable to its original standards and goals and not to the ever-changing a posteriori 
goals scientists fabricate to justify their research at hindsight.  
I have asserted before that Fuller‘s social epistemology is of little relevance for this 
thesis. Given the historical importance of Fuller‘s social epistemology, this negative 
assessment may need some vindication. Although I have announced that I remain rather 
descriptive in this chapter and postpone a critical assessment to the next chapter, I 
include a brief critical assessment of Fuller‘s account already at this point, precisely 
because I do not return to it later on. I appreciate Fuller‘s emphasis on the institutional 
and political contexts of science and his goals to make science address societal needs 
and to make it more accountable to the public. The relationship between societal needs 
and scientific goals has been debated hotly in philosophy of science. While many 
feminist epistemologists and philosophers of science have argued for an alignment of 
science to match the most pressing societal needs (e.g. Kourany 2003), others have 
defended the non-instrumental value of science (e.g. Ziman 2003). A constructive 
approach of how to overcome this dichotomization of ―pure‖ research and applied or 
instrumental research has been delivered by Martin Carrier (Carrier 2004; Carrier 2008), 
who has also argued for a concept of a science in the service of the public.
76
  
I also consider Fuller‘s suggestion that social epistemology should be a multi- or 
interdisciplinary endeavor that might play a crucial role for science policy interesting 
and valid. Despite this more general consilience, I am less convinced by Fuller‘s own 
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theoretical developments. Amidst an abundance of references to a variety of different 
lines of thought on the sociality of knowledge and science, I find it quite difficult to 
identify Fuller‘s main arguments beyond rather general recommendations concerning 
science policy outlined above (e.g. Fuller 1988). I do think that Fuller‘s account is broad 
in the variety of societal factors he acknowledges as well as in the reference he makes to 
various disciplines (most notably to the field of science and technology studies (Fuller 
2006). However, his analysis of the various kinds of social processes and mechanism, 
the various types of epistemic sociality that play a role within science is surprisingly 
thin. By focusing on the distribution of cognitive labor and reducing social epistemology 
to science policy, Fuller ignores other important aspects of what it means for knowledge 
to be social. Such neglected aspects include collaborative practices in the sciences, the 
different social forms of knowledge creation, etc. Therefore, I would argue that 
restricting social epistemology to science policy clearly is premature and forecloses a 
more thorough analysis of the different ways in which knowledge is social.  
Another point of critique concerns his reliance on Taylorism as a model for science 
management. While I agree that it might not be inherently problematic to use a 
mechanism from economy to amend scientific practices, I find it surprising that Fuller 
chooses Scientific Management from all available possibilities. After all, Scientific 
Management has not really been the most sustainable success story in the history of 
economics. As even Fuller acknowledges, Scientific Management failed due to the 
worker‘s protests and resistance (Fuller 1992: 422). Why should scientists react any 
different to such an incapacitating and disempowering process? Surely, simply referring 
to advocacy advertising or incentives does not seem to be too convincing. 
5.4.2 Alvin Goldman’s Veritistic Social Epistemology 
Introduction 
Alvin Goldman is one of the most prominent social epistemologists. He has clearly 
shaped the field of analytic social epistemology profoundly not only through his long-
lasting editorship of the journal Episteme. His own publications, especially his widely 
received book ―Knowledge in a Social World‖ have also inspired a lot of socio-
epistemological work. In this book, Goldman develops a veritistic social epistemology 
and applies it to a variety of different cases in science, law, politics and education. Two 
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aspects are of particular interest for this thesis. Goldman not only emphasizes the 
necessity of applying epistemology to real-life situations. He also develops his social 
epistemology as a ―philosophy for the information age‖ (Goldman 2003: back cover). 
Given the importance of Goldman‘s approach for the whole field of social epistemology 
and the similarity of its intended focus with the focus of this thesis, I portray Goldman‘s 
social epistemology in some detail using his book ―Knowledge in a Social World‖ as the 
primary basis for my portrayal. 
―Knowledge in a Social World‖ is divided into three parts. In part one, Goldman lays the 
foundations of his veritistic social epistemology. The goal of this veritistic social 
epistemology is to evaluate social practices with respect to their conduciveness or 
detriment to the attainment of truth. In part two he applies his veritistic social 
epistemology to four different types of generic social practices: testimony, 
argumentation, information technology and speech regulation. In the third part, he 
investigates special domains in which those social practices play a role. These special 
domains are science, law democracy and education.  
In the following I outline several aspects of his approach in more detail. At first, I 
portray some of the fundaments of Goldman‘s veritism. For the purpose of this thesis 
emphasis is then laid on Goldman‘s account of testimony, his recommendations for 
veritistically beneficial forms of argumentation, as well as the relevance of information 
and communication technologies (ICT) for a veritistic social epistemology. Regarding 
his analyses of specific societal domains, I focus especially on the domain of science.  
Key Features 
Complementarity 
According to Martin Kusch (Kusch 2002), Goldman is the prime representative of the 
complementary approach in social epistemology, which is characterized by a clear 
distinction between social and individual aspects of knowledge. For Goldman, social 
epistemology is meant to account for the social dimensions of knowledge, whereas there 
is a distinct individual dimension of knowledge that can best be described by classical 
epistemological theories and theories from the cognitive sciences. Individual 
epistemology would focus on beneficial psychological and cognitive processes within 
epistemic agents whereas social epistemology would focus on social and institutional 
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contexts of epistemic practices, such as interactions between agents to identify and 
evaluate social and communicational processes. This complementary approach is also 
reflected in the succession of Goldman‘s major publications: only after having 
investigated the respective relevance of psychology and epistemology for individual 
knowledge in great detail in his book ―Epistemology and Cognition‖ (Goldman 1986), 
his attempts to socialize classical epistemology culminate in ―Knowledge in a Social 
World‖ (Goldman 2003) more than a decade later.77  
Normativity  
Moreover, Goldman emphasizes the normative function of epistemology. That is he 
stresses that in opposition to sociological theories of knowledge epistemology cannot 
remain purely descriptive. Such normativity in Goldman‘s approach is twofold. On the 
one hand, epistemology should deliver criteria by which knowledge can be distinguished 
from mere belief or opinion. On the other hand, normativity is also understood in a 
prescriptive sense of identifying practices that are epistemically valuable and that should 
therefore be fostered. The goal of epistemology according to Goldman is to provide 
normative standards for epistemic practices. Epistemology should ―seek to identify and 
assess processes, methods and practices in terms of their contribution – positive or 
negative – to the production of true belief‖ (Goldman 2006). 
Veritism 
The most important characteristic of Goldman‘s approach however concerns the role of 
truth. That the attainment or approximation of truth looms large in Goldman‘s account 
becomes obvious not only from the previous quote. He also labels his whole approach 
veritistic social epistemology. To ground his veritism, Goldman argues that information 
seeking is a crucial activity in everyday life – be it for practical reasons or for mere 
curiosity. Moreover, for the most part we seek true information, or at least 
approximately true information. Therefore a proper epistemology – be it individual or 
social – should better come up with some help for the attainment of truth.  
Goldman defines knowledge in the ―weak‖ sense of (merely) ―true belief‖, i.e. he is 
concerned with the truth value of a proposition and not with its justification. And on the 
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 Although Goldman initially intended to synthesize social and individual aspects of knowledge in one 
book, they were nonetheless conceived to be different processes. And while the individual epistemology 
should be related to cognitive psychology, the empirical basis for a social epistemology was to be found 
rather in social and political science (Goldman 2003: ix). 
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first almost 100 pages of his book, Goldman seeks to defend the importance of truth in 
science and everyday life against a variety of enemies. At first he notes that some 
approaches that so far have been labeled social epistemology, namely Steve Fuller‘s 
―Social Epistemology‖ (Fuller 1988) and Shapin‘s ―Social History of Truth‖ (Shapin 
1994) do not deserve the label epistemology and should rather be tagged ―social 
doxology‖, because they cannot and do not differentiate between knowledge and 
opinion (Goldman 2003: 7). He identifies six criticism of a truth-based epistemology. 
While assessing them rather cursory, he concludes that none of them provides a serious 
threat to his veritistic social epistemology. Those six criticism and some of their major 
proponents are: the argument from social construction (Richard Rorty, Bruno Latour), 
language and worldmaking (Jacques Derrida, Nelson Goodman), the unknowability 
criticism, the denial of epistemic privilege (Rorty), the argument from domination 
(Michel Foucault) and the argument from bias (Sandra Harding). Goldman‘s brief 
dismissal of this variety of different approaches has been criticized even within the field 
of social epistemology, most notably by Longino (Longino 2002c) and Kusch (Kusch 
2002). Nonetheless, Goldman feels save to conclude that ―[...] all the central arguments 
against veritism that spring from postmodern and constructivist quarters have failed‖ 
(Goldman 2003: 40) and that the door is therefore wide open for a veritistic social 
epistemology.  
After having argued that the notion of truth indeed is useful and should be crucial in 
epistemology, one still has to decide which theory of truth is most adequate. Goldman 
defends a correspondence theory of truth that includes some elements of deflationary 
approaches (Goldman 2003: 41). The crucial aspect of such a correspondence theory is 
that ―what makes sentences or propositions true are real-world truth makers‖ (Goldman 
2003: 68). He defends this choice against pragmatic, epistemic and relativistic accounts 
of truth and proceeds to develop his veritistic social epistemology.  
Veritistic Social Epistemology: Assessing Veristic Values of Social 
Practices 
As noted before, epistemology quite generally for Goldman is ―[...] a discipline that 
evaluates practices along truth-linked (veritistic) dimensions‖, and ―[s]ocial 
epistemology evaluates specifically social practices along these dimensions‖ (Goldman 
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2003: 69). And his veritistic social epistemology is specifically targeted at supporting 
truth and countering error and ignorance. The central concept is that of veritistic value.  
Goldman argues that in everyday-life as well as in science, certain value is placed on 
having true rather than false beliefs and this value is what he calls veritistic value. For 
his assessment of epistemic social practices it is essential that these a) can have different 
veritistic outcomes, such as knowledge (positive veritistic value), error (negative 
veritistic value) or ignorance and b) that they can be evaluated according to these 
outcomes. Accordingly, an epistemic practice has a higher veritistic value if it yields 
more knowledge than another epistemic practice. The goal of epistemology in general is 
to evaluate practices along truth-linked dimension and the goal of social epistemology 
consequently is to identify those social practices that have a comparably favorable effect 
on knowledge as contrasted with error and ignorance. Epistemic states, knowledge, error 
and ignorance have fundamental veritistic values. If someone believes a true 
proposition, this has the veritistic value 1 (=knowledge). If someone rejects a true 
statement, this has the veritistic value 0 (= error). And if someone suspends judgment on 
a true statement this has the veritistic value 0.5 (=ignorance) (Goldman 2003: 89).  
Epistemic practices, by contrast, have instrumental veritistic values for achieving these 
states. Through different epistemic practices the overall veritistic values in a society, i.e. 
the relationship between truth, error and ignorance, can be changed. And these changes 
in turn can then be used to assess the value of epistemic practices. To illustrate how this 
evaluation of the veritistic value of different strategies might be achieved, Goldman 
(Goldman 2003) uses the example of judgment aggregating and compares different 
mechanisms of combining divergent expert opinions. He depicts a local weather bureau 
having five experts for the weather forecast (Goldman 2003: 81f). Those five experts 
unfortunately judge the likelihood that it will rain the next day very differently. 
Moreover, they have different forecasting competencies, conceptualized as different 
probabilities of delivering correct predictions. How should their opinions be 
amalgamated to provide the best possible weather prediction? Goldman offers three 
different strategies: The unweighted majority rule, the dictatorial rule, i.e. the bureau 
chooses the prediction of the most competent expert, and the weighted voting. In the 
case of weighted voting, the predictions of the experts are weighted by their 
competencies and as such are all amalgamated into a single value. Goldman 
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demonstrates that, given the competencies are known,
78
 the weighted voting scheme has 
the highest probability to lead to a true result. Modeled after this example, other social 
practices should also be evaluated with respect to their instrumental veritistic value, i.e. 
their ability to generate true predictions. Consequently, in the second part of his book, 
Goldman analyses different social practices (testimony, argumentation, technology and 
economics of communication, speech regulation and market place of ideas) with respect 
to their effects on the overall veritistic situation.  
Generic Social Practices 
Testimony 
Testimony in Goldman‘s account refers to the process of communicating knowledge 
from one person to another. Stating that testimony is the most elementary and universal 
path to knowledge, Goldman focuses on the different roles and options for action that 
the provider and the recipient of testimony have. He conceptualizes testimony as a 4-
stage process. After the initial discovery of knowledge (stage 1), someone decides to 
transmit a message containing this knowledge to others (stage 2). This message has then 
to be received (stage 3) and accepted (stage 4) by others. Only if all four stages are 
mastered successfully, knowledge has been transmitted from one person to another. This 
model strongly resembles Shannon & Weaver‘s mathematical theory of information 
(Shannon 1948). And in line with such a model of testimony as signal transfer, 
Goldman considers testimony to be responsible solely for the spread of knowledge, 
which has been created before. The crucial question from a veritistic point of view then 
is under what conditions the report of testimony will produce the largest possible change 
of veritistic value Goldman 2003.  
If knowledge has been created before, the starting point for testimonial transmission of 
knowledge lies in the testifier‘s decision to convey this knowledge to someone else. 
Goldman bases this decision about whether and what to report to others on the 
newsworthiness of the information and the degree of change in veritistic value to be 
expected from this information transmission. The crucial term here is ‗newsworthiness‘, 
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 This assessment and quantification of competencies is a crucial, but at the same time highly problematic 
aspect of Goldman‘s proposal. I return to this issue and the general difference between weighted and 
unweighted aggregation in the next chapters.  
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which in turn is defined as not being predictable on the basis of available background 
information.  
Given that the information is transmitted correctly and received by a recipient, the 
epistemic task for the recipient of testimony is then to decide what to do with this 
information. He has to decide whether and to what degree to accept or reject the 
testimonial information or withhold judgment. Since the central task for a veritistic 
evaluation is to identify epistemic practices that lead to the highest veritistic gain, 
Goldman seeks to identify those testimonial practices of testifier and recipient that 
would best improve the overall veritistic situation and lead to largest increase in truth 
known in a community. So ideally, he seeks for a general strategy for accepting or 
rejecting testimony which is valid in all situations.  
Unfortunately, in different reporting environments, different acceptance strategies 
concerning testimony may lead to the best results. For instance in the unlikely case that 
everybody always speaks the truth, the best acceptance strategy would be blind trust. In 
contrast in the reverse environment where everybody constantly lies, anti-trust would be 
the best strategy.
79
 Since most reporting environments lie somewhere in between these 
two extremes different strategies are the advisable depending on the circumstances. 
However, given Goldman‘s interest in a general theory of testimony reception, judging 
case by case may not be a satisfactory solution. Instead Goldman asks whether there is 
an acceptance strategy imaginable, which on average would work best in all possible 
reporting environments. He argues that the application of Bayes’ Theorem provides 
exactly such a strategy. Bayes‘ Theorem describes a probabilistic inference strategy 
which indicates how the probability of an event should be assessed and changed in the 
light of new evidence. To calculate this a posteriori probability of an event x given new 
evidence such as the testimony of a witness, what is needed are the prior probabilities of 
the x and not-x, as well as the conditional probability of the witness testifying x given 
that x has occurred and given that x did not occur. Please note that these latter 
conditional probabilities imply an assessment of the competency and truthfulness of a 
witness. The testimony of a testifier would be weighted by his perceived competency 
and truthfulness as was the case for the experts in the weather forecasts example.  
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To conclude, according to Goldman (Goldman 2003), the application of Bayesian rules 
of inference promises to yield more true beliefs on average than most other procedures 
and thus should be employed in rational reasoning in order to maximize the number of 
true beliefs. Thus, Goldman considers the application of Bayesian inference to 
testimonial evidence to be a socio-epistemological, normatively appropriate practice. He 
turns this rather individual act of statistical inference into a socio-epistemological 
practice by simply applying it to information received socially via testimony. And by 
doing this, he argues for the epistemic value of weighting different agents according to 
their perceived competence and honesty.  
Argumentation 
In his chapter on argumentation Goldman then puts the information provider into the 
spotlight and asks how she should behave to be of high veritistic value herself (Goldman 
2003). At first, he differentiates between monological argumentation, dialogical 
argumentation and debate. In a monological argumentation one person delivers an 
argument by giving premises and conclusions, in a dialogical one two persons argue 
about an issue and in a debate an additional audience is involved. With respect to 
different purposes of argumentation Goldman further distinguishes between factual 
arguments about what to believe and practical arguments about what to do. He confines 
his analyses to the factual cases.  
In line with his focus on veritistic gain, he then analyzes in which cases which forms of 
argumentation lead to veritistically good results and comes up with fourteen rules of 
good argumentation. He argues that these rules are not his invention, but tacit folk rules 
that ensure cooperation and information sharing in communities. For monological 
arguments to be veritistically beneficial, the following criteria should be met: Be 
informative, be credible, be comprehensible to your audience. Additionally it would be 
good if no one in the audience can defeat your argument and the remaining rules center 
around questions of how to deal with defeaters and rebuttal as well as ho to respond to 
criticism. Goldman puts emphasis to what he calls the truth-in-evidence principle (TEP), 
which holds that ―[a] larger body of evidence is generally a better indicator of the truth-
value of a hypothesis than a smaller, contained body of evidence, as long as all the 
evidence propositions are true and what they indicate is correctly interpreted. (Goldman 
2003: 145)‖.  
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He argues that this principle implies that it is veritistically desirable to engage in critical 
debates. If being critical is an epistemic duty, a crucial question for any social 
epistemology therefore consists in finding ways to support and foster an intellectual 
climate in which criticism can flourish. Goldman‘s conclusions are straightforward and 
one of the few similarities with Helen Longino‘s approach80 (Longino 2002c): increase 
the incentives for criticism and expand the opportunities for it.  
He concludes his normative-prescriptive account or argumentation by assessing four 
argumentative fallacies in the light of his veritistic social epistemology: argumentum ad 
verecundiam, i.e. the appeal to authority, begging the question, argumentum ad 
hominem, i.e. attacking the person instead of the argument, and the straw man fallacy, 
i.e. a misrepresentation of an opponent‘s position to make it easier attackable. While 
from his veritistic point of view the appeal to authority is not a fallacy in cases in which 
the authority really is knowledgeable, begging the question is problematic because no 
new true conclusions are conveyed. And while argumentum ad hominem might be 
admissible if there are serious doubts about the competency and integrity of an 
opponent, the straw man fallacy controverts the principle of accuracy and should 
therefore be avoided on veritistic grounds. 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) 
The third generic social practice Goldman analyses in the light of his veritistic social 
epistemology are information and communication technologies (ICT). The major 
criterion of his Goldman‘s assessment of the merits of ICT again lies in the potential of 
these technologies to increase the overall veritistic value. This can be done in two ways: 
either, more people get to know something, or something new gets known, i.e. new 
knowledge gets discovered. As was already the case in his analysis of testimony, 
Goldman‘s focus lies in the spread of existing knowledge and not in the creation of new 
knowledge. The epistemological task then consists in finding those means that can 
spread knowledge fast to many people. Besides the speed and breadth of spreading 
knowledge it might be of additional epistemic value that knowledge can be easily found 
and differentiated from non-knowledge. This aspect of quality assessment is 
increasingly relevant today where it is rather information overload than information 
scarcity which is problematic. Goldman analyses different tools, such as email, forums, 
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the WWW more generally, search engines, etc with respect to their contribution to 
veritistic gain and shows how those media can either be used to raise the overall 




ICT and Scholarly Communication  
An interesting issue that Goldman specifically addresses concerns the role of ICT for 
scholarly communication. The main topic he addresses is peer review and the difference 
between peer reviewed journals and e-print servers such as (http://arxiv.org/). Goldman 
argues that the process of peer review is beneficial for readers because experts filter and 
evaluate information for them. And for writers it is beneficial, because they gain 
reputation by having passed peer review and by publishing in those journals that have 
strict evaluation criteria. The fact that e-print servers without peer review function so 
well in certain natural sciences is explained by him through the high entrance barrier 
into sciences such as physics. Moreover, since the claims in physics are in principle 
replicable and the methods are verifiable, physicists would not dare to publish 
something that does not meet their community‘s standards on those servers. Thus 
although, there is no peer review, quality can be controlled in this case through the fear 
of post review. A crucial prerequisite for this mechanism to work lies for Goldman in 
identification. One has to be able to identify the author of a paper on such non-peer-
reviewed severs, because otherwise the fear to lose one‘s reputation by publishing low-
quality content does not work. Anonymity, as is the case for instance on Wikipedia 
would be detrimental on such an account. Further issues that Goldman raises with 
respect to scholarly communication are the costs of online publishing, the dangers of 
pay-per-view-policies for libraries as well as the balancing of different values, such as 
property rights versus public interest or freedom of information. These topics are 
currently hotly debated in academic discourse and I return to some of them in Part 3.  
Speech Regulation & the Marketplace of Ideas 
Goldman concludes his analyses of generic social practices with a chapter on speech 
regulation and the marketplace of ideas (Goldman 2003). Basically in this chapter he is 
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 Since many applications Goldman describes are by now outdated, I do not get into detail in describing 
them. However, Goldman has published a more recent paper on blogging (Goldman 2009) to which I 
return in the next chapter. 
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analyzing general policies for allocating speech opportunities with respect to their 
impact on the overall veritistic value in a society. Speech opportunity is to be understood 
in a broader sense of giving people the change to be heard or read, i.e. it does not only 
include direct allocation of speech time in a face-to-face encounter, but also the 
possibility to publish, broadcast, etc. Crucial issues he raises concern the relationship 
between facilitation speech and the prevention of speech (e.g. the rejection of a paper by 
an editor). In particular he analyzes the free-market thesis, according to which the 
market has to regulate itself and state intervention has to be avoided, and its impact on 
the veritistic value. In conclusion, he rejects the idea that an unregulated ―knowledge 
market is veritistically superior and argues instead that some form of regulation (e.g. 
state intervention into what is broadcasted, peer review, editorial choice, etc.) is needed 
to enable the prerequisites of a free market of ideas in the first place. Which forms of 
intervention are paramount is left open. But he insists for instance, that the inclusion of 
many people into epistemic practices is not per se desirable. Quite to the contrary, 
speech control might be necessary at times and with respect to science, Goldman 
concludes that the filtering function of peer review is a clear example of the benefits of 
such regulation and denial of speech Goldman 2003. 
Science 
From the four special domains that Goldman applies his veritistic social epistemology 
to, I focus on science only in more detail. One reason for this choice is that science is 
most directly concerned with knowledge creation. As a consequence, it is the topic 
which most other social epistemologies portrayed in this chapter have focused on and 
the differences between the different approaches can be made most transparent when a 
common framework is chosen. 
Goldman sets on what turns out to be a defense of the veritistic superiority of science 
with a critique of two seminal publications in the history and social studies of science: 
Steve Shapin and Simon Schaffer‘s ―Leviathan and the Airpump‖ (Shapin and Schaffer 
1985) as well as Bruno Latour‘s ―Science in Action‖(Latour 1987). The lense through 
which he reads those approaches is again his veritism. In ―Leviathan and the Airpump‖, 
Shapin and Schaffer examine the debate between Robert Boyle and Thomas Hobbes 
over Boyle's air-pump experiments in the 1660s with respect to the role of societal 
factors related to the different knowledge systems promoted by Boyle and Hobbes 
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(Shapin and Schaffer 1985). Goldman interprets Shapin and Shaffers analyses of 
Boyle‘s experimental program as a critique of credentialism, i.e. the reliance upon 
credentials such as titles as an indicator of a person or group's intellectual worth and as a 
proxy to assess their knowledge claims. Goldman argues that from a veritistic point of 
view credentialism might not be problematic at all. Quite to the contrary, he asserts that 
a ―[...] properly applied practice of credentialism would promote rather than hinder 
veritistic ends‖ (Goldman 2003: 225).  
The second approach, which Goldman seeks to debunk is Latour‘s empirical account of 
science in the making as depicted in Science in Action (Latour 1987). One the one hand, 
Goldman (mis-)interprets Latour as arguing that science is nothing but politics. On the 
other hand, he argues that Latour‘s ―political-military account of science‖ is in principle 
compatible with a veritistict epistemology, because deference to authorities can be 
epistemically valid if those authorities are reliable (Goldman 2003: 225ff).  
Goldman continues in his defense of science by arguing that the role of bias in science is 
often exaggerated (Goldman 2003: 234). To support this claim, he turns to experiments 
from the cognitive sciences in which cognitive biases, such as overconfidence, could 
have been reduced or overcome by minor changes in the instructions (e.g. Gigerenzer 
1991, cited from Goldman 2003). As for the non-cognitive hot biases, he confines 
himself to argue that doxastic voluntarism, the notion that ―one can choose to believe or 
disbelieve by a simple act of will‖ is controversial (Goldman 2003: 234) and that wishful 
thinking can be countered in science even better than elsewhere with the right 
incentives. As for values and cultural perspectives and their impact on science, Goldman 
simply asserts that such societal biases although they exist, exert less influence in 
science than in other societal systems. After a brief detour through the problems of 
underdetermination and the theory-ladenness of observation, Goldman lays open to be a 
scientific realist, whose social epistemology can nevertheless also be adopted from an 
anti-realist position.  
He continues his veritistic analyses of science with an argument for the comparative 
scientific superiority, which he defines as follows: ―Scientific practices are veritistically 
better than any set of nonscientific practices available to human beings for answering the 
sorts of questions that science seeks to answer‖(Goldman 2003: 247). This superiority is 
related to six characteristics of science, which distinguish it from other practices and 
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domains. I list these characteristics of science, because even if one does not consider 
them to be the ―sources of scientific success‖ (Goldman 2003: 250), they nonetheless 
stress some important features of contemporary science. Therefore, they are not only 
important for Goldman‘s own socio-epistemic account of science, but they also relate it 
to other social epistemologies to be portrayed in this chapter.  
1. ―An emphasis on precise measurement, controlled test, and 
observation, including a philosophy, organon, and technology for 
more and more powerful observation.  
2. A systematic and sophisticated set of inferential principles for 
drawing conclusions about hypotheses from observations of 
experimental results.  
3. The marshalling and distribution of resources to facilitate scientific 
investigation and observation.  
4. A system of credit and reward that provides incentives for workers to 
engage in scientific research and to distribute their efforts in chosen 
directions.  
5. A system for disseminating scientific findings and theories as well as 
critical assessments of such findings and theories.  
6. The use of domain-specific expertise in making decisions about 
dissemination, resource allocation, and rewards.‖(Goldman 2003: 
250f)  
Goldman argues that from those six characteristics, at least the last four are social. 
Therefore, a socio-epistemology of science has to assess whether those social aspects of 
science are actually beneficial or detrimental for science. Moreover, for each of those 
characteristics, there might be better or worse practices and a social epistemology has to 
assess the respective veritistic value of different social scientific practices. 
How could such a veritistic analysis of social practices in science look like? The first 
social aspect of science that Goldman addresses concerns the distribution of scientific 
labor. Goldman critically assesses Philip Kitcher‘s perspective on the distribution of 
cognitive labor according to which the diverse motives of scientists are sufficient to 
ensure a distribution of cognitive labor that is beneficial for science (Kitcher 1993).
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More specifically, Kitcher introduces the term notion of the epistemically sullied agent, 
a credit-driven scientist whose primary motivator is being the first one to solve a 
scientific puzzle rather than just aiming at truth in general. While Goldman agrees with 
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portrayed in more detail in the next Chapter.  
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Kitcher, that also from a Bayesian perspective, a certain diversity of approaches is 
beneficial and should be supported, he differs in his assessment of the value of the 
sullied agents and their drive for credit. Goldman asserts that credit-orientation, 
although it may not necessarily be detrimental to science, can make scientists chose a 
veritistically inferior research design (Goldman 2003: 263). 
Goldman then continues to give recommendations concerning scientific publishing, e.g. 
on the question of how editors should chose articles to increase the overall veritistic 
value in a society. Based on his prior analyses he concludes that editors should choose 
those articles which are not only qualitatively best, but also those which are the most 
significant, because those articles lead to the highest veritistic gain. And to assess the 
potential impact of scientific contributions, editors should turn to authorities in the 
field. Especially in cases of highly surprising results, i.e. those results with the highest 
potential to change the veritistic distribution, expert assessment is crucial, because 
experts are the most likely ones capable of assessing whether the results are really 
groundbreaking or rather due to mistakes in the research design, a statistical exception, 
etc.  
Given this crucial role of experts, it should not come as a surprise that Goldman puts 
emphasis on analyzing the relevance of recognizing authorities in science, a topic on 
which he elaborates in a later article as well (Goldman 2001). In arguing that everybody 
can assess expertise, i.e. the quality of different experts, he seeks to refute John 
Hardwig‘s doubts concerning the ability of lay people to assess expertise (Hardwig 
1985). Hardwig‘s work on trust gets portrayed in the next chapter in more detail. For 
the moment it suffices that Goldman cites Hardwig in arguing that lay people cannot 
assess experts empirically, because they ―[...] do not fully understand what constitute 
good reasons in the domain of expert opinion‖ (Hardwig 1985). Lay persons cannot 
assess the quality of an expert precisely because as non-experts they do not possess the 
competencies to assess the expertise of others. Hardwig concludes that therefore, 
laypeople sometimes simply have to trust experts, that this trust is sometimes even an 
epistemic duty. In a subsequent article he further argues that scientists themselves have 
to trust their peers in order to successfully operate in science (Hardwig 1991). Goldman 
(Goldman 2003) claims that this fallback on trust is precipitate and that lay people are 
perfectly capable of deciding about the merits of different experts if they follow some 
rules. He argues that even without being an expert, people can assess whether an 
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expert‘s predictions came true, they can verify the expert‘s claims elsewhere, they can 
assess whether the argumentation was sound and they can compare the conclusions of 
different experts. I return to Goldman‘s perspective on expertise and credentialism as 
well as to the topics of epistemic authority, trust and reputation more generally in the 
next chapter.  
5.4.3 Miriam Solomon’s Social Empiricism 
Introduction 
Miriam Solomon is another philosopher who has offered a comprehensive social 
epistemology which she has labelled Social Empiricism. Similarly to other social 
epistemologists, she acknowledges that the sociology of scientific knowledge, feminist 
studies as well as various historical, ethnographical or psychological accounts of science 
have posed serious challenges for traditional epistemology and philosophy of science. 
She takes that in order to develop more adequate and fruitful theories to account for the 
sociality of knowledge, the insights and claims coming from those fields have to be 
taken serious, and states that her approach can account for these challenges (Solomon 
2001).  
Solomon argues that despite other differences most philosophers and sociologists of 
science share not only standards for the evaluation of scientific practises, but also many 
underlying assumptions about science due to a shared background in Enlightenment 
epistemology (Solomon 2001: 2). These shared premises include individualism, i.e. the 
focus on the individual thinker; the demand that science should be free of motivational 
or ideological bias; the appreciation of consensus and the all-or-nothing-quality of 
rationality, i.e. the credo that rationality does not come in degrees. Solomon argues that 
these ―shared assumptions about the nature of rationality and progress lead to mirror 
image views of the nature of scientific change‖ (Solomon 2001: 6) and that they need to 
be overcome for a new more social epistemology.
83
 However, as is shown in the course 
of this analysis, instead of proclaiming her theory to be more social, it may be more 
adequate to label her approach (social) macro-epistemology. Similar to Steve Fuller‘s 
account Solomon‘s social epistemology aims at offering guidance for science policy. 
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epistemology‖ (Solomon 1994).  
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The perspective she takes is that of an external observer who evaluates epistemic 
activities and their distribution within a scientific community. Via funding, the 
distribution of such activities could then be changed according to socio-epistemological 
considerations. Her assertion that Social Empiricism is a social epistemology for science 
only and that it is more normative than descriptive (Solomon 2001) fits this alignment 
with the goals of science policy.  
Key Features 
Solomon delivers a full account of her social epistemology in her book ―Social 
Empiricism‖ and unless otherwise noted my portrayal is based on this book (Solomon 
2001). For the development of her theory, she uses case studies in the history of science 
to analyze the effects different types and distributions of bias had on the development of 
science in different fields. More specifically, she focuses on the role of biases for the 
achievement and dissolution of consensus on different theories within scientific 
communities, their effects on the distribution of cognitive labour and the overall impact 
on the advancement of science in different scientific fields measured by empirical 
success. In focusing on the distribution of these biases, it is the scientific community 
instead of the individual scientist that is in the centre of her inquiry. It is in this shift of 
attention to the scientific community as a whole that she claims to overcome the 
epistemic individualism that has long hampered philosophy of science and 
epistemology.  
Solomon‘s above mentioned critique of the shared premises of philosophers and 
sociologists of science also serves as a rationale for the development of her own account 
that sets on to overcome this individualism in a quite distinct way. In the following I 
introduce the three central socio-epistemic topics that are at the centre of Solomon‘s 
approach. The first one concerns the distribution of cognitive labour at the level of 
scientific communities. The second related topic concerns the role of consensus and 
dissent within scientific communities. And the third topic concerns the effects of 
different types and distributions of biases on the development of science. Instead of 
using the common, but rather pejorative term ―bias‖, Solomon introduces the notion of 
―decision vectors‖. This move is related to her argument that biases are not per se 
detrimental to science. Instead, it depends on the distribution of different types of biases 
whether science is advanced or hindered. 
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Division of Cognitive Labour: The Social Coordination of Epistemic Effort 
Division of cognitive labour concerns the question of how epistemic work should be 
most rationally and epistemically beneficial distributed over a multitude of people. This 
issue can be tackled on the micro-level of deciding upon how many people and who 
works on which tasks within a research group just as much as on the macro-level of 
deciding about the funding for different fields of research. Solomon‘s focus lies on the 
level of a research community and the guiding question is how many, which and for 
how long different research strategies should be pursued. This perspective that she 
adopts is comparable to a queen sending different variously well equipped ships into 
different directions to discover new continents. In a more modern variant, it is the view 
of science policy makers who have to decide upon the distribution of research grants, 
about the amount of money to be spent on different fields of research and different 
research strategies within these fields.  
This focus on the distribution of cognitive labour within scientific communities – not 
within research teams - is the framework for Solomon‘s Social Empiricism. Its goal is to 
develop guidelines for science funding based on the epistemological analysis of various 
case studies in the history of science. In effect, Solomon aims at culling examples from 
the history of science, in which the overall epistemic situation is characterized by 
advantageous distributions of decision vectors. Then these retrospective insights from 
historical analyses have to be transformed into prospective recommendations for science 
policy that ensure that such favourable epistemic situations with advantageous bias 
patterns will be achieved. According to Solomon, cognitive effort should ideally be 
distributed equitably, i.e. proportional to the empirical success of different theories or 
methods. Since empirical success however, can only be assessed after research has been 
conducted, her recommendation concerning the funding of research alternatives remain 
quite simple: As long as not all empirical evidence can be accounted for by one theory, 
all other theories that have empirical success which this theory cannot account for 
should continue to be pursued and thus have to be funded. This means that premature 
consensus has to be avoided as long as there is at least some empirical success by 





Consensus and Dissent 
The advice to fund diverse approaches and to avoid premature consensus on a specific 
theory or method leads to the second major topic of Solomon‘s Social Empiricism: the 
questions of consensus formation, retention and dissolution in science, the role various 
social factors play for it and the effects it has on the development of science in different 
fields. To get a grip on these questions, Solomon analyzes case studies in the history of 
science with respect to when, under what conditions and with which effects - consensus 
was achieved, retained or dissolved.  
For Solomon dissent plays a much bigger and more positive role in science that 
normally assumed. She considers consensus to be a special case of dissent, namely zero 
degree of dissent and argues that while dissent was traditionally perceived to be only a 
temporary phenomenon, that disappears once the source or error is detected, dissent 
usually is much more profound and enduring. In those traditional accounts, it is more or 
less assumed that if all scientists have the same information and act rationally, cognitive 
uniformity is to be expected - at least on the long run. Reasons for existing dissent 
continue to be numerous and diverse: imperfect communication of information, different 
access to evidence or different subjective prior probabilities for different theories, 
different weights for each of their theoretical values (e.g. fruitfulness, predictive 
accuracy, etc.) or simply different methodologies. However, once enough evidence is 
gathered and information has been properly communicated, etc. it is expected that there 
will eventually be consensus.  
That consensus is something inherently valuable also lies behind several normative 
theories of consensus, such as Keith Lehrer‘s theory on rational consensus formation 
(Lehrer and Wagner 1981), which is portrayed in the next chapter. Consensus in those 
normative approaches functions as an attainment, a major goal and endpoint of scientific 
inquiry. Presumably once truth has been identified and consented upon in a scientific 
community, social factors supposedly do not play any role anymore and hence, there is 
no need for a social epistemology at this stage anymore. This is where Solomon 
disagrees. Instead of taking consensus to be intrinsically valuable and the ultimate goal 
of science, Solomon shows that there have been numerous cases of premature consensus 
in the history of science, cases in which an early agreement on research agendas, on 
methods and theories, has actually hampered science by precluding the pursuance of 
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alternative approaches. She argues that while there certainly are some cases in which 
consensus is and remains normatively appropriate over time, in the majority of cases 
there either should have been still considerable dissent at the time consensus on one 
theory or method was reached or consensus should have been dissolved quicker in the 
light of contradicting evidence. 
One of Solomon‘s examples is the ‗central dogma‘ in molecular biology, which holds 
that it is only the DNA in the nucleus, which is in control of cellular processes via 
mRNA and protein synthesis. This exclusive focus on the nucleus has led to a neglect of 
cytoplasmic inheritance and the processes of non-chromosomal transmission taking 
place in the rest of the cell. The result was not only to ignorance, but also to the 
depreciation of those researchers who worked on such non-mainstream questions. 
According to her analysis it took molecular biology decades to loosen the grip of the 
central dogma to get non-nuclear inheritance into the focus of mainstream research. 
Thus, in this case, premature consensus, i.e. consensus on one theory that could not 
account for all empirical evidence, had a negative effect on the advancement of science, 
because it rendered the pursuance of alternative approaches unpromising. By doing this, 
it had an unfavorable effect on the distribution of cognitive labor within this research 
community and hindered research that would have been able to amend and improve 
mainstream research in molecular biology.  
One of the major goals of her Social Empiricism accordingly is to deliver some guidance 
as to whether and when to refrain from consenting, when to dissolve consensus and how 
to decide on the distribution of cognitive labor over different approaches. The bottom-
line of her argument is that as long as more than one theory or method is empirically 
successful, consensus on the mainstream approach should be suspended, because such 
premature consensus formation would be detrimental to the advancement of science. 
Instead, research efforts should be distributed around these different empirically 
successful theories – ideally in an equitable way.Thus, in contrast to classical normative 
theories of consensus such as the one developed by Keith Lehrer, she is not 
recommending a new method of consensus formation, but rather argues for a suspension 
of consensus and the pursuance of different research strategies until finally all empirical 
evidence is supporting only one theory. Since this condition is hardly ever met, the 
safest strategy is to support different research agendas for as long as possible, i.e. to 




As indicated by the title of the book, Solomon is strongly committed to empiricism and 
as such, her approach privileges empirical success over theoretical success. By 
empirical success, Solomon means predictive, retrodictive and also technological 
success. Theoretical success denotes concepts such as simplicity or elegance of a theory, 
breadth of scope, but also Helen Longino‘s list of feminist theoretical virtues, e.g novelty, 
ontological heterogeneity (Longino 1995). She argues for the primacy of empirical success 
for the following reason: empirical success is due to dependable behaviour of the world 
and as such not entirely fabricated or man-made. Moreover, it is indispensable: if 
empirical success is not a value, it is not science. Theoretical success by contrast, is not 
only contingent to the inquirer herself and accordingly less valuable, it is also 
negotiable. She concludes that this is why ―[e]mpirical success is a primary goal of 
scientific inquiry, and theoretical success valuable only when it brings extra empirical 
success, convenience or moral benefits with the available empirical success‖ (Solomon 
2001: 20).  
Considering the centrality of the term empirical success, but also Solomon‘s more 
general tendency to objectify science policy, it is astonishing that the term empirical 
success remains quite vague. Evaluating other accounts on empirical success, she 
concludes that definitions of empirical success are of little use and confines herself to 
describing it as the moment when ―[…] scientists, instruments and the world 
successfully coordinate their actions as a result of tinkering, conceptual adjustment and 
serendipity‖ (Solomon 2001: 27f).  
Whig Realism 
Even though Solomon stresses the importance of empirical success, she nonetheless 
agrees with Goldman (Goldman 2003) and Kitcher (Kitcher 1993) that truth, also serves 
as one of the primary goals of science. However, taking into account historical analyses, 
she rightly concludes that truth might be a difficult concept for assessing scientific 
theories, because the majority of claims and assumptions in science turn out to be false 
over time. Nonetheless, instead of rejecting the relevance of truth for science or 
developing an alternative epistemic success term, she sticks with the notion of truth and 
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labels her approach Whig realism, as a blend of Whig history 
84
and realism. Whig 
realism is meant to denote that although scientific theories might neither be literally, nor 
partially or approximately true nor even good representations, there is typically 
something true about empirically successful theories (Solomon 2001: 11). Giving a 
positive definition of her concept of truth however, seems to be more difficult, so that 
the following is as close as we get to a definition about what she means by truth in the 
theory: ―What is true about our empirically successful theories is, typically, an 
implication of the theory at the theoretical level (i.e., not just a prediction or 
observation) that may or may not be explicitly derived during the historical period in 
which the theory is accepted.‖ (Solomon 2001: 39). Crucially, this truth in the theory 
can only be recognized in hindsight. Thus, this truth can be analyzed and ascribed only 
by historical reconstruction, but is impossible to assess in the course of the actual 
research process. Only after having assessed the truth value of theories retroactively and 
having compared the different distributions of bias can we decide upon the benefits or 
detriments of different distributions and draw normative-prescriptive conclusions from 
them for science policy. This insight also explains Solomon‘s methodological choice of 
using case studies to make normative recommendations for science policy.  
Solomon concludes that her Whig realism is superior to realist and anti-realist accounts 
of truth, because of this possibility to make concrete recommendations for science 
policy based on historical analyses. More precisely and with reference to the question of 
consensus, she argues that while traditional realists simply aim at consensus in science, 
and anti-realists are indifferent to consensus or dissent, Whig realism can be more 
specific in arguing for or against consensus in different situations. Quite generally, 
consensus is only very rarely normatively appropriate, namely only when one theory can 
account for all empirical evidence. Otherwise, Solomon‘s approach would demand an 
encouragement of pluralism up until the point at which all last doubts about a theory are 
dispelled and all empirical evidence yields into one direction. Before returning to the 
questionwhen exactly dissent is normatively appropriate, we need to take a look at her 
concept of decision vectors.  
 
                                                 
84
 The term Whig goes back to the Whig party which has been one of the main parties in the British 
Parliament. Whig history usually denotes interpreting history from the present point of view and as a story 
of progress toward the present. This often also means implying a line of causation and stressing the 
necessity and unavoidability of historical development (Solomon 2001: 33).  
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Decision Vectors: The Role of Bias 
The key concept that Solomon introduces to account for the effect of various social 
factors on science and knowledge are her so-called decision vectors. In trying to show 
that social factors are not inherently detrimental to science and epistemic practices more 
generally, she proposes this term as an alternative to the clearly pejorative notion of 
bias. Following Hume and consonant with Kitcher‘s conviction that ―[p]articular kinds 
of social arrangements make good epistemic use of the grubbiest motives‖ (Kitcher 
1993: 305, quoted from Solomon 2001: 53), she argues that the term decision vector 
allows for biases having a positive effect on science.  
Decision vectors denote all factors that influence scientific decision making and as such 
have an effect on scientific outcomes. For Solomon, they include such diverse things as 
ideology, pride, peer pressure, deference to authority, salience of data or even the birth 
rank of scientists. Allegedly based on her case studies, but without giving any support 
for this claim, Solomon contends that there are 50-100 decision vectors and that while 
each of them is neither beneficial nor detrimental to science, their impact depends on 
their overall distribution (Solomon 2001).  
There is only one major differentiation she proposes, namely the difference between 
empirical and non-empirical decision vectors. The importance difference lies in their 
relation to empirical success. While empirical decision vectors are ―[…] causes of 
preference for theories with empirical success, (Solomon 2001: 56)‖, non-empirical 
decision vectors lack this connection to empirical success. Examples of such empirical 
decision vectors are salience and availability of data as cognitive factors, an egocentric 
bias towards one‘s own data as a motivational factor as well as more generally a 
preference for a theory which generates novel predictions. Non-empirical decision 
vectors by contrast are not related to empirical success and include social and political 
factors (ideology, deference to authority, agreement with scripture), motivational factors 
(pride, conservativeness, radicalism, competition, peer pressure) and cognitive factors 
(representativeness heuristic) as well as theoretical values, such as elegance, simplicity, 




Relating Decision Vectors, Consensus and the Distribution of Epistemic 
Labour 
How then are these decision vectors related to the formation of consensus and the 
distribution of cognitive labour? The connection between consensus and the distribution 
of scientific effort is straightforward, given that premature consensus can lead to an 
untimely cutting of research grants for alternative approaches and an accordingly 
unbalanced distribution of cognitive effort. The relationship to decision vectors 
however, is not that clear. By providing various historical examples from evolutionary 
biology, genetics, plate tectonics and cancer research, Solomon shows that decision 
vectors have played a role in the formation of consensus (Solomon 2001). More 
specifically, different distributions of decision vectors have been either beneficial or 
detrimental to the advancement of science in these different fields by affecting 
consensus formation or dissolution.  
Beneficial distributions of decision vectors would lead to consensus only when all 
empirical evidence can be accounted for by one theory. Otherwise they would ensure 
scientific pluralism. The positive example from the history of science that she cites here 
is plate tectonics, where three different theories have been pursued in parallel until 
finally continental drift was able to account for all empirical success. Detrimental 
distributions of decision vectors, by contrast, would either lead to premature consensus 
(as was the case concerning the central dogma in molecular biology), to delayed 
dissolution of consensus or possibly also to a refusal or delay of consensus, after one 
theory actually has already accounted for all empirical evidence.  
Advantageous Distributions of Decision Vectors: Guidelines for Science 
Policy 
But how exactly do such beneficial distributions of decision vectors look like or how 
should they look like in comparison to rather detrimental ones? And even more 
importantly, how can they be made useful for science policy? Solomon states that the 
ideal distribution consists in an equitable distribution of empirical decision vectors 
combined with an equal distribution of non-empirical decision vectors. She then simply 
counts those decision vectors she identifies for each theory in each historical case study, 
adds them up and compares their ratio for different competing theories. She concludes 
that the closer the distribution of decision vectors was to this ideal distribution, the 
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better science developed. If the decision vectors were far from ideal, problems such as 
premature consensus and unbalanced distributions of cognitive labour were the result. 
The goal of science policy would then be to affect the distribution of decision vectors to 
approximate this ideal state.  
By arguing for a science policy that changes the distribution of decision vectors, 
Solomon rejects an invisible-hand model of scientific reasoning.
85
 Similar to Fuller‘s 
argument (Fuller 1988) and against Kitcher (Kitcher 1993), she asserts that science does 
not self-organize in the best possible way without corrective intervention. Rather, 
science policy makers should intervene by making use of insights from a normative 
social epistemology that can prescribe how to ensure such favourable distributions of 
decision vectors (i.e. equitable distribution of empirical decision vectors, equal equitable 
distribution of non-empirical decision vectors. Solomon argues that her Social 
Empiricism is exactly such a normative social epistemology. More specifically, she 
specifies under which conditions consensus, dissent and the dissolution of consensus are 
normatively appropriate and makes these recommendations the normative-prescriptive 
core of her Social Empiricism. These are her three recommendations concerning 
consensus, dissent and the dissolution of consensus. There are distinct conditions under 
which dissent is appropriate and others under which consensus would be adequate and 
these conditions are related to the distribution of empirical success and the distribution 
of the different types of decision vectors. According to Solomon, when the following 
three conditions are fulfilled, dissent should prevail: 
―1. Theories on which there is dissent should each have associated empirical 
success.  
2. Empirical decision vectors should be equitably distributed (in proportion 
to empirical successes).  
                                                 
85
 When unfolding her concept of decision vectors, Solomon explicitly differentiates herself from other 
what she calls the ―invisible hand model of scientific rationality‖, which she ascribes to Goldman (1992) 
and Kitcher (1993). She asserts that this model is named after Adam Smith, denoting ―[…] that the 
impulse of self-interest, in a laissez faire economy, will bring about the desirable goal of public welfare 
(Solomon 2001: 55)‖. I think that she has fallen victim to the same misreading as many contemporary 
advocators of the ‗wisdom of the crowds‘. First of all, Smith‘s warning that state intervention might not be 
beneficial was set against the background of the very centralized France at the end of the 18th century, a 
situation which is hardly comparable to modern societal frameworks. Moreover, and even more 
importantly, Smith‘s is not simply advocating some form of free market liberalism. His recommendations 
emphasize the need for conscience and sympathy, the need to constrain one‘s behavior through virtue 
(moral sentiments), in order to balance the self-interest. Thus, Smith himself did not simply proclaim that 
everything settles for the best, if there only is no state interference. Rather, he based the success or failure 
of this on the virtue of sympathy. 
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3. Non-empirical decision vectors should be equally distributed (the same 
number for each theory)‖ (Solomon 2001: 117f). 
Since she considers consensus to be a special case of dissent, namely zero dissent, her 
normative account of dissent can be applied to consensus as well. Consensus is 
normatively appropriate only if one theory can account for all empirical evidence, which 
hardly ever is attainable.  
―1‘. One theory comes to have all the empirical success available in a 
domain of inquiry. 
2‘. This same theory comes to have all of the empirical decision vectors, 
since all scientists working productively (with empirical success) are 
working within the one theory.  
3‘. Any distribution of non-empirical decision vectors is OK, but typically 
more will develop, over time, on the consensus theory, as the old theories 
fade away. During dissent, and thus in the early stages of consensus 
formation, the above requirement of equal distribution of non-empirical 
decision vectors holds‖ (Solomon 2001: 119). 
However, since Solomon argues that consensus should not be regarded the final stage of 
scientific development, she also needs to account for the dissolution of consensus. This 
process basically is set off by new empirical evidence being produced by a theory other 
than the consensual one. If as a result the empirical decision vectors then become 
equitably distributed and the non-empirical ones equally distributed, consensus should 
be dissolved. With her own words, in order to dissolve consensus the following 
prerequisites should be met:  
―1‖. A new theory has empirical success that is not produced by the 
consensus theory. (So, the new theory deserves attention.)  
2‖. Empirical decision vectors come to be equitably distributed.  
3‖. Non-empirical decision vectors come to be equally distributed‖ 
(Solomon 2001: 119f). 
These three normative recommendations concerning consensus, dissent and the 
dissolution of consensus are at the heart of Solomon‘s Social Empiricism. She argues 
that her approach is social (and even more social than others) in making normative 
recommendations on the level on the community as opposed to normative 
recommendations for individual scientists. And it is empiricist, because empirical 
success along with truth is of prime importance. In comparison to other social 
epistemologies she argues that Social Empiricism demands more and less. While it does 
not demand that individual scientists improve their scientific reasoning, it requires 
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changes at the macro-level, i.e. systematic changes of science produced by a science 
policy based on Social Empiricism. In this sense, Social Empiricism is a form of social 
engineering for science (Solomon 2001).  
Thus, in the end, the normative implications of Solomon‘s Social Empiricism are quite 
clear: Suspend consensus on one theory for as long as any other theory also has 
empirical success that the mainstream theory cannot account for. For science policy, this 
means that alternative approaches should be funded up to that – quite unlikely - point of 
consensus as well. With respect to the ideal distribution of decision vectors, Miriam 
Solomon is also quite explicit: ideally empirical decision should be equitably distributed 
and non-empirical decision vectors should be equally distributed. However, when it 
comes to the crux of the matter this explicitness of profoundly lacking: How could such 
a favorable distribution of decision vectors get achieved? Which means of science 
policy are appropriate? How could science policy makers ensure that empirical decision 
vectors are equitably distributed and non-empirical decision vectors equally distributed? 
What is the use of quantifying decision vectors, given that the only option for action that 
science policy makers have consists in different amounts of money to different research 
fields and fund different approaches as long as dissent prevails? 
Solomon concludes her book with acknowledging that ―[s]ocial empiricism is 
conceptually simple. There is nothing mathematically or philosophically challenging in 
the idea that empirical decision vectors should be equitably distributed and non-
empirical decision vectors equally distributed. Difficulties come in identifying decision 
vectors, and in making realistic recommendations for changing their distribution.‖ 
(Solomon 2001: 151). Unfortunately, both these difficult tasks have not been tackled in 
this book. To play the devils‘ advocate one may question the relevance of decision 
vectors for Miriam Solomon‘s account altogether. If we skip the 2nd and 3rd criteria for 
consensus, dissent and consensus dissolution would not the normative recommendations 
stay exactly the same? Fund alternative approaches as long as they are empirically 
successful! That this funding should ideally be equitable might be a good idea, but we 
should remember that the empirical success can only be known after research is 
conducted. The concept of decision vectors does not help in finding out how to achieve 
such an equitable distribution. I critically assess Solomon‘s approach and its relevance 
for the analysis of socio-technical epistemic systems in the next chapter.  
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5.4.4 Martin Kusch’s Communitarian Epistemology 
Introduction 
In his book ―Knowledge by Agreement‖ Martin Kusch develops a Communitarian 
Epistemology, which he explicitly distinguishes from other social epistemologies 
portrayed in this chapter. Thus, while he asserts that his Communitarian Epistemology is 
not a social epistemology, he develops is dialogically against other social 
epistemologies. Those social epistemologies he refers to critically for him fall into one 
of the two categories of being either complementary programmes (e.g. Goldman 2003) 
or science policy programmes (most importantly Fuller 1988, Kusch 2002: 2ff). While 
the latter aims at improving science by changing its structures, the former seeks to 
develop epistemic accounts of social practices to complement individualistic 
epistemologies as traditionally conceived.  
Kusch‘s Communitarian Epistemology is different and understands knowledge to be 
social in a much more fundamental sense than has been the case in the previous 
approaches. For its development Martin Kusch sets on to combine epistemology with 
political theory. Communitarianism in political philosophy denotes a priority of 
community over the individual in order of explanation. This means that ―[m]oral 
individuals do not precede moral communities; moral individuals can be understood 
only through their membership in moral communities‖ (Kusch 2002: 1). For the 
development of a communitarian epistemology, this means that knowers can also be 
understood only through their membership in epistemic communities. Or to put it even 
more strongly, an isolated individual knower does not exist in a communitarian 
epistemology.  
Kusch bases his Communitarian Epistemology on two premises concerning the sociality 
of knowledge, in which this central role of the community becomes obvious. First, terms 
such as ―knowledge‖, ―knower‖ and ―know‖ mark social statuses, and by this they 
depend on communities to grant these social statuses. There are no exceptions to this 
rule. Without a community of knowers, there can be no knowledge. Secondly he claims 
that, ―[…] the social status ‗knowledge‘ is typically granted to, or imposed on, groups of 
people‖ (Kusch 2002: 1). In inserting the word ―typically‘, Kusch allows for the 
possibility that someone outside a community might be attributed knowledge. 
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Nonetheless, although such an individual may possess knowledge, it can only be 
ascribed to him by a community.  
With these two prerequisites, Kusch strongly deviates from the individualism which is 
still prevalent in the majority of social epistemologies, especially in those approaches, 
that he labels complementary. By arguing that the primary subject of knowledge is not 
the individual, but the community his communitarian approach goes as far as to 
conclude there is no such thing as the individual isolated knower. Individuals may have 
beliefs. But, beliefs can only become knowledge if a minimal epistemic community is 
formed around them. And by this process, these beliefs are not held by an individual any 
longer, but by a community bound together by a set of entitlements and commitments 
(Kusch 2002). 
Kusch sharpens his account by developing it dialogically against other theoretical 
approaches that aim at accounting for the social context or the social nature of 
knowledge. These approaches for instance include Keith Lehrer‘s consensualism, 
Donald Davidson‘s interpretationalism or different variants of contextualism. The three 
main epistemological problems he addresses in this book are the nature of testimony, the 
rationality of empirical belief and questions of objectivity (Kusch 2002). For the purpose 
of this thesis, emphasis is laid on his disquisition of testimony. Within the development 
of his communitarian theory of testimony the two crucial claims of his Communitarian 
Epistemology - that knowledge is a social status and that the granting of this status 
depends on communities - are also further elucidated. 
A Communitarian Account of Testimony 
That Kusch starts the development of his Communitarian Epistemology with the topic of 
testimony is indicative of the central role this topic has had for the development of social 
epistemology in general. Indeed, for the longest time testimony has been used as a 
covering term for all social aspects of knowledge within epistemological discourse. 
Analyzing the sociality of knowledge was investigating the role of testimony for 
knowledge understood as the transmission of knowledge from one individual to another. 
But, according to Kusch, the sociality of knowledge goes far beyond a mere 
transmission of knowledge from one person to another. To vindicate a communitarian 
account of testimony, Kusch starts by exposing the limits of individualistic 
understandings of testimony. He argues that the scope of testimony was too narrowly 
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conceived and that the notion of epistemic interdependence might be a better concept to 
describe the interrelatedness of epistemic agents. Moreover, the idea that testimony is a 
mere means of knowledge transmission has to be replaced with the acknowledgement 
that testimony often is a generative source of knowledge 
Critique of Individualistic Accounts of Testimony 
According to Kusch, there are two crucial flaws in individualist accounts of testimony 
(Kusch 2002). First, it has often been mistakenly assumed that testimony exhausts all 
social aspects of knowledge. Secondly, testimony was only considered to be a 
mechanism for the spread of existing knowledge, for the transmission of knowledge 
from one person to another. This distortion becomes understandable, when taking a look 
at the usage and the connotations of the word ―testimony‖ in everyday life. ―Testimony‖ 
is closely linked to eye witness reports in legal settings and this is the context in which it 
probably is most frequently used. Using this label ―testimony‖ to account for the social 
aspects of knowledge has led to a framing and narrowing of the sociality of knowledge 
to cases similar to this legal setting, where one person is reporting what she has seen or 
what she knows. Thus, unreflective usage of the label ―testimony‖ has had probably 
unintended, but detrimental effects on understanding the sociality of knowledge within 
mainstream (social) epistemology.  
What Kusch finds particularly worrisome is that with such a narrow view on testimony 
the possibility that testimony could be more than just transmission of existing 
knowledge, but also a means of generating new knowledge has been neglected, or even 
rejected. To outline, in which ways testimony is generative of new knowledge, Kusch 
develops a concept of performative testimony. This concept is based on the assumption 
that performative speech acts are important sources of new knowledge and as such have 
to be accounted for by any comprehensive theory of testimony. His Communitarian 
Epistemology of testimony aims at being such a comprehensive theory of testimony and 
I depict it below in more detail.  
Two topics are central in current debates around the epistemology of testimony: 
inferentialism and reductionism. Inferentialism concerns the question of whether our 
adoption of beliefs based on testimony is or should be direct or inferential; whether our 
adoption or rejection of testimony should be based on assessment of the testifier‘s 
competency and honesty. Kusch argues that the debates in this field have been impaired 
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by a confusion of different levels of analysis. Phenomenological and pragmatic 
questions around testimony have been interspersed with psychological and normative 
questions. To his mind, much of the debates around inferentialism have not been 
particularly enlightening with respect to an understanding of the epistemological 
function of testimony. He concludes that ―[a]n epistemology of testimony worth its salt 
had better avoid engaging in psychological speculations about subconscious processes; 
it had better stay clear of the misbegotten project of a phenomenology of testimony; and 
it had better give proper heed to the diversity of social practices surrounding the giving 
and receiving of testimony‖ (Kusch 2002: 28).  
The second major topic in epistemological accounts of testimony besides inferentialism 
concerns the general justification of testimony. The basic question is whether 
testimonial knowledge has to be justified by other, more fundamental sources of 
knowledge, such as memory, perception or inference. Kusch argues that much of the 
debate around whether testimony has to be justified by other epistemic sources again is a 
result of the legal connotations of the term testimony. In court, distinguishing testimony 
based on former empirical observation from mere hear-say is clearly necessary. 
However, once one leaves the courtroom, the situation changes. If one adopts a view of 
epistemic interdependence, i.e. of the interrelatedness of all epistemic sources, the 
reduction of testimony to more fundamental sources becomes implausible. If memory, 
perception, inference and testimony are intrinsically interrelated, no source is more 
fundamental than the other.  
After analyzing different forms of reductionism and anti-reductionism, Kusch argues 
that so far no convincing argument for a general justification of our reliance has been 
delivered (Kusch 2002: 43). Therefore, Kusch ends up arguing for communitarian 
quietism and contextualism and summarizes this position and its consequences as 
follows:‖Since testimony is constitutive of all forms of justification, it is senseless to 
provide a general justification for it. Only local and contextual justifications are 
meaningful‖ (Kusch 2002: 77).86 
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 The interdependence of epistemic sources as well as the consequences of Kusch‘s contextualist position 
are addressed in more detail in the next chapter. 
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Predecessors of Kusch’s Communitarian Account of Testimony 
There are two communitarian accounts of testimony that Kusch considers particularly 
inspiring for his own approach: John Hardwig‘s work on the role of trust in knowledge 
(Hardwig 1985; Hardwig 1991) and Michael Welbourne‘s communitarian account of 
testimony developed in ―Community of Knowledge‖ (Welbourne 1986). I depict these 
approaches here only briefly and in so far as they are relevant for Kusch‘s account of 
testimony.  
John Hardwig’s Role of Trust in Knowledge 
In his paper ―The role of trust in knowledge‖, Hardwig raises two issues which are 
highly relevant for any social epistemology and to which I return in the next chapter in 
more detail (Hardwig 1991). One topic concerns the distribution of epistemic labor, the 
other concerns the question of epistemic subjects in science. In contrast to Miriam 
Solomon (Solomon 2001), focuses on the distribution of work within research groups 
and not between them, i.e. within scientific communities as a whole. Arguing that the 
majority of research is nowadays conducted in teams, Hardwig emphasizes the 
fundamental role of trust in other epistemic agents for research. The second topic raised 
in his paper concerns the entity of the epistemic subject in science and is of primary 
concern for Martin Kusch‘s communitarian account of testimony. This issue centers 
around the question: Who knows? And more specifically: Who knows, if scientific 
knowledge has been created collaboratively?  
Hardwig offers three possible answers to this question and uses a case study from 
quantum physics to outline the problem. In this example, 99 physicists co-authored a 
paper on charm particles and took part in the creation of the scientific knowledge 
depicted in this article. No single researcher could have reached the collective result on 
her own. Hence, the question is: who knows this knowledge? If we demand that 
knowledge is only possessed by individuals and that in order to know, one has to be able 
to provide evidence for this knowledge, then in the case of the physics example no-one 
knows, because no single scientist can provide evidence for all aspects that were 
necessary for this communal knowledge creation. Hardwig (Hardwig 1991) and Kusch 
(Kusch 2002) assert that this conclusions in not quite intuitive since it would imply that 
most scientific knowledge is not known by anyone. Thus, if we want to maintain the 
individual as the knower and consider such scientific knowledge to be known, we have 
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to drop the requirement that knowers have to be able to marshal evidence in order to 




The alternative that Kusch proposes and that he also ascribes to Hardwig consists in 
taking the community as a whole to be the primary knower. Adopting such a 
communitarian view ‖[...] allows us to retain the idea that a knower must be in ‗direct‘ 
possession of the evidence but it breaks with the assumption that such a knower must be, 
or can be, an individual‖ (Kusch 2002: 49). Thus, Kusch interprets Hardwig‘s analyses 
as an argument for communitarism, because it solves the dilemma of either having to 
refrain from ascribing knowledge to anyone or to drop the requirement of justification 
for the scientific examples provided by Hardwig (Hardwig 1991).  
Moreover, Kusch also considers Hardwig‘s analyses to provide an argument for the 
generative role of testimony. He argues that ―given the fast and endless cycles of 
discussion and information exchange in, say, a place like CERN, the thesis that 
testimony is not generative loses all plausibility. Reports coming from other teams, the 
work of one‘s own primary team, and finally one‘s own work (usually itself part of a 
joint action with someone else) are so tightly interwoven that it is impossible to say 
where others‘ input ends and one‘s own processing starts‖ (Kusch 2002: 52).  
Michael Welbourne’s Community of Knowledge 
The second theory Kusch regards as a predecessor of his work is Michael Welbourne‘s 
communitarian account of testimony as developed in ―The Community of Knowledge‖ 
(Welbourne 1986). Welbourne‘s arguments rest on the idea that knowledge can be 
communicated through say-so to a believing hearer. His theory is based on a 
rehabilitation of a common sense understanding of knowledge which he sets against 
mainstream epistemology. His critical stance towards mainstream epistemology 
becomes quite obvious in the following quote. ―The philosophy of knowledge‖, he 
argues, ―has suffered greatly [...] from the obsession of philosophers with the word 
know‖ (Welbourne 1986: 3). And arguing for a more practice-related view on 
knowledge, he continues: ―Understanding knowledge is primarily a matter of 
understanding the role which the concept plays in the life and conversation of human 
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 Longino (2002c) has proposed a solution to Hardwig‘s dilemma that is depicted in the next chapter.  
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beings, the practices which it dominates. This understanding will not be gained just by 
puzzling out truth-conditions for sentences of the form ‗a knows that p‘; still less will it 
be gained by reflecting on the conditions, too often mistaken for truth-conditions, for 
responsible first-person singular assertions that one knows. One will get much further by 
examining the practice of telling the facts.‖ (Welbourne 1986: 3).  
There are three aspects that Kusch stresses in his reference to Welbourne: the 
understanding of knowledge as being commonable; the untypical role of belief for 
knowledge; and the central role of the community for knowledge. First of all, 
Welbourne argues that ―[k]nowledge is essentially commonable. That is knowledge, by 
its very nature it can be made the common possession of two or more people by simple 
say-so, written, spoken or, in suitable contexts, gestural‖ (Welbourne 1986: 1). Further, 
when knowledge is transmitted, it is not removed from its original place nor does it lose 
quality (Kusch 2002). To use a more economic term, knowledge is non-rival (Foray 
2004: 94). Not only can it be used individually as often as wanted without being worn-
out or exhausted. It can also be used by a multitude of people without losing its value or 
quality. This aspect becomes crucial also when analyzing socio-epistemic practices on 
the Web in Part 3 of this thesis.  
Secondly, the role of belief in Welbourne‘s approach differs profoundly from many 
traditional epistemologies, in which knowledge is considered to be a certain kind of 
belief, mostly justified true belief, sometimes with some additional requirement. 
Welbourne argues that knowledge is not a type of belief and that knowledge 
transmission is entirely different from belief transmission. However, belief becomes 
relevant as an attitude of the recipient of testimony. Knowledge transmission in this 
account is based on three prerequisites: that the speaker has the knowledge and is 
honest, that she communicates this knowledge via an appropriate speech act and finally 
that the speaker believes the testifier (Kusch 2002: 54). Thus, in this account, the 
attitude of the recipient of testimony is crucial, because the willingness to believe the 
testifier is a necessary prerequisite for a transfer of knowledge to occur. It is not the 
assessment of the speaker‘s competency or honesty that is crucial, ―[a]ll that is required 
of a listener who understands a knowledgeable teller if the knowledge is to be 
successfully transmitted to him is that he believe the teller. (Welbourne 1986: 5f) 
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The third aspect concerns the role of the community for knowledge in Welbourne‘s 
account. That the community is quite crucial becomes obvious in the title of his book, 
but how exactly is the community related to the transmission of knowledge? According 
to Welbourne, when someone tells another person something and is believed, the two 
create a primitive community of knowledge. Such a primitive community ―[...] consists 
of two people knowing the same thing and recognizing each other as sharers in that 
knowledge; so each can act on the assumption of knowledge in the other and they must 
be able to act co-operatively‖ (Welbourne 1986: 25). This community is dynamic in the 
sense that is depends on an act of communication that constituted it.  
Kusch uses Welbourne‘s approach to make two claims that go beyond Welbourne‘s own 
conclusions and prepare his own approach. First, in combining Welbourne‘s insights 
with Brandom‘s (Brandom 1994) notion of entitlement and commitments, he concludes 
that ―[...] sharing knowledge with others amounts to sharing entitlements and 
commitments with them‖ (Kusch 2002: 59). Referring to Welbourne‘s claim 
(Welbourne 1986: 84) that is it useless to insist on the value of a £10 note in a 
community that has no use for this note, Kusch (Kusch 2002: 62) further asserts that 
―[...] ‗knowledge‘ is a social status like money, and thus it only exists in so far as there 
are items upon which we are willing to impose the status‖. And as noted before, it is 
always a community that has to grant this status.  
Such a central role of the community for knowledge has implications for questions of 
objectivity in communitarian epistemologies. If knowledge depends on communities – 
does this dependence on the community diminish the objectivity of knowledge? Quite to 
the contrary, Welbourne argues. Instead of relativizing the possibility of objectivity, 
such a primitive community for knowledge actually enables objectivity in the first place. 
He states that the primitive community ―[...] essentially [is] the product of 
communication: it is informed by the idea of commonable knowledge and a sense of 
reciprocity, of mutual support and dependence, which will seem to confirm each 
member in the knowledge which he has. I shall argue later [...] it is only in so far as 
Jones and Smith can think of themselves as sharing the knowledge that p that they can 
have the idea of an objective matter of fact at all.‖(Welbourne 1986: 26).88  
                                                 
88
 That the community is the basis for objectivity is also characteristic of Helen Longino‘s (2002c) 
Critical Contextual Empiricism which is portrayed below. 
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Kusch concludes that while both, Hardwig and Welbourne deliver crucial insights for a 
communitarian account of testimony, they do not go far enough. While John Hardwig 
(Hardwig 1991) focuses on the object of knowledge, on how evidence can be pooled so 
that a group of people can know more or things that they could not know individually. 
Welbourne‘s Welbourne 1986 emphasis lies on the subjects of knowledge, i.e. on the 
question of how testimony constitutes knowers with specific entitlements and 
commitments. Kusch argues that for a Communitarian Epistemology both aspects need 
to be combined. More specifically, he asserts that it is the same process that generates 
new communal subjects of knowledge and new objects of knowledge. His 
communitarian account of testimony is an attempt to make explicit how testimony is 
related to the generation of knowledge as a social status in general and how it is imposed 
on people in specific situations as is outlined in the next section. 
Kusch’s Communitarian Account of Testimony  
Kusch develops his communitarian theory of testimony in five steps. The first step 
consists in introducing his central theoretical innovation: the concept of performative 
testimony. This concept of performative testimony is derived from the notion of 
performative speech acts. Performative speech acts are sentences such as ―I hereby 
declare you husband and wife‖. Kusch argues that since performative speech acts are as 
much part of our communicative daily life as constative speech acts, they should be 
accounted for in any comprehensive theory of testimony. Moreover, it is through such 
performative speech acts that we impose social statuses on others. And given that Kusch 
considers knowledge to be a social status, the centrality of performative speech acts is 
not just a matter of complementing an analysis of constative testimony.  
Performative speech acts differ from constative speech acts in their world-language 
relationship. While for constantive speech acts, the goal of language is to match the 
world, performative speech acts rather change the world. Thus, the direction of fit is 
different: for performative speech act, the world is to fit language, while for constantive 
speech act, utterances aim at fitting the world. By uttering a sentence such as ―I hereby 
declare you husband and wife‖ – under the right conditions, the world is made to fit this 
utterance. In Kusch‘s terms, performatives are self-referring and self-validating, i.e. not 
only refers a performative utterance to itself, it also validates itself by transforming the 
world according to its content. Due to these two features, performative speech acts 
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establish new social facts, create new knowledge for the listeners, and are as such a 
generative source of new knowledge (Kusch 2002 17). Kusch concludes that 
performative testimony is ―[...] an important generative source of knowledge: the say-so 
constitutes a social fact, and it does so by creating a new item of knowledge for the 
couple, the witness, and the registrar herself (Kusch 2002: 17).  
In the second step, Kusch introduces the notion of communal performative testimony, 
indicating utterances done by a ‗collective we‘. In the case of marriage it becomes 
obvious that not everyone is allowed to impose the social status of being married upon a 
couple, but that this person has to have been granted the status of being in the position to 
grant the status of being married himself. These rights to grant status are typically 
granted by social institutions. Kusch uses a very broad notion of ‗social institution‘ here 
and includes conventions such as greeting others under this term. Kusch argues that 
these social institutions themselves originate in performative speech acts conducted by a 
community, such as ―[w]e hereby declare that it is correct to greet people one knows‖ 
(Kusch 2002: 68). Obviously, this statement has never been uttered by a Greek chorus to 
come into effect. Kusch argues that instead ―[…] communal institution-creating 
performative testimony is typically fragmented and widely distributed over other 
speech-acts [italics in the original]. The communal performative is never explicitly 
made; it is only made implicitly or indirectly. It is carried out by people when they do 
other things [set in italics by JS]‖ (Kusch 2002: 67). 
I have set this last phrase into italics, because it introduces the third step of Kusch‘s 
argument. He states that almost all testimony is in part performative and as such 
generative of new knowledge. Thus, the social institution of greeting others, gets 
constituted by the practice of greetings others and not by a collective announcement of 
the necessity to greet others.  
Thus, in the third step Kusch shows that performative and constative testimony is indeed 
deeply intertwined. The relevance of performative testimony is most obvious when 
considering social kinds, such as money or marriage. The antonyms of social kinds are 
natural and artifical kinds. And this differentiation between social, natural and artificial 
kinds refers to the effect that the withdrawal of a communal performative testimony has 
on them. To elucidate this difference Kusch uses the three examples of an elephant 
(natural kind), marriage (social kind) and typewriter (artificial kind). While an elephant 
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and the typewriter continue to exist, although not as elephants and typewriter when we 
withdraw the communal performative that defines what an elephant or a typewriter is, 
social kinds, such as money or marriage cease to exist the moment, the communal 
performative testimony is withdrawn. Take again the example of marriage: without the 
performative act of declaring someone husband and wife, there is no independent reality 
of a married couple. The moment the communal performative testimony is withdrawn - 
let‘s say it gets known that the alleged priest is a fraudster – the marriage ceases to exist.  
Although the impact on social kinds is clearly more fundamental, performative 
testimony nonetheless plays a role also for natural kinds (e.g. elefants) and artificial 
kinds (e.g. typewriters). ―Every constative testimony about elephants carries part of the 
communal performative speech-act which constitutes the category of elephants, and in 
doing so, re-enforces the conventional ways of delimiting this category, and helps to 
entrench the conventional exemplars‖ (Kusch 2002: 69). Thus, a mutual relationship 
between performatives and constatives can be observed: ―On the one hand, constatives 
presuppose communal performatives. We can make claims about marriages, elephants, 
or typewriters only because our communal performatives have constituted the 
taxonomies and exemplars needed for making such claims. On the other hand, 
constatives perform (i.e. partially constitute) communal performatives. They carry out 
the fragments of widely distributed communal performatives‖ (Kusch 2002: 69).  
In step 4 Kusch identifies knowledge as a social kind as compared to natural or artificial 
kinds and concludes that generation of knowledge takes place in a quite similar form as 
the creation of greeting as a social institution. Accordingly, attribution of knowledge not 
only depends on these distributed and fragmented speech-acts, but it is also embedded in 
other practices. And if knowledge is a social kind, as Kusch argues, it also ceases to 
exist the moment it is not communally considered to be knowledge anymore. Within 
such a general approach, the question remains open how we decided about knowledge 
claims in specific situations. Just stating that knowledge comes into being by these 
distributed, communal acts does not help much in deciding what we take to be 
knowledge and what we reject. How do we decide whether something is knowledge or 
not? How do we decide whether to rely on someone‘s claims? How do we decide whom 
and what to trust when searching for knowledge? 
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Unsurprisingly, the answer to this again lies in the community. The last step in Kusch‘s 
development of his communitarian theory of testimony hence consists in emphasizing 
the relevance of epistemic communities for the attribution of knowledge. Kusch states 
that something that is testified can acquire the status of knowledge only if an epistemic 
community is formed around it. For something to become knowledge, a recipient of 
testimony has to enter into such as relationship with the testifier. Before this community 
formation knowledge does not exist. Hence, the testifier does not possess knowledge 
that he just transfers. An individual cannot possess knowledge in total solitude, because 
as a social status this privilege can only be granted by a community. The individual 
might believe something, or be convinced of something – as long as a community of a 
minimum of two people does not agree on this, there is no knowledge. Quite 
interestingly, Kusch considers teaching, which could be considered to be the prime 
example of testimony, to be an exception of this form of testimony (Kusch 2002: 73). In 
the case of teaching, the knowledge was generated before being transmitted to the 
student, who has not been involved in the initial act of constituting this knowledge. That 
is, in the case of teaching ‗p as a fact‘, where pure knowledge transfer takes place, the 
relevant epistemic community was formed before this act of transmission and with other 
people who formed an epistemic community to create this knowledge.  
5.4.5 Helen Longino’s Critical Contextual Empiricism 
Introduction 
The final comprehensive social epistemology that I portray is also the most instrumental 
one for this thesis: Helen Longino‘s Critical Contextual Empiricism. In her book ―The 
fate of knowledge‖, Longino develops an account of scientific knowledge that is 
supposed to be ―[…] responsive to the normative uses of the term ―knowledge‖ and to 
the social conditions in which scientific knowledge is produced.‖ (Longino 2002c: 1).89 
She argues that there have been two major shifts in the current philosophy of science, 
namely a growing recognition of the social character of science on the one hand and of 
explanatory plurality in science on the other. With her approach, which she labels 
Critical Contextual Empiricism, she aims to take into account insights on the nature of 
scientific inquiry obtained in the social studies of science, i.e. the various empirical 
approaches to understand scientific knowledge creation while sticking to the normative 
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 My depiction of her approach is primarily based on this book unless otherwise noted.  
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aspirations of epistemology. Longino focuses primarily on knowledge creation in the 
sciences, taking into account literature from sociology and philosophy of science. 
Nonetheless, I think that her approach does not need to be restricted to knowledge 
creation in science only. Rather, her observations with respect to plurality and 
provisionality as well as her recommendations regarding proper forms of criticism can 
easily be applied to knowledge creation in more informal contexts. 
Dissolving the Rational-Social Dichotomy 
Longino‘s initial target of criticism is what she calls the ―social-rational dichotomy‖ 
(Longino 2002c: 1). She argues that both sociologists and philosophers of science have 
fallen victim to this ―dichotomy between the rational (or cognitive) on the one hand and 
the social on the other [which] structures both (1) the disagreements between the 
practitioners of the social and cultural studies of science and the philosophers and (2) the 
constructive (or deconstructive) accounts they all offer of scientific knowledge‖ 
(Longino 2002c: 1). 
To develop her own account, she first analyzes some of the contributions of the social 
studies of science for an understanding of scientific reasoning. More specifically, she 
critically assesses the works of the Edinburgh school and the laboratory studies 
conducted by Bruno Latour and Karin Knorr-Cetina. While appraising the insights 
obtained on the actual practices in the sciences, she argues that the irrelevance of 
normative philosophical concerns proclaimed in these approaches can be explained by 
their adherence to the social-rational dichotomy and should be overcome. She then 
continues to analyze the philosophers‘ responses to the these sociological challenges, 
arguing that the – often strong - reactions of philosophers such as Alvin Goldman, 
Philipp Kitcher or Larry Laudan can also be explained by their entanglement in the 
rational-social dichotomy. Sociologists who deny that science has anything to do with 
rationality but rather is determined by social forces and or material conditions only 
commit the same mistake as philosophers who assume that since science is the most 
rational endeavor sociality can only come to the fore by being detrimental to rationality. 
Both versions are the flipsides of the same coin and bound to an antithetical conception 
of sociality and rationality: what is rational is by definition not social and what is social 
cannot be rational. Longino asserts that as long as this dichotomy is not resolved, neither 
can there be a rapprochement between sociologists and philosophers of science, nor can 
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science be properly understood as a rational and social practice. Accordingly, Longino‘s 
goal is to disentangle the rational-social dichotomy to open up a new line of reasoning 
about scientific knowledge creation that can account for both: the actual social practices 
of science as well as the normative concerns of philosophers, i.e. the recognition of 
knowledge as a success term (Longino 2002c: 10).  
Three Modalities of Knowledge  
Longino pursues this goal by at first disambiguating three senses of knowledge: 
knowledge as content, knowledge as a set of knowledge-productive practices as well as 
knowledge as cognitive agency, i.e. as a state of a person (‗knowing‘). Since I adopt 
Longino‘s tripartite notion of knowledge as the framework for my own analyses, I 
devote some space to it here and return to it in the next chapters as well. Longino argues 
that not only do philosophers and sociologists often understand and emphasize these 
three notions quite differently. Moreover these three different senses of knowledge do 
also get frequently mixed up within different accounts on scientific knowledge creation. 
Longino concludes that the ―failure to distinguish the different senses undermines efforts 
to make the case for the sociality of knowledge‖ (Longino 2002c: 77) and thus starts 
disentangling them. 
Knowledge Production 
Knowledge production deals with the transformation of various inputs, such as sense 
data into representational outputs, i.e. the question of how knowledge is produced. But 
while sociologists focus on the processes by which cognitive authority is actually 
granted to someone and how the legitimacy of knowledge claims gets decided, the 
philosophers note that neither cognitive authority granted nor the attribution of 
knowledge to someone might be warranted in every case. Hence they are rather 
interested in criteria to decide when the attribution of cognitive authority and legitimacy 
is justified and when it is not.  
Cognitive Agency 
Knowledge as knowing by contrast describes the state of a person towards some object 
and has been the main focus of attention in analytic epistemology, but has been of much 
lesser interest to sociologists. Knowledge in this sense is characterized as a three-term 
relation between a subject, an object and a representation, frequently associated with the 
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notion of knowledge as justified true belief and the omnipresent proposition “S knows 
that p”.  
Knowledge as Content 
The last sense of knowledge Longino distinguishes is knowledge as content, i.e. 
knowledge as that which is known, the corpus of knowledge, its materialization and 
aggregation. Here again, philosophers and sociologists focus on different aspects of this 
modality of knowledge. While the sociologists are rather interested in what a given 
community considers knowledge, the philosopher searches for a validation of 
knowledge independent of any given community. The result of this search may indeed 
be a negative one: some authors, such as Martin Kusch and Helen Longino herself 
conclude that knowledge always depends on communities and thus cannot be conceived 
independent of them. That means while sociologists focus on the empirical aspects of 
how knowledge gets validated, while neglecting or rejecting any normative questions of 
whether these practices of validation are appropriate; philosophers have been 
preoccupied with normative issues of how such validation should take place while often 
being negligent of the empirical question of how knowledge actually gets justified.  
Longino argues conclusively that many misunderstandings as well as much of the 
conflict between sociology and philosophy of science have their roots in a lack of 
recognition of the different senses of knowledge referred to as well as in a constant 
blurring of normative and descriptive foci. While acknowledging that these three senses 
are interrelated, Longino nonetheless argues for an analytical separation of these 
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 Explanation of abbreviations: PPe = knowledge productive practices, empirical, PPn = = knowledge 
productive practices, normative, C = community, S = subject, p = proposition.  
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Table 2: Longino's Three Senses of Knowledge 
The Sociality of the Three Senses of Knowledge  
Having distinguished these three senses of knowledge, their distinct comprehension as 
well as the different foci in philosophy and sociology, Helen Longino continues to show 
in which ways and to what extent all three senses are social. Socializing the three 
modalities of knowledge lead her to the following conclusions: knowledge-productive 
practices and their modes of justification vary in different contexts, cognitive agents are 
interdependent and knowledge as content is plural (Longino 2002c: 122).  
The Sociality of Knowledge Producing Practices 
Longino starts with arguing for the sociality of knowledge-productive practices, i.e. 
cognitive or intellectual as well as the material practices involved in science. The two 
major examples she chooses are observation and reasoning, because both are basic 
epistemic practices in science.
91
 Opposing epistemic individualism, Logino proposes 
―[…] to treat both observation and reasoning as dialogical, that is, as activities involving 
discursive interactions among different voices‖ (Longino 2002c: 99). Due to an overly 
individualistic philosophical tradition both practices have been considered to be private 
endeavors for the longest time. However, observation regarded as ―pure perception‖ has 
been the first primary source of knowledge whose alleged solitude has been 
disenchanted.  
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 Longino also considers material interventions and statistical procedures to be epistemic practices. Since 
socio-technical epistemic practices as well as stochastical and other mathematical procedures are an 
important aspect of many Web2.0 applications such a broad view on epistemic practices is highly relevant 
for my analyses. 
 Empirical Normative 
Knowledge-productive 
practices 
PPe: processes or practices 
that succeed in fixing belief or 
in having some content 
accepted in some community  
PPn: processes or practices of 
belief acquisition that justify 
belief  
Knowing S accepts that p, and p is 
accepted in C, and S‘s 
acceptance of p is acceptable 
in C  
S accepts that p, and p is true, 
and S‘s accepting that p is the 
outcome of or accords with 
PPn  
Content Contente: what is accepted in 
some community C or the 
outcomes of PPe in 
community C  
Contentn: the subset of truths 
which is known (whether by 





Analyses of science conducted in anthropological, sociological and historical analyses of 
science , such as Shapin‘s A Social History of Truth” Shapin 1994, have shown that 
scientific observation is by no means pure sensory perception, whatever that may be, but 
rather a process of ordering and organizing observational data, a public calibration of 
perception, and as such a social matter.
92
 The organization of these data is dependent on 
categories, classes and the boundaries between them as well as on theoretical and 
methodological background assumptions. Such background assumptions structure not 
only the organization of data, but also their very way of elicitation from the beginning. 
Thus, while sensory perception might be an individual act, observation can only be 
achieved collaboratively.
93
 It is not only reliant on consensual acceptance of central 
categories and background assumptions. Social mechanisms are also ―[…] what enables 
the transformation in assertability-status from ―It seems to me that p‖ to ―P‖.‖ (Longino 
2002c: 103). Only through interactive processes can perception became observation and 
hence opinion turn into knowledge.
94
  
It is in this fundamental sense, that knowledge in the sense of knowledge-productive 
practices is social in Logino‘s approach. She makes very explicit though, that the term 
social in her account is different from common, collective, or shared, but rather should 
be understood as interactive. Instead of sharing epistemic goals or having common 
knowledge, the crucial sociality of knowledge lies in being in a dialogue about issues at 
stake; it is about interacting in producing situated, partial and provisional knowledge.  
Reasoning 
That epistemic practices are social holds true not only for observation, but also for 
scientific reasoning, an argument which at first sight may appear less plausible. Most 
people would think that reasoning - maybe sitting in your armchair with a pot of tea, 
pondering on some question - is the most individual practice one can imagine. And 
indeed, Longino states that while ―[b]oth inference and observation are mediated, […] 
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 Shapin‘s work will be portrayed in more detail in the next chapter.  
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 I would argue that even this notion has to be rejected since perception is influenced by learned 
categories and by higher cognitive processes.  
94
 This dependence of knowledge on the interaction between at least two persons is also characteristic for 
Kusch‘s (2002) and Welbourne‘s (1986) communitarian epistemologies. 
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the degrees of freedom in inference or reasoning are greater than in observation‖ 
(Longino 2002c: 104, footnote).  
Reasoning, Longino argues, is more than just calculation and has two meanings, a 
constructive and a justificatory one. While in the constructive sense ―[...] reasoning is 
the combining of ideas or information to produce new ideas‖, in the justificatory sense, 
―reasoning is the combining of ideas or information to support some other idea‖ 
(Longino 2002c: 103, emphasis added). Thus, Longino differentiates between creative 
reasoning and supportive reasoning, i.e. between the generation of new ideas and the 
confirmation of such ideas.
95
 While the cognitive abilities of individuals are ―[...] both 
necessary and sufficient for the generation of ideas‖ (Longino 2002c: 122), it is in the 
justificatory part that the social processes of reasoning becomes obvious. Justification 
according to Longino is a social practice and its standards are determined through social 
interaction. Since knowledge depends on such a social process of validation ―[…] what 
counts as an appropriate consideration, as a reason, is determined and stabilized through 
discursive interactions‖ (Longino 2002c: 103f). Justification of knowledge is social in a 
double sense: not only is the mechanism of justification social by involving others, its 
standards are also discursively enacted.  
Thus, concerning the sociality of epistemic practices, Longino concludes that ―[...] 
discursive interactions are integral to both observation and reasoning in the sciences. 
The results of both reasoning and observation, then, are socially processed before 
incorporation into the body of ideas ratified for circulation and use, or are treated as 
having been so processed‖ (Longino 2002c: 106). Acknowledging the social nature of 
justification is consequential. If these standards are socially negotiated, how can we 
make sure that they are not completely wrong or biased? Longino‘s solution consists in 
requiring the participation of ―[...] multiple points of view to insure that the hypotheses 
accepted by a community do not represent someone‘s idiosyncratic interpretation of 
observational or experimental data‖ (Longino 2002c: 106). Together with the 
requirement of empirical adequacy, this is all that can be done to avoide falsity and bias.  
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Two aspects are crucial concerning her request. First of all, directly after having 
accounted for the sociality of scientific practices, Longino draws normative conclusions 
about the impact this observation should have on epistemic practices and the structure of 
science. And to my mind, this constant interrelation of descriptive with normative 
aspects is one of the major merits of Longino‘s approach. Secondly, Longino is very 
aware that the sociality of knowledge is a two-edged sword. Being a feminist 
philosopher, Longino is far from stating that the sociality of knowledge is without 
problems or cannot be detrimental to science. Biases and discrimination as social 
injustices can play a role in science as much as they do in other societal domains. 
However, she argues that their sociality is not only a source of problems, but can also be 
a solution to them. Seen in this respect; ―[…] socializing cognition is not a corruption or 
displacement of the rational but a vehicle of its performance‖ (Longino 2002c: 106). 
Thus, the social nature of epistemic practices such as observation and reasoning comes 
with pros and cons and Longino‘s request to include multiple voices into scientific 
practices is exactly an example of using social mechanisms to counter social injustices, 
biases and corruptions. The sociality of knowledge-productive practices can be a source 
of error and bias as much as a cure for them. But either way, it is unavoidable and hence 
has to be accounted for – descriptively and normatively. 
The Sociality of Cognitive Agency 
Longino continues to show then that not only are these knowledge-productive practices 
social, but that the same holds true for knowledge as agency. Acknowledging the 
sociality of cognitive agency for Helen Longino means to reject the unconditioned 
subject S, known from the classical ―S knows that p‖. Again alluding to insights from 
sociology, she argues that ―[…] subjects creating scientific knowledge are located—
historically, geographically, socially— and that their locatedness must be taken 
seriously. To acknowledge the locatedness of subjects is to reject what we might call an 
―unconditioned subject,‖ that is, a knower guided only by context-independent and 
value-neutral methodological rules (Longino 2002c: 107).‖ And instead of being 
independent - or fully determined, knowers are interdependent of each other and it is in 
this sense, that knowledge as cognitive agency is social.
96
 Longino therefore stresses 
two different but related social aspects of knowledge as cognitive agency: Not only is 
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emphasis of the epistemic interdependence as a replacement for the concept of testimony. 
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the knower a subject situated in a certain social environment and shaped by her 
experiences in this environment. She is also connected to other knowers through her 
interactions within her cognitive communities. 
The Sociality of Knowledge as Content & the Notion of Conformation  
Finally, Longino concludes, that knowledge in the third sense, i.e. knowledge as content 
is social, too. She argues for the plurality of knowledge which can be addressed through 
the notion of conformation. Two aspects of this third modality of knowledge, knowledge 
as content, are important. First of all, knowledge in this sense is considered to be more 
than just mental, propositional content. It is something that can be stored and transmitted 
– in documents as well as in memory. Moreover, knowledge can not only be embodied 
in text, but also pictures, diagrams and other non-textual formats. Further, knowledge 
also includes what Longino labels practical knowledge, and is otherwise referred to as 
tacit knowledge (Polanyi 1985) or procedural knowledge. Such a broad notion of 
knowledge is necessary for the analyses of epistemic social software as is shown in the 
third part of this thesis. 
Secondly, knowledge is used as a success term, i.e. it is meant to distinguish successful 
content (= knowledge) from unsuccessful content. It is essentially this second 
characteristic that often divides the philosophers from the sociologists. While success of 
content for the sociologist denotes that which gets accepted in a certain community, 
success for the philosopher usually has to do with a truth or correspondence to reality. 
Based on analyses by Nancy Cartwright (Cartwright 1983) and Ian Hacking (Hacking 
1992a) concerning the notion of truth in the science and in line with model-theoretical 
accounts of scientific theories, Longino denies that truth is a good indicator for the 
successfulness of content in science. As was also argued by Miriam Solomon (Solomon 
2001), most theories in the history of science are strictly speaking not true. Instead of 
adopting Solomon‘s Whig realism in order to keep the notion of truth, Longino argues 
differently. She proposes her notion of conformation as an alternative to the true-false-
distinction (Longino 2002c: 115ff).  
Conformation is meant to be an umbrella term for the empirical success of content. 
Notions of truth, isomorphism, homomorphism, fit, similarity or approximation are just 
special instantiations of it. Conformation is dependent on the purpose of an epistemic 
task. And as compared to the true-false-dichotomy, it comes in degrees. Comparing 
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theories with maps, Longino exemplifies her notion of conformity very clearly. 
Theories, just as maps, are made for certain purposes and might serve these purposes 
better or worse. Of course, in order to be useful, maps have to be empirically adequate, 
but maps are hardly true. What should the truth of a map be? Being a duplicate of the 
terrain they are intended to map? Quite to the contrary, it is a crucial characteristic of 
maps, that they do not just duplicate the terrain they are supposed to map. Doing this, 
they would be useless. In a similar vein, theories are not meant to just copy the reality 
they seek to explain and as such are never strictly speaking true, at least not in the sense 
of corresponding to reality.  
Moreover, comparing theories to maps also supports Longino‘s proposed plurality of 
knowledge. Since there can be different maps of the same terrain that serve different 
purposes, there is not one true map of this terrain or even the best map. Rather, 
depending on the question, one might make use of a political map or a geographical 
map, depending on whether I drive to place in France by car or want to go hiking in the 
Mercantour National Park I chose maps of different scales. Depending on my interest, a 
geographic or a political map of Germany may be better. Clearly, none of the maps of 
the maps is false. None of them even is essentially better than the other. Only for and 
within each purpose can I compare the quality of these maps.  
However, such a context- and purpose-dependence understanding of empirical success 
does not imply that success is free choice and construction is just making things up. 
Empirical adequacy always also has to be given and Logino concludes:  
―Success can not just be a matter of the user wanting the theory to be correct 
or wanting to be able to act as if the supposed consequences of the theory 
are true. If they are not, reality will eventually bite back. To suppose that 
success has nothing to do with the interests of the users is just as fruitless, 
however. The idiom of representation must be such as to enable successful 
interaction with that which is represented. The choice of idiom, and of the 
degrees to and respects in which it must fit the objects of representation, is a 
social choice, a matter of goals collectively endorsed in the community 
conducting inquiry. In this sense the community determines what will count 
as knowledge.‖ (Longino 2002c: 119).  
A final advantage of conformity over truth is that it can be applied to non-propositional 
content as well. If one grants that knowledge comes in many non-propositional forms as 
well, i.e. in pictures, in diagrams, etc., then such a broader concept to assess the quality 
of different knowledge types should clearly be favored.  
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Critical Contextual Empiricism: Longino’s Social Account of Knowledge 
Helen Longino develops her social theory of knowledge based on the distinctions 
fleshed out before. She argues that her account is superior to other accounts on the 
sociality of knowledge because it not only meets the challenges posed by philosophers 
and sociologist. It can also handle the problem of underdetermination, i.e. the gap 
between observational data and theories, which has haunted philosophy of science for a 
long time. Her definition of knowledge as epistemically acceptable content then reads as 
follows:  
―Some content A is epistemically acceptable in community C at time t if A is or is 
supported by data d evident to C at t in light of reasoning and background assumptions 
which have survived critical scrutiny from as many perspectives as are available to C at 
t, and C is characterized by venues for criticism, uptake of criticism, public standards, 
and tempered equality of intellectual authority‖ (Longino 2002c: 135). 
The concept of epistemic acceptability forms the second key normative concept in 
Longino‘s approach together with the previously introduced notion of conformation. 
Before I explain it in more detail, I outline Longino‘s four social norms featured in the 
definition above: venues for and uptake of criticism, public standards and tempered 
equality of intellectual authority. 
Social Norms for Knowledge: Four Norms for Effective Transformative 
Criticism 
These four social norms mark the normative-prescriptive core of Longino‘s social 
epistemology and are also closely related to her feminist concerns (Longino 1996, Keller 
and Longino 1996). If one acknowledges that knowledge creation in science and 
elsewhere is a social process one also has to deal with the possibility of social 
inequalities and epistemic injustices within such processes. Therefore, a normative 
social epistemology has to provide guidance as to how to avoid or counter such biases. 
Longino‘s request to include as many perspectives as possible into the process of 
knowledge creation is an attempt to counter such bias. However just including different 
perspectives is not sufficient.  
For instance, if certain people can participate but are not taken serious, then such an 
―inclusion‖ of multiple voices would be pure lip service. On the other hand, if 
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everybody has a say irrespective of whether he actually knows anything about the topic 
or even tries to torpedo the epistemic endeavor, this can also not be beneficial for 
science or knowledge creation more generally. Therefore, the inclusion of multiple 
perspectives needs to be specified. And Longino does this by proposing four social 
norms that should be fulfilled. If fulfilled they provide the basis for transformative 
criticism and ensure that knowledge can be generated effectively and with the least 
possible bias. What exactly are these four requirements that such an epistemically ideal 
community would have to satisfy?  
The first requirement consists in the availability of ―[…] publicly recognized forums for 
the criticism of evidence, of methods, and of assumptions and reasoning‖ (Longino 
2002c: 129). Venues for criticism have to exist and they have to be publicly recognized - 
in other words: criticism needs more space and more recognition. Criticism not only 
advances research and thinking by identifying mistakes or biases. It also helps to 
understand the grounds, limits and consequences of knowledge to a greater extent, as 
Longino argues with reference to John Stuart Mill (Longino 2002c: 3f).  
However, that people criticize others, even if this happens in the most constructive way, 
does not ensure that knowledge production is improved. The criticism might not be 
heard, ignored or even bluntly rejected without having been considered. Longino 
therefore demands as a second norms that it is not sufficient to just tolerate criticism, but 
requires that a community‘s ―[…] beliefs and theories must change over time in 
response to the critical discourse taking place within it‖ (Longino 2002c: 129f). She 
concludes that only ―[u]ptake is what makes criticism part of a constructive and 
justificatory practice‖ (Longino 2002c: 130). In contrast to the sheer availability of 
venues for criticism, this prerequisite requires the development of a new attitude; it 
involves learning and possibly pedagogic intervention to foster a more positive stance 
towards criticism. 
The third critical factor in establishing an ideal epistemic community concerns the 
availability of public standards. Longino argues that for criticism to take place 
participants in such a dialogue must share some terms, standards and epistemic methods. 
In contrast to Longino‘s former usage of the term social as interactive instead of shared 
or common, in this case some degree of consensus seems to be necessary. In order to be 
in interaction, certain prerequisites, such as terminology and definitions, but also values 
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of scientific conduct have to be shared and consented upon. Since these standards are 
related to the current goals of a community, they are not fixed for all times, but change 
with the community‘s development and its changing goals. Nonetheless, at least 
temporarily they have to be agreed upon. Moreover and similarly to Kusch‘s notion of 
‗communal performative testimony‘ (Kusch 2002: 66f), these standards are not 
generated by a public announcement or a single willful act, but rather they are developed 
and enacted while participants act according to them. Scientists co-create and re-enact 
these standards and values while performing and evaluating epistemic practices and 
results.  
Longino‘s final requirement concerns tempered equality of intellectual authority. The 
request for equality is most directly linked to Longino‘s feminist orientation. However, 
this requirement is not meant to be merely a political, social or ethical imperative, but 
also essential for the effectiveness of knowledge production. She argues that ―[t]he 
exclusion of women and members of certain racial minorities from scientific education 
and the scientific professions constitutes not only a social injustice but a cognitive 
failing‖ (Longino 2002c: 132). Longino backs this assumption with reference to various 
feminist analyses in the history and sociology of science, which have shown that 
scientific development has often suffered, because certain voices were not heard, 
because criticism by certain groups of people (women, racial minorities or scientists 
from different scientifically less acknowledged countries or institutions) were not taken 
serious and ignored (Longino 2002c: 132). Therefore, the feminist concern about the 
equality of different voices is not purely politically motivated, but also an epistemic 
duty. However, the word tempered provides a relativization of the proposed equality. 
Longino acknowledges that not everyone should be granted the same amount of 
authority on each topic. Further, it has to be avoided that the same criticism is uttered 
unchanged over and over again, i.e. the request to uptake criticism is also valid for the 
critic herself. Concerning the conditions of how to temper equality of intellectual 
authority, Longino does not give a definite answer, but confines herself to listing critical 
issues around it (Longino 2002c: 133f). I do agree that a general answer to the question 
of tempering equality cannot be given and that such decisions have to be made locally. 
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However, this issue surely is crucial to distinguish a reasonable selection of valid 
criticisms from epistemic injustice.
97
  
Epistemic Acceptability: A Socio-Empirical Criterion for Knowledge 
These four social norms then form the basis for Longino‘s definition of knowledge as 
epistemically acceptable content. However, they form only one of its two parts as can be 
seen from her definition of knowledge above.
98
 Her emphasis on the necessity to 
provide empirical evidence to support knowledge claims shows that social mechanisms 
alone do not make knowledge claims epistemically acceptable – at least not in a 
normative sense.  
Rather both, empirical data and social mechanisms of validation and criticism are 
needed for the transformation of mere belief into knowledge. Longino argues that while 
philosophers usually stress the underdetermination of theories, sociologist often commit 
a similar felony by arguing that theories are entirely determined by social mechanisms. 
Instead, she argues, both evidence (e.g. empirical or logical evidence) and social 
interactions play a role in the creation and justification of knowledge. Thus, her concept 
of epistemic acceptability offers a model of dual justification, of a social and empirical 
validation. In doing this, it unifies not only the traditional philosophical concept of 
justification by evidence with a social justification mechanism that works via public 
criticism, but also philosophical concerns about normativity with the sociologists‘ 
insights into the nature of knowledge production. She concludes that by this move, her 
account can not only avoid collapsing into relativism, while still being able to address 
the problem of underdetermination. The dichotomy between the rational and the social 
which has caused such a great deal of misunderstandings is also dissolved by combining 
the social and the rational as two equally important and related aspects of knowledge 
creation and justification.  
To summarize, epistemic acceptability and conformity are the two central normative 
concepts in Helen Longino‘s social epistemology. While her notion of epistemic 
acceptability combines the classical philosophical concern with justification through 
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 ―Some content A is epistemically acceptable in community C at time t if A is or is supported by data d 
evident to C at t in light of reasoning and background assumptions which have survived critical scrutiny 
from as many perspectives as are available to C at t, and C is characterized by venues for criticism, uptake 
of criticism, public standards, and tempered equality of intellectual authority.‖ (Longino 2002c: 135) 
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empirical evidence with a social mechanism for effective criticism, conformity servers 
as an umbrella term for the relation to the aspect of reality a theory intends to map. 
Helen Longino‘s social and contextualist conceptions have consequences for the concept 
of knowledge they entail: Knowledge in this sense is initially always partial, provisional 
and plural, although these features might not be necessary on the long run. 
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6 Assessing Social Epistemology 
6.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter I introduced the field of social epistemology and how I am 
conceiving it in this thesis, and portrayed five major socio-epistemological theories. I 
implied that the field of social epistemology has to be understood in a broad context of 
multiple, interdisciplinary approaches to understand the sociality of knowledge. 
Moreover, I argued that even in its narrow delineation social epistemology is not a 
unified field. Rather, different lines of conflict, different cleavages can be made out and 
the positioning of different authors along the lines has lead to various classifications of 
the field of social epistemology. For the most part, the field has been divided into two 
opposing positions; sometimes even tripartite notions of social epistemology have been 
proposed.  
These classifications include the following confrontations:  
- analytic social epistemology versus critical social epistemology (Quinton 2004) 
- descriptive versus revisionist social epistemologies (Fuller 2004) 
- classical versus anti-classical social epistemologies (Goldman 2006) 
- revisionist, preservationist and expansionist social epistemologies (Goldman 
2009b, Goldman 2009a).  
- social epistemology as individual doxastic agents with social evidence, collective 
doxastic agents and systems-oriented social epistemology (Goldman 2009c). 
- complementary versus science policy programmes versus communitarian 
epistemology (Kusch 2002), 
- diagnostic social epistemology as a future discipline that could be differentiated 
into: analytic social epistemology, genealogical social epistemology, historical 
epistemology, political social epistemology and naturalistic epistemology. 
(Kusch 2009).  
These attempts to classify the field of social epistemology are an indicator of the central 
debates within the field. From my reception of the various socio-epistemological 
theories, as well as from these proposed classifications, I have extracted the following 
points of conflict within the field: 
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- Complementarity: Is social epistemology complementary to some individual 
epistemology or does it replace individualistic epistemologies?  
- What is knowledge and who is to decide? (Definition of knowledge, 
adherence or rejection of the definition of knowledge as justified true belief; 
stance towards sociological and historical approaches) 
- The utility of truth: Is truth a useful and/or sufficient concept to assess 
epistemic practices and concepts? 
- The relevance of the community: How central is the community? 
Implications concerning contextualism, local epistemologies and relativism.  
- Methodological issues: Naturalism and the relevance of quantification.  
- Normativity: normativity refers to two issues: a) normativity as providing 
criteria for knowledge and b) normativity in a prescriptive sense of making 
recommendations to improve epistemic practices and systems  
I am by no means arguing that these are the only topics that are up for debate. However, 
they are surely central and important to consider when trying to understand conflicts 
within social epistemology debates. Thus, I use the arguments and the positioning of 
different social epistemologists along these lines of conflict as a grid for my critical 
analysis of the social epistemologies portrayed in the previous chapter. I do not aim at 
resolving the debates that I open up. The goal is rather to span the field of social 
epistemology by using the debates as vectors for analysis and to position myself in the 
field.  
Although I have distinguished different debates, these are clearly not independent or 
unrelated. For instance, the utility of truth plays a role for the definition of knowledge, 
for normativity, for relativism, etc. Nonetheless, I think my breakdown of topics enables 
a clearer view on the central debates.  
Before outlining the debates I want to focus on three core social mechanisms that were 
addressed in almost all of the major social epistemologies portrayed in the previous 
chapter: testimony, the distribution of cognitive labor and consensus formation. I return 
to these mechanisms in some detail and portray some additional perspectives on them 
for two reasons. First, I would argue that analyses on these three mechanisms form the 
core of the field of social epistemology as conceived in this thesis. Secondly, the socio-
epistemological model that I develop in the next chapters provides a conceptual 
framework that is built upon these socio-epistemological mechanisms.  
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I conclude this chapter by linking social epistemology to social software. More 
specifically, I assess the utility that these five social epistemologies portray for analyses 
of socio-epistemic practices on the Web and outline some initial attempts to analyze ICT 
and social software from a socio-epistemological perspective. The analyses of this 
chapter then serve as a basis for the development of my theoretical framework for 
analyzing socio-epistemic practices on the Web – and beyond – in the succeeding 
chapters.  
To summarize, I start this chapter by giving some details on the three central socio-
epistemic mechanisms: testimony, distribution of cognitive labor and consensus 
formation. I follow by outlining the central topics in social epistemology along the lines 
of debate, and I conclude the chapter by linking to and assessing the merits and current 
limits of social epistemology for analyzing social software when it is understood from 
the vantage point of socio-technical epistemic systems. All of these analyses serve as the 
basis for the development if my own socio-epistemological model, which I develop in 
the next chapters. 
6.2 Central Socio-Rational Mechanisms 
Testimony, the distribution of cognitive labor and consensus are three central socio-
epistemic topics and almost all social epistemologists have addressed them in their 
theories. In this section, I expand on these topics by providing information on the central 
debates and central approaches by theoreticians other than those introduced in the 
previous chapter.  
In developing my own socio-epistemological model, I argue that testimony, the 
distribution of cognitive labor and consensus are three socio-epistemic mechanisms 
which denote central temporal occurrences in socio-epistemic processes. While 
distribution of cognitive labor refers to multiple ways in which socio-epistemic 
processes can be started, consensus is one distinct mechanism of closing such socio-
epistemic processes amongst others. Testimony also refers to a central socio-epistemic 
mechanism, but for the most part this notion is exclusively focused on the transmission 
of existing knowledge, on the distribution of information to multiple receivers.
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topic of epistemic trust is often discussed in the same context as testimony, because it 
refers to the stance that recipients of testimony have towards testifiers. However, as I 
argue in more detail in the third part of this thesis, trust refers to another dimension of 
epistemic sociality. While testimony, distribution of cognitive labor and consensus all 
refer to the mechanisms of distribution and reuniting either knowledge or epistemic 
tasks over different epistemic agents, trust refers to the evaluation of such agents. These 
two dimensions, distributing-reuniting work over epistemic agents on the one hand and 
evaluating them on the other, are crucial for the socio-epistemological model I outline in 
Part 3. First, however, I give some background on the central debates about testimony 
and trust, distribution of cognitive labor and consensus in socio-epistemological 
discourse.  
6.2.1 Testimony  
One of the most central topics in any social epistemology is testimony. Testimony, 
considered the fourth classical route to knowledge, in addition to perception, inference 
and memory, refers to the process of acquiring knowledge though the words of others. 
The relevance of testimony for knowledge cannot be underrated as many philosophers 
have noticed. Jenifer Lackey notes:  
―Almost everything we know depends in some way on testimony. Without 
the ability to learn from others, it would be virtually impossible for any 
individual person to know much beyond what has come within the scope of 
her immediate perceptual environment. The fruits of science, history, 
geography – all of these would be beyond our grasp, as would much of what 
we know about ourselves‖ (Lackey 2007). 
Elizabeth Fricker has stressed that the role of testimony has even increased in our 
contemporary society and linked this to the increasing relevance of distributed labor. 
She argues that: ―We citizens of the 21st century live in a world where division of 
epistemic labor rules. Most of what we know we learned from the spoken or written 
word of others, and we depend in endless practical ways on the technological fruits of 
the dispersed knowledge of others—of which we often know almost nothing—in 
virtually every moment of our lives‖ (Fricker 2006a: 592).  
                                                                                                                                               
as sheer transmission should be overcome, the distribution of information is nonetheless a crucial socio-
epistemic function of social media traditional models amongst others. Hence, classical analyses of 
testimony might shed some light on these processes of information transmission while they are not suited 
to analyze the role social media plays for knowledge creation.  
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Given this pervasiveness of knowledge received via testimony, one might assume that 
analyzing the epistemology of testimony has been a major topic in philosophy ever 
since. However, quite to the contrary, testimony has received quite little attention by 
philosophers until quite recently.  
Epistemic Individualism in Western Philosophy 
Many authors attribute the long-lasting neglect and depreciation of testimony to a 
pervasive epistemic individualism in Western philosophy. Some trace the roots of this 
individualism all the way back to Plato or Aristotle, while others stress the relevance of 
Descartes‘ individualistic rationalism as developed in Discourse on the Method (cf. 
Coady 1992: 4ff; Adler 2006). Yet, the most cited statement concerning the inferior 
epistemic status of testimony comes from Locke, who writes:  
―I hope it will not be thought arrogance to say, that perhaps we should make 
greater progress in the discovery of rational and contemplative knowledge if 
we sought it in the fountain, in the consideration of things themselves, and 
made use rather of our own thoughts than other men‘s to find it: for, I think, 
we may as rationally hope to see with other men‘s eyes as to know by other 
men‘s understanding... The floating of other men‘s opinions in our brains 
makes us not one jot the more knowing, though they happen to be true. What 
in them was science is in us but opiniatrety.‖ (Locke 1961: 58, quoted from 
Coady 1992: 14).  
This quote can be read as a direct request to use one‘s own cognitive capacities, one‘s 
own perception and inference in our attempts to know instead of relying on others. For 
Locke, perception, inference and memory were considered primary sources of 
knowledge, which might be deceivable but in principle reliable, knowledge observed via 
testimony seemed much more fallible. What we do not acquire through our own 
observation, through own inference or memory, cannot be considered knowledge. The 
problem with such a strong notion of knowledge is that most of what we would consider 
to be knowledge, the most basic examples of what we think we know, we actually would 
not know anymore: our date of birth, the size of Germany, the length of the equator, that 
Beijing exists if you have not been there, etc. Moreover, even scientific knowledge, by 
many considered to be the prime example of knowledge, would not be knowledge; since 
the majority of science is nowadays conducted in teams, scientists themselves often have 
to rely on the testimony of their peers (Hardwig 1991). Reducing knowledge to what we 
directly perceive or have inferred with our on-board cognitive resources would diminish 
enormously the body of what we consider to be knowledge.  
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So this is the dilemma of the epistemology of testimony: on the one hand, the majority 
of what we know, we know through others. As compared to the amount of knowledge 
that we receive via perception or inference, the vast majority of our knowledge is 
acquired from testimony. On the other hand, there is as of yet no consensus upon 
whether the knowledge acquired via testimony, through the words of others, even counts 
as knowledge.  
The Rediscovery of Testimony 
Despite this long-lasting neglect, the topic of testimony has received quite some 
attention in recent years. Several anthologies, monographs, special issues and numerous 
articles have been devoted exclusively to the epistemological analysis of testimony (e.g. 
Lackey 2007, Lackey and Sosa 2006, Coady 1992, Pritchard 2004, Lipton 1998, Fricker 
and Cooper 1987). Moreover, almost all authors portrayed in the previous chapter, have 
developed their own accounts of testimony or at least reference the topic (e.g. Longino 
2002c, Kusch 2002, Kusch 2009c, Goldman 2003). 
Given this newly inspired interest in the topic, I cannot do justice to the epistemology of 
testimony in this small section. Moreover, adding something new to this sophisticated 
debate in a just few words is out of the question. However, this is not the intention of 
this section. I do not aim at joining the highly specific and, to my mind, overly abstract 
debate around the epistemological problems of testimony in contemporary analytic 
philosophy. In lieu thereof, I sketch out some of the major issues and questions around 
testimony that are of relevance for the applied questions of this thesis, such as how 
people collectively construct knowledge and how these processes might be improved. 
Two Major Debates: Inferentialism and Reductionism 
There have been two central debates in contemporary epistemological accounts of 
testimony. One debate concerns the question of whether testimony is a basic source of 
knowledge with the same status as perception, memory or inference or whether its status 
is lower thereby requiring justification from more fundamental sources of knowledge. 
This debate concerns the possibility of a global justification of testimony. The second 
topic - about inferentialism – concerns the question of whether adoption of beliefs 
received via testimony is direct or inferential, meaning that it also involves an 
assessment of the honesty and competency of the testifier.  
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In the debates around the status of testimony as a source of knowledge, the two poles of 
argumentation are reductionism and anti-reductionism. Fricker summarizes the 
reductionist position by stating that ―[r]eductionists about testimony hold that, if 
testimony is to be vindicated as a source not merely of belief, but of knowledge, our 
epistemic right to believe what others tell us must be exhibitable as grounded in other 
epistemic resources and principles-perception, memory and inference -- which are 
regarded by them as both more fundamental, and less problematic‖ (Fricker 1995a: 
394).  
The reductionist position is often traced back to David Hume‘s Enquiry Concerning 
Human Understanding, although the assumption that Hume is a reductionist is not 
undisputed (e.g. Faulkner 1998 & Welbourne 2002, cited from Kusch 2002: 31). Hume 
acknowledges the ubiquity of testimony and its relevance for knowledge by stating that 
―[...] there is no species of reasoning more common, more useful, and even necessary to 
human life, than that which is derived from the testimony of men and the reports of eye-
witnesses and spectators‖ (Hume 1957: 88, quoted from Coady 1992: 7). Yet, Hume 
also asserts that we trust testimony only because we have repeatedly experienced – via 
perception - correspondences between testimony and reality. Hence, in those cases when 
other sources of knowledge are not at our disposal, we can trust testimony only via 
induction. The opposite position is often attributed to Thomas Reid‘s principle of 
credulity, according to which we have [...] ―a disposition to confide in the veracity of 
others, and to believe what they tell us[...]‖, because God intended us to be ―social 
creatures‖ (Reid 1983: 94f, quoted by Adler 2006).  
The debate around reductionism versus anti-reductionism concerns the question of 
whether testimony has to be justified by other, ―more basic‖ sources of knowledge, 
namely perception, inference or memory, or whether it is of the same status and 
therefore needs no further justification. Jonathan Adler summarized the difference 
between Hume‘s and Reid‘s view on testimony as follows: ―Reid‘s position is that any 
assertion is creditworthy until shown otherwise; whereas Hume implies that specific 
evidence for its reliability is needed‖ (Adler 2006).  
One major proponent of an anti-reductionist position today is C. A. Coady, who has 
written a seminal book on testimony (Coady 1992). He argues against the possibility of 
a testimony-free justification of testimony. While global reductionism is hardly 
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defended anymore, a variety of more limited versions of testimony exist, such as Peter 
Lipton‘s concept of rule-reductionism (Lipton 1998), Fricker‘s minimal or local 
reductionism (Fricker and Cooper 1987; Fricker 2006a, as well as Goldman‘s Bayesian 
justification of testimony, (Goldman 2003) which has been depicted in some detail in the 
previous chapter). 
The second main debate, concerning inferentialism, concerns the question of whether an 
assessment of the testifier‘s trustworthiness and competency are necessary for the 
rational acceptance of testimony. As expected, Coady is a proponent of a non-
inferentialist position, arguing that acquiring knowledge through testimony is as direct 
as acquiring knowledge via testimony (Coady 1992). Since both perception and 
testimony are fallible yet reliable, he argues, no additional assessment of the 
competency and honesty of the speaker is principally needed. Elizabeth Fricker is a 
proponent of inferentialism. In a critical note on Coady‘s book on testimony (Coady 
1992), she writes: ―[...] it seems obvious that we must have a default position of trust in 
what others tell us - that human personal relations would be unimaginable without this; 
but consider others, and it seems equally obvious that our attitude to others must be 
critical and skeptical, that we must and do weigh the balance of probabilities against 
what they say being true, on the one hand, and against their being mistaken or insincere 
on the other‖ (Fricker 1995a: 406f). She concludes that we therefore have an epistemic 
duty to monitor the testifier for signs of insincerity or incompetence. 
Testimony and Trust 
While much of the debate portrayed above centers around the question of how and to 
which extent epistemic agents have to empirically test either an epistemic claim or the 
testifier in order to rationally accept testimonial evidence, there are alternatives to these 
evidential theories of knowledge (Faulkner 2007b: 877). Paul Faulkner, as do many 
other authors (Welbourne 1986, Hardwig 1985; Hardwig 1991), argues that the 
acceptance of testimony rests fundamentally on the question of whether the hearer trusts 
the speaker (Faulkner 2007b, Faulkner 2007a). In opposition to inferentialist accounts, 
Faulker insists that ―[i]n trusting a speaker we adopt a credulous attitude, and this 
attitude is basic: it cannot be reduced to the belief that the speaker is trustworthy or 
reliable (Faulkner 2007a: 305) . 
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To my mind, many analytic accounts of the epistemology of testimony, such as those 
depicted above, describe ―core cases‖ of testimony that are characterized by highly 
unrealistic situations. Adler (Adler 2006), for instance, delineates a model of testimony 
that is based upon several assumptions, including that testimony consists in a brief 
assertion, that the hearer cannot attribute authority to the testifier and that the testifier 
is a stranger to the hearer. Clearly, this might be a valid thought experiment to reach 
some general account of testimony. However it fails to address the question of whether 
such an abstract account has any relevance to real socio-epistemic practices.  
As Faulkner has noted, such a view ―[...] ignores the fact that the testimonial 
relationship is often embedded in an established relationship, or can initiate a 
presumption of relationship‖ (Faulkner 2007b: 876). Testimony most of the time is not a 
one-shot game. Rather, giving and receiving testimony involves the development of 
trust relationships between testifier and recipient. Trust is the opposite of relying on 
empirical evidence, because it implies dependence and the risk of being betrayed or let 
down (Faulkner 2007b, Mcleod 2006, Baier 1986).  
Trust within Science 
One of the authors active in the analysis of the role of trust in science is John Hardwig, 
whose work was introduced in the previous chapter. In his seminal paper, ―The role of 
trust in knowledge‖, Hardwig assesses the function of trust for knowledge creation in 
science. He argues that in taking a closer look at scientific practice, we have to rebut the 
antithetical conceptualization of trust and knowledge still prevalent in epistemology that 
states ‖[w]e can not know by trusting in the opinion of others; we may have to trust 
those opinions when we do not know‖ (Hardwig 1991: 693). He notes that in 
epistemology as well as in philosophy of science, it has been nearly universally assumed 
that knowledge rests on evidence and not on trust. If knowledge were to rest on trust, it 
would have to be partly blind, which seems to be an unacceptable premise. However, 
Hardwig argues that analyzing current scientific practice even in the most renowned 
disciplines casts a new light on the relationship between knowledge and trust. ―Modern 
knowers‖, he states, ―[…] cannot be independent and self-reliant, not even in their own 
fields of specialization‖ (Hardwig 1991: 693).  
His analysis departs from the observation that the majority of research is nowadays 
conducted in teams and he presents two exemplary case studies of major scientific 
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achievements in physics and mathematics to support his claims. Cooperation in science 
is supposedly needed to overcome time restrictions on the one hand and to handle the 
rising specialization in science on the other. Due to this high specialization, scientists do 
not only lack the time to perform every subtask of their research on their own, but 
mostly they also lack the necessary expertise in the respective area of research. As a 
consequence, in scientific co-operations scientists have to trust the competency and the 
honesty of their colleagues. Moreover they have to rely on what Hardwig calls the 
―adequate epistemic self-assessment‖ of their peers, i.e. their ability to realistically 
assess their own competencies and levels of expertise in the areas of concern (Hardwig 
1991: 700).  
Thus, in order to successfully operate in science, scientists need to assess their 
colleagues not only epistemically but also morally. As a consequence, Hardwig 
emphasizes the necessity to consider and combine epistemology and ethics when 
reasoning about knowledge. To put it in a nutshell, Hardwig (Hardwig 1991) argues that 
trust is even more fundamental epistemologically than evidence like empirical data or 
logical argumentation because one needs to trust these pieces of evidence and their 
providers to actually use them at all. Thus, the trustworthiness of members of epistemic 
communities is fundamental to all scientific endeavors and represents the groundwork of 
(scientific) knowledge creation. 
Trusting the Gentlemen: Steven Shapin’s “A Social History of Truth” 
One of the most interesting historical accounts of the role of testimony and trust for 
scientific knowledge was delivered by Steven Shapin. In his seminal book ―A Social 
History of Truth,‖ Shapin depicts the crucial role of gentlemen‘s testimony for the 
development of English experimental philosophy as a predecessor of experimental 
science (Shapin 1994). He shows how the development of this epistemic practice in the 
Seventeenth century fundamentally rests on the gentlemanly identities of its key 
advocates, such as Robert Boyle.  
Shapin‘s premise is that ―[k]nowledge is a collective good. In securing our knowledge 
we rely upon others, and we cannot dispense with that reliance. That means that the 
relations which we have and hold our knowledge have a moral character, and the word I 
use to indicate that moral relation is trust‖ (Shapin 1994: XXV). Shapin argues that our 
knowledge about the world depends on knowledge about other people and a crucial 
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epistemic task therefore is to identify trustworthy people: Whom should I turn to in 
order to know? Whose testimony should I trust? In 17
th
 century England as much as in 
contemporary science, reliable witnesses are needed crucially to testify the results 
obtained by experiments. Hardwig gives a straightforward answer to the questions above 
(Hardwig 1991): trust people who are competent, honest, and who can assess their 
competency on the issue at hand.  
But how should one identify those honest and competent testifiers? One good rule of a 
thumb would be to find someone who is disinterested, someone who is free. And in 17
th
 
century England those who were considered to be free were the gentlemen, in particular 
because their economic position allowed them not to work. Thus, economic freedom 
was considered to be a prerequisite for moral freedom. It was assumed that ―[g]entlemen 
were truth-tellers because nothing could work upon them that would induce them to be 
otherwise‖ (Shapin 1994: 84). Shapin argues that ―[...] it was the disinterestedness of the 
English gentleman‘s situation that was most importantly identified as the basis of his 
truth-telling‖ (Shapin 1994: 83).  
While some philosophers deplore Shapin‘s relativist notion of truth, (Lipton 1998: 4), or 
even more harshly criticize his work and consider it to be ―social doxology‖ (Goldman 
2003: 7), Shapin‘s account has deservedly received a lot of attention and praise. 
Feminist epistemologists and philosophers of science especially have built upon 
Shapins‘s work to analyze and stress the impact of gender and hierarchical social 
relations on the ascription of epistemic authority to knowers (cf. Anderson 2009, Alcoff 
2001, Daukas 2006; Fricker 1998; Fricker 2006b; Fricker 2007). Such an extrapolation 
is clearly valid given that in 17
th
 century England women were deemed unreliable 
witnesses whose unreliable truthfulness was a result of their ―constrained 
circumstances‖ and their economic dependence on men (Shapin 1994: 86ff).  
Gentlemen were not only trusted because of their supposed moral and financial freedom. 
They also trusted one another because ―they belonged to the same club‖ as Lipton notes 
(Lipton 1998: 12). Thus, at least two critical issues are related to the epistemology of 
testimony and trust: First, to what extent is the social identity of the testifier relevant for 
the attribution of epistemic trustworthiness and the evaluation of the testifier‘s epistemic 
claims (e.g. Alcoff 2001, Fricker 2007)? Second, to what extent does membership in the 
same community matter to the acceptance of testimony (e.g. Kusch 2002)? I return to 
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both issues at various instances in the remaining chapters of this thesis as they are also 
fundamental for my analyses of epistemic social software.  
Testimony and Social Epistemology 
That there is a relationship between testimony and social epistemology should have 
become obvious by now. For the longest time in the history of philosophy, addressing 
the social dimensions of knowledge simply meant analyzing the epistemology of 
testimony. The question of how to treat testimonial evidence, knowledge reported from 
others, was the only way in which knowledge was understood as being social. To this 
extent then, the epistemology of testimony is a major philosophical predecessor of social 
epistemology. This view is supported by the fact that almost all social epistemologies 
portrayed in the last chapter have proposed their own accounts of testimony or at least 
addressed the issue.  
Moreover, many social epistemologists still adhere to a very narrow conception of 
testimony as transmission of knowledge, which is also characteristic of the majority of 
analytic treatments of testimony described earlier. Alvin Goldman, for instance, has 
proposed a Bayesian account of testimony, which is clearly based on the model of 
testimony in a legal setting. Goldman proposes a simple sender-receiver model to 
transfer knowledge from one person to another. In this process, veritistic improvement 
can only be achieved by using communication to spread existing knowledge across a 
community; the generation of new knowledge via testimony is not considered. Opposing 
such a view of testimony as simple signal transmission, Martin Kusch argues that 
testimony is almost always generative of new knowledge. Criticizing social 
epistemologists for adhering too closely to a model of testimony as mere knowledge 
transmission, Kusch instead has proposed his own model of performative testimony to 
account for the creative and generative aspect of testimony understood as ―learning from 
communication‖(Kusch 2002: 18). While I agree with Kusch that testimony should be 
understood more broadly, such narrow conceptions are nonetheless of some interest for 
socio-epistemological analyses of one important aspect of epistemic social software: the 
distribution and spread of information and existing knowledge over multiple epistemic 
agents. Hence, insights derived from narrow conceptions of testimony may be useful to 
understand certain functions of social software (e.g. the distribution of information), yet 
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they may be completely unsuited or even misleading if applied to other issues (e.g. the 
creation of knowledge in socio-technical epistemic systems).  
Instead of rehearsing the arguments from the previous chapter, I conclude this section 
with two important epistemological views on the debate concerning the status of 
testimonial knowledge in comparison to knowledge from other epistemic sources: 
Martin Kusch‘s notion of epistemic interdependence and Helen Longino‘s 
disentanglement of knowledge as knowledge-productive practices and knowledge as a 
state.  
Testimony and Epistemic Interdependence  
Jonathan Adler notes that ―[t]estimony depends upon other fundamental sources of 
epistemic warrant like perception or memory, but not conversely‖ (Adler 2006). Is this 
position plausible? Perception, to take one of the allegedly direct sources of knowledge, 
is a process of filtering information out of available information. Anyone whose mind 
has been occupied by something for quite a while might have experienced one the 
following situations – or a variation of it: seeing the initials of a loved one on many 
license plates, pregnant women walking all around the neighborhood, no-smoking signs 
on every corner, etc. In philosophy of science, similar phenomena are accounted for 
under the label ‗theory ladenness of observation’.  
Clearly, perception, the extracting of information, is not random, but bound to memory, 
to inference and also to testimony. The dependence of memory on perception has been 
demonstrated over and over again in cognitive psychology. Elisabeth Loftus, in 
particular, has devoted much of her career to the so-called mis-information effect, which 
in fact is nothing beyond and a clear indicator of epistemic interdependence Loftus and 
Palmer 1974; Loftus and Hoffman 1989). Additionally, the relevance of language for all 
epistemic sources cannot be questioned, even if the extent to which testimony, 
perception, inference and memory are influenced by language may differ. At the very 
least, one has to acknowledge that a major part of reasoning depends on categories, 
which are socially constructed, i.e. based on linguistic conventions. If one takes this 
admittedly brief reference to empirical results seriously, then perception, memory and 
inference cannot be considered more fundamental than testimony. Those cases show 
that, although degree may differ, perception, memory and inference are also socially 
shaped. From the authors who are portrayed in this chapter, it has been Martin Kusch in 
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particular, who has stressed the epistemic interdependence of all epistemic sources. 
Kusch argues that not only are ―human cognizers [...] highly gregarious and deeply 
interdependent‖ (Kusch 2009c 20), but the sources of knowledge themselves are deeply 
intertwined (Kusch 2002).  
If one adopts such an account of epistemic interdependence, as I do on naturalist 
grounds, we must reject reductionist claims stating that testimony depends upon more 
fundamental sources of epistemic warrant, such as perception or memory, while those 
sources do not depend on testimony (or other sources more generally). 
Testimony: Epistemic Practices versus Knowledge as a State 
In the previous chapter I introduced Hardwig‘s puzzling question of who knows when 
knowledge has been produced collectively (Hardwig 1991). In referring to an example 
where ninety-nine scientists collectively produced a paper on charm particles he asks 
who knows. If we insist that knowers must be able to provide evidence for all aspects 
necessary for the creation of knowledge and that knowers must be individuals, then no-
one knows. While Martin Kusch (Kusch 2002) argues that the solution to this dilemma 
lies in acknowledging the community as the knower, Helen Longino proposes a different 
solution based on her three modalities of knowledge, knowledge as content, knowledge 
as knowing and knowledge as knowledge production (Longino 2002c).  
Longino argues that differentiating between her three different modes of knowledge can 
clear much of the confusion about the epistemological status of testimony. As noted 
before, the reductionism debate around testimony concerns the question of whether 
knowledge obtained via testimony has a different, mostly lower status than knowledge 
received from other epistemic sources like perception, reasoning or memory. Longino 
argues that this debasement of testimonial knowledge has its roots in an extended 
individualism and a lack of consideration of the different modalities of knowledge - 
more precisely, in a conflation of knowledge as knowledge-production and knowledge as 
the state of knowing. Knowledge does not lose any value in transmission, she claims, 
and to know something, you do not have to have produced this knowledge yourself.  
Referring to John Hardwig‘s article (Hardwig 1985) on the role of trust in knowledge, 
Longino argues that if it were the case that knowledge lost its quality in transmission, 
most contemporary practices of science could not be considered knowledge producing. 
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Following on this, if science, as the perceived stronghold of knowledge, is no longer 
considered emblematic of it any longer, then the question of what remains to be called 
knowledge arises. In fact, without such non-dissipative transmission of knowledge, not 
only would contemporary science be impossible, but the institutions of education and 
journalism would not make sense either!  
One of the open questions in Hardwig‘s article is the question of who possesses 
knowledge that is collectively produced, i.e. who is the knower? Longino argues 
convincingly that once we separate the process of knowledge production from the state 
of knowing, this problem disappears. The community is the producer of knowledge (in 
Hardwig‘s case, the community of mathematicians and physicians Hardwig 1991). 
However, the moment this knowledge has been produced by the community, it can be 
obtained and possessed by anyone.  
6.2.2 Distribution of Cognitive Labor 
Another central socio-epistemic mechanism that has been extensively addressed in 
social epistemology is the distribution of cognitive labor. How should effort be 
optimally distributed over multiple epistemic agents? In principle, this topic can be 
addressed at the level of scientific communities or of smaller entities such as research 
teams. Within social epistemology, work using the label ―distribution of cognitive 
labor‖ has focused primarily at the macroscopic level of research communities and has 
included the question of how resources and funding should be optimally distributed 
within a scientific community (Solomon 2001, Kitcher 1990). However, in the second 
part of this thesis I argue that the process of distributing labor over multiple epistemic 
agents is a fundamental socio-epistemic mechanism that operates on various levels. It is 
a major constituent of my socio-epistemological model.  
Almost all social epistemologists address the distribution of epistemic or cognitive labor 
more or less explicitly.
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 One of the most explicit and formal treatments has been 
provided by Philip Kitcher in the last chapter of his book ―The Advancements of 
Science‖ (Kitcher 1993). I have decided to portray his approach in some detail here for 
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three reasons. First, I consider Kitcher‘s to be one of the most in-depth analyses on the 
topic. Second, his account is the one that is most frequently referred to within socio-
epistemological discourse and influenced other treatments of the topic within social 
epistemology (e.g., Miriam Solomon‘s work). Third and most importantly, Kitcher 
distinguishes two central aspects of the organization of cognitive labor in science that 
are also important for of my own socio-epistemological model. The first one concerns 
scientists‘ relations to one another, including questions of trust and authority. The 
second aspect concerns the distribution of cognitive effort within scientific communities. 
I return to both questions in the third part of this thesis. In this section, I focus on 
Kitcher‘s work on distributed cognitive effort only. 
Distribution of Cognitive Labor in Science 
Distribution of cognitive labor is one of the two main socio-epistemological topics that 
Kitcher addresses in his chapter on ―The Organization of Cognitive Labor‖ (Kitcher 
1993). This section of his work refers to the question of how effort, resources and 
funding should be optimally distributed within a scientific community. His guiding 
questions include what amount of and division of effort is desirable within a scientific 
community and how diversity in scientific communities should be maintained. Kitcher 
proposes a normative-prescriptive model for the distribution of cognitive labor in 
science based on formal analyses, instead of an empirical account of how scientific 
effort actually is distributed in different scientific fields. This normative-prescriptive 
orientation is notable in the last sentence of a paper on the division of cognitive labor: 
―How do we best design social institutions for the advancement of learning? The 
philosophers have ignored the social structure of science. The point, however, is to 
change it.‖(Kitcher 1990: 22).  
Kitcher‘s analyses of the distribution of cognitive labor are socio-epistemological with 
two respects. First, he describes an epistemically beneficial structure of a scientific 
community, i.e., the object of analysis and recommendation is not aimed at the 
individual scientist, but rather at the scientific community as a whole. Secondly, by 
highlighting the benefits of epistemically sullied agents Kitcher allows non-epistemic 
motives to play a positive role in the quest for knowledge. In continuing this section, I 
briefly summarize Kitcher‘s analyses, confining myself to a depiction of the general idea 
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behind this model while omitting many details, including Kitcher‘s formalizations and 
his comments on the constraints of his model. 
According to Kitcher, the value of an epistemic practice is judged in terms of the rate of 
progressive change. In turn, progress is judged in terms of the attainment of significant 
truth (Kitcher 1993: 118ff), a focus which Kitcher shares with Alvin Goldman 
(Goldman 2003). The question then arises: how should cognitive labor be distributed to 
enable the largest possible gain in significant truth?  
Imagine a situation in which a scientist can choose between three different methods for 
approaching a certain problem. Let‘s assume further that one method – method A - is 
considered to be much more likely to lead to results than the other two. These other two 
approaches, B and C, are not completely implausible, but they are less promising than 
method A. If the scientist is to decide rationally, then for him it would be best to choose 
method A. But if this is individually the most rational decision and all scientists act 
rationally, then this would be detrimental to science. Why? Because from such an 
individual point of view, the optimal distribution of research effort would lead to a 
situation in which all scientists use them same method – method A. And this would lead 
to a premature consensus method A, although method B or C may eventually lead to the 
desired results. Whenever such a less promising method ends up being the one that 
solves a problem, premature consensus on the most promising method would have been 
detrimental for science. No one could have found out that the less promising method 
would have been successful, because no one had used it. But if a situation in which all 
scientists decide rationally leads to results which are detrimental for science, this means 
that individual rationality and social rationality can contradict each other. What is best 
for an individual scientist may not be what is best for the community as a whole.  
To avoid the problem of premature consensus a plurality of methods and theories should 
be supported and cognitive diversity should be encouraged (Kitcher 1993: 344). More 
specifically, from the perspective of the community as a whole, the best thing is to 
allocate scientists to each method in accordance with the relative plausibility of those 
alternatives. How could such an allocation of scientists to tasks be achieved? How can 
we make sure that less promising approaches are also pursued, given that for each 




One could either hope for some very altruistic scientists who pursue the less promising 
approaches solely for the collective good of the scientific community. Or, less 
optimistically, one could imagine a dictator, or a philosopher-monarch to use Kitcher‘s 
expression (Kitcher 1993: 334) who has absolute control over the research activities in 
his empire. Given that he has an ―[...] unerring eye for detecting the objective merits of 
theories‖ (Kitcher 1990: 8), he should distribute the scientific effort proportional to this 
merit. If method A is considered to have a probability of 0.6 to lead to true results, 
method B 0.3 and method 0.1, then our dictator should allocate 60% of the scientists to 
work on method A, 30% on method B, and 10% should on method C. Unfortunately – 
or luckily, depending on the point of view – there is no such science dictator in Western 
societies. Moreover, although science funding certainly has effects on the amount of 
scientific effort in different domains, allocation clearly is not that perfect. Furthermore, 
while science policy can deny funding for certain research programs, it cannot force 
scientists to pursue certain strategies or topics against their will beyond providing 
incentives for certain strategies or launching calls for specific areas of research.  
However, maybe neither excessive altruism nor a science dictator is needed actually to 
solve the dilemma of contradicting individual and social rationality. According to Philip 
Kitcher, certain characteristics of scientists solve this dilemma without top-down 
allocation. The solution lies in epistemically sullied communities (Kitcher 1993: 345). 
Epistemically sullied communities consist of epistemically sullied agents who are not 
only motivated by their eagerness to find truth, but are also credit-driven. These agents 
strive for recognition from their peers, for prestige, for being first. The characterization 
of scientists as epistemically sullied agents appears descriptively quite accurate. Being 
the first person to discover something or to obtain significant results appears to be a 
crucial factor for many scientists, especially in the natural sciences.  
If a scientist uses the same method as many other scientists, the probability that he will 
be the first to make a new discovery is quite low. On the other hand, even if his method 
is fairly unlikely to succeed given the available evidence, if it actually is correct and the 
scientist has been the only one who pursued it, he will earn all the merit. Therefore, a 
social factor mostly considered to be detrimental to science, namely the scientists‘ 
grubby quest for personal glory and reputation, is turned into a necessary condition for 
an optimal distribution of research efforts. Such Hobbesian communities comprised of 
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epistemically sullied agents tend to work much better than communal approaches that 
are either purely rational or even altruistic (Kitcher 1990).  
Kitcher concludes: ―The very factors that are frequently thought of as interfering with 
the rational pursuit of science—the thirst for fame and fortune, for example—might 
actually play a constructive role in our community epistemic projects, enabling us, as a 
group, to do far better than we would have done had we behaved like independent 
epistemically rational individuals. Or, to draw the moral a bit differently, social 
institutions within science might take advantage of our personal foibles to channel our 
efforts toward community goals rather than toward the epistemic ends that we might set 
for ourselves as individuals.‖(Kitcher 1990: 16).  
Division of Cognitive Labor Beyond Science 
Although Kitcher‘s approach is developed in the context of science, questions of how to 
distribute cognitive labor are clearly also of tremendous relevance for other epistemic 
environments and practices. Consider different epistemic communities on the Web, such 
as the open source movement, the Wikipedia community, or an abundance of other 
epistemic communities that Yochai Benkler, one of the most influential thinkers 
analyzing the potential of the Web to transform modes of production, subsumes under 
the label of commons-based peer production on the Web (Benkler 2002).
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 For those 
projects, an enormous number of people need to be coordinated – or rather need to 
coordinate themselves and assume different tasks. Clearly, in most cases, there is even 
less formal coordination than there is in science with official science funding. Moreover, 
the modes of coordination and allocation typically differ, some might be more top-
down, others completely bottom-up. Nonetheless, all these projects, many of which 
serve explicitly epistemic purposes, have to deal with the issue of how to organize and 
distribute cognitive labor.  
A second aspect that has been stressed by Kitcher, and which also is of significant 
relevance for communities on the Web, concerns motivational issues. Some community 
members may be motivated by the reputation they can gain from their peers, some draw 
their inspiration from the joy of taking part in an enterprise centered on providing free 
knowledge, and others might take part in open source to learn some skills for their job 
portfolio in hopes of getting a job offer. Whatever their motives might be, the clear 
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effect is that an incredible number of people work for free by providing knowledge, 
information, software or other goods for themselves and others.  
In focusing only on the distribution of labor within scientific communities, I have 
suppressed several other socio-epistemological topics that Kitcher has raised. These 
questions include the following: To what extent, when and with which consequences 
should we defer to authorities? How are authorities actually evaluated? How should 
credit be attributed? When should we cooperate and when is competition a better mode 
to achieve superior epistemic results? How should individuals or the community as a 
whole respond best to innovation? Is it better to be an early adopter or are laggards on 
the safer side? How and then should consensus be reached or resolved? How and to 
what extent is cognitive diversity needed? The topic of consensus formation is addressed 
below, and, as noted before, the issues of trust and authority become crucial in the third 
part of this thesis.  
6.2.3 Consensus Formation 
Consensus formation is another crucial topic in social epistemology and again, almost 
all social epistemologists deal with it in their theories. Some consider it to be crucial for 
the advancement of science (Kitcher 1993), while others argue that consensus should be 
avoided as long as possible (e.g. Solomon 2001). While some theorists provide 
normative models of consensus formation as rational processes of closure (e.g. Lehrer 
and Wagner 1981), others stress the dangers of premature consensus and deliver criteria 
for the dissolution of consensus (Solomon 2001). Although the stance towards 
consensus and the aspects of it that are emphasized may differ, the topic cannot be 
avoided in any social epistemology. Accordingly, consensus will also be addressed in 
my own socio-epistemological model later. There, I argue that consensus is a mode of 
closing socio-epistemic processes. Before this, however, let‘s take a look at a very 
specific theory of consensus.  
Although several social epistemologists address the topic of consensus formation, I have 
chosen to portray Keith Lehrer‘s model of rational consensus in some detail to introduce 
the topic. Given that there are numerous models of consensus formation within 
philosophy, I deliver the reasons for choosing Lehrer‘s approach as a showcase. First of 
all, Lehrer‘s model is probably one of the most well-known models of consensus. 
Secondly, and possibly for that reason, it is the model of consensus formation that is 
205 
 
most often addressed within socio-epistemological discourse. Although Lehrer is rarely 
directly labeled a social epistemologist and rather known for his coherence theory of 
knowledge (Lehrer 1990b), his work is central within the socio-epistemological field of 
discourse. Besides the reception of his model of rational consensus, his investigation of 
the relationship between personal and social knowledge should be mentioned, given that 
it was part of the crucial 1987 Synthese special issues on social epistemology (Lehrer 
1987). Thirdly, Lehrer introduces a central distinction between content information and 
social information. This distinction and the relevance of social information as evaluative 
information about the competency and honesty of one‘s peers are crucial for the 
development of my own socio-epistemological model. The relevance of Lehrer‘s model 
for my own model is twofold: on the one hand it delivers an example as well as a 
normative model for a mechanism of closing processes in which multiple epistemic 
agents are involved. On the other hand, it is a mechanism that exploits reputation, i.e., 
social evaluative information to decide upon topic matters.  
Keith Lehrer’s Model of Rational Consensus 
Lehrer‘s theory of rational consensus describes how consensus should be rationally 
achieved in science and society more generally, and as such is a normative-prescriptive 
account of consensus formation (Lehrer and Wagner 1981). This point is of socio-
epistemological interest for two reasons. First of all, it describes a social mechanism for 
achieving epistemic results. Second, it deals with the question of how empirical 
information should be combined with social information, understood as information 
about the competency and honesty of peers, to achieve better epistemic results.  
Together with the mathematician Carl Wagner, Lehrer has developed a formal theory of 
consensus in science and society more generally. It is depicted in great length in their 
book ―Rational Consensus in Science and Society‖ (Lehrer and Wagner 1981), which 
consists of a philosophical section written by Lehrer and a mathematical section 
authored by Wagner. In the philosophical part, Lehrer situates his model of rational 
consensus in relation to philosophical accounts of consensus in different contexts. He 
argues that the role of consensus has been extensively discussed in a variety of different 
context and lists the major contributors to these debates. Those topics and their main 
proponent include politics (Hobbes, Rousseau, Locke and Spinoza), social choice 
(Arrow, Rawls), justice (Rawls), epistemology, science, intuition and common sense 
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(Reid, Locke, Moore, Chisholm, Goodman), and language (Putnam) (Lehrer and 
Wagner 1981: 3ff). Given the fact that consensus obviously has played and continues to 
play a profound role not only for philosophical reflection, but also for real-life decisions, 
a rational way of reaching consensus should be of prime concern for philosophy. 
Therefore, Lehrer combines these philosophical insights with statistical models for 
amalgamating information, especially of how to aggregate individual probability 
assignments to reach a consensual verdict ((Lehrer and Wagner 1981:17). 
Lehrer and Wagner‘s theory of rational consensus rests upon the employment of 
consensual probabilities, utilities and weights for rational decision making processes in 
science, society and the arts (Lehrer and Wagner 1981, Lehrer 2007
102
). Lehrer argues 
that for decision making processes to be rational, it is central that all salient evidence or 
empirical information available be used. This spectrum of available information - for 
instance, concerning disputes on scientific theories - should not be limited to 
experimental information, however, but should also include the opinions experts have of 
their fellows. Lehrer calls this second type of information social information (Lehrer 
1990a). Accordingly, his theory of rational consensus is meant to describe a rational 
form of information aggregation encompassing total empirical information – i.e., social 
information concerning the reliability of experts as well as the experimental data - that 
members of a given group or community possess collectively. Lehrer and Wagner‘s 
theory of rational consensus is a socio-epistemological theory, because it describes a 
socio-rational mechanism that can be used for epistemic purposes. It is actually social in 
a dual sense. Not only is a social mechanism developed to reach consensus rationally, 
but it is also social information, i.e., collectively assessed information about the 
intellectual authority, information about the reputation of scientists, that is epistemically 
used.  
To illustrate how his model of rational consensus works, Lehrer uses the so-called 
―expert dilemma‖, a frequently encountered situation in which evidence for answering a 
question is inconsistent, thereby leading different experts to recommend different 
options (Lehrer and Wagner 1981). If scientific dissent is prevailing, but suspension of 
judgment is not an option, how should the conflicting information be used to reach a 
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consensual conclusion? ―Decide on the experts to decide on the issue‖ could be the 
motto of Lehrer‘s approach. Recalling that Lehrer proposes that the inclusion of all 
relevant and available information would be most rational, it becomes more plausible 
why he turns to assessing the other experts on the issue at stake before returning to the 
question itself. Each expert in a certain community might be more or less reliable or 
competent with respect to the specific question at stake. Therefore, it would be best to 
include each expert‘s answer weighted by his competency. And who could assess each 
expert‘s competency better than her peers in her scientific community? Since they are 
the ones who are most likely able to assess her competence, they could also collectively 
decide how much intellectual authority to grant her. It would be even better, if each 
peer’s verdict on the other members of the group be weighted by his or her own 
ascribed intellectual authority, and by his or her own reputation as well. Thus, in a 
collective process, through a social mechanism, quantitative weights are calculated for 
each member of a scientific community to serve as a quantitative indicator of this 
person‘s intellectual authority on the issue of interest. One could argue that this amounts 
to using quantified reputational cues as information to decide on factual matters. This 
recommendation to use reputation as an epistemic proxy rests upon the assumption that 
members of a group—for instance, members of a certain scientific community—―have 
opinions about the dependability, reliability and rationality of the other members of the 
group‖ (Lehrer and Wagner 1981: 19).  
Lehrer & Wagner develop a quite complex mathematical model that describes an 
iterative and collective process to reach quantitative values for the reputation of each 
scientist (Lehrer and Wagner 1981). The basic idea, however, is quite simple. The first 
step in this model consists in each expert giving a weight to all other experts 
summarizing all his information about the other‘s expertise and reliability concerning 
the issue at stake. In other words, he gives a quantitative indicator of what he considers 
to be the reputation of the scientist with respect to topic at hand. In a second step, the 
average reputation values for each scientist are calculated with a specific algorithm and 
then laid open. Then in the second round, each expert has to reassess the reputation 
value he has given to all other members of the community, i.e., she has the chance to 
revise his or her judgment taking into account the average weights which the other 
members of the community have given to their fellows. Similar to Delphi-studies in the 
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social sciences, this process is ideally repeated until finally a consensual weight for each 
member of a community is achieved (Linestone and Turoff 2002). 
The idea is that, if you are less secure about the reputation of a certain researcher, you 
might tend more towards the group average in your second vote. If you are very sure 
about the reputation of someone, however, you will not let yourself be influenced by this 
average. If everyone acts this way, that is considered to be most rational, then the 
consensus that is finally achieved is considered to be the most rational consensus. 
According to Lehrer ―[t]he aggregation procedure is simply an iterated averaging 
procedure for obtaining a summary of the total information in the initial state. The 
summary consists of a set of weights in which one convergent weight is assigned to each 
member of the group‖ (Lehrer 1990a: 176). Crucially, once these consensual weights are 
achieved, they can be applied to answering the question of concern by weighting each 
member‘s vote on the issue with their consensual personal weight of reputation.  
Rational Consensus Beyond Science  
Lehrer and Wagner (Lehrer and Wagner 1981) deliver a formal model of how a 
community should use social information, i.e., information about the intellectual 
authority of other people, rationally for epistemic purposes. Their approach is socio-
epistemic to the extent that it describes a mechanism in which not only a social process 
is considered to be rational at the same time. It also argues for the epistemic value of 
social information, i.e. judgments about others‘ reputation and the intellectual authority 
they should be granted with respect to a certain topic matter.  
For the purpose of this thesis, this epistemic use of reputation is highly relevant. 
Moreover, taking into account the prevalence of all sorts of indices, which are meant to 
function as proxies for the reputation of researchers and even the quality of their work 
(e.g., h-index, etc.), taking a closer look at how these algorithms actually function might 
prove rewarding. Clearly, not all epistemic usage of reputational cues has to follow such 
a formal method. Quite on the contrary, ratings and other reputational tools might be 
used in a variety of different ways on the Web and our everyday life more generally. 
Nonetheless, Lehrer & Wagner‘s model delivers a clear example of the potential that 
reputation, particularly when understood as social information from an evaluative 
stance, can have for epistemic tasks (Lehrer and Wagner 1981).  
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That said, however, there are limits, shortcomings and dangers inherent in Lehrer and 
Wagner‘s model. The first problem concerns the concept of the communities. Although 
the community of scientists plays a decisive role in Lehrer‘s model, it remains 
underdetermined. The whole process of rational consensus formation is based on the 
ability of experts to evaluate their fellows. However, how these judgments are to be 
obtained in the first place remains open. It is obvious that for experts to judge the 
competency of their fellows, they must have had contact with them at least indirectly via 
reading their publications, etc. However, even though this interaction and 
communication within the communities is a necessary prerequisite for the whole process 
of obtaining consensual weights, it is not explicitly described or analyzed in Lehrer‘s 
approach. The only form of communication which is explicitly needed for the process of 
consensus attainment is the interchange of numbers, i.e., the communication of weights. 
The social or community aspect of knowledge may rest upon information about the 
fellow experts, but the process of how experts arrive at their weights, how they assess 
their peers intellectual authority is not addressed.  
Of particular concern here is the relevance of various societal factors (institutional 
background, gender, nationality) in this process. Given the centrality of reputational 
weights for consensus formation in this model and the fact that it is a normative model, 
one would assume that the processes of attributing reputational values to others is under 
close scrutiny in Lehrer‘s model. However, the criteria upon which epistemic agents 
form their opinions on their peers are not addressed at all within Lehrer‘s approach.  
This neglect of the social processes taking place within scientific communities, as well 
as the broader societal context in which these are embedded, leads me to a more 
fundamental critique of Lehrer‘s model of rational consensus. The use of reputational 
cues, as beneficial as it might be for reaching consensus, comes with serious epistemic 
and ethical dangers. Primarily feminist epistemologists as philosophers of science have 
pointed out the risk of epistemic injustices and biases that can occur when invalid 
reputational proxies are used to assess knowledge claims without critical reflection. (cf. 
for instance Fricker 2007, Scheman 2001, Alcoff 2001). Feminist theoreticians have also 
convincingly argued that such biases and the unfair attribution of intellectual authority 
are not only ethical but also cognitive and epistemic failures, and have therefore 
requested a tempered equality of intellectual authority (Longino 2002c:131).  
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To be sure, neither the impact or relevance of communicative processes within social 
groups or communities for knowledge nor the potential infiltration of societal injustices 
into this process is negated in this account. However, these processes are rendered 
invisible by being used as important but unstudied prerequisites or as interchangeable 
sources of information or domains of application, and are thus removed from the center 
of inquiry. At various points in the course of this thesis I return to the possibility of 
epistemic injustice that lurks in the corners of social mechanisms that rely heavily on the 
collective attribution of intellectual authority. 
To conclude, the use of reputational cues to weight knowledge claims according to the 
perceived reputation of the knower comes with opportunities on the one hand and 
dangers on the other. Reputation can help to make a quick judgment concerning the 
expected quality of information and, in this role, reputational cues are of high relevance 
on the Web , which is characterized by its overabundance of information. Reputation 
can serve here as a filter which can result in new classifications of information, which 
would be second-order knowledge (Origgi and Simon 2010). On the other hand, there is 
always the danger that invalid proxies are used to judge the epistemic trustworthiness of 
a knower: whenever social criteria that are not related to someone‘s quality as a knower 
are assessed to judge one‘s quality as a knower such epistemic injustices may occur. 
Hence, although one should consider using reputational weights for epistemic purposes, 
such usage and the processes of attributing weights has to be monitored and re-assessed 
constantly. I return to this topic in more detail when outlining the difference between 
weighted and unweighted forms of epistemic sociality in the third part of this thesis. 
6.3 Central Debates within Social Epistemology: Differentiating 
the Field 
As noted in the previous chapter, social epistemology, even when it is narrowly 
conceived, is not a homogenous or unified field. Rather, there are numerous 
controversies concerning even the most basic features of social epistemology. In the 
following section, I outline some of the most central debates within social epistemology. 
Clearly, the topics and categories I have chosen are neither exhaustive nor selective. 
Nonetheless, I think that they enable a clearer picture of the field of discourse known as 
―social epistemology‖. My goal in the following sections is neither to close any of the 
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debates nor to contribute substantially to them. Rather I use these conflicts to span and 
outline the field and situate my own approach therein. 
6.3.1 Complementarity 
One of the central debates within social epistemology concerns the relationship between 
social and individual epistemology. Many social epistemologists consider their social 
epistemologies – or social epistemology in general – to be complementary to individual 
epistemologies, as traditionally conceived. Given the background and training of many 
social epistemologists, such individual epistemologies are mostly rooted in analytic 
epistemology.  
Alvin Goldman is one of the main proponents of such a complementary view that 
distinguishes individual and social epistemologies as two distinct endeavors. In 
proposing to divide epistemology into two branches he sees their respective duties as 
follows: ―Individual epistemology would identify and evaluate psychological processes 
that occur within the epistemic subject. Social epistemology would identify and evaluate 
social processes by which epistemic subjects interact with other agents who exert causal 
influence on their beliefs.‖(Goldman 2006). Other social epistemologists argue along the 
same lines. Hilary Kornblith, who has proposed a ―conservative approach to social 
epistemology‖ in Schmitt‘s anthology (Schmitt 1994b), also considers social 
epistemology to be an amendment to individual traditional (naturalistic) epistemology 
(Kornblith 1994). While acknowledging that ―knowledge is a socially mediated 
phenomenon‖ (Kornblith 1994: 97), he favors an account of social epistemology, which 
―will leave important room for input from the study of group processes and institutions, 
but will leave the overall structure of our epistemological theories substantially 
unchanged‖ (Kornblith 1994: 94). He states that ―since belief acquisition and retention 
must be seen as a product of both social and nonsocial factors [...] both kinds of factors 
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 Interestingly, when referring to the nonsocial factors, Kornblith refrains from talking about knowledge, 
but instead refers to beliefs. That beliefs may be nonsocial is indeed not denied from all social 
epistemologists who argue that knowledge is social in a more profound sense. Helen Longino (2002c) for 
instance argues that while beliefs can be held by individuals, knowledge depends on discursive 
interactions in communities and therefore cannot be conceived nonsocially.  
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Philip Kitcher, whose work on the distribution of cognitive labor I discussed previously, 
has advocated for a distinction between individual and social epistemology as two 
complementary programs. While ―[...] individualistic epistemology concerns itself with 
those processes that promote an individual‘s attainment of true belief, so too social 
epistemology should be concerned with the organization of communities of knowers and 
with the processes that occur among knowers within such communities that promote 
both the collective and the individual acquisition of true belief ‖(Kitcher 1994: 113). 
Other social epistemologists, most notably Martin Kusch but also Helen Longino, argue 
that such a complementary understanding of social epistemology as a mere addendum 
that leaves the individualistic foundations of analytic epistemology untouched is 
insufficient. Both authors consider knowledge to be social in a fundamental sense and 
hence propose social epistemologies that question the foundations of individualistic 
(analytic) epistemology. Kusch instead proposes a diagnostic social epistemology, 
which instead of remaining as deferential as Alvin Goldman and other proponents of the 
complementary view ―tries to analyze, explain and criticize the foundations of classical 
epistemology‖ in social and political terms (Kusch to appear: 3). Kusch considers his 
Communitarian Epistemology to be an example of an analytic version of such an 
diagnostic social epistemology. It is based on the conviction that ―a social isolate is 
unable to know anything‖ (Kusch to appear: 4)) and that instead knowledge is a social 
status that communities grant to individuals or groups (Kusch 2002).  
Although Longino puts certain emphasis on the role of the individual, her concept of 
knowledge is thoroughly social as well. This becomes obvious in her statement that 
knowledge, as opposed to belief, is a social status – and not a psychological state 
(Longino 2002c: 204). When analyzing observation and reasoning as two central 
epistemic practices in science, she states that social mechanisms are ―[…] what enables 
the transformation in assertability-status from‘It seems to me that p‘ to ‗P‘‖ (Longino 
2002c: 103), and concludes that ―[...] the results of both reasoning and observation, then, 
are socially processed before incorporation into the body of ideas ratified for circulation 
and use, or are treated as having been so processed‖ (Longino 2002c: 106). 
Concerning the issue of complementarity, I side with Martin Kusch and Helen Longino. 
Knowledge has to be understood as social in a more fundamental sense than 
complementary approaches convey. Both authors consider knowledge to be a social 
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status and highlight the central role of communities for the generation of knowledge. 
However, Kusch and Longino use different antonyms for the term ―social status‖, and 
by so doing refer to central aspects of the sociality of knowledge. Kusch uses the 
differentiation into social, artificial and natural kind to characterize the extent to which 
these different kinds of things depend on communities, and asserts that knowledge as a 
social kind ceases to exist once the communal performative is withdrawn (Kusch 2002: 
165ff). Longino, alternately, stresses that knowledge depends on interaction between 
multiple epistemic agents by defining it as a social status as opposed to a psychological 
state (Longino 2002c: 204).  
To be sure, arguing that knowledge is thoroughly social, that it is a social status and that 
there is no such thing as an isolated knower does not imply that an individual cannot 
engage in epistemic practices or that individuals cannot believe, see, remember or infer 
something. This argument does imply, however, that only through the community can 
belief turn into knowledge, that only through communal vetting will the results of 
individual – or collective – epistemic practices be accepted as knowledge. Longino‘s 
critique of knowledge as a psychological state leads to the next topic: the concepts of 
knowledge employed in different social epistemologies. 
6.3.2 What’s Knowledge and Who’s to Decide? The Reception of 
Sociological Research 
One of the central demarcation lines in social epistemology concerns the stance towards 
the definition of knowledge as justified true belief or some variant of it. Alvin Goldman 
has used this criterion to distinguish classical and anti-classical social epistemologies 
(Goldman 2006). Those social epistemologists that adhere to a notion of knowledge as 
justified true belief are classical social epistemologists (e.g. Goldman 2003, Kitcher 
1993) and those that reject it are anti-classical social epistemologists (Barnes and Bloor 
1982, Latour 1987, Fuller 1988). Goldman further divides the classical social 
epistemologists into those that emphasize the role of social factors for the acquisition of 
true beliefs and those that highlight the sociality of justification and rationality. The 
proponents of the anti-classical positions do - according to Goldman (Goldman 2006) - 
neither care about notions of truth nor of justification, but instead take for knowledge 
what is believed, i.e., they deny the existence of any criteria which could distinguish 
knowledge from belief or what is true from what is merely taken to be true. According 
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to Goldman, such approaches should not be considered proper epistemologies and he 
proposes the term ―social doxology‖ (Goldman 2003: 7) for these positions instead. In a 
later paper, he labels those approaches that do not accept knowledge as (justified) true 
belief or oppose a correspondence truth, revisionist social epistemology, but 
nevertheless maintains his verdict that those approaches should not be considered real 
epistemologies. Such undeserving approaches include quite a variety of isms, namely: 
―[p]ostmodernism, deconstructionism, social constructionism, relativism, and the social 
studies of science, including the ‗strong programme‘ in sociology of science‖ (Goldman 
2009b). In the development of his own, Veristic Social Epistemology, Goldman 
criticizes those anti-classical positions and labels their proponents ―veriphobes‖ 
(Goldman 2003: 7).  
Martin Kusch and Helen Longino have both criticized not only the reduction of 
knowledge to mere variants of justified true belief, but they have also outlined serious 
flaws in Goldman‘s reception of the theories he dismisses. Kusch acknowledges that 
among the many approaches that Goldman dismisses out of hand (such as 
postmodernism, deconstructionism, social constructionism, relativism and social studies 
of science) only the social studies of science have been analyzed – although this analysis 
is considered inaccurate. While Kusch (Kusch to appear) clarifies Goldman‘s 
misrepresentations of the positions of David Bloor, Barry Barnes and Harry Collins, 
Helen Longino (Longino 2002c: 44ff) shows similar flaws for the depiction of Bruno 
Latour‘s (Latour 1987) as well as Steven Shapin‘s and Simon Schaffer‘s (Shapin and 
Schaffer 1985) work. Clearly, one cannot critically assess all other approaches that 
address the sociality knowledge. However, the moment one uses them as a background 
foil to develop one‘s approach against them, one should take great care in portraying 
them correctly. Otherwise, one conducts one of the fallacies, Goldman rightly 
indentifies as detrimental to science and knowledge: the straw man fallacy (Goldman 
2003: 153): misrepresenting others‘ approaches to make them more easy to attack.  
Concerning the stance towards the social studies of science, I side with Martin Kusch 
and Helen Longino‘s positions. Kusch has revealed his debt to the sociologists of 
knowledge, most notably to the works of Barnes, Bloor, Collins, and Shapin (Kusch 
2002: 4)). Helen Longino has been particularly receptive to the works of Bruno Latour 
and urges philosophers of science and social epistemologists to take science studies 
serious more generally (Longino 2002c). I agree that social epistemology would lose a 
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central source of information if it does not consider sociological analyses relevant. Any 
consideration of how epistemic practices should be conducted has to understand first 
how they are conducted. This stance does not imply that sociological methods are 
superior to philosophical method, nor acts as a judgment about the relative worth of 
philosophical versus sociological, or theoretical versus empirical reasoning. Rather, both 
fields should be more receptive to one another. Empirical analyses deliver crucial 
insights for theoretical reasoning; they are important as a source or as a probing stone 
for normative considerations. Moreover, the social studies of science and technology 
have delivered invaluable insights for the analyses of socio-epistemic practices in 
general and socio-technical epistemic practices in particular, as I have shown in Part 1. 
Longino‘s Critical Contextual Empiricism is also an attempt to build a bridge between 
philosophical and sociological analyses of science and knowledge by providing a 
framework that is ―[…] responsive to the normative uses of the term ‗knowledge‘ and to 
the social conditions in which scientific knowledge is produced.‖ (Longino 2002c: 1). 
Remember that one of her primary goals lies in dissolving the social-rational 
dichotomy, which she holds responsible for the continuous misunderstandings between 
philosophers and sociologists of science. 
To overcome this dichotomy, Longino has proposed a tripartite notion of knowledge 
that serves as a framework for my own analyses. Longino distinguishes knowledge as 
cognitive agency from knowledge as knowledge-producing practices and knowledge as 
content. Knowledge as cognitive agency, knowledge as the state of a person towards an 
object and the discussions around the formulization ―S knows that p‖, refer to merely 
one modality of knowledge. Longino asserts that in each modality knowledge is social 
and rational at the same time; in each case ―[t]he social is not a corrupting but a 
validating element in knowledge‖ (Longino 2002c: 122). Stressing the interdependence 
of cognitive agency, the plurality of knowledge and the contextuality of knowledge-
producing practices, she proposes normative recommendations that take into account the 
actual knowledge-producing practices in contemporary science, thus consolidating 
sociologists‘ and philosophers‘ concerns.  
Thus, to understand the sociality of knowledge comprehensively, this focus on 
knowledge as cognitive agency has to be amended at least by a comprehension of 
knowledge as knowledge-producing practices as well as knowledge as content.  
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6.3.3 The Utility of Truth 
It should not come as a surprise that a concept as central for epistemology as ―truth‖ has 
received a lot of attention in social epistemology. The previously portrayed debates 
around the notion of knowledge as justified true belief – or true belief only (Goldman 
2003) – are a clear indicator of the relevance of this concept for socio-epistemological 
considerations. Nonetheless, the utility of the notion of truth for socio-epistemological 
analyses is less then clear. While truth and the truth-conduciveness of socio-epistemic 
practices loom particularly large in Goldman‘s Veristic Social Epistemology104, other 
social epistemologists have assessed the merits and shortcomings of the concept of truth 
for the assessment of epistemic practices and products more critically.  
With respect to science for instance, different social epistemologists have noted that 
truth might not be the best indicator of the quality of scientific theories (Solomon 2001; 
Longino 2002c). Miriam Solomon notes that the majority of theories in the history of 
science have been neither literally, partially nor approximately true (Solomon 2001). 
There may be some truth in scientific theories that have proven successful, but this truth 
can be recognized only in hindsight. The truth value of a scientific theory can be 
assessed only at a later stage than when it was first proposed. Even if knowledge is 
considered true at this later stage of appraisal, it is impossible to know whether or not it 
could be falsified in the future. It is this dependence on the historical reconstruction of 
truth, the ―[p]ractise of assessing truth in the past theories from the perspective of 
present knowledge‖ (Solomon 2001: 33), that made Solomon choose the label ―Whig‖ 
for her Whig realism.  
Instead of stretching the concept of truth to allow for the assessment of scientific 
theories, Helen Longino has proposed the concept of conformation as an umbrella term 
for the relation between the content of knowledge and its intended object (Longino 
2002c: 117ff). Truth is but one instantiation of conformation; others are fit, 
approximation, etc. I side here with Longino because there are several reasons why 
conformation may be an appropriate concept for this thesis. First of all, the concept of 
conformation can be applied to non-propositional content: diagrams, maps are not true 
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 Goldman adopts a correspondence theory of truth with some elements of deflationary approaches. The 
core of such a correspondence theory for Goldman is that ―what makes sentences or propositions true are 
real-world truth makers‖ (Goldman 2003: 68). 
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or false - they are more or less useful for certain tasks.
105
 The same is true for epistemic 
practices, they are also neither true nor false – they are only more or less useful for the 
achievement of epistemic goals. For his Veristic Social Epistemology Goldman has to 
introduce the concept of instrumental veristic value to retain the notion of truth for the 
assessment of epistemic practices (Goldman 2003: 87). Moreover, conformation, as 
opposed to truth, comes in degrees and it can be assessed for different dimensions 
depending on the purpose of epistemic tasks. All these characteristics make 
conformation an attractive concept for analyzing socio-epistemic practices and products 
on the Web.  
6.3.4 The Relevance of Epistemic Communities: Contextualism 
and Relativism 
Epistemic communities are a central concept in social epistemology. Every social 
epistemologist refers to groups of epistemic agents in some form or another. The 
minimal acknowledgement consists in agreeing that knowledge can be and often is 
created collaboratively in groups and that such collaborations may be epistemically 
beneficial, etc (e.g. Thagard 1997a). Other authors analyze the ontological and 
epistemological status of groups by asking what it means for a group to know, etc. (most 
notably Margaret Gilbert, e.g. Gilbert 1987; Gilbert 1989; Gilbert 1994; Gilbert 2004, 
but also Schmitt 1994c, Mathiesen 2005, Tollefsen 2007, Tuomela 2004). In most 
approaches it is acknowledged that knowledge can be created in groups, but it is usually 
posited that individuals can create knowledge as well.  
Some authors go further than this, however, and insist that knowledge depends on 
epistemic communities in a more profound sense. Martin Kusch and Helen Longino, in 
particular, have put emphasis on the role of communities to grant knowledge as a social 
status, to provide the means for vetting content as knowledge. Without a community to 
declare something to be knowledge, there can be no knowledge. Individuals may have 
doxastic autonomy, they may not be constrained by the beliefs held in their community, 
but knowledge requires discursive interaction and being a knower requires being 
recognized as a knower. As Helen Longino asserts: ―‘S knows ...‘ attributes a status to S 
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 Of course maps can be false if they do not correspond to the terrain they intend to correspond to – this 
would be a case of non-fit, a lack of conformation. It is where reality bites back. Yet conformation as a 
term indicates that the evaluation of epistemic practices and tools depends on their intended purpose.  
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on the basis of S‘s actual engagement in or presumed capacity to engage in certain 
discursive interactions. Cognitive agents are interdependent, and their knowing is a 
social status, not a kind of psychological state‖ (Longino 2002c: 204).  
But how fundamental is such a dependence of knowledge on communities and what are 
the consequences? Does the fact that only communities can grant knowledge imply that 
knowledge is only valid within specific epistemic communities? And what is the status 
of knowledge in epistemic communities other than the one where is was initially 
created? Can knowledge claims be detached from their contexts of creation? And how 
then can communities be wrong? These topics refer to the relationship between 
contextualism and relativism. Both, Martin Kusch and Helen Longino advocate for 
contextualist epistemologies, in which the existence of epistemic communities is a 
central prerequisite for knowledge. But the two authors differ profoundly in their 
answers to the questions posed above. While Helen Longino argues that her approach is 
contextualist, yet decidedly non-relativistic, Martin Kusch embraces a methodological 
relativism.  
Helen Longino: Contextualism without Relativism?  
Longino defines cognitive communities as ―[…] any group bound by some set of 
common goals and shared public standards regulating critical (knowledge-productive) 
discourse and the stabilization of representations as knowledge‖ (Longino 2002c: 145)). 
While such communities are bound together by common goals and shared standards, 
these goals and standards differ between different communities. Even within 
contemporary Western science, which is Longino‘s frame of reference, different 
epistemic communities, even within scientific fields, have different goals and standards 
for evaluating epistemic practices and products. Controversies within scientific fields are 
an indicator of such epistemic pluralism.  
Based on the acknowledgement of epistemic pluralism within science, Helen Longino 
advocates for local epistemologies. Having analyzed various case studies in biology, she 
argues that ―[…] a plurality of adequate and epistemically acceptable explanations or 
theories can be generated by a variety of different factors in any situation of inquiry‖ 
(Longino 2002c: 184). These different factors include various methodological and 
substantive assumptions as well as premises about the form of knowledge. 
Methodological assumptions include decisions about appropriate methods of data 
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generation (e.g. field work versus experimental studies), the kind of data (qualitative or 
quantitative) as well as assessments of reliability, etc. Substantive assumptions are 
assumptions about the world under study, such as the acceptance of the regulative 
function of genes. Finally, forms of knowledge are supposed to describe what is often 
called epistemic virtues, i.e., virtues such as simplicity or unification. However, all of 
these virtues, Longino argues, are not only based on substantive assumptions 
themselves, but are also hardly universal. The only universal standard she accepts is that 
of empirical adequacy, which has to guide every scientific endeavor. Any community of 
researchers has its very own assemblages of these different background assumptions, 
which form this community‘s ―local epistemology‖. However, this local epistemology, 
as a ―dynamic complex of beliefs, norms, goals, and practices‖ (Longino 2002c: 187), is 
bound to change when confronted with external or internal challenges. Such challenges 
might either be encounters with researchers having different background assumptions, 
changing goals, or data that seem to produce internal inconsistencies or tensions. And in 
preparation of what follows in the next chapters, I would like to argue that the 
introduction and use of new technologies, resp. the establishment of new socio-technical 
assemblages, is another source of such epistemic change.  
Accounting for these background assumptions and their impact on research does not 
imply that these assumptions are necessarily detrimental or that they can or should be 
abolished. However, recognizing the situatedness of research and the partiality and 
plurality of knowledge should make knowledge claims more modest as well as appraisal 
of alternative views more palatable. Longino therefore concludes (Longino 2002c: 202): 
―The challenge posed by the plurality of contemporary science is not so much a 
metaphysical one but an educational one. How can the value of scientific research as a 
source of guidance for policy decisions be maintained in the face of the complexity of 
nature and the partiality and plurality of our knowledge of it?‖  
While I completely agree with Longino‘s analyses and her arguments concerning the 
plurality, partiality and provisionality of knowledge as well as the necessity for 
educating people to acknowledge these characteristics, I am not sure whether such an 
account can defend relativism in the end. Let me elucidate. Longino argues that the 
sociality of knowledge or the role of communities in knowledge production does not 
mean that the members of the community share concepts, goals or theories, but rather 
that they are in interaction with each other on these concepts, goals and theories. What 
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is needed for this interaction to take place, however, are shared standards of criticism 
and evaluation.  
These shared standards are Longino‘s weapon against relativism. But are they effective? 
Longino argues that ―[s]hared standards permit diversity of beliefs, but unity in their 
methods of evaluation‖ (Longino 2002c: 148). But how do these standards come into 
play? And are they stable or do they change over time? Longino suggests that while 
standards are temporarily binding, they indeed change over time and differ between 
different communities. But if that is the case, how can they be said to defeat relativism?  
If relativism is not meant to denote that anything goes, but rather that epistemic practices 
and knowledge can only be evaluated relative to certain criteria, to a specific set of 
standards, then Longino‘s approach is relativistic. And the argument that while a 
framework of reference might be chosen more or less freely, each choice comes with 
constraint is neither new nor to my mind unacceptable. Indeed, I think it is the only 
empirically adequate and consistent understanding of what contextualism may amount 
to. Similar ideas have been proposed by numerous theoreticians, such as Ian Hacking, 
Yehuda Elkana, Luwdik Fleck.  
Yehuda Elkana (Elkana 1986) argues that in choosing a frame of reference 
conventionality comes into play and one has to be a relativist with respect to possible 
frameworks. Truth and logic are always formulated in accordance with this chosen 
frame of reference, a certain culture and language, and this contingency cannot be 
avoided. However, once a certain framework is set, criteria of truth and rationality can 
be set. Hence, Elkana considers himself to be a relativist between frameworks, but a 
realist within a framework. He labels this view historical relativism. As compared to 
stronger relativists, such as Mary Douglas, who has had a huge impact on the Edinburgh 
School, Elkana stresses the belief in reality and objective realism based on consensus. 
Along with Longino, he also stresses the necessity of critical dialogue as a prerequisite 
for the growth of knowledge. 
Ian Hacking (Hacking 2002: 4), referring to Comte‘s and Foucault‘s notion of positivity, 
uses the concept of truthhood and falsehood, arguing that truth conditions are bound to 
styles of reasoning. Every style of reasoning, such as the statistical or the laboratory 
style, enables new conditions for truth, new ways of approaching the truth and new 
criteria for argumentation and demonstration. The question accordingly is not what is 
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true and what is false, but rather how is something true? What are the conditions for 
something to be true?  
Ludwik Fleck (Fleck 1980), whose concept of thought style (―Denkstil‖) forms one 
vantage point for Hacking‘s style of reasoning, introduces the notions of active and 
passive connections to account for the relationship between construction and cognition 
on the one hand and reality on the other. While active connections are contingent and 
depend on the prevailing thought style, the passive connections impose themselves upon 
the observer. They are ‖reality biting back‖ -- to use Longino‘s terminology (Longino 
2002c: 119).  
Thus, according to Elkana (Elkana 1986), Hacking (Hacking 2002), Fleck (Fleck 1980) 
and Longino (Longino 2002c), epistemic standards and conditions for truth are 
historically and locally contingent. Nonetheless, success is not arbitrary and construction 
is not just ―making things up‖. As Longino concludes: ―[s]uccess cannot just be a matter 
of the user wanting the theory to be correct [...]. If they are not, reality will eventually 
bite back. To suppose that success has nothing to do with the interests of the users is just 
as fruitless, however. The idiom of representation must be such as to enable successful 
interaction with that which is represented. The choice of idiom, and of the degrees to 
and respects in which it must fit the objects of representation, is a social choice, a matter 
of goals collectively endorsed in the community conducting inquiry. In this sense the 
community determines what will count as knowledge‖ (Longino 2002c: 119). But 
doesn‘t this form of contextualism also imply relativism understood as evaluation 
relative to contextual criteria and local standards? This would be exactly Martin 
Kusch‘s position, who is a declared relativist. He states that relativism as he uses the 
term does not mean that ― [...] all beliefs or statements are only relatively true‖ (Kusch 
2002: 269), but rather that truth and falsity depend on a communities interests, 
exemplars and goals.  
Martin Kusch: Embracing Relativism 
In Martin Kusch‘s Communitarian Epistemology, the community looms particularly 
large. Indeed, the community is the primary knower. There is no such thing as an 
isolated, individual knower - without communities, there can be no knowledge. But 
while Longino considers her theory of Critical Contextual Empiricism to be 
contextualist but non-relativist (Longino 2002c), Kusch complements his 
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Communitarian Epistemology with a ―communitarian finitistic form of relativism 
concerning truth, reality, and objectivity‖(Kusch 2002: 280). Although he assures his 
readers that it is possible to accept his positions on testimony and empirical belief 
without having to endorse his stance on relativism, he has continued to work on 
developing an account of methodological epistemological relativism more recently 
(Kusch 2009b, Kusch 2007).  
Knowledge in Kusch‘s account refers to a ―bundle of entitlements and commitments‖ 
(Kusch 2002: 166), which link together those who know. Entitlements and commitments 
relate us to one another in our knowing. As Kusch states, ―[i]n claiming to know 
something, we commit ourselves to being able to marshal evidence in support of the 
claim. We entitle our interlocutors to call on us to present this evidence, and – at least 
prima facie – we entitle ourselves to the status of someone who is worth consulting and 
following‖ (Kusch 2002: 166). 
In his characterization of epistemic communities, Kusch combines Welbourne‘s idea of 
primitive communities of knowledge (Welbourne 1986) with Robert B. Brandom‘s 
notion of entitlements and commitments (Brandom 1994). Brandom uses this notion for 
his account of objectivity, arguing that the game of giving and asking for reasons forms 
the basis of all our social discursive practices. Thus, epistemic notions such as 
objectivity, knowledge, or truth can only be understood in relation to these discursive 
practices. Despite this indebtedness towards Brandom, there are crucial differences 
between his and Kusch‘s conclusions concerning the consequences of community 
centrality for knowledge. More specifically, if it is the community that decides upon and 
attributes knowledge, how can the community be wrong? And does the fact that 
knowledge depends on communities implicate that knowledge is always only relative to 
this community?  
Brandom rejects the idea that objectivity is based on intersubjectivity, because such a 
concept of objectivity based on consensus in a community would not allow for a 
community as a whole to be wrong about something. By contrast, he states, it is exactly 
this difference between what is true for us versus what is true in fact, which allows 
objectivity to come into play (Brandom 1994, as cited in Kusch 2002: 215). Thus, 
Brandom argues that I-thou relationships are more fundamental than I-we relationships, 
which would be the central term in communitarian epistemologies. If I-we relations 
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were fundamental, there would be no possibility for a community to be wrong. 
However, it is exactly this possibility of error that needs to be accounted for if truth 
differs from what is taken to be true.  
Kusch considers Brandom‘s argument for the primacy of I-thou-relationships to be 
unconvincing. Admitting that a community can be wrong, Kusch insists that ―[…] the 
judgement according to which a whole community is, or was, wrong can only come 
from within another community (or a later time-slice of the same community). And such 
judgement will have to be based on the exemplars and the consensus in that other 
community‖ (Kusch 2002: 259). This implies that there is no view from above, that 
criteria of evaluation are always local and contingent. Indeed, Kusch acknowledges that 
―we cannot escape our own contingency as members of our own culture and its 
tradition‖ (Kusch 2002: 274). But as noted before, while Longino considers her 
approach to be contextualist but non-relativist because of the relevance of shared 
standards, Kusch embraces relativism by stating: 
―Which statements are labelled ‗true‘ or ‗false‘ in a given community 
depends on its prevailing exemplars, interests, and goals. Changes in any of 
the latter lead to changes in the former. The sorting of beliefs or statements 
into ‗true‘ and false statements‘ is thus done relatively to prevailing 
exemplars, interests, and goals‖ (Kusch 2002: 270).  
Acknowledging ―[...] we cannot escape our own contingency as members of our own 
culture and its tradition‖ (Kusch 2002: 270), however, does not imply that all statements 
are only relatively true. Differentiating these two notions of the word ―relative‖ as 
―nearly‖ versus ―in relation to‖ may be crucial for sorting debates around relativism as 
Kusch has argued convincingly. Kusch‘s embrace of relativism goes too far for many, if 
not for all social epistemologists portrayed before. But - for better or worse - I consider 
his arguments for such a relativist stance to be consistent.  
6.3.5 Methodological Issues: Naturalism and Quantification  
Methodological decisions are another criterion in which social epistemologies differ. 
Although it seems that debates about methodology are less vivid than other discussions, 
I would argue that these methodological choices are fundamental and have considerable 
effects. Two issues here are of crucial concern: naturalism in epistemology and the role 
of quantification and stochastical methods. At first I briefly address the topic of 
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naturalism more broadly conceived as the receptiveness to empirical data before turning 
to the issues of quantification and the use of stochastical methods in particular.  
Naturalism in Epistemology  
Several social epistemologists portrayed consider their approaches to be naturalistic in 
the sense of being receptive to empirical studies of knowledge and epistemic practices. 
Miriam Solomon even considers naturalism to be the ―most important development in 
epistemology over the last fifty years,‖ and claims that her ―arguments for social 
empiricism have been consistently naturalistic‖ in that [she] appealed to case studies and 
to the empirical sciences of knowledge (social psychology, cognitive psychology, 
sociology, etc.) in making them (Solomon 2001: 137). The basic idea is that in order to 
propose how epistemic practices ought to be conducted, one has to know how they are 
actually conducted. Hence, any attempts to be normative or prescriptive about epistemic 
practices should be rooted in the analyses of actual epistemic practices. Yet while the 
role of psychology and cognitive science for epistemology has long been acknowledged 
in contemporary analytic philosophy, the openness to other empirical disciplines, such 
as sociology, anthropology or history, has been more circumspect.  
In principle, those authors who consider their approaches to be naturalist have imported 
either insights or methods from the empirical sciences into philosophy. Various authors 
have used historical case studies from the history of science for the development of their 
theories. For instance, Paul Thagard, whose considerations on collaboration in science I 
portray in Chapter 9, has not only conducted extensive case studies in the history of 
science and medicine (Thagard 1998a; Thagard 1998b), he has also used computational 
methods and modeling to amend philosophical methods (Thagard 1998c). Longino has 
developed her own approach based on analyses of theories of human evolution and of 
the hormonal basis of sex differentiated behavior (Longino 1990). She has also 
thoroughly analyzed the challenges that sociologists, anthropologists and historians of 
science have posed to philosophy of science (Longino 2002c). Longino specifies that her 
approach is naturalistic in the sense that ―[...] it treats the conditions of knowledge 
production by human cognitive agents, empirical rather than transcendental subjects, as 
the starting point for any philosophical theory of knowledge, scientific or otherwise. It is 
not naturalist in the sense of treating knowledge as a natural kind whose nature or 
essence can be discovered (by scientific or philosophical methods)‖ (Longino 2002c: 
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10). I share Longino‘s position concerning the necessity for social epistemology to be 
naturalist in focusing on actual epistemic practices and to take insights from different 
empirical accounts of knowledge and science seriously while rejecting the idea that 
knowledge is a natural kind.  
As should have become obvious, I do share a commitment to naturalism when 
understood as the receptiveness to insights of knowledge and epistemic practices from 
the empirical sciences. I do also consider quantitative methods, various stochastical 
techniques in particular, to be important for social epistemology. Indeed, in the second 
part of this thesis I outline a type of epistemic sociality that is entirely based on 
statistical aggregation of data and defend it as an important socio-epistemic mechanism. 
However, I am also aware of the inherent dangers of quantifying the qualitative. As 
Friedman and Nissenbaum have noted in their analyses of information systems, the 
formalization of human constructs is always bound to biases, quantifying the qualitative 
always means losing some information while focusing on other information (Friedman 
and Nissenbaum 1997). This insight will remain important in my analyses that follow in 
the succeeding chapters.  
But what is even more dangerous is that quantification may put a patina of scientific 
integrity atop faulty assumptions. Proclaiming the use of multivariate statistical methods 
or recommending the application of Bayes‘ Theorem for judgment aggregation may give 
social epistemology a more scientific ring—numbers are often convincing—yet one of 
the crucial mantras here should be: garbage-in, garbage-out. Quantitative results can 
only be valid if the data that feed into them are valid. Hence, paying close attention to 
the methods of quantifying the qualitative and the quality of the initial input data is 
paramount for the assessment of quantitative approaches in social epistemology. If the 
basic assumptions, the variables or the input data are faulty, the results are at best 
useless but, very often, misleading.  
Below, I critically assess two attempts at quantification that have been proposed within 
social epistemology. Initially, I assess Miriam Solomon‘s Social Empiricism in some 
detail, with respect to her stance towards naturalism in general and her mode of 
quantification (the ―improper linear model‖) in particular. I argue that Solomon uses 
quantification inappropriately and that such a usage is best avoided. Following on this, I 
look at Alvin Goldman‘s Bayesian account of testimony and argue that quantification is 
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dangerous here as well because it is likely to conceal the qualitative and highly 
subjective nature of the input variables.  
Quantification and the Use of Stochastical Techniques in Social 
Epistemology 
Naturalism and Quantification in Solomon’s Social Empiricism 
In addition to the scholars I have already mentioned, Miriam Solomon has also analyzed 
episodes from the history of science to develop her theory of Social Empiricism. She 
claims that her decision vectors are not conceptual but empirical, because they are 
derived from these case studies. Moreover, she frequently alludes to the relevance of 
statistical methods or multivariate models for the development of appropriate 
frameworks for understanding scientific change. Although I welcome Solomon‘s 
reference to historical case studies and stochastical procedures, I am not convinced by 
her realization. Below I address some of the methodological issues concerning the origin 
of Solomon‘s decision vectors, her classification into empirical and non-empirical 
decision vectors, and her usage of an ―improper linear model‖.  
Origin of Decision Vectors 
Solomon lists a number of decision vectors in her theory including: ideology, pride, 
conservativeness, radicalism, elegance, simplicity, representativeness heuristic, 
competitiveness, peer pressure, defense to authority, birth order of scientists, etc. These 
are all examples of non-empirical decision vectors. Empirical decision vectors are, for 
instance, salience and the availability of data, or an egocentric bias towards one‘s own 
data or a preference for a theory which generates novel predictions (Solomon 2001: 
57f). Even at first glance these decision vectors look quite diversified. But as Solomon 
reminds us - ―a decision vector is anything that influences the outcome of a decision‖ 
(Solomon 2001: 62). One would assume that given this broad definition many things 
would qualify as decision vectors in science. Indeed, Solomon criticizes other social 
epistemologists for sidestepping complexity by considering too few decision vectors 
(e.g. Goldman 1992, Kitcher 1993). To her mind, ―the number of types of decision 
vectors is probably between 50 and 100‖ (Solomon 2001: 62). 
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But how does Solomon arrive at this number? And how does she arrive at the distinct 
decision vectors she labels ―ideology‖ or ―pride‖ or ―birth order‖? The decision vectors 
that Solomon lists appear to be a quite random synopsis of various social, political, 
motivational and cognitive biases extracted from a variety of theoretical and empirical 
literature (Solomon 2001: 51ff). How exactly she ends up with the proclaimed 50-100 
discrete vectors is not obvious. Throughout the book, there is no method discernible 
despite a seemingly random choice of labels for different factors that might or might 
have not have had an impact on the development of science. While the listing of 
decision vectors from various sources is a valid procedure of course, problems occur 
when these decision vectors get quantified. I outline this problem below when 
addressing Solomon‘s usage of an improper linear model.  
Empirical versus Non-empirical Decision Vectors 
Before, doing so, however, I want to return to Solomon‘s differentiation between 
empirical and non-empirical decision vectors. Since this is the primary classification of 
decision vectors and forms the conceptual basis of her Social Empiricism, the 
plausibility and discriminatory power of this differentiation is crucial. Surely, while 
some factors which influence decision making in science are related to empirical 
success, I am not convinced by Solomon‘s examples. As compared to the extensive list 
of non-empirical decision vectors, Solomon lists only four empirical decision vectors: 
salience of data, availability of data, egocentric bias towards one‘s own data, and 
preference for a theory which generates novel predictions (Solomon 2001: 57).  
But are these really empirical decision vectors, i.e., are they necessarily linked to 
empirical success? For instance, are salience and availability of data necessarily 
empirical decision vectors? Or could they also be non-empirical? Just imagine that some 
very important literature on a certain topic exists only at a library to which you either 
have no access or knowledge of. Here data would not be available or salient, even 
though it exists, yet could be highly relevant for future empirical success. Alternately, 
think about the decisions that are made within an epistemic community – or maybe even 
within a research group, about what literature and which methods should be used. In this 
case, information may simply not be salient to someone because it is not considered to 
be important for reasons other than empirical adequacy. Or – to link this to more recent 
developments: what happens to data, information, articles, etc. that are not available in 
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electronic format? Think about how many pages of Google results one can check when 
searching for information, and how much relevant information is neglected for reasons 
other than empirical adequacy? Research on information retrieval suggests that these 
sources of information, however valid they might be, are neglected precisely because 
they are not considered salient when not easily accessible. To put it in a nutshell: 
saliency often depends on other non-empirical decision vectors. Thus, neither are 
decision vectors independent, nor is the differentiation between empirical and non-
empirical decision vectors indisputable.  
The Improper Linear Model: Simple Addition of Independent, Equipollent Factors? 
Solomon proposes an ‗improper linear model‘ as the simplest form of multivariate 
analysis for the basis of her Social Empiricism. The terms ―improper linear model‖ and 
―multivariate analysis‖ sound quite mathematical, so what exactly is an improper linear 
model? Solomon explains that ―[i]n this analysis, variables are not assigned their actual 
magnitudes nor are their interactions with one another considered. It is simply noted 
whether the effects are positive (+) or negative (-), and then the effects are summed 
additively‖ (Solomon 2001: 77). Note, however, that this model states nothing about the 
origination of its variables. It is only an assertion that once variables have been defined, 
the improper linear model will allow for the simple addition of such variables. The 
fundamental flaw of Solomon‘s approach to my mind lies in applying this quantitative 
model to the qualitative decision vectors extracted from various sources.  
Solomon has extracted her list of decision vectors from a wide variety of literature on 
social, political motivational and cognitive biases. As noted before, these include a 
variety of very different factors from large-scale political factors like ideology to 
theoretical values, such as simplicity or elegance, to peer pressure and competition in 
science. While I agree that all these factors can play a role in decision making processes 
in science, it is the next step in Solomon‘s approach that is fatal: she counts her decision 
vectors.  
For instance, when having analyzed the distribution of decision vectors for the 
Continental Drift Dispute between 1920 and 1950, Solomon summarizes the 












Table 3: Distribution of Decision Vectors (Solomon 2001: 91) 
If one adds up all the possible factors that have had an effect on the distribution of 
epistemic labor, and on consensus and dissent within the scientific communities working 
on plate tectonics from 1920 till 1950, one arrives at following conclusion: two 
empirical decision vectors worked in favor of Permanentism and Contractionism, and 
one worked in favor of Drift. Five non-empirical decision vectors worked in favor of 
Permanentism, four in favor of Contractionism and Drift. Solomon concludes that ―this 
is a fairly equitable distribution of empirical decision vectors, and equal distribution of 
non-empirical decision vectors, indicating appropriate distribution of research effort‖ 
(Solomon 2001: 91).This distribution is the reason why there was normatively 
appropriate dissent in the Continental Drift Dispute between 1920 and 1950. The 
distribution of decision vectors then shifted between 1958 and 1970, and consensus was 
formed on drift. Solomon asserts that this consensus occurred because the distribution of 
decision vectors shifted in a certain way and that consensus on plate tectonics was 
normatively appropriate in this later time period. Here I do not want to address the 
question of whether this consensus really was normatively appropriate (for a critical 
view, confer Oreskes 2008). Rather, by taking a closer look at what exactly has been 
calculated here I want to emphasize the inadequacy of adding up decision vectors.  
Here are some examples of factors that were counted as ―1 decision vector‖ in 
Solomon‘s innocuous table (cf. Solomon 2001: 87ff). 
 European geologists‘ tradition of theorizing and speculation: 1 non-empirical 
decision vector in favor of Drift and Contractionism. 
 Anti-German Feelings: 1 non-empirical decision vector against Drift 
 Birth Order of Scientists: 1 non-empirical decision vector in favor of Drift, 
Contractionism and Permanentism 
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 Belief Perseverance Phenomena: empirical decision vector: two points for 
Permanentism, one for Contractionism. 
I do not even want to dwell on the question of why belief perseverance is an empirical 
decision vector and how it is that it can count double if alleged variables are not 
assigned magnitude in an improper linear model. I find the way in which random 
qualitative factors are arithmetically calculated highly irritating. Just to give another 
example: in the case of cancer virus research, Solomon counts the fact there was a lack 
of fear of contagion as one non-empirical decision vector and the fact that the main 
advocate of the research was an immigrant as another (one!) non-empirical decision 
vector—each of which have to be set against one other.  
While I do certainly agree that all these factors play a role, quantifying them as discrete 
decision vectors to be measured against one another is an astonishing simplification. 
How could something as broad, complex and pervasive as ‗conservatism‘ or ‗belief 
perseverance‘ be condensed into one single decision vector? Moreover, how can one 
reasonably assume that all the decision vectors have the same weight?  
Solomon‘s simple addition of decision vectors is based on two premises outlined in the 
definition of the improper linear model above. First, decision vectors are not related. 
Second, they do not differ in weight - if there is a difference in magnitude, it is 
neglected. Both assumptions are highly problematic, but only if they are fulfilled can an 
impropriate linear model be applied and decision vectors added up.  
Is it reasonable to assume that the decision vectors in Solomon‘s model are unrelated to 
each other and of the same strength? I start with the question of whether all vectors 
have the same strength. Please note that a simple, unweighted addition of decision 
vectors implies that strength does not matter. This means that all of the above mentioned 
factors – ideological issues, pride of scientists, simplicity of the theories, 
competitiveness and peer pressure within scientific fields, birth order of scientists, etc. – 
have the valence of 1. Hence all factors have the exact same impact on scientific 
decisions, on consensus and dissent within a scientific field. Does this sound plausible?  
Furthermore, the longer one looks and the more one reads about certain episodes in the 
history of science, the more decision vectors one may be able to extract. Remember that 
according to Solomon, decision vectors are anything that affects the outcome of decision 
making in science. Anything! How can one possibly be sure that she has not missed 
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something that has affected the outcome of a scientific debate? If strength of the impact 
is irrelevant – as must be the case if Solomon‘s improper linear model is to be applied – 
then this process is, in principle, endless and each distribution is an arbitrary 
termination of counting. The assumption that the strength of decision vectors is 
irrelevant seems not only implausible, but also leads to unwelcome consequences 
concerning the arbitrariness of the distribution of decision vectors. This alone should be 
reason enough to abandon such an improper linear model when analyzing the role of 
different biases in the history of science. 
The second prerequisite, that decision vectors must be independent, is also highly 
implausible in the case of such biases. Isn‘t it rather unlikely that there is a relationship 
between pride, agreement to scripture, competitiveness and peer pressure? This problem 
of interdependence becomes even worse if one looks at the concrete historical case 
studies which Solomon analyzes. Not only are numerous decision vectors related, but 
her decision whether to label something as a distinct decision vector, and is therefore 
calculable, is subjective and arbitrary. This leads back to the question of how Solomon 
arrives at her decision vectors in the first place. Her list of decision vectors appears not 
only to be an arbitrary synopsis of various heterogeneous influencing factors, but the 
application of these decision vectors to historical case studies is also highly subjective. 
To be sure, I consider neither the heterogeneity of the factors nor the subjective 
attribution in itself problematic. But the moment one starts counting these 
heterogeneous, subjective variables, one commits a fatal mistake: the data fail to satisfy 
the requirements for an improper linear model as I have shown. One also obfuscates the 
subjectivity and arbitrariness of the input data and puts a patina of scientific integrity 
over questionable or even faulty assumptions. Clearly, such as method does not seem 
recommendable to make claims about the appropriateness of scientific conduct or to 
even guide science policy. 
Alvin Goldman’s Bayesian Account of Testimony  
Alvin Goldman‘s account of testimony is another example of quantifying the qualitative 
within social epistemology. As was outlined in the previous chapter, Goldman 
recommends the application of Bayes‘ Theorem to testimonial evidence as a socio-
epistemic practice that raises the likelihood of obtaining true belief. Remember that the 
central task for Goldman‘s veritistic evaluation of socio-epistemic practices is to identify 
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those practices that lead to largest increase in truth known in a community. With respect 
to testimony, Goldman seeks to identify veristically superior testimonial practices of 
testifier and recipient. The goal would be a general strategy for accepting or rejecting 
testimony which is valid in all situations. Yet since in different reporting environments, 
different acceptance strategies concerning testimony may lead to the best results, many 
simple heuristics do not work. Hence, Goldman proposes Bayesian inference as such a 
general strategy.  
As noted before, applying Bayesian inference to testimonial evidence only works, if the 
following probabilities are known: the prior probabilities of an event x and not-x, as well 
as the conditional probability of the witness testifying x given that x has occurred and 
given that x did not occur.
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 These latter conditional probabilities imply an assessment 
of the competency and honesty of a witness. Moreover, all of these values have to 
quantitative, for Bayes‘ Theorem to be applicable. My criticism of Goldman‘s proposal 
concerns exactly this quantitative assessment of the competency and honesty of the 
testifier which is a necessary input variable, this estimation of testimonial likelihoods. 
The crucial question is how we are supposed to arrive at quantitative values to indicate 
the perceived competency and honesty of our fellows and friends?  
Given the centrality of the correctness of such testimonial likelihoods, it is surprising 
how little Goldman has to say about how to arrive at correct likelihood ratios and it is 
precisely this central blind spot that has lead to a US Supreme Court verdict arguing 
against the use of Bayesian inference in court. Kusch reports on this verdict of the 
Supreme Court arguing that the likelihoods of different pieces of evidence are a result of 
judgment and that the quantified results and mathematical processing of this initially 
qualitative data ―[...] might easily ‗conceal the element of judgement‘‖ (Kusch 2002: 
80f).  
Clearly, the merits of Bayes‘ Theorem are not to be questioned in this thesis. Indeed, 
Bayes‘ Theorem is not only of great value for the empirical sciences, it has also been 
successfully employed in many social software applications. What I do question is the 
utility of recommending Bayesian inference for processing testimonial evidence. First of 
all, only few people know how to calculate it and it also quite unlikely that even if they 
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do, they will employ this method on all those innumerous occasions in which they 
accept testimonial evidence in their daily live. One may argue that Web applications 
which make use of Bayesian inference are exactly an example of a useful distribution of 
cognitive labor between humans and computers. I return to these issues in the second 
part of this thesis when assessing the merits and dangers of algorithmic authority. 
However, the second problem is even more fundamental. Using Bayesian inference is 
only possible if the testimonial likelihoods are known. Even if we can delegate the 
processing to machines, we need to feed in the data about the competency and honesty 
of the testifiers – and this is a highly subjective judgment. If testimonial likelihoods are 
not know and can only be approximated, guessed or even chosen randomly, then making 
use of Bayesian inference is likely to obfuscate the amount of subjectivity and 
arbitrariness of input data. 
6.3.6 Normativity 
Almost all social epistemologists stress that their theories are normative. Normativity 
here comes in two forms. On the one hand it means that a social epistemology is able to 
distinguish knowledge from mere belief, to distinguish what is true from what is taken 
to be true. On the other hand, normativity refers to prescription, to recommendations on 
how to improve socio-epistemic practices.  
Normativity1: Criteria for Knowledge 
The ability of an epistemology to distinguish knowledge from mere belief seems a 
crucial requirement for Anglo-American social epistemology and is closely related to 
some of the debates outlined before: the acceptance or rejection of the definition of 
knowledge as justified true belief, the reception or rejection of sociological theories, the 
stance towards relativism, etc. Being able to distinguish knowledge as true belief from 
mere belief is of particular concern for Alvin Goldman‘s veristic epistemology. It is also 
the rationale behind characterizing Steve Fuller‘s and Steven Shapin‘s work to be 
―social doxology‖ (Goldman 2003: 7), the reason for denying that ―revisionist social 
epistemologies‖, rooted in postmodernism, deconstructionism, social constructionism, 
and various social studies of science, including the ―strong programme‖ in sociology of 
science ‖ are real social epistemologies (Goldman 2009b).  
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That the distinction between knowledge and mere belief is crucial for Goldman‘s 
veristic account should be of little surprise. Yet even a contextualist epistemologist like 
Helen Longino asserts that although knowledge on her account is always only partial, 
plural and provisional, her contextual critical empiricism can nonetheless distinguish 
knowledge from mere belief (Longino 2002c). To support this claim Longino analyzes 
two examples of epistemic practices which any normative social epistemology should 
discredit by showing that they are not epistemically acceptable: fortune telling and 
defending creationism. Remember that Longino defines a cognitive community as a 
group bound by a ―set of common goals and shared public standards regulating critical 
(knowledge-productive) discourse and the stabilization of representations as knowledge‖ 
(Longino 2002c: 145). Crucially, those communities determine the standards by which 
the evaluate knowledge claims and depending on the community, the context or the 
epistemic goal, these standards may differ. If all communities can make up their own 
standards, how can it be argued that creationists and fortune tellers are not creating 
knowledge? According to their own standards their epistemic practices are epistemically 
acceptable – so according to which standards do they fall short?  
Lognino argues that there are two crucial requirements which cognitive communities 
have to fulfill to be normatively appropriate. First, they must be willing to make their 
standards subject to scrutiny. Second, cognitive communities must have an interest in 
the accurate description of their physical environment (Longino 2002c: 162). She 
demonstrates that in the cases of creationism and fortune tellers these two prerequisites 
are not met. While creationists do not open their central dogmas to criticism, fortune 
tellers are not interested in depicting an accurate description of reality when reading tea 
leaves. Both aspects however, are necessary conditions for epistemic communities and 
the pursuit and attribution of knowledge.  
Martin Kusch goes furthest in arguing that normativity can only be understood in 
relation to epistemic communities and not as an interaction between the world and the 
individual mind (Kusch 2002: 121). One of the central premises of Kusch‘s 
Communitarian Epistemology is that ―normative phenomena—rules, norms, 
conventions, prescriptions, and standards of correctness—can exist only within 
communities (Kusch 2002: 175). Drawing on arguments against private languages, 
Kusch argues for what he calls the ―Strongest Present-Tense Community Thesis‖ 
according to which ―[a]n individual is able to follow a rule only if the individual is 
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currently a participating member of a group in which the very same rule is followed by 
other members (Kusch 2002: 181).  
Normativity2: Improving Socio-Epistemic Practices and Systems 
The second denotation of normativity refers to prescription, to recommendations on how 
to improve socio-epistemic practices and systems. Examples of this form of normativity 
are Steve Fuller‘s (Fuller 1988) and Miriam Solomon‘s (Solomon 2001) attempts to 
influence science on a macroscopic level, Helen Longino‘s (Longino 2002c) social 
norms for social knowledge and Goldman‘s recommendation of Bayesian inference to 
assess testimonial evidence (Goldman 2003). Although these recommendations target 
different entities and operate at different levels, the goal of all the recommendations is 
the same: to change the parameters of socio-epistemic systems and socio-epistemic 
practices for better. I do not rehearse all normative-prescriptive epistemologies at this 
point since they have been portrayed in some detail before. Their implications, possible 
implementations and utilizations in socio-technical epistemic systems are addressed 
below in the section on social epistemology and social software.  
In contrast to all other comprehensive social epistemologies portrayed in Chapter 5, 
Martin Kusch‘s Communitarian Epistemology does not provide any normative-
prescriptive framework. Indeed, Kusch argues that his interest lies in understanding 
rather than changing socio-epistemic practices (Kusch 2002: 2). Kusch is highly 
skeptical about social epistemologists who confine themselves exclusively to normative 
issues and deplores that while ―social epistemologists eagerly set norms for groups and 
interacting individuals [...] they never stop to ponder the nature of norms, standards, 
institutions, or groups‖ (Kusch 2002: 115). In other words, he criticizes the insufficient 
reception of empirical analyses from the social science and argues that this neglect is 
particularly astounding given epistemologists‘ interest in cognitive psychology or 
artificial intelligence. This topic leads back to the debates around naturalism outlined 
before: while many social epistemologists claims to be naturalist, their interpretations 
differs profoundly as to what this implies in general and which empirical fields of 
research are considered to be relevant in particular.  
While I agree with Kusch on the necessity to analyze actual epistemic practices before 
making recommendations on how to improve them, I consider this normative-
prescriptive orientation to be a crucial aspect of any social epistemology. Given the 
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breadth and depth of his analyses and his own proposal for a communitarian 
epistemology it would have been interesting to see which normative-prescriptive 
conclusions Kusch draws from them. Especially given his indebtedness to feminist 
epistemologies I find this neglect somewhat disappointing. In the end he assures 
however, that there is a place for a normative-prescriptive epistemology within 
Communitarian Epistemology and that he does not question its usefulness (Kusch 2002: 
285). Yet against the background of his Communitarian Epistemology it should not 
come as a surprise that ―[...] communitarian epistemologist insists that all such 
normative—prescriptive endeavors have their roots in local contexts and contingencies‖ 
(Kusch 2002: 285).  
Normativity1 & 2: Criteria for the Critical Assessment and Amendment 
of Socio-Epistemic Practices and Systems 
To conclude, I argue that social epistemologies should not remain purely descriptive but 
that a normative stance is crucial. If one wants to critically assess socio-epistemic 
systems and practices, as I do in the second part of this thesis, such a normative 
orientation is indispensable. Without a normative stance, there are no criteria for critical 
assessment. Yet I share Longino and Kusch‘s assertion that normativity and hence 
criteria to assess epistemic practices and systems vary between different communities as 
well as within communities depending on the context and the goals of epistemic inquiry. 
Different criteria are of different relevance depending on the current norms and the goals 
of epistemic inquiry. Alvin Goldman has proposed five general standards of epistemic 
appraisal (Goldman 1992: 195): reliability, power, fecundity, speed and efficiency. 
Although these criteria seem to be a good starting point for the analysis of socio-
epistemic practices as well as socio-technical epistemic systems, they are by no means 
the only criteria imaginable. Other criteria may be heuristic fruitfulness, freedom from 
bias or accountability (e.g. Friedman and Nissenbaum 1997, Nissenbaum 1997). As long 
as these criteria have epistemic relevance, they are valid criteria for a socio-
epistemological analysis of epistemic practices and systems.  
Critical assessment however does not have to be the final step for social epistemologists. 
Rather they should develop and propose alternatives for those socio-epistemic practices 
and systems that they consider inadequate or wanting. The means and possibilities to 
improve socio-epistemic practices are as manifold as the criteria for assessing them. 
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With respect to socio-technical epistemic systems a wide variety of interventions and 
recommendations can be imagined. There could be guidelines on how to avoidance 
different forms of bias or on how to provide access to information for more people. 
Another possibility could be to support processes of knowledge creation by offering 
platforms for critical discourse, by helping to find partners for epistemic endeavors. 
Social epistemology with normative aspirations has to come up with ideas of how to 
support the creation as well as the distribution of knowledge and there are innumerous 
aspects which may be taken into account. Exploring them should be a central task for 
social epistemologists – a task that is taken up in the third part of this thesis.  
6.4 Social Epistemology Beyond Science: Social Epistemology for 
Social Software 
All social epistemologists portrayed use science as a field of reference for developing 
their social epistemologies. However, while some restrict their social epistemologies to 
apply to science only (e.g. Solomon 2001), others have proposed social epistemologies 
that either describe more general models of the sociality of knowledge (e.g. Kusch 2002) 
or have explicitly addressed socio-epistemic practices beyond science (e.g. Goldman 
2003, Goldman 2008, Thagard 1997b). Since the goal of this thesis is to provide a model 
to analyze socio-epistemic practices and systems on the Web those social epistemologies 
that go beyond science or even directly address information and communication 
technologies may appear to provide more appropriate frameworks. However, I argue 
that even from those approaches that are as decidedly ―science-only‖-models, such as 
Solomon‘s Social Empiricism or Longino‘s Critical Contextual Empiricism, important 
insights for the analysis of socio-epistemic practices and systems on the Web can be 
extracted. In the following I briefly outline the relevance of different social 
epistemologies for the analysis of epistemic social software. Afterwards I portray some 
of the initial attempts to analyze information and communication technologies (ICT) 
from a socio-epistemological perspective. In particular, I refer to the Alvin Goldman‘s, 
Paul Thagard‘s and Don Fallis‘ analyses of ICT as well as a recent Episteme special 
issue on epistemic mass collaboration. I conclude this chapter with a brief summary of 
my own position on the issues raised in this chapter in so far as they are relevant for the 




6.4.1 General Models of Epistemic Sociality 
Martin Kusch proposes his Communitarian Epistemology as a general social 
epistemology that is not restricted to scientific knowledge creation, because according to 
him ―[…] as far as their basic ‗socialness‘ is concerned, scientific and ordinary forms of 
knowledge do not differ from one another‖ (Kusch 2002: 4). I agree that depending on 
the level of abstraction socio-epistemic practices on the Web share fundamental aspects 
with socio-epistemic practices in science.This openness of his approach towards non-
scientific knowledge and more secular epistemic practices is clearly crucial for the 
questions of this thesis. If we aim at understanding knowledge and epistemic practices in 
epistemic social software or socio-technical epistemic systems in general, our analyses 
will indeed be hampered if we focus too narrowly on scientific, and especially only 
experimental forms of knowledge creation. Hence, my own socio-epistemological 
framework also aims at providing a general model of epistemic sociality. It is based on 
analyses of socio-epistemic practices on the Web and on my reception of social 
epistemologies which are mostly based on the analyses of socio-epistemic practices in 
the science, but due to the abstractness of the types of epistemic sociality I propose, this 
framework can be considered a general socio-epistemological model which is applicable 
to a wide variety of socio-epistemic practices and systems.  
6.4.2 Social Epistemologies for Science and Their Implications 
Beyond Science  
Miriam Solomon‘s as well as Helen Longino‘s approaches have been either developed 
in the context of science (Longino 2002c) or decidedly for science (Solomon 2001). 
However, I would argue that even from those approaches important insights for the 
analysis of socio-epistemic practices and systems on the Web can be extracted. Despite 
my critique of Solomon‘s approach, I nonetheless consider her focus on the community 
as the decisive level at which scientific rationality gets decided interesting for socio-
epistemological analyses. Such a macroscopic perspective surely can provide important 
insights into the socio-epistemic processes on the Web. Also, her list of possible 
decision vectors may provide a starting point for critical analyses of socio-epistemic 
practices and systems and the role of biases therein. The aspect that I consider most 
important in Solomon‘s as approach concerns her macroscopic view on the scientific 
field as a whole as well as her emphasis on the benefits of epistemic diversity. Various 
239 
 
forms of distributing labor over multiple agents on the Web as well as the 
acknowledgement of the diversity of their motives are crucial for any general framework 
for assessing socio-epistemic practices and systems.  
Helen Longino‘s Critical Contextual Empiricism has also been developed within the 
framework of scientific knowledge creation. Nonetheless, I consider her approach to be 
exceptionally inspirational and fruitful for the analyses of socio-epistemic practices and 
systems more broadly conceived. One aspect that I find particularly useful in Longino‘s 
account, are her four social norms for social knowledge. To my mind, those social 
norms can and should be applied to assess and amend socio-epistemic practices not only 
in science but also in other epistemic systems. Indeed, I would argue that certain 
developments in information and communication technologies can even ease the 
implementation of these social norms. Take for instance the first requirement for her 
transformative criticism: the demand for publicly acknowledged venues for criticism. 
This demand implies actually two needs: criticism need more space – in journals, 
conferences, etc. and it has to be valued to a greater extent, maybe even to the same 
extent as original research. In science, original contributions are usually considered to be 
far more important than critiques of the works of others and are therefore given more 
space in journals. While reference to others clearly plays a role in publications and 
therefore criticism is implicitly implied in scientific conduct, the space that is given to 
explicit criticism is clearly smaller and less renowned than the space given to original 
research. Also, pure replications of experimental results are rarer than one would assume 
given their alleged relevance for science. Original works are considered to be more 
important and the reputation of a scientist depends far more on his original research than 
on the reviews her writes about the works of other people. Just think about the perceived 
value difference between a journal publication providing new content and a book 
review.  
However, if we take not only Longino‘s approach serious, but also the more general idea 
that science in principle consists in mutual criticism and improvement, than it should be 
obvious that constructive and fruitful criticism is just as central to the development of 
science as the production of new data. This emphasis on the crucial role of effective 
criticism becomes important in Part 3 of this thesis again. Especially in an environment 
in which space is scarce, the perceived value difference between original contributions 
and replications or critical assessment has negative consequences. If you only have a 
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certain number of pages for a given journal edition, most editors would probably try to 
include as much new content as possible and this takes away space for criticism. Given 
that such space constraints cease to exist on the Web, the rehabilitation and 
encouragement of criticism is a crucial epistemic task that should be of vital concern 
when developing new socio-technical tools for science and beyond. 
Or take the fourth prerequisite of tempered equality. The Web and social software in 
particular have provided an opportunity to include more voices into epistemic 
communities. Think of Wikipedia. Think of the open source movement. Of course one 
can argue that the chances for people to take part in epistemic communities are not equal 
for everyone due to the digital divide and that there is a gender imbalance in the open 
source community. Nonetheless, joining epistemic communities, taking part in various 
epistemic endeavors, getting into intellectual exchange with others has clearly become 
easier with the advent of the Web and other information and communication 
technologies. The question of how to temper equality also had to be – and has been 
tackled in different applications and a multitude of different possibilities has been tested.  
The Wikipedia predecessor Nupedia for instance relied on academic credentials to select 
contributors – and failed with this strategy. Its successor Wikipedia then opened the 
door and allowed for the participation of everyone who had access to the Internet. Only 
once the community grew they introduced a hierarchy of users by differentiating normal 
users from administrators with more rights. Slashdot.org would be an example of a 
website that works quite different in the selection of content. All users are permitted to 
post comments on this platform and other readers can rate these comments. These 
ratings are aggregated into collective judgments about the quality of these comments 
and those can then used by the other users to filter comments (cf. for instance Benkler 
2002). As such slashdot.org and other similar applications combine human judgment 
with various algorithms to evaluate content, and by doing this ―temper‖ the intellectual 
authority of the content providers.  
Given that Longino argues for local and situated ways of tempering intellectual 
authority and a consideration of the actual epistemic practices, a fruitful collaboration 
between epistemology and web science seems feasible. Epistemology can be of use for 
the design of such systems by epistemically assessing the modes of credit attribution in 
such systems. They can also help in developing new approaches. A closer analysis of the 
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mechanisms involved however, should also not leave epistemology untouched. The 
different evaluative mechanisms embedded in these socio-technical systems are not only 
of interest for the empirical assessment of epistemic practices that should form the basis 
of normative-prescriptive social epistemologies. They can clearly also deliver 
inspiration for new epistemic accounts of how to rationally attribute intellectual 
authority. I would therefore conclude that Longino‘s approach makes a clear case for the 
potential fertility of applying social epistemology to research on and development of 
social software. I come back to the issues raised here in much more detail in the third 
part of this thesis.  
6.4.3 Socio-Epistemological Analyses of Information and 
Communication Technologies  
So far, there have been only few attempts of social epistemologists to address 
information and communication technologies. Alvin Goldman (Goldman 2003) and Paul 
Thagard (Thagard 1997b) have recognized the relevance of those technologies for 
knowledge and science in particular already in the 1990ies. Although there have been 
dramatic changes in ICT since these days, some general aspects of Goldman‘s and 
Thagard‘s analyses clearly remain valid. Moreover, Goldman has continued working on 
the topic and proposed a social epistemology of blogging more recently (Goldman 
2008). In 2006, Don Fallis has provided an extensive review on the relationship between 
social epistemology and information science (Fallis 2006) and in 2008 he edited a 
special issue of the journal Episteme on ―The epistemology of mass collaboration‖, in 
which numerous aspects of Wikipedia, the relevance of decision markets and the 
differences between Web2.0 and the Semantic Web were outlined. I portray these 
approaches in same detail below since they represent some initial attempts to assess 
information and communication technologies from a socio-epistemological perspective. 
I conclude this portrayal by arguing that while these approaches are interesting they can 
only be considered starting points for any comprehensive understanding of the socio-
epistemological relevance of such systems. Moreover, the majority of these approaches 
are limited by a too narrow focus on the distribution of knowledge while neglecting their 
relevance for knowledge creation.  
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Thagard’s Internet Epistemology 
Thagard‘s (Thagard 1997b) internet epistemology is an early example of how to assess 
the epistemic merits and problems that come with the usage of Web for epistemic 
purposes. Clearly, not only the Web applications themselves, but also research on ICT 
has developed profoundly since 1997. A whole range of organizations and journals have 
emerged that are devoted to an assessment of the Internet and the Web since then.
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Nonetheless, I do think that Thagard‘s analyses are still interesting. Especially his 
portrayal of ―a day in the life of a cyberscientist‖ is pretty close to the day of many 
scientists today and did not remain just ―speculative science fiction‖( Thagard 1997b).  
Thagard portrays a short history of the Internet and the Web and depicts the role ICT 
plays in some major science projects. Amongst the main examples he chooses are two 
large-scale scientific collaborations: CERN and the Human Genome Project, the former 
being the birthplace of the Web. Comparing the Web to the advent of the printing press, 
he makes use of five general epistemic standards proposed by Alvin Goldman (Goldman 
1992: 195) to assess the merits of ICT. These five standards of epistemic appraisal are 
reliability, power, fecundity, speed and efficiency. He concludes his analyses on the 
contributions of ICT to science in a table and instead of describing them in length, the 
table is depicted below. 
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Table 4: Internet Technologies and Scientific Research (Thagard 1997b) 
Thagard concludes that while the Web and the Internet clearly led to increases in power, 
speed, fecundity and efficiency, the effect on reliability is less clear. Reliability 
understood as the ―ratio of truths to the total number of beliefs‖ can be increased as well 
as decreased on the Web. While he asserts that in the end, the question of whether 
reliability will be increased or decreased will depend on the ―users‘ intellectual tools for 
discriminating between reliable and reliable sources of information‖, taking a look at the 
first column of table above is also instructive. Almost all the benefits of the Webwith 
respect to reliability are related to the Web‘s ability to increase mutual criticism. 
Feedback, revisions, local control, updatability, and verifiability are the major factors for 
reliability. It is only a short mental leap to relate them to Helen Longino‘s four standards 
to enable transformative criticism (Longino 2002c) and only another small step to assess 
Web2.0 projects such as Wikipedia with respect to their ability to foster and support 
such criticism. Indeed, Thagard stresses this relationship between science, criticism and 
ICT himself by stating that ―[s]cience, like knowledge in general, is an inherently social 
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enterprise in which achieving truth and avoiding error gains enormously from feedback 
that Internet technologies can help to provide‖ (Thagard 1997b). 
I consider Thagard‘s usage of Goldman‘s five epistemic standards to assess the merits 
and problems of ICT to be instructive and think that these standards can be also used for 
the assessment of epistemic social software, although they need to be amended. From 
those five standards, the question of reliability might be the most interesting and tricky. 
Alvin Goldman’s Veristic Analyses of ICT 
Alvin Goldman applies his social epistemology to various fields beyond science as was 
outlined in the previous chapter. Not only does he analyze socio-epistemic practices in 
education, law and democracy, he also devotes a whole chapter of his book ―Knowledge 
in a Social World‖ to ―The Technologies and Economics of Communication‖ (Goldman 
2003).
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 Many of the issues which Goldman identifies at the end of the last century, are 
still valid today although the Web has changed profoundly since then. Indeed, some of 
the topics around information retrieval, the utility of autonomous agents or the relevance 
of ICT for scholarly communication are probably even more hotly debated today than at 
the time when Goldman published his book. Moreover in a more recent paper, he 
analyzes the social epistemology of blogging. More specifically, he focuses on the role 
of blogging for democracy. The major question for him is whether the Web ―[...] is 
better or worse in epistemic terms than the conventional media, in terms of public 
political knowledge generated by the respective communication structures‖(Goldman 
2008: 12).  
His arguments in this recent paper are consistent with the veristic perspective expressed 
in ―Knowledge in a Social World‖ (Goldman 2003). For instance, he argues that 
conventional media often have the positive function of filtering information and 
compares this process to peer review in the sciences. With respect to an overall veristic 
analysis of blogging, Goldman argues that in the end, the veristic impact of the 
blogosphere will depend on the users‘ motivations. Some users may use the abundance 
of unfiltered information to pick out only the information that corroborates their views, 
which are possibly biased or even utterly wrong.
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 Others however, might use the 
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existing diversity to cross-check information from a variety of different sources in 
search for the truth in between. By using the example of blogs and describing them as 
mainly parasitic to traditional media Goldman adopts a simple sender-received model of 
communication as information transmission, a model reminiscent of Shannon & 
Weaver‘s mathematical theory of communication (Shannon 1948). The question of how 
and whether new knowledge gets created with the use of ICT is therefore again out of 
focus, although it should be a crucial topic given Goldman‘s interest in increasing the 
overall veristic value in a society. Despite my general acknowledgment of Goldman‘s 
early identification of these issues, I do think that his analyses of ICT suffer from the 
same narrow perspective which he also endorses for the topic of testimony. He considers 
both generic social practices, testimony and the use of ICT solely to be a means of 
knowledge transmission. However, as should have become obvious in my introduction 
of different social software applications, the Web has enabled an abundance of socio-
technical epistemic practices which are generative of new knowledge and not only a 
means of signal transfer. To account for those practices a more comprehensive and 
broader understanding of the socio-epistemic functions of ICT has to be developed.  
Don Fallis & the Epistemology of Mass Collaboration 
Other than Goldman, it has been most notably Don Fallis, who related ICT and social 
epistemology. In an extensive chapter in Annual Review of Information Science and 
Technology (ARIST) he analyses and comments on the relationship between social 
epistemology and information science (Fallis 2006). In this paper, Fallis stresses the 
close relationship between information science and social epistemology. Libraries and 
information science more generally aims at helping people acquire knowledge by 
collecting, organizing and providing access to knowledge materialized in physical or 
digital media (Fallis 2006). Epistemology in general can help clarifying what knowledge 
is and social epistemology by focusing on the social factors and institutions that play a 
role in knowledge acquisition can enhance this perspective.  
Fallis also notes that the term social epistemology was initially coined in the library 
sciences by Mary Egan and Jesse Shera, who argued for ―[...] a new discipline [...] that 
will provide a framework for the effective investigation of the whole complex problem 
of the intellectual processes of society‖ (Egan and Shera 1952: 132, cited from Fallis 
2006: 476). Information science according to Shera should focus on the ―production, 
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flow, integration, and consumption of all forms of communicated thought throughout 
the entire social fabric‖ (Shera 1970: 86, quoted from Fallis 2006: 482f), which is why a 
broader socio-epistemological perspective was required. According to Fallis (Fallis 
2006) the connection between social epistemology and information science can and 
should be bi-directional: not only can information science be used for socio-
epistemological research, e.g. by using bibliometrical data. Epistemology can also guide 
information science with respect to methodological issues.  
If information science aims at providing knowledge, then clearly, social epistemology 
can be useful for a critical information science and Fallis lists several relevant issues 
(Fallis 2006: 502). One topic that should be of interest to information science is the 
philosophical analyses of testimony. Social epistemology might moreover help in 
weighing different epistemic objectives for information systems. Goldman‘s five 
standards for epistemic appraisal, i.e. power, speed, fecundity, reliability and efficiency 
may for instance be of particular interest (Goldman 1992: 195). Social epistemology 
might help in identifying different types of knowledge, in discerning different degrees of 
reliability that are needed in different situations. It might be of use for knowledge 
organization, e.g. for questions concerning classification and tagging. Finally, since 
Fallis acknowledges that epistemology and ethics are related in the analysis of ICT, he 
refers to some crucial value conflicts at this intersection: i.e. questions of intellectual 
freedom versus censorship, issues of privacy, intellectual property versus the freedom of 
sharing information, etc (Fallis 2006: 503ff). 
Recently, Fallis also edited a special issue of the journal Episteme devoted to the 
―Epistemology of Mass Collaboration‖. This special issue is one of the first attempts to 
understand the role new media play for epistemic practices. Fallis argues that while 
people have for a long time collaborated for epistemic purposes in science and beyond, 
new technologies have enabled possibilities for mass collaborations on a much bigger 
scale. Some examples for such mass collaborations he refers to are Wikipedia, Yahoo! 
Answers and Digg.Com (Fallis 2009: 1). Given the ubiquity and importance of many of 
these social software applications for epistemic purpose, a critical epistemological 
analyses is indispensable and Fallis outlines some relevant questions: 
―How reliable are large collaborative projects that produce and disseminate 
information? What is the explanation for their reliability? Can large 
collaborative projects be reliable even if they do not make use of experts? 
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Does the information produced by such projects count as testimony? Can we 
be justified in believing information produced by large collaborative 
projects? How should we go about deciding whether to believe information 
produced by such projects?‖(Fallis 2009: 2)  
Most of the papers in this journal focus on the example of Wikipedia and indeed 
Wikipedia is an interesting example for an epistemological analysis. First of all, it is a 
clear case of mass collaboration in a socio-technical system that serves epistemic 
purposes. How well it serves this purpose however, is hotly debated. While Wikipedia is 
rightly considered to be one of the great success stories of the Web , it also has many 
critics (e.g., Keen 2008, Sanger 2009, Waters 2007). Every once in a while, there are 
even political cries to ban Wikipedia and often it seems that some critics tend to throw 
the baby out with the bathwater. Instead of such clearly unrealistic overreactions, some 
more nuances analyses would be of great value. Several of the papers in this special 
issue deliver such analyses and this is why they are depicted below in some detail.  
Wikipedia as a Source of Testimony 
Deborah Tollefsen analyzes Wikipedia as a source of testimony. While most 
philosophical analyses of testimony have focused on testimonial transmission of 
knowledge between two individuals, Tollefsen has introduced the notion of group 
testimony (Tollefsen 2007). She argues that such a distinct concept of group testimony is 
necessary, because group testimony cannot be understood in a summative way. That 
means that group testimony is not just the sum of the individuals‘ testimony, i.e. 
testimony is not justified by the individuals of that group but by the group itself 
(Tollefsen 2009: 8).  
Applying her notion of group testimony to Wikipedia, she asks what it is like to trust 
Wikipedia as a source of testimony (Tollefsen 2009). Are we - and if so to what extent – 
justified in believing Wikipedia as a source of testimony? Tollefsen affirms that 
Wikipedia can count as a source of testimony and that the question should rather be 
what exactly this source consists in. Analyzing the process in which Wikipedia entries 
are construed, she argues that Wikipedia consists of individual testimony and group 
testimony. Mature articles, articles which have been edited by different people and 
whose content is basically consented upon can be conceived as group testimony of the 
Wikipedia community. But since Wikipedia also includes many less elaborated articles, 
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she compares Wikipedia to an ―epistemic child‖ and argues that ―[...] we should be 
careful [...] to monitor it closely for trustworthiness (Tollefsen 2009: 18).  
Yet how exactly should we monitor Wikipedia? Tollefsen discusses a variety of 
reductionist possibilities to assess the trustworthiness of Wikipedia. She refers to 
Magnus (Magnus 2009)
110
, who argues that common rules of thumb might not be suited 
to assess content on Wikipedia. Therefore, she argues that Adler‘s proposition to 
evaluate testimony by corroborating it with background beliefs rather than a monitoring 
of the speaker might be better suited to assess the trustworthiness of Wikipedia (Adler 
1994, cited in Tollefsen 2009). Thus, instead of scrutinizing the content of Wikipedia for 
signs of trustworthiness, we might simply have to test to which extent the content of 
Wikipedia is corroborated by background beliefs we hold. Tollefsen concludes that 
either Wikipedia may evolve to become more mature so that we do not need to monitor 
its trustworthiness that closely anymore. The other possibility would be that the more 
familiar we get with the use of Wikipedia ―[...] our learning mechanism [...] or epistemic 
sensibility [...] will develop in such a way as to be able to respond to group testimony in 
an unreflective yet critical way‖ (Tollefsen 2009: 22).  
Trusting Wikipedia 
P.D. Magnus asks whether and to what extent we should trust Wikipedia (Magnus 
2009). He argues that although the average quality of Wikipedia articles is quite high, 
there is a huge variance between the qualities of different papers. Moreover, since 
articles can constantly change, one‘s assessment of the quality of the article can always 
only refer to its status at a very specific point of time. The epistemological problem 
given this variance and dynamicity then is how to distinguish the good from the bad and 
ugly, how to assess the quality of an article.  
Magnus argues that several rules of thumb that we normally employ to assess the quality 
of epistemic content do not work properly in the Wikipedia environment. These 
strategies include the assessment of authority, i.e. does the information come from a 
reliable source; the plausibility of style, i.e. is the writing style adequate; plausibility of 
content, i.e. are there clearly implausible claims; calibration, i.e. is the majority of the 
other claims of this article correct; sampling, i.e. comparing claims from different 
sources (Magnus 2009: 79ff). Magnus argues that these strategies work differently and 
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often less suited for Wikipedia than for other non-Web resources. Two examples are 
checking for implausible claims and cross-checking of content with other references. 
Magnus argues that since deleting inconsistencies and implausible claims is often the 
first step in editing a Wikipedia entry, those indicators of low quality are often deleted 
although the article is still as bad. Moreover, since many other websites link to 
Wikipedia or recycle content from it, the checking of independent sources becomes 
more difficult.  
One aspect of Magnus analysis that I do very much appreciate concerns his emphasis on 
empirical data about how users actually use Wikipedia and his avoidance of frequently 
encountered simplifications as to whether Wikipedia should be used at all for epistemic 
purposes. As I have argued elsewhere (Simon 2009), I agree with Magnus that ―[t]he 
question of whether we should trust Wikipedia becomes the question of how and to what 
extent we should trust Wikipedia (Magnus 2009: 77f). I do also agree with Magnus that 
we need to develop new methods and rules of thumb to assess the quality of online 
content. He argues that Wikipedia articles should be used as pointers to other resources, 
and that users should make more use of the history-pages of Wikipedia. Magnus 
acknowledges that many users might not take the time and effort to check these pages, 
although this may be epistemically beneficial. Fortunately, there is research on 
visualizing the history-pages in order to give some more intuitive and direct indicator of 
the reliability of Wikipedia articles. In Part 3 I introduce some of this research 
conducted by Ed Chi and his colleagues of the Socially Augmented Cognition Group at 
the Palo Alto Research Center (PARC) (e.g. Chi, Suh et al. 2008, Suh, Chi et al. 2008). 
Magnus concludes his analysis by stating that ―[...] teaching people to engage Wikipedia 
responsibly will require getting them to cultivate a healthy skepticism, to think of it 
differently than they think of traditional sources, and to learn to look beyond the current 
articles – and it will require learning to engage with it more responsibly ourselves‖ 
(Magnus 2009: 89). While I agree to almost all of these goals, I would insist that such 
healthy scepticism should also be retained when assessing traditional sources.  
The Epistemic Culture of Wikipedia 
Kay Brad Wray takes a different look at Wikipedia and compares the epistemic cultures 
of science and Wikipedia (Wray 2009). He argues that collaboration in those two fields 
functions quite differently. Not only is the stance towards knowledge itself different 
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(creating new knowledge versus making it available), the knowledge producers (experts 
versus mainly amateurs) and the epistemic processes (democracy versus meritocracy) 
also differ between science and Wikipedia. Since the social structures, the norms and 
incentives as well as the goals of science and Wikipedia differ, Wray concludes that 
while an invisible hand model of scientific rationality can be assumed for science, this is 
not the case for Wikipedia (Wray 2009: 38).  
He argues that due to these crucial differences between the types of epistemic 
collaboration, our reliance on the epistemic outcomes of these collaborative endeavors 
should differ as well. Wray concludes that Wikipedia is not a reliable source of 
knowledge and even if it were, it would be reliable for very different reasons that 
science is. I think that Wray‘s analysis of the differences between science and Wikipedia 
is a step in the right direction. Analyzing different socio-epistemic practices for their 
respective efficiency and reliability is certainly a major task for social epistemology. 
However, I am not quite convinced by some of his conclusions. First of all, he argues 
that Wikipedia cannot be a source of testimony, because we do not know anything about 
the person who has made a claim. To take ignorance of the testifier as a criterion not to 
accept testimony per se comes a bit surprising, given that Jonathan Adler for instance 
notes, that for some standard models of testimony in analytic philosophy it is actually 
assumed that the testifier is a stranger (Adler 2006). Moreover, referring to the notion of 
epistemic trust can shed a different light on this process of accepting rejecting Wikipedia 
as a source of testimony. More specifically, people may trust the process by which 
knowledge is provided in Wikipedia instead of the provider. I return to such a notion of 
procedural trust and its relevance on the Web in Part 3. A final point of critique that I 
see with respect to Wrays‘s analysis concerns the question of why the fact that 
Wikipedia functions differently from science necessarily implies that it functions worse. 
To my mind, it would be clever to suspend judgment for a moment and start analyzing 
on which occasions, which type of mass collaborations function best for which 
purposes. In Part 2 of this thesis, I target exactly this question.  
Expertise and Wikipedia 
In his article on ―The Fate of Expertise after Wikipedia,‖ Larry Sanger, defends the 
importance of experts for knowledge creation and for society more generally (Sanger 
2009). Sanger founded Wikipedia together with Jimmy Wales, but left it in 2002. He has 
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initiated a new Web-encyclopedia, Citizendium.org, which he considers to be superior 
to Wikipedia particularly due to its greater acknowledgement of experts. He starts his 
article with the observation of what he considers to be the paradox of Wikipedia, namely 
that ―[...] Wikipedia is a striking popular success, and the quality of its articles, while 
uneven, is remarkably good; yet its success can be attributed in large part to the fact that 
it is both wide open and bottom-up‖ (Sanger 2009: 68). He asserts that while many 
Wikipedians would take a declaredly anti-expert stance, Wikipedia cannot serve as an 
example that experts are not needed anymore and that the wisdom of a crowd of 
amateurs can make up for expertise. Rather, it is the remainders of expertise in 
Wikipedia, such as giving reference to original work conducted by experts and the 
participation of experts that enables its success. If that reliance on experts were 
enhanced, Wikipedia would work even better, which is why, Citizendium.org offers 
exactly such an expert-friendly environment where knowledge can blossom. To my 
mind, Sanger confounds two issues that are frequently mixed up when the pros and cons 
of Web2.0 applications are discussed. One question concerns the relationship between 
experts and lay people, the other concerns the question of how many people participate 
in and epistemic endeavor. Although, most authors argue dichotomous either for single 
experts or masses of amateurs, I would argue that before making premature and 
simplified recommendations, one should devote some more time to analyze when and 
under which circumstances experts or amateurs, in solitude or united in different ways 
are best for which kinds of epistemic tasks. 
The Epistemic Utility of Decision Markets 
Only two authors in this Episteme special issue focus on examples of epistemic mass 
collaboration other than Wikipedia. George Bragues analyzes the relevance of 
prediction markets for a very special type of knowledge production: the forecast of the 
future (Bragues 2009). Bragues argues that for the longest time, certain individuals were 
chosen to predict the future. By now the role of the prophet or the augur is mostly taken 
over by scientists or other intellectuals. Nonetheless, the prediction is still mostly in the 
hands of individuals, or at least in those of small groups of experts. This situation 
changes with the emergence of prediction markets. Prediction markets are ―[...] venues 
in which individuals trade securities whose value is tied to the outcome of a future 
event‖ (Bragues 2009: 93). While betting and gambling has existed for ages, the spread 
of prediction markets was greatly facilitated by the Internet and a variety of different 
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types of prediction markets emerged. Bragues gives a brief survey of existing prediction 
markets and lists their characteristics, the opportunities and challenges that come with 
using them for epistemic purposes.  
Bargues concludes his analysis by stating that prediction markets are a valid tool for 
forecasting and that they should be fostered. While some authors have interpreted the 
utility of decision markets and related tools as an argument to replace traditional experts 
with statistical procedures (e.g. Ayres 2007), Bragues delivers a more modest defense of 
the value of decision markets. He argues that decision markets should be regarded as 
one tool among others and that their value depends on circumstances. There are several 
prerequisites that have to be met for decision markets to function, such as liquidity, the 
ability to attract enough participants. Similar to James Surowiecki‘s prerequisites for a 
―wisdom of a crowds‖ (Surowiecki 2004)111, Bragues also notes that a diversity of 
opinions and cognitive strategies are necessary for decision markets to function. 
Moreover, participants have to bet independently to avoid information cascades.
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Finally, decision markets might not be suited for all types of questions, since they 
depend on quantifiable outcomes.  
Bragues concludes his analysis of the epistemic value of decision markets by stating that 
while ―[...] in non-empirical disciplines like literature and philosophy, it has long been 
customary to rely on individual geniuses to provide illumination, [...] prediction markets 
disclose that there is much knowledge to be gained by analyzing the fruits produced by 
the combined efforts of many people seeking to comprehend the same problems ― 
(Bragues 2009: 103). I do appreciate Bragues thorough analysis a lot and also his 
modest and realistic assessment of the pros and cons of using decision markets for 
epistemic. In contrast to some more radical proposals, such as Ayres (Ayres 2007), his 
analyses strike me as a good starting point to assess socio-epistemic practices that are 
not based on deliberation and consensus, but on an aggregation of individual bets. This 
differentiation between different socio-epistemic mechanisms is explored in depth in 
Part 3 of this thesis.  
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Web2.0 versus Web3.0 
Luciano Floridi finally assesses the success of Web 2.0 in comparison to the Semantic 
Web or Web3.0 (Floridi 2009). He argues that the reason why Web2.0 is so successful 
as compared to Semantic Web projects or earlier approaches in Artificial Intelligence is 
because Web2.0 exploits existing intelligence smartly instead of trying to construct new 
forms of intelligence. So far, he argues ―[...] humans are the only semantic engines 
available‖ (Floridi 2009: 32) and any attempts to automate semantics in the Semantic 
Web are still based on human input. As a result, Semantic Web applications are either 
exciting science fiction (when ―semantic‖ in Semantic Web is taken seriously) or 
realistic trivialities [...]‖ (Floridi 2009: 26), which do not go beyond metasyntax.  
Web2.0 works very differently. By exploiting human intelligence in an aggregated and 
collaborative way, Web2.0 applications have been highly successful in providing and 
filtering information. One example that Floridi uses to explain the difference between 
Web2.0 and Web3.0 are folksonomies. Folksonomies are the result of the aggregation of 
bottom-up, user-generated tags to organize content for later retrieval. They provide the 
opposite to top-down classifications, to expert-generated ontologies. This is not the 
space to discuss the pros and cons of classification versus tagging, but for the moment it 
suffices to note that although folksonomies might come with some problems, they are 
much more robust and adaptive than ontologies. Floridi summarizes his comparison by 
stating that because of these differences ―[...] Semantic Web is a well-defined mistake, 
whereas the Web 2.0 is an ill-defined success‖ (Floridi 2009: 33), because Web3.0 does 
not exploit the collective intelligence of humans in the way Web2.0 applications do.  
Interestingly a similar trend can be observed when taking a look into the history of 
learning software (Issing and Klimsa 1997). A lot of work was spent on building 
intelligent tutorial systems (ITS), which should adapt to users‘ needs by analyzing their 
learning progress and modifying the teaching material accordingly. Despite this energy, 
the systems never quite met the expectations of the developers or the users. The learning 
models implemented in the systems were too much simplified to adapt appropriately to 
the users‘ needs. The real change by contrast was brought about by hypertextual 
environments. The adaption in these systems was much more effective and efficient, 
because it was now the users who could adapt their own navigation through the system 
to their needs. Although successful navigation was not always ensured and required a 
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certain amount of expertise and hypertext literacy from the user, such hypertextual 
systems took their advantage from the fact that they used existing – human - intelligence 
instead of trying to simulate it technically.
113
 To my mind a crucial lesson that can be 
learned from these failures is that one should take a great deal of effort in distinguishing 
which epistemic practices should be done by humans and which should better be 
delegated to the computer. Since the respective intelligence of human and computers 
differs, it would be stupid not to take the best from both worlds and to combine it 
fruitfully. 
6.4.4 Socio-Epistemological Analyses of ICT: Conclusions & 
Critique 
I consider all the before-mentioned analyses to be interesting starting point for assessing 
the socio-epistemic relevance of social software. They highlight various aspects that any 
thorough and comprehensive social epistemology of epistemic social software has to 
address. However, I think that these are only the first beginnings and there still is a lot of 
work to be done in analyzing the new possibilities, the new risks and chances that come 
with the emergence of new socio-technical networks.  
First of all, there are several shortcomings within social epistemology as portrayed in the 
last chapters, which have also hampered the socio-epistemological analyses of ICT. As 
was shown for Alvin Goldman, most of his analyses are clearly based on a simple 
sender-receiver model of testimonial knowledge transmission (Goldman 2003, Goldman 
2008). While transmission of existing knowledge might be one crucial goal that ICT 
serve, it clearly is not the only one. Therefore, it will be essential to broaden the frame 
and assess the role different information and communication technologies play for the 
creation of knowledge. Moreover, I consider the models of information and 
communication technologies to be too simplistic. As I have argued in Part 1, epistemic 
social software should better be understood as socio-technical epistemic systems 
consisting of multiple agents, and not as mere tools or technologies in the hands of 
rational human agents. I think this narrow focus on social software as information and 
communication technologies and the neglect of the entangled nature of the social, the 
technical and the epistemic is also one of the reasons for the narrow focus on knowledge 
transmission.  
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Secondly, we need to analyze more and different examples of epistemic social software. 
To understand the relevance of socio-epistemic practices on the Web, we have to assess 
applications beyond Wikipedia and decision markets, such as recommender software or 
social bookmarking systems or search engines (cf. Mager 2009, Röhle 2009). I have 
focused on recommender systems and social bookmarking systems before (Simon 2007; 
Simon 2008; Simon 2009), and will address these and other examples in the remaining 
chapters of this thesis as well.  
Thirdly, we also have to broaden the kinds of questions we ask. Some of them will have 
to deal with the different types of people involved in such socio-technical systems. For 
instance, to what extent are different user groups affected differently by socio-epistemic 
practices on the Web? Who gets included and who gets excluded by which mechanism? 
What are the possible epistemic effects of such differential treatment? To what extent 
are those epistemic effects related to ethical and political considerations? We may not 
only have to ask more and different epistemological questions about the relevance of 
ICT for knowledge, but also have to investigate the relationship between epistemology, 
ethics and politics. 
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7 Summary and Conclusions of PART 2 
Before developing my own comprehensive socio-epistemological framework to analyze 
epistemic social software, I briefly summarize my position on the issues raised in this 
second part of the thesis along the major debates that I have outlined. 
Testimony 
A broader notion of testimony that includes its relevance for the creation of knowledge 
is needed for a full account of testimony. To understand processes of knowledge 
distribution on the Web, however, even narrow conceptions of testimony may be 
helpful.  
Trust 
Epistemic trust is a crucial concept for any socio-epistemological analysis of epistemic 
social software. Trust in agents, processes and trust in knowledge as content are 
indispensable prerequisites not only for the reception of testimony, but also for 
knowledge creation. However, this trust is hardly ever blind - and it should not be blind 
either. Assessing the epistemic trustworthiness of epistemic agents and processes is 
crucial for being a responsible knower. The assessment of epistemic trustworthiness is a 
judgment based on criteria which can be more or less valid. If they are invalid, not only 
can error, i.e. epistemic mistakes, be a result, epistemic injustices may take place as 
well.  
Distribution of Epistemic Labor 
I prefer the term epistemic labor over the more widely used term cognitive labor because 
it avoids implicit assumptions that epistemic practices may be only mental. Rather 
epistemic labor is meant to include all sorts of practices that are related to the creation or 
distribution of knowledge, i.e. handling machines, manipulating artifacts, using 
mathematical procedures, gathering data through various methods, etc. Further, although 
the term distribution of cognitive labor usually refers to distributions of research effort 
within scientific communities as a whole, I will use the term more broadly. I argue that 
distribution of labor is a crucial starting mechanism for any socio-epistemic process 




Consensus formation is a central topic in social epistemology. I consider consensus 
formation to be a possible mechanism of closing socio-epistemic processes, but it is not 
the only one. My own socio-epistemological framework indeed is based on a tripartite 
classification of closure mechanisms. Further, I agree that with Solomon and Longino 
that consensus on methods, theories or approaches in science should be avoided as long 
as possible and that epistemic pluralism should be supported. Nonetheless, in cases 
where consensus is needed, normative methods of achieving it may be useful. I consider 
Keith Lehrer‘s model of rational consensus to be of particular relevance for two reasons. 
Not only does he provide a rational model for consensus, he also delivers insights 
concerning the use of reputation for epistemic purpose. The pros and cons of using 
evaluative social information, i.e. reputation, to weigh epistemic statements or epistemic 
agents are highly relevant for my analyses in the next chapters. While the benefits of 
using reputation as an epistemic proxy are acknowledged, the dangers of epistemic 
injustice have to be kept in mind.  
Complementarity 
I side with requests for more radical conceptions of social epistemology that are not 
merely an addendum to individualistic epistemologies, but question the foundations of 
individualistic approaches. In particular, I agree that knowledge is a social status that 
fundamentally depends on communities. While individuals may believe, see, infer, 
knowledge only comes into existence though communal vetting of content. This does 
not imply however, that insights obtained from complementary social epistemologies 
may not be suited to analyze certain socio-epistemic aspects of socio-technical epistemic 
systems.  
What’s Knowledge and Who is to Decide? 
I adopt Longino‘s tripartite notion of knowledge for this thesis (Longino 2002c). Her 
distinction between knowledge as content, knowledge as a set of knowledge-productive 
practices and from knowledge as cognitive agency, i.e. as a state of a person (‗knowing‘) 
provides a solid foundation for analyzing socio-epistemic practices in socio-technical 
epistemic systems. I also share Martin Kusch‘s and Helen Longino‘s receptive stance 
towards the social studies of science. As should have become obvious from my analyses 
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in Chapter 3, I consider the insights obtained in these fields to be highly relevant for the 
development of any social epistemology that aims at being not only normatively 
appropriate, but empirically adequate. Indeed, I consider empirical adequacy to be a 
prerequisite for normative adequacy. 
The Utility of Truth 
There are several reasons why I consider Longino‘s notion of conformation to be the 
most attractive framework for analyzing socio-epistemic practices and products on the 
Web. First of all, the concept of conformation can be applied to non-propositional 
content and to epistemic practices. Moreover, conformation as opposed to truth comes 
in degrees and it can be assessed for different dimensions depending on the purpose of 
epistemic tasks.  
The Relevance of Epistemic Communities: Contextualism and Relativism 
I agree with Martin Kusch and Helen Longino that epistemic standards are always local 
and that declaring epistemic content to be knowledge depends on negotiations based on 
such local standards. I further share Longino‘s acknowledgement of shared standards 
which evolve over time, but are nonetheless temporarily binding. However, I do not 
think that such a contextualist position can avoid being relativist. Here I side with 
Martin Kusch: if relativism denotes that truth and falsity depend on a communities 
interests, exemplars and goals but does not imply that all statements are only ―relatively 
true‖ or that one can make a theory true by simply wanting it to be true, then the position 
taken in this thesis is relativistic.  
Methodological Issues: Naturalism and Quantification 
I share the commitment of many social epistemologists naturalism understood as the 
receptiveness to insights from empirical sciences. Yet I do not consider knowledge to be 
a natural kind. Moreover, many quantitative methods, especially various stochastical 
techniques are and should be important for social epistemology. Indeed, in Chapter 10 I 
outline a type of epistemic sociality that is entirely based on statistical aggregation of 
data and defend it as an important socio-epistemic mechanism. However, there are also 
inherent dangers of quantifying the qualitative and those have to be monitored. Issues of 
particular concern are flaws in the initial quantification of the qualitative, biases, and the 




I agree with most social epistemologists that social epistemologies cannot remain purely 
descriptive but that a normative stance is crucial. Normativity is necessary for critical 
analyses just as much as for suggestions on how to improve socio-epistemic practices 
and systems. In either case, numerous criteria for assessment are available and they need 
to be chosen and weighted depending on the context and the goals of epistemic inquiry. 
Towards a Social Epistemology for Social Software 
The initial approaches to analyze ICT and social software from a socio-epistemological 
perspective portrayed in this chapter are interesting, but they can only be considered 
starting points for a more comprehensive analysis of socio-technical epistemic systems. 
Many approaches are hampered by a narrow focus on knowledge distribution. 
Moreover, more and different examples of social software should be analyzed, such as 
recommender systems, search engines, social bookmarking systems. Finally there are 
more and different questions to be asked. A comprehensive framework for analyzing 
epistemic social software must enable addressing all or at least most of the issues raised 
in the previous two chapters. I have now outlined my stance towards the most central 
debates in social epistemology. My own socio-epistemological framework to be 





8 Towards A Socio-Epistemological Framework for 
Epistemic Social Software and Beyond 
8.1 The Fundaments 
In the following chapters I outline a new socio-epistemological framework to analyze 
epistemic social software, i.e. social software whose primary purpose lies in the 
creation, dissemination or evaluation of knowledge. In emphasizing the processes of 
collective knowledge creation, this framework goes beyond previous socio-
epistemological analyses of ICT which mainly focus on the distribution of knowledge 
only. 
The key commonality of epistemic social software is that multiple epistemic agents 
interact with each other, with technological artifacts and infrastructures, with objects, 
i.e. with the world around them more broadly conceived, to create epistemic content. 
Based on insights from the field of STS I argue that social software should better be 
understood as socio-technical epistemic systems in which multiple human and non-
human agents interact. I ascribe agency to non-human or non-animated agents to stress 
their central role in processes of knowledge creation. Knowledge is the result of 
entangled processes taking place within such socio-technical networks comprising of 
different agents – human and non-human - who fulfil different epistemic tasks. Indeed 
one of the crucial insights from my analyses is that in certain socio-technical epistemic 
constellations, technologies - non-human epistemic agents- are ascribed more authority 
than human epistemic agents. In those cases, trust is placed in algorithms rather than in 
human knowers. Hence, applying the term epistemic agents to human as well as non-
human agents is meant to indicate a dissolution of boundaries between human and 
technologies with respect to their agency, their roles within epistemic processes.  
Ascribing agency to artifacts has to be distinguished from ascribing intentionality to 
them. The attribution of authority to algorithms for instance does not imply the 
attribution of intentionality to such algorithms, but it stresses their active role within 
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epistemic processes. It emphasizes that they follow certain dynamics; that they have 
certain effects; that they have a life on their own instead of being mere tools in the hands 
of fully rational and intentional agents. This active role has to be acknowledged and 
addressed in any analysis of socio-technical epistemic systems. This ascription of 
agency to technological artifacts also does by no means imply that I wish to equalize 
humans, technological artifacts, animals, unanimated objects etc. in all respects. As 
argued in Chapter 3, there are epistemological as well as ethical reasons for not 
completely equalizing human and non-human epistemic agents. For this reason I 
frequently distinguish between human and non-human epistemic agents in the following 
chapters. While intentionality may be one important difference, the problems around the 
attribution of accountability and responsibility are of even greater concern. Both aspects 
have been emphasized in particular by feminist STS scholars in their ethical-
epistemological analyses of technologies. Accountability and responsibility have 
twofold meanings for critical analyses of ICT. Not only do we want to attribute 
responsibility and accountability to other agents within systems, especially in cases of 
failure or error. We also want to assume accountability and responsibility for our own 
actions within socio-technical epistemic systems to be responsible and accountable users 
– and knowers. Whether it is possible to be responsible for one‘s own actions, however, 
depends on the extent to which one understands one‘s own actions within such systems. 
This in turn requires a certain amount of transparency – a criterion for which systems 
designers are responsible. Hence, a) there are differences between human and non-
human epistemic agents with respect to questions of responsibility and accountability 
and b) the possibility for participants in such systems to be responsible for their actions 
depends upon criteria of the system, such as transparency, for which the system 
designers are responsible and to be held accountable.  
A crucial characteristic of social software, which distinguishes it from ICT more broadly 
conceived, is that human agents do not only interact with technologies, but also with 
other human agents in various forms. This interaction is technically mediated in various 
ways and to varying degrees, but nonetheless the participation of multiple human agents 
is a crucial feature of social software. Within epistemic social software applications, 
which are at the heart of this thesis, such agents participate for epistemic purposes.
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people interact for epistemic purposes, they have to communicate epistemic content. 
That is, they make use of existing epistemic content, process it and share their own 
results. From this procedural perspective the focus of social epistemology on the 
distribution of existing knowledge makes some sense: since knowledge-producing 
practices depend on previous knowledge, the distribution of existing knowledge is an 
important function of ICT. However, distributing knowledge is clearly not the only 
epistemic process within social software. At least as important are processes of 
knowledge creation, yet this aspect has so far been rather neglected in socio-
epistemological analyses.  
Talking about knowledge distribution and knowledge creation presupposes a definition 
of what is understood by knowledge. As outlined in Part 2, my conception of knowledge 
is strongly influenced by the socio-epistemological theories developed by Martin Kusch 
(Kusch 2002) and Helen Longino (Longino 2002c). With them I conceive knowledge to 
be a social status that can be ascribed to epistemic content by a community. Knowledge 
further is a success term labelling epistemic content that has survived critical scrutiny 
from multiple agents and satisfies communal standards. Knowledge is the result of 
socio-epistemic processes, in which interdependent and situated epistemic agents 
interact in different ways and to different degrees. Moreover, I adopt Longino‘s tripartite 
classification of knowledge into knowledge as content, knowledge as cognitive agency 
and knowledge as knowledge-productive practices, because it helps avoiding frequent 
misunderstandings concerning the term knowledge.  
Longino‘s tripartite notion of knowledge has been portrayed in detail in Chapter 5. To 
recapitulate, she argues that many misunderstandings concerning knowledge are a result 
of the fact that the word ―knowledge‖ is used to describe quite different things. 
Knowledge-productive practices describe the processes involved in transforming various 
inputs into representational, epistemic outputs. Knowledge as cognitive agency describes 
the three-term relation between a subject, an object and a representation. Knowledge as 
content finally refers to the body of knowledge, to what is known in its materialized 
form. Socializing the three modalities of knowledge made Longino conclude that 
knowledge-productive practices and their modes of justification vary in different 
                                                                                                                                               
peer production, the motivations to take part in the collective production of content on the Web may 
comprise of different combinations of epistemic and non-epistemic, altruistic and egoistic motives. 
Nonetheless, the systems of concern are characterized by a clear epistemic dimension even if the 
motivations for participation may be diverse.  
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contexts; cognitive agents are interdependent and situated; and knowledge as content is 
plural and depends upon effective transformative criticism by differently situated 
epistemic agents who nonetheless share epistemic standards (Longino 2002c: 122). 
Adopting such a perspective on knowledge has consequences for the analysis of 
epistemic social software. Such software as socio-technical epistemic systems consists 
of situated and interdependent epistemic agents that engage in knowledge-productive 
practices by interacting with one another, with their objects of inquiry and the 
technological infrastructure connecting them. To reach their epistemic goal, agents make 
use of existing epistemic content, ideally successful epistemic content, i.e. knowledge as 
content that has survived critical scrutiny. They use this content as input for knowledge-
productive practices through which new epistemic content is produced that can then be 
subjected to public scrutiny and may end up being knowledge if this status is ascribed to 
it by a community.  
All these interactions are based on trust: trust in other epistemic agents, trust in 
epistemic content that is used as input, trust in artifacts, and trust in epistemic processes 
themselves. Trust is a fundamental ingredient of epistemic processes, without trust there 
can be no knowledge. Yet as I argue in detail in the next chapters the loci of trust differ 
profoundly among different socio-epistemic systems.  
Another crucial consequence of distinguishing knowledge-productive practices and 
knowledge as content concerns the acknowledgement of the temporal structure of 
epistemic processes. If knowledge as content serves as input and as output of epistemic 
processes, knowledge as content depends upon a process of closure, upon the 
(temporary) termination of epistemic processes. In order to declare epistemic content to 
be knowledge it must have been made subject to scrutiny. Hence content has to be put 
into a format and it has to be made public. Epistemic processes are not unstructured 
processes, which continue in eternity. Even if they continued in eternity they are 
partitioned by temporary terminations, closures of processes, which result in closed, 
presentable epistemic products. These closed and presentable products are the pivots, 
which serve as reference points for socio-epistemic practices. Knowledge as content 




In the following chapters I outline a framework to analyze epistemic social software that 
is based on a tripartite classification of different socio-epistemic mechanisms of closure 
employed in such systems. That is, I propose a framework to analyze socio-technical 
epistemic systems that unfurls epistemic processes from its end, from the mechanisms of 
termination. This closure puts an end to a socio-epistemic process by creating the 
collective epistemic result of this process. In that sense creation of epistemic products 
depends upon the temporary termination of socio-epistemic processes. This end, of 
course, and the product that is produced by it, then offer the venture point for another 
epistemic process to set it. The epistemic product that is generated can be used as input 
for further epistemic processes. This is what I mean by saying that knowledge is input 
and output of epistemic processes.  
Indeed, to close socio-epistemic processes actually two processes need to be closed: the 
individual epistemic processes in which individual epistemic agents are involved and the 
social or collective epistemic process comprising of these individual processes. In each 
socio-epistemic process in which multiple epistemic agents are involved and aim at 
certain epistemic goals the following steps have to be taken. First, each individual has to 
provide his or her epistemic result - as minuscule as it may be. Given the generality of 
my framework as well as the generic yet nuanced understanding of knowledge adopted 
from Helen Longino, the range of such individual epistemic contributions is immense: it 
can be anything from a judgment of a person on the quality of a book to a written book 
itself, from the design of experimental stimuli to experimental result, from a diagram to 
a PhD-thesis on the use of diagrams for philosophical reasoning. In either way, for this 
individual epistemic result to be considered knowledge or even to be used for further 
knowledge creation, it has to be externalized. The process of its production has to be 
terminated to produce a sharable and addressable output. However, to obtain a collective 
result, the socio-epistemic process needs to be closed as well. The individual epistemic 
products need to be put together in one way or another; a decision needs to be made 
about how to construe the collective result from the individual results. These processes 
of closure form the core of my socio-epistemological framework. More specifically, I 
argue that three generic mechanisms of closing socio-epistemic processes exist: 
integration, aggregation and selection. In the following chapters I depict their 
characteristics and the differences between them in some detail. 
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8.2 Two Additional Sources of Inspiration 
Before I start outlining my model in more detail, I have to introduce two more 
approaches, which have served as important input for the specification of these closure 
mechanisms: Yochai Benkler‘s work on commons-based peer production (Benkler 
2002; Benkler 2006; Benkler and Nissenbaum 2006) as well as James Surowiecki‘s 
introduction of the term ―wisdom of the crowds‖ (Surowiecki 2004). This further hiatus 
before presenting my own model needs to be explained.  
To a certain degree, the works of Surowiecki and Benkler do not fit into the previous 
chapters, because they are neither part of the socio-epistemological nor the STS 
discourse. Nonetheless, they address socio-epistemic topics and, albeit in different ways 
and to different degrees, epistemic social software. Benkler‘s work on the transformative 
power of the Web is characterized by an analysis of different social software 
applications from an economic and legal perspective and methodologically based on 
transaction cost analysis. Thus, our perspectives as well as our theoretical and 
methodological frameworks differ. Yet we analyze the same phenomena and ask similar 
questions. In particular his work delivers crucial insights for socio-epistemological 
analyses of epistemic social software for two reasons. First, his notion of commons-
based peer production can shed light on important aspects of socio-technical epistemic 
systems that employ integrative mechanisms of closure. Hence, I refer to Benkler in 
particular for the characterization of my first type of epistemic sociality: Epistemic 
Sociality:Integration (ES
I
). Second, Benkler exposes important characteristics of socio-
technical epistemic systems and processes on the Web which can serve as criteria for 
the analyses of epistemic social software employing different mechanisms of closure, 
i.e. integrative, aggregational or selective mechanisms. Hence, I introduce Benkler in 
some detail, because I make use of his insights to a) characterize one specific type of 
epistemic sociality and b) to deliver criteria for the analysis of systems employing all 
types of epistemic sociality.  
James Surowiecki‘s work is also characterized by an economic perspective, but it is less 
scholarly than Benkler‘s. Indeed, Surowiecki‘s book ―The Wisdom of Crowds: why the 
many are smarter than the few and how collective wisdom shapes business, economies, 
societies, and nations‖ has been a bestseller and the notion of the wisdom of the crowds 
is used extensively in the discourse around the merits of the Web2.0. The reason for this 
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is less the relevance of Surowiecki‘s own analyses of social software, but rather the fact 
that the basic mechanisms of his wisdom of the crowds are characteristic of many 
Web2.0 applications. I argue that Surowiecki‘s book has been so influential, because he 
addresses a new type of epistemic sociality, a new mechanisms of orchestrating 
epistemic labor, namely the collective creation of epistemic content through 
aggregation. Hence, I use Surowiecki‘s work to characterize another type of epistemic 
sociality: Epistemic Sociality:Aggregation (ES
A
).  
Despite numerous differences between my approach and these two approaches, 
Benkler‘s and Surowiecki‘s work has crucially informed my analyses because we ask 
similar questions concerning the coordination of epistemic processes in which multiple 
epistemic agents are involved. Therefore I make use of their insights to amend my own 
socio-epistemological framework  
8.2.1 Yochai Benkler’s Commons-Based Peer Production 
One of the most interesting accounts of how changes in information and communication 
technologies affect the ways in which we produce intellectual content was delivered by 
Yochai Benkler.
115
 In his book ―The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production 
Transforms Markets and Freedom‖ Benkler delivers an analysis of the impact of ICT on 
production processes in our contemporary society (Benkler 2006). While his analyses 
are based on economic theory, the conclusions he draws target legal and political action. 
With reference to transaction cost analysis, Benkler assesses and explains the 
emergence of a third mode of productions, in addition to markets and firms. Benkler 
labels this third mode commons-based peer production (CBPP). He argues that while 
sharing and exchange have always existed as modes of production in societies, it is due 
to the availability and ubiquity of personal computers connected to the Internet that a 
mode of production emerged which operates on the same scale as markets and firms but 
on entirely different principles. Moreover, commons-based peer production has 
systematic advantages over markets and firms in the production of informational goods, 
i.e. in the production of knowledge, information and culture.  
Although the emergence and success of numerous examples of CBPP might speak for 
itself, it is not at all clear that the hopes attached to it will come true and that the full 
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primarily based on Benkler (2006, especially Chapter 3 & 4) and Benkler (2002).  
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potential of CBPP can be tapped. Benkler argues that we are currently at a moment of 
transformation in which we have to take a stance and in which the political and legal 
decisions we take will be highly consequential. He urges that we have to decide upon 
the direction in which our society quite generally should be heading. In particular, 
Benkler argues that we have to fight strict copyright and intellectual property rights and 
promote nonproprietary, commons-based information production. By combining 
empirical data from the social sciences with economic reflection, Benkler shows that 
strict enforcement of intellectual property rights, limiting access to intellectual products 
is detrimental to creativity and innovation. In brief, he argues that information as 
opposed to other market goods has two key characteristics. First of all, it is non-rival, 
i.e. the value of information is not diminished by use. If I share my knowledge with you, 
I do not have less knowledge afterwards, nor is the value of my knowledge decreased.
116
 
Secondly, information is not only the output of a production process, but it is also its 
input. To use socio-epistemological terminology, knowledge as content serves as input 
for knowledge-productive processes yielding in new epistemic content which may end 
up being acknowledged as knowledge (Longino 2002c). In order to produce new 
knowledge, people need access to prior intellectual products, to existing knowledge and 
information. If this access to existing knowledge is restricted, decreases in innovation 
and knowledge creation are the result.  
Accordingly, in order to improve creativity and the production of knowledge, access to 
intellectual goods has to be free and not restricted by property laws that only benefit 
their few owners. Benkler thus contravenes positions according to which property rights 
are needed as incentives, because people would stop producing content if they could not 
hold exclusive rights over them. He refutes these claims arguing that many highly 
knowledge intense sectors, such as science, are structured around non-exclusive and/ or 
non-market strategies. Given that the positive effects of strict intellectual property rights 
are minor or even altogether questionable compared to the negative effects, he argues 
against such strong intellectual property rights. Realizing that especially mass media 
monopolists have a lot to lose in this battle, Benkler considers his work to provide not 
only an empirical or conceptual, but also a moral framework for an argument to support 
CBPP legally and politically (Benkler 2006: 472). The scope of changes that rest upon 
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the seemingly minor decisions about intellectual property rights is enormous. The 
decisions that are made will affect major questions of justice, freedom and human 
welfare. Benkler delineates the effects of strong intellectual property rights for a huge 
variety of issues, ranging from political freedom and democratic participation over 
cultural capital to health care and agricultural infrastructure in developing countries 
(Benkler 2006).  
To my mind many aspects of his analyses do have socio-epistemic relevance and there 
are many important insights to be gained from Benkler‘s work despite his focus on 
economic theory and political-legal interventions. First and foremost, his model of 
CBPP delivers a clear case of socio-technical epistemic processes on the Web2.0. Not 
only does CBPP refer to the organization of multiple human agents interacting with each 
other via technological infrastructures. Such agents are also engaged in the collective 
production of intellectual goods, the production of information, culture and knowledge. 
To my mind, two clusters of problems addressed by Benkler are crucial for any socio-
epistemological analysis of socio-technical epistemic systems and should hence be 
considered when developing socio-epistemological frameworks to analyze such systems. 
The first concerns the different epistemic functions of communication for peer 
production. The three functions which Benkler distinguishes are uttering content, 
relevance/accreditation and distribution (Benkler 2006: 68ff). I relate Benkler‘s analysis 
of the collective realization of these three functions on the Web to socio-epistemological 
considerations on different phases in the process of knowledge creation. The second 
cluster concerns the organization of collective action. It comprises of answers to the 
questions of a) how to allocate tasks to agents, b) how to partition and re-integrate 
epistemic tasks and c) how to motivate participants to engage in collective action.  
Three Epistemic Functions of Communication: Uttering, Accrediting 
and Distributing Content 
Benkler describes three different functions of communication in the peer production of 
information, knowledge, and culture more generally: uttering content, 
relevance/accreditation and distribution (Benkler 2006: 68ff). These three functions 
have their counterparts in knowledge-producing practices and have therefore been 
addressed – albeit with different terminology – in socio-epistemological theories. First 
of all, it seems plausible to draw a parallel between Benkler‘s two functions of uttering 
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content and relevance/accreditation and Helen Longino‘s two aspects of reasoning, i.e. 
constructive and the justificatory (Longino 2002c: 103). As noted before, while 
individuals can create content, the creation of knowledge depends on a communal 
accreditation of content, on the attribution of knowledge as a label for successful 
epistemic content that has survived critical scrutiny. Thus, by analyzing the distribution 
of this accrediting process over multiple agents on the Web, Benkler clearly highlights a 
process of high socio-epistemological relevance. Finally, the distribution of existing 
knowledge has not only been the aspect under which ICT has mostly been analyzed in 
social epistemology. From the perspective of knowledge creation, this distribution of 
knowledge as the output of previous socio-epistemic processes is important in so far as 
is makes this content available as input for new socio-epistemic processes by which new 
epistemic content is produced that finally may end up being attributed the status of 
knowledge by a community as well. 
The Web offers a platform where everyone with the necessary technical equipment and 
skills can produce content and make it publicly available. Hence, the Web itself is an 
example of commons-based peer production. On the Web people provide content for 
one another – often for motives other than financial ones, content is continuously 
uttered. In CBPP collective, distributed action, however, is not only relevant for the 
creation of content, but also for the assessment of relevance and for accreditation. That 
is, not only is content produced collectively, the assessment of the relevance and the 
control for quality is often also done collectively on the Web. With respect to social 
epistemology, this difference between the initial uttering of content and the assessment 
of relevance can be compared to the stages in which knowledge gets created. First some 
intellectual content has to be produced, but only after a communal evaluation it may be 
considered knowledge (e.g. Kusch 2002, Longino 2002c). Clearly not all processes of 
relevance assessment necessarily lead to knowledge claims being justified. Nonetheless, 
the opposite holds true, without evaluative assessment, knowledge does not get created.  
On the Web, relevance assessment and accreditation comes in more or less automated 
forms. Prime examples of automated processes are recommender systems, such as the 
ones employed by Amazon.com and search algorithms like Google‘s PageRank. 





 The ODT is a human-edited Web-directory, which aims at organizing the 
content of the Web by topics. Volunteers decide upon the acceptance of links to this 
comprehensive directory. However, this human-centered form of knowledge 
organization lost much of its relevance in the last years. While in 2004 the directory was 
still on the main page on Google, it was degraded gradually into the submenu until it 
finally disappeared from the options on Google in 2008 (Rogers 2009).  
Clearly, simply ranking content or providing a classification for it does not make it true. 
However, as Helen Longino (Longino 2002c) and Paul Thagard (Thagard 1997a) have 
argued, truth may not be the best concept for assessing scientific theories and practices. 
What also matters is their fertility, the extent to which they lead to new research and to 
empirical results. A similar stance might be taken when analyzing (automated) forms of 
accrediting and relevance assessment on the Web. If the information I get matches my 
epistemic needs, this mechanism for filtering for relevance is epistemically successful. 
Thus, accreditation and relevance are not knowledge itself, but they are instrumental for 
knowledge. They should and actually cannot be assessed with a dichotomous true-false 
distinction, but rather with respect to their fertility, the efficiency, etc. Alvin Goldman, 
for instance, has presented five standards to assess epistemic practices: reliability, 
power, fecundity, speed and efficiency (Goldman 1992: 195), which Paul Thagard has 
already applied fruitfully to ICT (Thagard 1997b). I come back to the usefulness of these 
standards below, but for the moment I only assert that these standards may well be 
suited to assess different mechanisms of accreditation and relevance assessment on the 
Web. If these mechanisms deliver information needed to create new knowledge they are 
epistemically beneficial. If they deliver information that inhibits the creation of 
knowledge or leads to more ignorance and error, they are epistemically detrimental.  
Benkler delivers numerous examples of how content gets uttered, accredited and 
distributed on the Web to support the idea that commons-based peer production indeed 
is a mode of production that competes with markets and firms and may even overtrump 
them when it comes to the creation of intellectual products (Benkler 2006). In the 
following I list some of the examples that Benkler refers to in order to show the ways in 
which multiple agents are engaged in the uttering, assessment and distribution of 
intellectual content.  
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A particularly prominent example of collaborative content creation on the Web is 
Wikipedia.
118
 In Wikipedia thousands of volunteers from all over the world collaborate 
to create a comprehensive, multi-lingual encyclopedia for free. The accreditation and 
quality control mechanisms here are a mix of technical features (e.g. history page, ease 
of revision to former status), social norms (such as Wikipedia‘s Neutral Point of View 
policy), and a hierarchical division in users and administrators with special rights and 
obligations (Benkler 2006: 70ff). In an earlier paper, Benkler also refers to 
Kuro5hin.org
119
, a platform where essays on the interplay between technology, media, 
politics and culture are published and commented on. The quality control mechanisms 
here are similar to academic peer review but get combined with post-publications peer 
comments (Benkler 2002).  
Another example in which relevance assessment comes closer to forms of quality 
control known from science is Slashdot.org. Slashdot.org is a platform, which according 
to their self-description provides ―News For Nerds. Stuff That Matters‖120. The ―stuff‖ 
that they provide is primarily information on technology-related topics, but the process 
by which this content gets filtered is quite complex and epistemically interesting. Users 
can submit content that they consider interesting and want to share. The filtering of these 
submissions lies in the hands of paid employees, who basically function as editors. 
However, after this filtering, the published content can be commented upon and 
evaluated by the users again. These comments on papers are subject to scrutiny as well 
and can get rated by ―moderators‖. The role of the moderator is temporarily ascribed to 
users, who fulfill certain criteria: they have to be logged-in and not anonymous, they 
must have participated for a while and their comments must have been evaluated 
positively by others. Once they have obtained this status, they can rate five comments 
within the next three days. Their review of the comments is assessed as well by a 
process of meta-moderation of yet another group of moderators. Thus, slashdot.org 
provides a peer review mechanism that is amended with several checks and balances. 
They combine hierarchical structures with egalitarian means to acquire these statuses 
temporarily. Benkler concludes that Slashdot.org with its complex review mechanisms 
provides an example of how accreditation and relevance assessment can be done in a 
distributed way instead of having to rely on professional accreditation experts.  
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Another example that Benkler introduces to show how content is produced via 
commons-based peer production is related to science as well: NASA clickworkers.
121
 In 
this project, volunteers can mark and classify craters in maps of the Mars (Benkler 2002; 
Benkler 2006). Formerly, such tasks had to be done by experts. In Clickworkers, they 
are split up over thousands of lay people who perform these highly modularized tasks of 
marking and classifying at the instance of a click. No particular expertise is needed in 
the performance of these single tasks. Expertise is needed however in the coordination 
and integration of these tasks and in the provision of control mechanisms to weed out 
error and two NASA employees were in charge of these professional tasks. In particular, 
the control mechanisms employed to minimize error are based on redundancy and 
automated averaging of the input.  
Many social epistemologists have focused in particular on the role that ICT plays for the 
distribution of knowledge (e.g. Goldman 2003, Magnus 2009, Tollefsen 2009). Benkler 
(Benkler 2002; Benkler 2006) agrees that the benefits of the Web and the Internet with 
respect to the ease, speed and low costs of distributing information are enormous and 
cannot be underrated. If knowledge is needed as input for (socio)-epistemic processes, 
then the distribution of knowledge is of clear socio-epistemic relevance. Moreover, in 
certain Web projects, distribution is amended by value-adding practices. One example is 
the Project Gutenberg, which provides books as well as more recently also audio books, 
whose copyrights have expired. Yet Project Gutenberg does not merely distribute 
knowledge. Instead it is value-added distribution, because volunteers transcribe the 
books into electronic formats and by doing this make them available electronically. 
Moreover, in the course of this process, proofreading is an essential mechanism of 
quality control and this task is done by volunteers as well. On the site Distributed 
Proofreaders
122
, users can proofread single pages and by this help improve the quality 
of the electronic versions of the books.  
Having introduced these examples of in which people collaborate on the Web, Benkler 
draws his conclusions on this phenomenon he labels CBPP. He describes commons-
based peer production as a new mode of production that is ―[...] ―radically 
decentralized, collaborative, and nonproprietary; based on sharing resources and outputs 
among widely distributed, loosely connected individuals who cooperate with each other 
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without relying on either market signals or managerial commands‖ (Benkler 2006: 60). 
He argues that its emergence is due to a change from the industrial information economy 
of mass media to the networked information economy, characterized by ―[...] 
decentralized individual action—specifically, new and important cooperative and 
coordinate action carried out through radically distributed, nonmarket mechanisms that 
do not depend on proprietary strategies‖ (Benkler 2006: 3). 
This third mode is not meant to replace markets and firms as the two main contemporary 
modes of production. It is rather a third type that emerges when certain prerequisites are 
met, i.e. ubiquity of networked personal computers, and it is particularly advantageous 
for certain types of products, namely intellectual products, such as information, culture 
and knowledge. This means that while commons-based peer production might be better 
suited to create software or to write an online encyclopedia, it might not be the best way 
to produce cars. However, since the focus of this thesis lies exactly on one of those 
intellectual products, namely knowledge, analyzing the characteristics and prerequisites 
of CBPP may be instructive for the development of a new socio-epistemological 
framework to analyze epistemic social software.  
Organizing Collective Action: Allocation, Division, Integration & 
Motivation 
Similar to markets and firms, in CBPP the problem of how to organize collective action 
has to be solved. While firms and market operate on managerial commands, contracts 
and property rights, CBPP solves this problem differently. Take a classic example of 
CBPP: the open source movement. In this community thousands of programmers 
collaborate voluntarily to produce software that they and others can use freely. That 
such a loose network of programmers can compete with the R&D departments of the 
biggest international software companies should be reason enough to analyze these 
collaborations from a socio-epistemological point of view. To understand why and how 
CBPP functions, basically three types of question have to be asked. First, how is 
collective action organized? How are people allocated to tasks? Second, how are tasks 
split up and how can they be (re-) integrated again? Thirdly, how are people motivated 
to take part in these collective endeavors and how could such motivation be sustained. 
These questions should sound familiar, and indeed, similar issues have been addressed 
in socio-epistemological considerations on the distribution of epistemic labor as outlined 
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in the previous chapters. Given the different theoretical background of Benkler‘s 
analysis, i.e. mainly transaction cost analysis, a comparison of the answers given and the 
conclusions drawn should be rewarding.  
Allocation of Epistemic Tasks  
In order to organize large scale collaboration without market signals or managerial 
commands, CBPP basically depends on self-attribution with checks and balances. In 
contrast to firms, where tasks are often assigned to others, CBPP is based on self-
assignment of tasks: programmers in open source projects or Wikipedia authors choose 
for themselves whether, how and to what extent they want to participate in their project. 
On the one hand, such self-attribution can solve allocation problems quickly, because 
instead of managers searching for the right person for a given task, people will simply 
indicate themselves whether they are able and willing to do this task. Benkler argues 
that, from the perspective of transaction costs, ―[t]he widely distributed model of 
information production will better identify who is the best person to produce a specific 
component of a project, all abilities and availability to work on the specific module 
within a specific time frame considered‖ (Benkler 2002: 414).  
However, people are not always the best judges of their abilities. As John Hardwig has 
stressed, the necessity of adequate epistemic self-assessment for scientific collaboration 
is fundamental (Hardwig 1991). The same surely holds true for epistemic collaborations 
more generally. Given that this problem exists in science as well, it seems a bit 
precipitous to give up on epistemic self-assignment only because some people might 
misjudge their competencies.
123
 Just because one cannot be 100% sure about the 
competency, honesty and adequate epistemic self-assessment of one‘s peers does not 
imply that one could or should refrain from collaborating. Rather, control mechanisms 
are needed to detect whether someone lies, is incompetent and does not even know he is 
incompetent. In science, peer review emerged as the most important quality control 
mechanism.
124
 In CBPP, peer review is also one of the crucial control mechanisms, but 
it is only one among others. Depending on the project there is a variety of different 
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mechanism employed to weed out low quality. On platforms such as Slashdot.org and 
Kuro5hin processes similar to traditional peer review are employed. In the case of 
NASA clickworkers, quality is ensured through statistical weeding out and the use of 
redundancy for verification.  
The reference to statistical weeding out and the potential benefits of redundancy leads to 
the question of size. According to Benkler, when it comes to CBPP bigger is better - up 
to certain boundaries.
125
 He states that ―[p]eer production relies on making an 
unbounded set of resources available to an unbounded set of agents, who can apply 
themselves toward an unbounded set of projects. The variability in talent and other 
idiosyncratic characteristics of individuals suggests that any given resource will be more 
or less productively used by any given individual and that the overall productivity of a 
set of agents and a set of resources will increase when the size of the sets increases 
toward completely unbounded availability of all agents to all resources for all projects‖ 
(Benkler 2002: 415f, emphasis added). 
Dividing and Integrating Epistemic Tasks 
One crucial prerequisite for the success of collaborative endeavors concerns the 
structure of the tasks. Clearly, in order to collaborate on something, tasks have to be 
distributable over different people and therefore have to be divisible in the first place. 
Some tasks are more easily divisible than others. An encyclopedia can be more easily 
distributed over many people than a text book. This is the case not only because an 
encyclopedia is already structured into different articles and the different roles are more 
clearly separable, encyclopedias also demand a lesser degree of coherence than high 
school textbooks (Benkler 2006: 326). One might think that the more complex a project 
is, the more difficult its division and hence also collaboration. However, Benkler argues 
that ―[p]eer production is limited not by the total cost or complexity of a project, but by 
its modularity, granularity, and the cost of integration‖ (Benkler 2002: 435).  
Modularity refers to the sheer fact of whether and to what extent tasks are divisible into 
subtasks. Some tasks can be split up more easily than others and accordingly some tasks 
are better suited for collaboration than others. Granularity refers to the different sizes of 
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duplication of effort (as opposed to useful redundancy) and degree of standardized effort (versus 
variability of talent). (Benkler 2002: 422)  
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modules. In open source projects and in Wikipedia people can chose the extent to which 
they are willing to participate. They can choose to do more or less, depending on the 
time they are willing to devote. If people can choose different types and sizes of 
modules, it is much more likely that they will continue to participate a bit even in 
stressful times and to participate more in times of boredom.  
Once tasks have been split up, they need to be combined again in the end. Thus, a 
crucial aspect concerns the costs of integration. The larger and more modular a project 
is, the higher are the costs of integration. Therefore, the ability of CBB to efficiently and 
successfully integrate individual contributions into a whole is one crucial factor often 
deciding upon its success or failure. Accordingly, Benkler argues that ―[...] for a project 
to be susceptible to sustainable peer production, the integration function must be either 
low-cost or itself sufficiently modular to be peer-produced in an iterative process.‖ 
(Benkler 2002: 436). Different social and technical solutions to the problem of task 
integration exist and are used in different projects. He distinguishes four strategies for 
information integration in CBPP: iterative peer production of the integration function 
itself, technical solutions embedded in the collaboration platform, norm-based social 
organization, limited reintroduction of hierarchy or market to provide the integration 
function alone (Benkler 2002: 436). Different projects employ different mechanism or 
combinations thereof; Wikipedia, for instance, combines all four types.  
Motivation of Participants 
The last crucial question is how to get people motivated to participate and how to keep 
them motivated over time. While in firms and markets, financial profit clearly is one 
major motivator; financial incentives are usually not decisive in CBPP. Skeptics of 
CBPP sometimes argue that projects based solely on altruism are doomed to fail on the 
long run. However, such an appeal to altruism might not even be needed. It is rather that 
motivations are more diverse than just bound to financial gain. Take academia. I do not 
attempt to paint too rosy a picture of academia or even downplay the crucial role of 
basic income. Nonetheless, many activities that academics undertake cannot be 
explained by simple reference to monetary reward. Academics for the most part do not 
get extra payments for publishing or presenting their work, for reviewing, for 
supervising theses. All these tasks are compensated for in their salaries, provided they 
have an appointment. However, this does not mean that scientists are pure altruists or 
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unflinching chasers of truth either. Scientists may be motivated by the reputation of their 
peers. They might also strive for truth. They may value the freedom of research. They 
might of course also be motivated by future financial gain through a better position (or 
an appointment at all to begin with). Obviously, there is a mix of different motivations 
for action in academia, and as Philip Kitcher has shown, such epistemically sullied 
agents are not detrimental to science (Kitcher 1993). Quite to the contrary, a diversity of 
differently motivated people might actually have positive effects on science by avoiding 
premature consensus. Taking part in collective voluntary endeavors on the Web is based 
on rather similar motives than taking part in science, although Benkler uses more 
positive terms than Kitcher to describe such diversely motivated agents. What motivates 
people, Benkler argues, is in all probability a combination of different types of 
motivation: the pleasure of creation, reputation gains and also much more mundane 
benefits such as the acquisition of skills that might help later on in finding a job – all 
these motivators and others may play a role in various combinations (Benkler 2006).  
Besides this more general question of what motivates people to act voluntarily, there is 
also the specific question of how to design a project so that people are motivated to 
participate – and continue to be motivated over time. According to Benkler, in the light 
of motivational issues, granularity and modularity of tasks may play a major role for the 
initial motivation to participate, while the effectiveness of integration rather keeps 
people motivated. If people cannot choose to what extent and in what way they want to 
participate or get the impression that their work is wasted because of inefficient or 
lacking integration, their motivation to participate will in all likelihood drop. Moreover, 
CBPP communities are often quite sensitive to misuse, such as unilateral appropriation 
or economic exploitation more generally. If Wikipedia decided to sell their information, 
this would probably be its death sentence. In a similar vein, the likelihood that people 
will donate processing power or memory capacity of their home computers for 
distributed computing depends crucially on the perceived value of the project. In a 
presentation on distributed systems, Adam L. Beberg from the Stanford Computer 
Science Department, summarized the first rule of distributed computing with a quite 
innocent request: Don‘t be evil!126 People participate in voluntary, collective action only 
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if the goals of the project are transparent and good for humanity according to their 
views.  
Benkler: Conclusions & Socio-Epistemological Relevance 
Which conclusions can be drawn from Benkler‘s notion of CBPP for a socio-
epistemological analysis of epistemic social software and why is it relevant for a social 
epistemology for socio-technical epistemic systems? First of all, Benkler not only 
analyses similar systems as the one‘s addressed in this thesis, he also asks similar 
questions and raises similar topics. Since Benkler‘s analyses are rooted in a very 
different disciplinary background, comparing his insights and results with socio-
epistemological ones may thus serve as a probing stone for the validity of a new socio-
epistemological framework.  
Moreover, the relevance of CBPP for social epistemology is even strengthened by the 
similarities between science and CBPP, which Benkler notes himself. Indeed, science 
serves for him as a prime example for commons-based peer production. He argues that 
science is a classic case of commons-based peer production because in science 
―[t]housands of individuals make contributions to a body of knowledge, set up internal 
systems of quality control, and produce the core of our information and knowledge 
environment.‖ (Benkler 2002: 382). And it is commons-based peer production because 
its product – knowledge and information – usually is a commons that has to be made 
publicly available.  
Although crucial differences between science and certain examples of CBPP have been 
assessed (e.g. the differences between Wikipedia and science outlined by Wray 2009), 
science and CBPP nonetheless share many features: both are usually non-proprietary 
and non-market modes of production. Moreover, both entail a division of cognitive labor 
and as such depend on the competency, honesty and adequate epistemic self-assessment 
of its participants (cf. Hardwig 1991). Both have developed mechanisms to control these 
factors, such as peer review, although the control mechanisms employed in different 
projects might differ. Finally their contributors are motivated by similar motives: 
pleasure of creation, reputation gains and more mundane gains.  
Benkler‘s view on the role of technology in human affairs is also similar to the one 
adopted in this thesis. Benkler acknowledges the centrality of technology for the societal 
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change without falling victim to technological determinism. With reference to Barry 
Wellmann‘s usage of the term ―affordances‖ and Langdon Winners ―political properties 
of technologies‖ Benkler (Benkler 2006: 17) aligns himself with certain views 
concerning the relationship between the technical and the social from the field of 
Science and Technology Studies portrayed in Chapter 3. He states that ―[d]ifferent 
technologies make different kinds of human action and interaction easier or harder to 
perform [...]‖ and concludes that ―[...] neither deterministic nor wholly malleable, 
technology sets some parameters of individual and social action‖ (Benkler 2006: 17). 
With distinct reference to the triplicate relationship between the social, the technical 
and the epistemic, he asserts that ―[t]he actual practices of human interaction with 
information, knowledge, and culture and with production and consumption are the 
consequence of a feedback effect between social practices, economic organization, 
technological affordances, and formal constraints on behavior through law and similar 
institutional forms‖ (Benkler 2006: 17). I fully agree with Benkler on his view on 
technology. Yet given that we analyze the same phenomena, this accordance is probably 
not too surprising.  
Finally, Benkler‘s approach goes beyond a mere description of information production 
in economic terms. Instead he provides a moral framework to understand the profound 
changes brought about by the availability of networked computers and he takes a 
normative stance. In addition to this quite more general moral or normative thrust, 
Benkler delivers crucial insights and criteria to evaluate different socio-technical 
systems. He shows what is necessary for commons-based peer production to function 
well. The criteria for such functioning center around issues that have been outlined 
before: the different epistemic functions of communication for peer production (uttering 
content, relevance/accreditation and distribution) and the organization of collective 
action (allocation of tasks to agents, division and integration of tasks, motivation) 
(Benkler 2006: 68ff). These criteria can be used not only for the evaluation of existing 
projects, but also for the design and developments of new socio-technical systems for 
epistemic purposes. To recapitulate, to promote commons-based peer production 
systems should meet the following prerequisites:  
1. The tasks should be highly modular and of varying granularity. With rising scale, 
the relevance of both modularity and granularity increases.  
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2. The integration of tasks should be low-cost, possibly partly automated and/or 
again modularized 
3. Self-attribution of tasks should be combined with robust mechanisms for quality 
control. There are various social and technical mechanisms that can be used and 
also combined for quality control. 
4. A diversity of motivations for participation is possible and possibly beneficial in 
its diversity. 
5. To attract a vast crowd the goals of the project should be noble.  
6. To keep the crowd on board, economic exploitation, unilateral appropriation has 
to be avoided at all costs and transparency has to be ensured.  
I think these criteria are worth remembering for the development of a socio-
epistemological framework to analyze epistemic social software and socio-technical 
epistemic systems more generally.  
8.2.2 Surowiecki’s Wisdom of the Crowds 
In his book ―The wisdom of the crowds - why the many are smarter than the few‖ 
(Surowiecki 2004), Surowiecki analyzes collective ways of finding solutions to 
problems or making predictions. The term wisdom of the crowds has ever since become 
a synonym for the success of collective epistemic processes on the Web. Surowiecki‘s 
major argument is that ―under the right circumstances, groups are remarkably intelligent, 
and are often smarter than the smartest people in them‖ (Surowiecki 2004: XIII). As a 
consequences, it is epistemically superior to ask the crowds instead of wasting time to 
chase the expert (Surowiecki 2004: xv).  
In the context of Web2.0, the term wisdom of the crowd and Surowiecki‘s argument are 
frequently used to argue for the epistemic merits of bottom-up, democratic approaches 
as compared to more meritocratic systems depending on the differentiation between lay 
people and experts. This anti-expert-rhetoric on the Web has stirred a lot of debate and 
in this debate the impression is conveyed that one has to choose between scale and 
expertise as two distinct options for problem solution: either you ask a single expert, 
who knows it all or you use statistical averaging of people who do not know nothing at 
all. While more nuanced analyses of the respective strengths and weaknesses of different 
forms of problem solution seem to be lacking, simplifications and misrepresentation 
often lead to exaggerated claims. While some authors proclaim the end of experts as we 
282 
 
know them (Ayres 2007), others send out warnings about ―The Cult of the Amateur‖ 
(Keen 2008). The truth may lie somewhere in between as Surowiecki notes himself 
when writing that ―[...] for the group to be smart, there has to be at least some 
information in the ‗information‘ part of the ‗information minus error‘ equation‖ 
(Surowiecki 2004: 10).  
It is however not only rhetoric and the reception of a term in the Web2.0 discourse, 
which makes Surowiecki‘s work central for this thesis. Although Surowiecki describes 
different modes of problem solving as well as different kinds of problems that can be 
solved collectively, the term ―wisdom of the crowds‖ is primarily used to describe one 
very specific mechanism which consists in a combination of individual betting, 
aggregation and averaging for decision making and prediction. And the Web2.0 is full 
of socio-technical systems that function exactly in such an aggregational mode. 
Recommender Systems, websites like Digg.it, Google‘s Page Rank algorithm – in all of 
these examples and many more – masses of individual votes are being aggregated for 
epistemic purposes. Indeed, aggregation is one of the major epistemic closure 
mechanisms employed on the Web. I argue in detail in Chapter 10, it forms one of three 
generic socio-epistemic closure mechanisms that should be distinguished to analyze 
socio-technical epistemic systems.  
Surowiecki‘s book is divided into two parts. In the first one Surowiecki explicates his 
theoretical assumptions (Surowiecki 2004). More specifically, he argues that for the 
wisdom of the crowds to come to the fore, three prerequisites have to be met: groups 
have to be diverse, their members have to act independently and decentralization has to 
be coupled with adequate aggregation mechanism. I explicate these criteria below in 
some detail, because they are crucial for formulating prerequisites for one type of 
epistemic sociality I distinguish in my model: ES:Aggregation.  
After devoting a chapter to each of these prerequisites Surowiecki differentiates three 
different types of problems that can be collectively solved: cognition problems, 
coordination problems and cooperation problems. For my own socio-epistemological 
framework, Surowiecki‘s analyses on cognition problems are central. For this type of 
problems, he argues that a combination of individual betting, aggregation and 
averaging is superior to other epistemic strategies when it comes to decision making and 
prediction (Surowiecki 2004). In the second part of the book Surowiecki shows how the 
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wisdom of the crowds functions in a variety of different fields by providing brief 
anecdotes on topics such as traffic regulation and jury formations, as well as different 
processes within companies, markets, democracies and science.  
Aggregating to Know 
In the introduction to the book, Surowiecki uses two main examples to elucidate the 
wisdom of the crowds (Surowiecki 2004: xiff): how it helped Francis Galton to judge 
the weight of an ox and how it helped the US navy to find a lost submarine.  
Francis Galton, one of the founders of psychometrics did the following real-life 
experiment. When visiting a country fair in 1906, he observed a popular game of those 
days, the weight-judging competition. After buying a ticket, the visitors of this fair could 
place a bet on the weight of an ox and whoever came closest to the ox‘s weight won a 
price. About 800 people submitted their guess and they were a pretty diverse crowd. 
There were butcher, maids, farmers, children, etc. One would expect that the guesses of 
the butchers and farmers might be best, because they should experts on the weight of ox, 
while maybe the village‘s priest, the clerk or the maid would know less about the weight 
range of cattle. Galton was interested in the abilities of the average person. This interest 
for him was also of political nature, because he wanted to assess the capabilities of 
average voters in making plausible judgments. To assess the average person, Galton 
collected the bets and calculated the average of all the weight guesses. This average of 
all judgments, he thought, would be the average person’s bet. Clearly, since Galton was 
not too optimistic about the capabilities of the average man, especially given that there 
were so many non-experts in the crowd of betters, he assumed that this average bet 
would be far off. He was surprised. The averaged guess of the crowd was 1,197 pounds 
– and the real weight of the ox was 1,198 pounds. Surowiecki cites Galton stating that 
―[t]he result seems more creditable to the trustworthiness of a democratic judgment than 
might have been expected‖ (Surowiecki 2004: xiii). And Surowiecki adds: ―That was, to 
say the least, an understatement‖ (Surowiecki 2004: xiii). 
In the second example, Surowiecki describes a naval officer in search of a lost 
submarine who came up with the idea to have people bet on different scenarios of what 
had happened to the submarine instead of having people discuss the issue. After having 
developed these scenarios, the officer aggregated these bets by using Bayes‘ Theorem. 
By aggregating these bets according the this algorithm, he obtained a collective 
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judgment about the location of the submarine – and this judgment was pretty close to 
where the submarine actually sank and enabled its location.  
Judging the weight of an ox and locating a lost submarine are two examples of a 
problem type that Surowiecki labels cognition problems (Surowiecki 2004: xvii). In 
both examples, the aggregation of individual votes enabled predictions that were closer 
to the true value than individual bets. One commonality of these two examples is that 
there are true values to which the predictions could be compared: the ox was weighted, 
the submarine was found. Hence, definite solutions to the problems existed and the 
predictions could be tested and verified. Cognitive problems, however, also include 
more open-ended question, such as finding the best place to build a new public 
swimming pool as well as probabilistic questions, such as the likelihood of the approval 
of a drug by the Federal Drug Administration (Surowiecki 2004: xvii).  
Surowiecki distinguishes such cognition problems from coordination and cooperation 
problems. According to Surowiecki, coordination problems ―[...] require members of a 
group (market, subway riders, college students looking for a party) to figure out how to 
coordinate their behavior with each other, knowing that everyone else is trying to do the 
same‖ (Surowiecki 2004: xviii). Cooperation problems, by contrast, for Surowiecki, 
―[...] involve the challenge of getting self-interested, distrustful people to work together, 
even when narrow self-interest would seem to dictate that no individual should take 
part‖ (Surowiecki 2004: xviii). Surowiecki delivers an abundance of examples for 
different – more or less successful - solutions to various coordination and cooperation 
problems. Although his examples come from a variety of different fields and his 
perspective is different from those authors portrayed in the previous chapters, his 
comments on the epistemic relevance of coordination and collaboration correspond quite 
well to socio-epistemological considerations, as becomes obvious in his chapter on 
science.  
Reminiscent to Kitcher‘s (Kitcher 1993) and Solomon‘s (Solomon 2001) works, 
Surowiecki adopts a similar macroscopic perspective and analyzes the ways in which 
science as a collective endeavor is organized. One of the examples he chooses is the 
distributed research effort that revealed the causes of SARS. Surowiecki uses this large-
scale international collaboration to show how a combination of competition and 
collaboration conducted by independent researchers, who exchange information, lead to 
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incredibly fast research results. Moreover, as Thagard (Thagard 1997a), Hardwig 
(Hardwig 1985; Hardwig 1991) and others, Surowiecki argues that modern science is 
collaborative in nature and stresses the role of trust for science (cf. also Welbourne 
1986, Shapin 1994 and Kusch 2002). Similar to Yochai Benkler‘s comments on 
information and knowledge as public and non-rival goods (Benkler 2006: 36f), 
Surowiecki stresses the distinctiveness of knowledge and information as goods, whose 
value does not diminish through transmission and emphasizes that free access to 
information is crucial for science.
127
 He argues that although science can flourish in 
private companies, the freedom of science and knowledge might be endangered by 
rising commercialization, a point that has also been made – and discussed - by various 
philosophers of science (e.g. Ziman 2003). Finally, while he acknowledges the crucial 
role of reputation as a motivator and currency in science, he also stresses the dangers 
that may come with an overreliance on reputation as a proxy for assessing the quality of 
content by referring to the Matthew-Effect (Merton 1988).  
Although based in very different theoretical frameworks, the insights Surowiecki obtains 
from his analyses on coordination and cooperation problems correspond well with many 
claims and insights from social epistemology. Hence, one can conclude that addressing 
these issues is important not only to analyze science, but socio-epistemic practices and 
systems more generally. Yet while his insights on coordination and cooperation 
problems may merely support socio-epistemological claims made before, his analyses of 
cognition problems are far more innovative and relevant for this thesis. Indeed, the 
mechanisms of individual betting and statistical aggregation of results form the basis of 
many socio-technical epistemic systems. Through such aggregational mechanisms, new 
modes of knowledge creation have emerged on the Web. Since this thesis aims at 
providing a framework to analyze such systems and the processes taking place within 
them, getting a better understanding of the functionalities, the prerequisites, the benefits 
and shortcomings of aggregational mechanisms is essential. Surowiecki‘s work on 
cognition problems deliver a good starting point for the development of a framework to 
analyze aggregation as a socio-epistemic mechanism of closure to be addressed in 
Chapter 10.  
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The Core of the Wisdom of the Crowd: Aggregating Individual 
Judgments 
What is the core of the wisdom of the crowds? Think back to the examples depicted 
before: Galton‘s ox and the sunken submarine. In both cases – and in all other examples 
Surowiecki uses - individuals independently made guesses, which were then aggregated 
statistically. This aggregated result was then taken to be the collective judgment of the 
group. In the Galton example, the aggregation process was quite simple and consisted in 
simple averaging: add up the guesses, divide by the number of betters. In the case of 
finding the sunken submarine, the aggregation mechanism was more advanced and 
included a weighted aggregation based on Bayes‘ Theorem. One application of this type 
of epistemic sociality that has attracted a lot of attention recently – decision or 
prediction markets – are yet another refinement of the same process of individual 
guesses combined with smart stochastical aggregation mechanism.  
Surowiecki shows that in many cases, decision making, predictions and problem 
solutions based on stochastical aggregation of individual bets outperform individual 
judgments even if they are made by experts. Moreover, under certain circumstances, 
such a mode of aggregation often leads to better results than deliberative processes. In 
other words in certain situations it is better to let people bet individually on an issue and 
calculate their average bet than letting them discuss the same issue. However, for group 
intelligence or wisdom of the crowd based on such a mechanism to occur, certain 
prerequisites have to be met: the groups have to be diverse, people have to be 
independent and there have to be adequate aggregation mechanisms. 
The rationale behind these claims for a superiority of aggregated judgments made by a 
diverse crowd of independent individuals is a purely statistical and related to the axioms 
of classical test theory. Simply put, the idea is that if one repeats a measurement the 
errors will cancel each other out and one will be left with the information only. As 
Surowiecki states, at the heart of his argument lies a ―mathematical truism. If you ask a 
large enough group of diverse, independent people to make a prediction or estimate a 
probability, and then average those estimates, the errors each of them makes in coming 
up with an answer will cancel themselves out. Each person‘s guess, you might say, has 
two components: Information and error. Subtract the error, and you‘re left with the 
information‖ (Surowiecki 2004: 10). However, to make sure that you really end up with 
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the information – or the true value - this mechanism is based on various prerequisites. 
Not only do you need a large enough number of measurements. The measurements also 
need to be independent to avoid systematic bias. 
Diversity 
That cognitive diversity is beneficial for socio-epistemic processes has been argued 
extensively within social epistemology (e.g. Longino 2002c, Solomon 2006) and other 
fields of research (e.g. Page 2007). Explicitly referring to early works of Scott Page 
(Page 2001), Surowiecki argues that the more diverse a crowd is, the more likely it is 
that they come up with a diverse set of alternative problem solutions. However, diversity 
is not only needed to uncover possible alternatives, but also to choose among them. To 
use Benkler‘s (Benkler 2006) terminology, diversity is not only used to ―utter content‖, 
but also for relevance assessment and accreditation. For the assessment of different 
solutions diversity matters, because it offers a variety of different perspectives and helps 
to avoid groupthink, a cognitive failure in homogenous groups, which ―works not so 
much by censoring dissent as by making dissent seem somehow improbable‖ 
(Surowiecki 2004: 37). 
Diversity is related to scale, since the bigger the group is, the more likely is cognitive 
diversity. In smaller groups, however, diversity might have to be induced artificially, 
e.g. by certain employment policies or knowledge management measures. Surowiecki 
links his request for diversity with a critique of expertise in three ways. First of all, he 
argues that expertise usually refers only to a very narrow realm. By combining this 
specificity with the second argument, that experts tend to be overconfident, i.e. lack one 
of Hardwig‘s crucial prerequisites for successful collaboration, namely ―adequate 
epistemic self-assessment‖(Hardwig 1991), Surowiecki uses this as an argument why as 
a general practice, reliance on expertise is less advantageous than a wisdom of the 
crowds (Surowiecki 2004: 31ff). Finally, even groups of experts might be inferior to 
groups mixed of experts and non-experts, because they are less diverse. This argument is 
based upon the idea that experts use similar cognitive strategies and might thus not come 




Diversity is crucially related to independence, because diversity can help preserve 
independence (Surowiecki 2004: 39). From an epistemic point of view, independence is 
needed to avoid two major cognitive failures: group think and information cascades. 
Group think describes a situation in which the generation of alternative problem 
solutions is unlikely because of a lack of cognitive diversity and deliberation leads to 
additional conformity pressure (Surowiecki 2004: 337ff). As a consequence Surowiecki 
advocates for voting and betting procedures over deliberative means to reach consensus.  
Information cascades are a different problem and they result from decisions taken in 
sequences rather than simultaneously. According to Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer et al. 
(Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer et al. 1992: 992) ―[a]n informational cascade occurs when it 
is optimal for an individual, having observed the actions of those ahead of him, to 
follow the behavior of the proceeding individuals without regard to his own 
information‖. An example would be a situation that might sound familiar. Imagine you 
walk around in Paris in search for a good restaurant and you do neither have a guide 
book nor any other information on the respective quality of restaurants you pass by. A 
useful heuristic may be to use the number of guests as a proxy for the quality of a 
restaurant. While inferring the quality of the food from the popularity of a restaurant 
indicated by the number of guests might work out quite well in practice, it depends on 
the fact that some of those who go there actually know that the food there is good. 
Imagine that there are two restaurants next to each other. Let‘s assume both look nice 
and have the same menus. Yet while one of them offers fabulous food, the food in the 
other restaurant is always salty and the waiters unfriendly. For the sake of simplicity let 
the good restaurant be named ―Stairway to Heaven‖ and the bad one ―Highway to Hell‖. 
When the first guests arrive and stop in front of the two restaurants, they cannot decide 
based on the heuristic or number of guest = quality. And without any knowledge about 
the restaurants, they simply have to pick one of the two randomly. If they end up in the 
―Highway to Hell‖, this may be just bad luck. However, if every person decides upon 
the number of guests this night this will lead to everybody having tasteless food at the 
―Highway to Hell‖, while the ―Stairway to Heaven‖ is empty. Clearly, something went 
wrong here. This simple example offers an example of a full-fledged information 
cascades with clearly negative results for all parties involved except from the owners of 
the ―Highway to Hell‖. To use Surowiecki‘s terms ―everyone ends up making the wrong 
decision, simply because the initial diners, by chance, got the wrong information‖ 
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(Surowiecki 2004: 53). Instead of aggregating information, basically no information is 
used in such cascades: the initial decision was based on an error and everyone repeats 
the same mistake, by assuming that those before knew – which they did not. Where 
private information should be aggregated, ignorance is simply spread and reinforced. To 
avoid such information cascades diversity and independence of judgment has to be 
ensured. One of the easiest ways – at least in laboratory situations – is to ask people to 
take their individual decisions simultaneously instead of sequentially.
128
  
Decentralization & Modes of Aggregation 
The benefits of decentralization are implied in Surowiecki‘s request for independent 
judgments of diverse agents. However, if these independent tasks or judgments do not 
get integrated properly again, information gets lost and the intended benefits of 
decentralization may be lost. Surowiecki summarizes the dilemma as follows: 
―Decentralization‘s great strength is that it encourages independence and specialization 
on the one band while still allowing people to coordinate their activities and solve 
difficult problems on the other. Decentralization‘s great weakness is that there‘s no 
guarantee that valuable information which is uncovered in one part of the system will 
find its way through the rest of the system‖ (Surowiecki 2004: 71). Thus, effective 
modes of integration are needed. There are of course different, non-aggregational 
methods of integrating individual epistemic results into collective epistemic results, such 
as the ones outlined in the next chapter. Surowiecki‘s focus however, clearly lies in such 
aggregational mechanisms.  
The simplest method of information aggregation proposed was simple averaging. While 
this process may be sufficient for tasks as simple as judging the number of jelly beans in 
a jar or the weight of Galton‘s ox, more complex problems may require more complex 
aggregation mechanisms. The case of the sunken submarine would be one example 
where different aspects and criteria have to be weighted and hence Bayes‘ Theorem was 
chosen.  
Various more complex aggregation mechanism are also employed in decision and 
prediction markets (Surowiecki 2004: 79ff). In an article that surveys and evaluates the 
merits and limits of such markets, Bragues defines prediction markets as ―venues in 
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which individuals trade securities whose value is tied to the outcome of a future event‖ 
(Bragues 2009). Some examples of such decision markets that Surowiecki refers to are 
Iowa Electronic Markets (IEM), in which election results are predicted and FuturePAM, 
resp. the Policy Analysis Market PAM, where bets were made on international affairs 
(Surowiecki 2004: 79ff). The fact that people could bet on terrorist attacks or 
assassinations has stirred a lot of moral debate, so that the project was terminated. The 
epistemically interesting question is, however, whether and why such markets function 
better than traditional polls or expert predictions in forecasting the future. It has been 
argued that ―prediction markets are the opposite of social collaboration‖ (Bragues 2009: 
95). Participants do not collaborate, but compete against one another. Each person 
independently makes his or her bets and competes against the others in their effort to 
make money. Although people compete against each other, it is their combined effort, an 
aggregated result that is the epistemic outcome of a prediction market. Thus, decision 
markets are an example of a distinct type of epistemic sociality in which the results of 
individual independent action get aggregated to reach collective epistemic results.  
Surowiecki: Conclusions & Socio-Epistemological Relevance 
What insights can be taken from Surowiecki‘s analyses for the development of a socio-
epistemological framework to analyze epistemic social software? The main reason why I 
have inserted this section on Surowiecki‘s is that his exploration in the wisdom of the 
crowds delivers crucial insights for one of my three types of epistemic sociality: 
aggregation. Since I consider aggregation, together with integration and selection, to be 
a generic mechanism for closing socio-epistemic processes, Surowiecki‘s analyses 
concerning the prerequisites for the proper functioning of aggregational mechanisms can 
serve as criteria for the analysis and evaluation of socio-technical epistemic systems. A 
proper socio-epistemological analysis of systems employing aggregational mechanisms 
has to check whether independence and diversity of participants is ensured and whether 
adequate aggregational algorithms have been employed. Since aggregational systems 
have been on the rise on the Web in the last years, being able to specify criteria to 
analyze such systems is an important aspect of any socio-epistemological framework to 
analyze such systems.  
Besides adopting Surowiecki‘s criteria, another important issue can be inferred from his 
observation that the emergence of any wisdom of the crowds crucially depends on the 
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aggregation of individual results. Without aggregation, no epistemic results are obtained. 
The creation of knowledge qua aggregation is delegated to algorithms. Given the 
centrality of these aggregation processes it becomes obvious that a lot of trust needs to 
be placed in such aggregational mechanisms, i.e. authority is attributed to algorithms in 
this type of epistemic sociality. In aggregational socio-technical epistemic systems trust 
is deferred from individual epistemic agents to the mechanism of closure, from the 
people to the algorithm, from human to non-human epistemic agents. This shift in trust 
and authority is a central feature of aggregational systems, as I argue in more detail in 
Chapter 10. But trust can be misplaced; authority can be attributed inappropriately. As a 
consequence, this new locus of trust and authority has to be made subject to scrutiny by 
any social epistemology to assess the validity of this delegation of epistemic trust and 
authority.  
8.3 The Core: Closure through Integration, Aggregation or 
Selection 
In the following chapters I outline my socio-epistemological framework to analyze 
epistemic social software understood as socio-technical epistemic systems consisting of 
multiple agents. This framework is based on a tripartite classification of the different 
socio-epistemic mechanisms of closure employed in such systems, i.e. I argue that there 
are three generic mechanisms of closing socio-epistemic processes in which multiple 
agents are involved. These mechanisms are integration, aggregation and selection. By 
distinguishing systems according to the mechanisms of closure they employ, important 
differences between systems come to the fore. Hence, I use the names of the closure 














S for selection. These three types of epistemic sociality form the basis of the new socio-
epistemological framework I propose to analyze epistemic social software and socio-
technical epistemic systems more generally.  
The term epistemic sociality refers to the fact that in all cases there is more than just one 
epistemic agent involved in the epistemic process. Different concepts have been 
introduced to label and describe the utilization of a multitude of epistemic agents for 
epistemic tasks: collective intelligence, wisdom of the crowds, team work, cooperation, 
collaboration, to name just a few examples. I use the term epistemic sociality as a 
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generic term that encompasses all these notions. The reason for using a generic term 
here is that each of the before mentioned terms, collective intelligence, wisdom of the 
crowds, etc., already implies a specific way in which the multitude of epistemic agents is 
organized. Yet those specificities are neither always clear, nor consistent, nor used in the 






) is introduced to 
avoid confusion. Nonetheless, reference is made to the common language terms 
introduced above to explain and describe the processes taking place in the three types of 
epistemic sociality before closure occurs.  
Thus the utility of my analysis is twofold. First, providing a schema to distinguish 
different modes of epistemic sociality is of theoretical interest for social epistemology 
by offering a more fine-grained and nuanced framework for analyzing socio-epistemic 
practices. Differentiating distinct forms of epistemic sociality, outlining their 
prerequisites as well as their strengths and weakness is crucial for understanding the 
ways in which knowledge is or can be created socially. Secondly, such a classification 
can also serve as the theoretical basis for improving socio-epistemic practices and 
systems. Knowledge about the prerequisites, strengths and weaknesses of different 
social mechanism enables the design and development of socio-technical systems that 
serve epistemic purposes in a rational, efficient and effective way.  
In particular, I can show that employing different mechanisms of closure has differential 
consequences for the organization of epistemic labour in socio-technical epistemic 
systems and for the relationships between different epistemic agents in such systems. 
With respect to these inter-agent relationships, I focus in particular on the differential 
placements of trust within such systems as well as on differential attributions of 
authority, among human epistemic agents and between human and non-human epistemic 
agents. Further, I highlight their respective strengths and weaknesses, as well as the 
epistemological and ethical opportunities and challenges they entail, drawing 
conclusions about how to best make use of each mechanism to design socio-technical 
epistemic systems that are epistemologically and ethically sound. Finally, I show that 
such mechanisms can be – and indeed are - combined in different socio-technical 
epistemic systems on the Web and elsewhere. Normative recommendations concerning 
systems design therefore do not consist in advocating one mechanism or another, but 
rather in finding useful combinations of socio-epistemic mechanisms of closure that 
minimize epistemic and ethical harm. 
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The following picture visualizes the basic structure of my model. Within socio-technical 
epistemic systems epistemic labor is distributed over multiple agents, which can either 
individually or collectively take part in epistemic endeavors. The epistemic results that 
they obtain depend upon the temporary closure of epistemic processes. Besides the 
termination of individual epistemic processes, i.e. the process of bringing content into a 
certain form an making in available to others, three generic social mechanisms of 
closure exist: integration, aggregation and selection. Systems employing these different 
mechanisms of closure differ with respect to numerous aspects. Most importantly, they 
differ with respect to the primary loci of trust, the attribution of authority, reputation and 
trustworthiness. They depend on different amounts and forms of independence and 
diversity. They are suited for different tasks and have different strengths and 
weaknesses. To outline these differences in detail is the goal of the next three chapters.  
 
 
Figure 12: Types of Epistemic Sociality: ES:Integration, ES:Aggregation, ES:Selection 
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9 Epistemic Sociality 1: Closing Socio-Epistemic 
Processes Through Integration  
9.1 Epistemic Sociality:Integration (ESI) 
ES:Integration (ES
I
), is probably the most familiar form of epistemic sociality and refers 
to the type of epistemic practices that come to mind first when thinking about ways in 
which people collectively create knowledge. This type of epistemic sociality has also 
been at the heart of most works on the social aspects of science conducted in social 
epistemology as well as in other philosophical, sociological and historical analyses of 
science. Also on the Web, this type of epistemic sociality has also been studied most 
intensely, e.g. in Yochai Benkler‘s analyses of Wikipedia or the open source movement 
(Benkler 2006). In the following I portray Wikipedia as the prime example of this type 
of epistemic sociality on the Web in more detail and use LiquidPub, a research project in 
which I am involved as a case to exemplify ES
I
 in science. 
9.1.1 ES:Integration & Wikipedia  
Wikipedia is probably the single, most well-known example of ES:Integration on the 
Web. A multitude of people contribute and interact to create a collective epistemic 
product: a multi-lingual encyclopedia. Millions of epistemic tasks of varying kind and 
size are distributed over more than 85.000 diversely motivated volunteers via self-
allocation. Yet how can we understand these epistemic processes? Since I have proposed 
a differentiation of types of epistemic sociality according to the mechanisms of closure, 
I first take a look at the integration of these innumerous epistemic tasks conducted by 
different agents. How is integration achieved in Wikipedia? In short, integration of 
epistemic content in Wikipedia happens on different levels with the help of technical 
and social constraints.  
On a top level, Wikipedia as a whole is structured along languages. From the website of 
the Wikipedia organization http://wikipedia.org/ one can access different language 
versions, e.g. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page, leading to the English version 
starting page, http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Hauptseite, for the German 
starting page, etc. The differentiation between different languages is therefore indicated 
by the en for English, de for German, etc., followed by the common string 
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.wikipedia.org/wiki/. What comes after this common string indicates the topic of the 
article to which the URL is linking. For instance, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemology is linking to the article about epistemology or 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Macaron is leading to a description and depiction of a 
famous Parisian delicacy. 
Hence, on the most global level the integration of different articles into the totality of the 
multi-lingual encyclopedia is first of all structured by this specific usage of URLs. There 
is a common top-level distinction into language versions, followed by a common string, 
followed by the indication and reference to the article. Only for the last part there is 
some variance: to create URLs indicating and linking to topics that need several words, 
people mostly use underscores (e.g. Main_Page), but some use colons (e.g. 
Wikipedia:Hauptseite), or combinations of colons and underscores (e.g. 
Portal:Featured_content).  
From a socio-epistemic perspective it is essential that the integration of articles into the 
entirety of the encyclopedia depends on a combination of technical constraints and 
social constraints. Technical constraints are for instance: the necessity to create a URL, 
the necessity to indicate the language specifier, the necessity to use the common string, 
the necessity to complete the URL by creating an end that is not yet assigned and 
consists of valid characters.
129
 However, with only those technical constraints there is 
still a huge variety of practices possible. Thus, the homogeneity of the URL-usage 
cannot be explained by technical constraints alone. For instance, it is technically feasible 
to use URLs consisting of very many characters, to use different characters to split 
words, or even to create URLs that do not content-wise refer to the topic of the linked 
article. However, given the uniformity of URL-design, obviously there are some rules, 
some conventions on how to create URLs. And indeed, there are guidelines for the 
creation of URLs to be found on Wikipedia. Besides proposals on how to link to article 
titles that consist of more than one term, numerous other recommendations are being 
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offered: on how to decide upon an article title in the first place, how to deal with 
common names, foreign names, how to be precise and unambiguous in labelling, etc.
130
  
However, since most articles are written by more than one author, integration is not only 
crucial for integrating articles into the entirety of the encyclopedia, but also on a lower 
level, e.g. within each article. Content needs to be created by typing words into a 
template. Links need to be created, references should be made to literature, spelling and 
grammar needs to be checked. Many people conduct tasks of varying granularity and 
modularity, they spend different amounts of time in participation and they do this for 
different motivations. In the worst case, people may participate for the sole intention of 
destroying knowledge. Hence a system of checks and balances needs to be installed as 
well. This system of control is also based on social and technical features. Important 
technical features that serve to reduce vandalism are the history-page, which helps to 
track changes, and the possibility to easily undo revisions and restore content.  
Yet in addition to the technical features, there are innumerous social constraints in 
Wikipedia. Indeed, a discourse analysis of all those norms, guidelines and policies may 
be a rewarding project. For instance, the Wikipedia Editing Tutorial
131
 offers ―guidance 
about the style and content of Wikipedia articles, and tell[s] you about the Wikipedia 
community and important Wikipedia policies and conventions‖. In addition to the 
Tutorial
132
, which offers help on editing, formatting, linking, citing, etc, Wikipedia has a 
Manual of Style
133
, and a Frequently Asked Questions section.
134
 There are lists of 
guidelines
135
 on behaviour, content, deletion, editing, naming, notability and style as 
well as lists of policies
136
 on conduct, content, deletion, enforcement, legal, procedural 
and miscellaneous issues. After having completed the tutorial there is a link to numerous 
further sites subdivided into sections on ―Advice and general information‖, ―Policy 
references‖, ―Editing references‖ and ―Creating new articles‖.137 I have provided a 
screenshot of this page just to give an idea about the breadth of social constraints that 
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are communicated and fostered via these rules and guidelines. Obviously, social 
constraints, i.e. rules and norms, not only play a crucial role for the integration of 
individual contributions into the entirety of Wikipedia; these social norms which cover 
numerous pages are subject to discussions themselves. Moreover, the social norms were 
not decided upon once. Instead, they are performed and enacted through participation, 
they are fostered, strengthened or changed over time. They are created by what Kusch 
describes as communal performatives, the performative utterances carried out by a 
collective ‗we‘ that take place in a distributed and fragmented manner (Kusch 2002: 17). 
They are what for science Longino describes as the shared social norms (Longino 
2002c: 145). Obviously, such norms are not only crucial in science, but in any collective 
epistemic endeavour. 
 
Figure 13: Social Constraints in Wikipedia
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9.1.2 ES:Integration & Academic Research 
A field in which ES:Integration clearly also is the norm is academic research. Think 
about molecular biologists working in a research lab. Think about three pedagogical 
psychologists writing a textbook together. Think about an interdisciplinary team of 
scientists, ethicists, social scientists and legal scholars trying to outline the benefits and 
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problems around stem cell research together. Or think about a project funded by the 
European Union in which researchers with backgrounds in computer science and 
engineering, artificial intelligence, theoretical physics, economics, and philosophy try to 
come up with new ways of creating and scientific content. The last example refers to the 
project LiquidPub, a project funded by the Future and Emerging Technologies (FET) 
programme within the Seventh Framework Programme for Research of the European 
Commission (FET-Open grant number: 213360).
139
 Since I am part of this project, I use 
it for some reflections upon the socio-epistemic processes taking place in 
interdisciplinary research projects in order to outline the functioning and some key 
elements of ES:Integration in science.  
Given the focus of this chapter on collectively produced knowledge created via 
integration of individual contributions, I use the project description from the project‘s 
website instead of paraphrasing it.  
―The world of scientific publications has been largely oblivious to the 
advent of the Web and to advances in ICT. Even more surprisingly, this is 
the case even for research in the ICT area: ICT researchers have been able to 
exploit the Web to improve the (production) process in almost all areas, but 
not their own. We are producing scientific knowledge (and publications in 
particular) essentially following the very same approach we followed before 
the Web. Scientific knowledge dissemination is still based on the traditional 
notion of ―paper‖ publication and on peer review as quality assessment 
method. The current approach encourages authors to write many (possibly 
incremental) papers to get more ―tokens of credit‖, generating often 
unnecessary dissemination overhead for themselves and for the community 
of reviewers. Furthermore, it does not encourage or support reuse and 
evolution of publications: whenever a (possibly small) progress is made on a 
certain subject, a new paper is written, reviewed, and published, often after 
several months. The situation is analogous if not worse for textbooks.  
The LiquidPub project proposes a paradigm shift in the way scientific 
knowledge is created, disseminated, evaluated and maintained. This shift is 
enabled by the notion of Liquid Publications, which are evolutionary, 
collaborative, and composable scientific contributions. Many Liquid 
Publication concepts are based on a parallel between scientific knowledge 
artifacts and software artifacts, and hence on lessons learned in (agile, 
collaborative, open source) software development, as well as on lessons 
learned from Web 2.0 in terms of collaborative evaluation of knowledge 
artifacts.‖140 
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 Further information on the project can be found on this website: http://project.liquidpub.org/ [date of 
access: 16.03.2006] 
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As should be obvious from this description, the project itself addresses numerous socio-
epistemic processes taking place within socio-technical epistemic systems. Moreover, 
this text and the website as a whole are examples of collectively produced epistemic 
results for which numerous epistemic agents have been responsible. When exploring the 
website, one comes across numerous epistemic products of varying size for which 
multiple researchers have interacted with each other via technology or with technology 
in various ways to create and evaluate content. However, these socio-technical epistemic 
processes, in which several agents are involved, need to be closed to lead to collective 
results, which can then be accessed on this website: products such as reports, demos, 
articles or links, which can be used as epistemic input for new socio-epistemic 
processes, in which researchers from the project and beyond can take part.  
In the course of this three-year project more than 40 people with different competencies, 
skills and motivations have been contributing in varying degrees and various respects to 
the collective goals of the project by fulfilling epistemic tasks of different size and kind, 
by creating and co-creating epistemic products through closure of socio-epistemic 
processes. Within the project, partners interact and communicate not only with and 
about the new applications and technologies that are being developed. We also make 
extensive use of existing information and communication technologies to guide and 
support our interaction. We use various mailing-lists, GoogleDocs and 
GoogleCalendars, servers, a blog, a private and a public wiki, Delicious, CiteULike, to 
organize work, to interact and to communicate with each other.  
Nonetheless, the goal of each of these communicative and interactive processes is the 
creation of tangible epistemic products: reports, articles and tools. For those reports and 
tools, the individual contributions have to be integrated. That is, the creation of these 
epistemic products depends on the closure of socio-epistemic processes in which social 
and technical constraints again play a crucial role. As was the case for Wikipedia, when 
co-producing technological tools, there are technical constraints upon what can be and 
what cannot be done. Moreover, with respect to certain constraints the distinction 
between social and technical indeed becomes blurry. For instance, one can conceive the 
templates we use for reports and documents as technical constraints. However, they only 
serve as constraints in so far as they are agreed and consented upon, i.e. they may better 
be conceived as socio-technical constraints.  
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Finally, as is the case for Wikipedia, social constraints, norms, policies and values play a 
crucial role for the integration of epistemic products into collective entities. While some 
of these constraints were quite explicitly discussed and consented upon, others were 
enacted, modified or abandoned rather implicitly. Examples of the explicit social 
constraints were the list of deliverables, the time schedule and deadlines for annual 
reports, the responsibilities of each team, etc. These explicit constraints were articulated 
in the DOW, the description of work. This document was the common reference point, 
the solidified agreement to which everyone could refer to when evoking others‘ 
responsibilities or for attributing accountabilities. However, work, its distribution, and 
re-integration do not follow such a schematic description irrespective of how detailed 
such an account may be. The majority of rules and norms were rather enacted and 
performed during interactions, while content was collectively co-produced. People 
created content that others could refer to, – sometimes verbally during meetings or calls, 
but mostly in written form. Others provided feedback on this – and through this process 
of providing content and commenting on it, rules and modes of conduct emerged. These 
rules and modes of conduct are of course embedded in more general academic rules and 
modes of conduct. Yet they differ among disciplines, countries and institutions and these 
differences need to be accounted for in interactions. In writing reports, different styles of 
scholarly writing have to be integrated. Author orders for reports and articles have to be 
decided upon – with each discipline having different credit-attribution rules. Emails are 
sent around – half-joking, half-seriously addressing the appropriate time span to reply to 
emails from partners.  
All these social, technical and socio-technical constraints have an impact on the 
integration processes within the research project. All of them leave an imprint on the 
epistemic products that results from the processes, which are created and made public 
for scrutiny by people other than the ones producing them. Once published, these 
epistemic products have a life of their own: they may be used as input for future socio-
epistemic processes or they may be abandoned and never read again. Either way, for 
them to be created, and especially for them to be declared to be knowledge, they depend 
upon the closure of socio-epistemic processes. Once closed, they should be an integrated 
whole, an atomic unit of knowledge, which nonetheless reflects the collective character 
of its mode of production. Indeed, there was a strong concern that the epistemic products 
should reflect their history of distributed labor and integration, because one major 
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criterion for the evaluation of the project concerned the quality of the interaction and 
collaboration between partners itself.  
9.2 ESI and Social Epistemology 
Social epistemologists and philosophers of science have addressed ES
I
 sociality 
primarily in their analyses on collaboration in science. Different authors have stressed 
different issues related to collaboration in science: How to split, distribute and re-
integrate tasks, how to motivate participants and sustain diversity, how to attribute 
authority and place trust. In the following I address these socio-epistemological 
considerations in so far as they shed light on the specificities of systems employing of 
ES
I





9.2.1 Studying Collaboration in Science 
Given the ubiquity of collaboration in science and elsewhere and the interest that it has 
ignited in different academic disciplines, what have philosophers had to say about 
collaboration? An interesting classification of collaborations in science has been 
provided by Paul Thagard. In a paper entitled ―Collaborative Knowledge‖, Thagard 
differentiates four types of scientific collaboration and outlines their respective merits: 
Employer/employee, teacher/apprentice, peer-similar and peer-different (Thagard 
1997a). I use Thagard‘s classification and the case studies he draws upon as a reference 
point to outline crucial topics which have to be addressed within the analysis of socio-
technical epistemic systems that employ integrative mechanisms of closure. These topics 
concern the structure of epistemic tasks, diversity, trust, as well as the relationship 
between reputation, trustworthiness and authority. But let‘s first take a closer look at 
Thagard‘s four types of collaboration in science. 
Employer-employee collaborations are collaborations in which one party can tell the 
other what to do. That means they are characterized by a difference in status; examples 
are relationships between laboratory supervisors and technicians or research staff. For 
teacher-apprentice collaborations, such a status difference persists, but the goal here is 
to train the apprentice to become a full member, i.e. a teacher, herself one day. An 
example would be the collaboration between researchers and graduate students. For the 
two kinds of peer collaborations, collaborators usually are on the same status level, 
although differences in status can of course exist. The difference between peer-similar 
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and peer-different collaborations concerns whether the researchers work in the same or 
different fields of research. While in peer-same collaborations researchers work in 
similar fields, multi-, inter- and transdisciplinary work would all be instances of peer-
different collaborations in Thagard‘s terminology.  
Having classified these types of scientific collaborations, Thagard assesses their 
epistemic value with reference to Alvin Goldman’s five standards of epistemic appraisal 
(Goldman 1992: 195): reliability, power, fecundity, speed and efficiency. The question 
is how, with respect to these five standards, epistemic practices are affected by different 
types of scientific collaboration. In Goldman‘s social epistemology, the contribution to 
the achievement of truth is the central criteria of his epistemic assessment and he 
accordingly defines each standard with respect to its contribution to true belief. Thagard 
(Thagard 1997a), in a similar vein as Longino (Longino 2002c) argues however, that 
truth might not be the best concept to assess socio-epistemic practices in the sciences. In 
most cases, whether a theory is true or not, turns out only on the long run. Scientists are 
therefore rather interested in publishable results. If something gets published in a good 
peer-reviewed journal, he argues, it means it is accepted by an epistemic community and 
can serve as a proxy for truth, which can only be assessed on the long run – if ever (cf. 
Solomon 2001, Longino 2002c). In sum, scientists in their daily work rather strive for 
publishable results than for a rather abstract notion of truth. Accordingly, Thagard 
modifies Goldman‘s standards by replacing the reference to truth with a reference to 
publishable results.  
His five standards now read as follows (Thagard 1997a: 247):  
―1. The reliability of a practice is measured by the ratio of results to total 
number of results and errors fostered by the practice;  
2. The power of a practice is measured by its ability to help cognizers find 
results that answer the questions that interest them;  
3. The fecundity of a practice is its ability to lead to large numbers of results 
for many practitioners;  
4. The speed of a practice is how quickly it leads to results;  
5. The efficiency of a practice is how well it limits the cost of getting 
results.‖  
Thagard then evaluates his four types of scientific collaboration with respect to these 
five modified epistemic standards. In employer-employee collaborations researchers 
decide to delegate tasks to technicians or assistants. These tasks they could mostly do 
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themselves, and probably even better.
141
 In those cases, delegation might lead to a 
decrease in reliability. However, this potential loss is made up for by an increase in 
power, speed and efficiency. The same is true for teacher-apprentice collaborations. 
There might be an additional loss in efficiency, since some of the researcher‘s time is 
devoted to training. However, this loss in efficiency is made up for by a gain in 
fecundity, because once the apprentice is trained, he can produce results of her own (and 
train other apprentices) (Thagard 1997a).  
When applying the standards to peer-similar and peer-different collaborations, the 
potential gains and losses become less straightforward. For instance, reliability may just 
as well be increased than decreased by peer-similar collaboration. Reliability may be 
increased, if researchers carefully check each others‘ results and many researchers may 
even check others work more critically than their own. However, if they spend too much 
time on cross-checking, they can just as well do the work themselves and potential gains 
in efficiency are lost. There is also the possibility that they are overconfident in their 
collaborators and do not cross-check the results in principle or carefully enough. Cases 
of scientific fraud are often the result of such overconfidence and lack of scrutiny.  
Further, the more researchers depend on each other, the more difficult it might be to 
challenge the other; incompetence or fraud might either be not detected or even 
obfuscated. As Shapin has already noted for the Gentlemen culture of the Royal Society 
in the 17
th
 century, withdrawal of trust may come at high (epistemic) costs (Shapin 
1994). Cross-checking gets even more difficult in peer-different collaborations because 
often researchers do not even have the skills to check their colleagues‘ methods or to 
verify their results. Here trust is even more pronounced (e.g. Hardwig 1991) and 
reliability might be endangered. However, if results obtained with different methods 
converge, these results are more robust and reliability can be increased through such a 
triangulation of methods.  
Obviously, for peer collaboration, gains as well as losses in the different standards can 
be expected. So why collaborate, if it is not even sure that this will be epistemically 
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certain tasks than their supervisors and technicians might be specially trained to do something the 
supervisor is not able to do. I think this is a reason rather to add another type of scientific collaboration to 
Thagards list. I would argue that these cases are a mixture between hierarchical differences of the first two 
types and the differences in specialization characteristic of peer-different collaborations. Hence, they 
could be labeled non-peer-different collaborations.  
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beneficial? Thagard argues that one important aspect of science got neglected in this list 
of standards: explanatory efficacy. He defines explanatory efficacy as the extent to 
which a practice ―[...] contributes to the development of theoretical and experimental 
results that increase explanatory coherence‖ (Thagard 1997a: 255). Scientific 
collaboration and especially peer-different collaboration, he argues, can increase 
explanatory coherence in two ways: conceptually by developing new theoretical 
frameworks by combining conceptual approaches, and empirically, by integrating 
experimental results from different fields.  
Thagard depicts two case studies from science to show that peer-different collaboration 
in particular can increase his sixth criterion of explanatory efficacy profoundly. One 
example, which he analyzes in a subsequent paper in more detail, concerns peptic ulcer 
(Thagard 1998a; Thagard 1998b). Thagard (Thagard 1997a) argues that until 1981, it 
was widely held in medicine that peptic ulcer was caused by excess acidity. By 1995, 
the common view was that it was caused by a bacterium, Helicobacter pylori. How did 
this ―paradigm shift‖ happen?  
According to Thagard (Thagard 1997a) it was a peer-different collaboration that 
initiated this shift. J. Robin Warren, a pathologist noticed the bacteria in biopsies. He 
could not account for their relevance and therefore sought assistance from a 
gastroenterologist, Barry Marshall. Together they devised an experiment to empirically 
test the association between peptic ulcer and the occurrence of the bacteria. When they 
were also able to show that peptic ulcer could be cured by applying antibiotics the 
medical community began accepting this new cause of peptic ulcer. To use Solomon‘s 
terms (Solomon 2001): premature consensus had to be dissolved before a new consensus 
could be achieved. In the course of this process, it was not only the two of them, but also 
medical experts from other fields (e.g. microbiology and pharmacy) who participated in 
this interdisciplinary collaboration. It was this successful peer-different collaboration, 




9.3 Key Topics 
9.3.1 ESI & the Structure of Epistemic Tasks – Or the Two Cultures 
Revisited  
Despite obvious benefits, (interdisciplinary) collaboration is still quite rare in the 
humanities as compared to the natural and social sciences. Thagard exemplifies this 
difference by reference to the ratio between single- and multi-author papers in some 
major journals in the sciences and the humanities. In the Journal of Philosophy of 1992 
only 4 out of 27 papers are written by two or three authors, while the remaining 23 are 
written by only one author. By contrast, in the 1992 volume of Cognitive Psychology 
only 4 out of 16 are single-author papers and in the Physical Review Letter only 67 out 
of 558 contributions are single authored (Thagard 1997a: 244f).  
Thagard identifies three reasons for this different prevalence of collaboration: funding, 
tradition and lack of a natural division of cognitive labor. A quite mundane reason for 
this lack of collaboration might simply be that in the humanities researchers less often 
have funding to employ grad students and that close collaboration is therefore less 
frequent. Moreover, philosophy for instance, is still considered to be a rather solitary 
practice of reading and writing, even if intellectual exchange between colleagues clearly 
is crucial for philosophy. The third point, however, the lack of a natural division of 
cognitive labor, is most interesting and relates back to Benkler‘s claims concerning the 
necessity of modularity and granularity of epistemic tasks (Benkler 2006).  
While in many natural and social sciences there are distinct subtasks that have to be 
conducted in research, such a differentiation is less clear in the humanities. For instance, 
in experimental research there are different, related, but easily distinguishable steps of 
research: conceptualizing the experiment, preparing the experiment, finding participants, 
running the experiment, calculating the results, interpreting the results, writing the 
reports, presenting the findings, etc. To use Benkler‘s terminology, one can argue that 
experimental research is highly modular.  
Clearly, research in the humanities also consists of different steps and different tasks. I 
can surely distinguish different epistemic tasks necessary for the completion of this 
thesis: there were various rounds of reading, excerpting, writing, presenting, discussing, 
reviewing, etc. However, these tasks are not as easily divisible or distributable over 
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different people, because the final result, the thesis, needs to be particularly coherent, it 
needs to be monolithic. As Benkler has already noted, there are differences with respect 
to the modularity of different epistemic tasks, depending on their goals. Writing an 
encyclopedia is different from writing a textbook for high schools, which is why 
Wikipedia is more successful than Wikibooks (Benkler 2006: 326).  
One might wonder whether this means that the humanities are less suited for 
collaboration just due to the fact that the typical tasks, processes and products are less 
modular than those one finds in the social and natural sciences. A possible conclusion 
could then be that one should not request humanities scholars to collaborate. However, 
given the obvious benefits of collaborative practices, a different consequence might be 
to question – or even change – the tasks in the humanities. Are different, more modular 
forms of intellectual work in the humanities feasible? And are they desirable? These are 
questions any request to increase the amount of large-scale collaboration in the 
humanities has to address. Yet taking into account the outlined benefits of combining 
and integrating the competencies and skills of diverse epistemic agents, a rise in 
collaborative and interdisciplinary projects seems clearly desirable also in the 
humanities.  
9.3.2 ESI & Diversity 
In his case study on peptic ulcer, Thagard shows that a multitude of different types of 
expertise and skills was needed to find the causes of peptic ulcer (Thagard 1998a; 
Thagard 1998b) . He concludes that for this reason only an interdisciplinary 
collaboration, a peer-different collaboration, to use his terminology, could possibly have 
come up with these results (Thagard 1997a). To develop a new theory of peptic ulcer, 
not only were new ideas about possible causes combined that contradicted the 
mainstream point of view and. It was also necessary to combine different empirical data 
from different disciplines to provide evidence for these theoretical claims. Due to this 
combination of resources, the explanatory efficacy of this new theory was very 
powerful, and as a consequence, it was possible to change a widely held belief in the 
medical community. Referring to yet another example of an interdisciplinary project in 
cognitive science, in which Thagard participated, he concludes that peer-different 
collaboration is epistemically desirable particularly because of its potential to increase 
explanatory efficacy (Thagard 1997a).  
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This conclusion can be read as an advocacy of interdisciplinary research – or, more 
broadly conceived, as a defense of epistemic diversity in science. Indeed, the epistemic 
merits of diversity have not only been addressed by social epistemologists and 
philosophers more generally (e.g. Solomon 2006, Kitcher 1993, Longino 2002c, 
Bohman 2006, Ober 2006, Kelly 2006), they have also been supported mathematically 
(Page 2007, Page 2001) and have further been used as an explanation for the success of 
most, if not all, examples of epistemic social software.  
While the benefits of cognitive diversity are widely acknowledged in social 
epistemology and philosophy of science and beyond, there is little consensus on whether 
or not diversity has to be reinforced by various interventions. In a paper on ―Norms of 
Epistemic Diversity‖ Miriam Solomon distinguishes three different socio-
epistemological stances towards diversity in science (Solomon 2006). The first one is a 
laissez-faire view according to which there is enough diversity in science and that for 
various reasons there should be no intervention into science. Solomon attributes this 
view amongst others to Philip Kitcher (Kitcher 1993). Solomon contrasts this laissez-
faire or invisible hand model with feminist positions that demand explicit 
encouragement and support of more diversity, e.g (Longino 1990 or Evelyn Fox Keller 
Keller 1985). 
I return to Solomon‘s analysis of diversity in more detail in Chapter 11, because her 
perspective is relevant to understand diversity with socio-epistemic systems that 
function via selection. This implies already that diversity can be assessed on different 
levels and that it functions differently in different types of epistemic sociality. I argue 
that within systems which depend on integration of epistemic tasks and results, diversity 
needs to be coupled with shared standards. By contrast, systems that depend on 
aggregation or selection as mechanisms of closure do not need shared standards to the 
same extent.  
The social epistemologist, whose account I consider most instructive for understanding 
the relevance of diversity in socio-technical epistemic systems that use integrative 
mechanisms of closure, is Helen Longino. Longino resolutely defends epistemic 
diversity and argues that ―[a] diversity of perspectives is necessary for vigorous and 
epistemically effective critical discourse (Longino 2002c: 131). However, as we have 
learned from her criteria for ideal epistemic communities, such diversity needs to be 
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combined with shared standards to lead to epistemically desirable results. For Longino, 
openness and the diversity of perspectives together with critical interaction are features 
which make science robust and thus need to be fostered and supported. The primary 
benefit of diversity in Longino‘s account consists in its potential to avoid and counter 
biases. Diversity of perspectives and transformative mutual criticism among epistemic 
agents with different perspectives is the prerequisite for knowledge to be created, for 
objectivity to be achieved. To elucidate this interplay of diversity, shared standards and 
critical interaction, I use a longer quote from Logino:  
―By ―social,‖ I have meant ―interactive.‖ Certainly, some assumptions and 
values are shared in any community, but genuine interaction requires 
diversity among the members. What identifies a given community as a 
community is a not a set of shared substantive beliefs, but a set of public 
standards to which community members appeal in critical discursive 
interactions. These standards may include substantive content, but they also 
include criteria of evidence and reasoning, methods of investigating. [...] 
They are [...] regulative elements of critical discourse. They come into 
existence in the course of the elaboration of such a discourse and are 
themselves subject to the same kind of critique they regulate. They may be 
internalized by individuals, but this is a consequence of their status in 
community interactions and not the other way around. Shared standards 
permit diversity of beliefs, but unity in their methods of evaluation.‖ 
(Longino 2002c: 148) 
A quite similar ideal of using diversity to counter bias is evoked in Wikipedia‘s 
emphasis on pluralism in their description of the ―Strengths, weaknesses, and article 
quality in Wikipedia‖. They write that ―Wikipedia is open to a large contributor base, 
drawing a large number of editors from diverse backgrounds. This allows Wikipedia to 
significantly reduce regional and cultural bias found in many other publications, and 
makes it very difficult for any group to censor and impose bias‖.142 As Longino does for 
science, Wikipedia uses diversity and openness as arguments for the validity of 
epistemic practices and systems. Although the openness of Wikipedia can also be a 
danger, that is acknowledged in their explication of the weaknesses of Wikipedia
143
, this 
openness is essential, because it enables diversity, which is necessary to counter bias. 
Yet obviously, diversity does not guarantee that bias is avoided and this is why an 
abundance of norms, guidelines and policies has emerged in Wikipedia as was outlined 
                                                 
142
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:About#Strengths.2C_weaknesses.2C_and_article_quality_in_W
ikipedia [date of access: 17.03.2010] 
143
 Please confer also: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:About#Strengths.2C_weaknesses.2C_and_article_quality_in_Wiki
pedia [date of access: 17.03.2010].  
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before. These social norms act as constraints, as shared norms of evaluation and conduct 
to which members of the Wikipedia community can appeal and which get enacted, 
internalized or transformed via interaction.  
Moreover, Wikipedia acknowledges a second function of diversity, namely the 
possibility to pool cognitive resources. Hence the self-description cited above continues 
as follows: ―A large, diverse editor base also provides access and breadth on subject 
matter that is otherwise inaccessible or little documented‖.144 Here diversity is 
considered positive, not because it makes systematic bias less likely, but because it helps 
to gather necessary competencies, skills and knowledge which may be widely 
distributed.  
To conclude: The dual epistemic function of diversity for systems that use integration as 
a mechanism of closure consists in pooling of socially distributed epistemic resources as 
well as in the avoidance or counter of bias. Yet while access to widely distributed 
knowledge and skills is also characteristic for the other two types of epistemic sociality, 
the need to integrate these competencies implies the needs for shared standards of 
evaluation and shared social norms of collaboration and interaction. Hence, for diversity 
to be beneficial in such systems it is not sufficient to simply lump together a bunch of 
diversely skilled epistemic agents. For socio-technical epistemic systems employing this 
type of epistemic sociality to successfully produce epistemic content, the individual 
contributions need to be integrated. This integration crucially depends on shared norms 
and standards. However temporary they may be, such shared norms and standards are 
indispensable in such systems. As is shown in the next chapters, this dependence on 
shared standards is one of the crucial differences between systems depending on 
integration as opposed to those depending on aggregation or selection as mechanisms of 
closure.  
9.3.3 ESI: Trust 
The relevance of diversity and task structures is not the only topic raised in Thagard‘s 
account of scientific collaborations. He also makes reference to Hardwig‘s work on the 
central role of trust in science and for knowledge more generally. Since Hardwig‘s 
                                                 
144
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:About#Strengths.2C_weaknesses.2C_and_article_quality_in_W
ikipedia [date of access: 17.03.2010] 
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position has been outlined before, a quote should suffice to summarize his claims. 
Hardwig states:  
―Modern knowers cannot be independent and self-reliant, not even in their own fields of 
specialization. In most disciplines, those who do not trust cannot know; those who do 
not trust cannot have the best evidence for their beliefs. In an important sense, then, trust 
is often epistemologically even more basic than empirical data or logical arguments: the 
data and the argument are available only through trust. If the metaphor of foundation is 
still useful, the trustworthiness of members of epistemic communities is the ultimate 
foundation for much of our knowledge‖ (Hardwig 1991: 693). 
This quote indicates the centrality of trust for knowledge: we have to trust other 
epistemic agents as well as epistemic content to use it as input for further epistemic 
processing. For epistemic content to be considered trustworthy, we further have to trust 
non-human epistemic agents as well as the processes involved in the creation of this 
epistemic content. Trust then pervades all phases and instances of socio-technical 
epistemic systems and processes. The following picture visualizes this pervasiveness of 
trust in socio-technical epistemic systems that employ integrative mechanisms of 
closure. As will become obvious in the following chapters, the loci of trust differ 
between systems that employ different mechanisms of closure.  
 
Figure 14: Trust in ES:Integration 
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Referring back to Longino‘s differentiation of different senses of knowledge, I take it as 
a central premise that, to understand science as well as open-ended epistemic practices 
on the Web, we have to focus on the interaction between knowledge as content and 
knowledge-producing practices (Longino 2002c: 77ff). Knowledge as content is the 
input just as much as the output of knowledge-producing practices. In order to use 
knowledge as input for epistemic practices, we have to trust this knowledge. This 
implies trust in the people and mechanisms that have produced this knowledge. We 
cannot possibly test every premise before accepting it. We have to stop scrutinizing 
somewhere and trust. We trust people, we trust methods, we trust our senses – without 
trust, knowledge is impossible. In this sense trust is fundamental for knowledge: without 
trusting some knowledge by using it as input for our epistemic practices, we cannot 
engage in the process of creating knowledge. At the very least we have to trust our 
senses or our reasoning, yet in the majority of epistemic situations, we have to trust in 
much more profound ways: other people, instruments, methods, etc. Science and the 
Web in particular are environments in which epistemic processes are less likely to be 
finalized by direct recognition. Indeed, scientific knowledge is always provisional, 
partial and plural, as Helen Longino has convincingly argued (Longino 2002: 207). I do 
think that the same is true for knowledge as content and knowledge-producing practices 
on the Web.  
Thus trust seems to be indispensable for knowledge creation in science and beyond. And 
indeed, Thagard also agrees with Hardwig (Hardwig 1985; Hardwig 1991) that ―we very 
much epistemically dependent on one another: much of what each of us professes to 
know depends on information that we have acquired from others that we trust‖ (Thagard 
1997a: 241). However, he immediately alerts us to the dangers of trust for science when 
he continues: ―The cost of epistemic dependence of the sort especially notable between 
collaborators is that mistakes can enter and propagate within the system because of 
collaborators who are inept or corrupt. Hence collaboration between equals may 
decrease as well as increase reliability‖ (Thagard 1997a: 241). Here, Thagard hints at the 
delicate equilibrium of trust which is needed for collaborations to score well with 
respect to the five standards of epistemic appraisal. Too much trust – or blind trust – 
may reduce reliability and hence have detrimental epistemic effects by leaving 
questionable results and methods unquestioned. Too little trust may lead to losses in 
efficiency and speed because agents would waste too much time in checking others‘ 
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results. Not to mention the more atmospheric problems that will occur when distrust 
becomes obvious. If trust is suspended altogether, collaborations become impossible.  
This ambivalence is inherent in the concept of trust itself. In her article on trust in the 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Carolyn McLeod states that ―trust is an attitude 
that we have towards people we hope will be trustworthy‖ (Mcleod 2006). In line with 
my previous arguments, I would add that trust is an attitude that we not only have 
towards people, but also to knowledge as content, to mechanisms, processes, to non-
human epistemic agents more broadly conceived. Yet as the word hope indicates we 
cannot be sure that what we trust really will prove to have been trustworthy in the end. 
Trust is not being certain. Trust by definition contains the risk of being let down, the risk 
of having placed trust wrongly – and one of the crucial philosophical questions about 
trust is under what conditions trust is warranted. 
Relating back to Hardwig‘s original paper, trust involves a reliance on others‘ 
competence and their honesty. Trust then is warranted if we identify those epistemic 
agents who are competent and honest, if we can distinguish the honest from the 
dishonest, the competent from the incompetent. This identification implies a differential 
epistemic and moral assessment of epistemic agents.
145
 However, this assessment comes 
with several problems. First of all, assessing someone else‘s competency is difficult in 
fields in which we are not competent ourselves. Assessing someone‘s honesty also is a 
difficult task if we do not know what is at stakes for him. Second, even if we have the 
means to assess someone‘s competency, some of the benefits of collaboration (with 
respect to efficiency and speed) would be diminished if we spent too much time cross-
checking others. Thus, in cases where we lack the means to assess someone‘s 
competency or honesty directly or if we want to save time, we make use of different 
proxies of trustworthiness. 
As outlined in Chapter 6, Shapin (Shapin 1994) offers one rule of a thumb to decide 
upon the honesty, namely disinterestedness. While analyzing the development of 
English experimental philosophy as a predecessor of experimental science, Shapin 
argues that a good proxy to find someone who does not lie is to find someone who is 
                                                 
145
 Hardwig (1991) introduces a third criterion to assess someone‘s trustworthiness: adequate epistemic 
self-assessment, i.e. the ability to assess one‘s own level of competence regarding the issue at hand. Since 
adequate epistemic self-assessment is a second-order competence, which indicates the limits of one‘s 
competence, I for the moment subsume it under my considerations on the assessment of competence. 
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disinterested, someone who is free. And in Seventeenth-century England, those who 
were considered to be free were the gentlemen, because their economic position allowed 
them not to work. Economic freedom was understood as a prerequisite for moral 
freedom. It was assumed that ―[g]entlemen were truth-tellers because nothing could 
work upon them that would induce them to be otherwise‖ (Shapin 1994: 84). Indeed, 
Shapin argues, ―[...] it was the disinterestedness of the English gentleman‘s situation that 
was most importantly identified as the basis of his truth-telling‖ (Shapin 1994: 83). 
Philipp Kitcher (Kitcher 1993) is another author who has stressed the crucial role of 
trust for collaboration in science and acknowledges that trust not only needs to be placed 
in people, but also in instruments, techniques and procedures (Kitcher 1993: 308)). The 
major part of his analyses, however, concerns the assessments of peers. In contrast to 
Shapin, however, Kitcher does not focus on an assessment of others‘ honesty, but on an 
estimation of their competency. The guiding questions for him are: ―Whom should one 
trust? When should one trust others more than oneself? When is it worth risking the 
errors that others might make?‖ (Kitcher 1993: 304). Kitcher emphasizes the differential 
assignment of trust to different epistemic agents – oneself included. This differential 
assignment of trust is based on an estimation of the competence of epistemic agents 
based on different proxies. That is, when competence cannot be directly assessed, people 
use different indicators to predict the competence of others. Sometimes it may be 
possible to rely on the evaluation of past performances. If that is not possible, one may 
use someone‘s social position, her institutional background, etc. as indicators for her 
competence. Kitcher uses the term earned authority to refer to the former and unearned 
authority to refer to the latter (Kitcher 1993: 315).  
This leads us to the relationship between trust and authority. In order to know, we have 
to trust. Yet trust implies the risk of misplacing trust, of placing trust in agents who are 
incompetent or dishonest, in instruments, procedures and information, which are not 
valid. Trust is not certainty. But in order to be epistemically responsible knowers, we 
have to strive for placing trust adequately. And to do this, we have to assess epistemic 
agents and processes. For the assessment of human epistemic agents this implies that 
where we cannot assess their competence and honesty directly, we may have to rely on 
proxies of trustworthiness. These proxies can and often are reputational cues, indicators 
of past performance as well as various social cues – Kitcher‘s unearned and earned 
forms of authority. However, I would argue that these cues are not types of authority 
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themselves, but indicators of how to attribute authority to others. Authority in this sense 
implies the assignment of power based on the making of differences between epistemic 
agents based on various – more or less valid – proxies of epistemic trustworthiness. 
Indeed, power functions twofold in this process. On the one hand existing differences in 
societal status may have an effect on the attribution of epistemic authority to epistemic 
agents as feminists have shown (e.g. Alcoff 2001). On the other hand, differences in 
power are also the result of such differential attributions of authority and epistemic 
trustworthiness. I return to questions of authority, trustworthiness and reputation in the 
next section.  
Before, let me conclude these explanations on the role of trust in socio-technical 
epistemic systems and processes. In order to know we have to put some trust in 
knowledge, we can never be certain about all the premises we use in our knowledge-
producing practices. However, since trust is not certainty, it involves the risk of being let 
down. And as responsible knowers, we have to be aware of this risk. We may have a 
default to trust, but also a duty to watch out for signs of dishonesty and incompetence. 
Therefore the differential assessment of peers regarding their competency and honesty is 
a major issue for analyzing socio-technical epistemic systems in which multiple 
epistemic agents are involved in epistemic practices. And this differential assessment 
leads us to another cluster of issues: the relationship between authority, reputation and 
trustworthiness. 
9.3.4 ESI: Authority, Reputation, Trustworthiness: Making 
Differences that Matter 
While in the last section it has been noted that trust can and has to be placed in people as 
much as in non-human epistemic agents, in techniques, processes and mechanisms, I 
focus in this section on human epistemic agents. I analyze and show how we use 
reputational cues to assess the trustworthiness of epistemic agents, how we attribute 
authority based on this assessment. This section is on the power of making differences 
that matter between epistemic agents.  
Coming back to Thagard‘s analysis of the respective merits of different types 
collaborations in science, it becomes obvious that the main criterion for distinguishing 
these different types consisted in the respective authority of epistemic agents. The 
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distinction between peers and non-peers is essentially a distinction based on the amount 
of authority ascribed to different epistemic agents. This differential attribution of 
authority is then used as a criterion for attributing differential amounts of 
trustworthiness to epistemic agents.  
As noted before, Philip Kitcher examines the role of authority in his formal analyses of 
the organization of cognitive labor (Kitcher 1993). He starts with the assertion that 
collaboration is advantageous, because it allows scientists to achieve some goals faster 
and makes other larger tasks, tasks that would extend the lifespan of one person, feasible 
in the first place. However, in those tasks that could be conducted individually, the 
decision to collaborate depends not only on the gain in time, but also on the assumed 
error rates of doing the task yourself versus delegating it to someone else. That is, gains 
in speed have to be weighed against potential losses in reliability. This estimation of 
error rates assumes that scientists can – and do – assess their peers‘ authority, i.e. they 
estimate each others‘ reliability to decide upon collaborations and deference to 
authority. Kitcher outlines different options scientists have in order to assess their peers. 
One of the crucial distinctions is between earned and unearned authority. While 
unearned authority for Kitcher refers to scientists‘ social position or their institutional 
background, whereas the quality of their papers and the journals they have published in 
refers to their earned authority. Moreover, scientists can assess their earned authority 
via direct or indirect calibration. Direct calibration refers to assessing epistemic claims 
oneself, e.g. by reading an article by someone to assess her competence, whereas 
indirect calibration refers to assessing her competence by taking into account how 
others have judged her article, e.g. via ratings, recommendations, etc. 
Kitcher crucially notes that the idea that non-epistemic, social factors play no role in the 
attribution of authority is a ―traditional epistemologist‘s utopia‖ (Kitcher 1993: 318). 
Alliances, prestige effects and backscratching are the topics that he outlines to show the 
extent to which social factors and relations do influence or bias the attribution of 
authority. The crucial criterion to assess such practices for Kitcher however remains 
purely epistemic: to what extent does deference to authority save time and resources and 




However, many feminist scholars have stressed that such socially induced biases in 
attributing authority are epistemically and ethically highly problematic (e.g. Fricker 
2007, Code 1987, Scheman 2001, Campbell 2001, Alcoff 2001). To what extent is the 
social identity of epistemic agents relevant for the assessment of their capacities as a 
knower? Which proxies are valid as indicators of her epistemic trustworthiness? Which 
reputational cues should be used for ascribing authority? And how do we detect and 
avoid the use of invalid proxies? The use of reputational cues to assess epistemic 
trustworthiness and to attribute authority has epistemic advantages, especially in the 
absence or - as is particularly true in the case of the Web - in the overabundance of 
information. Yet it also comes with epistemic and ethical dangers. 
First of all, the use of reputation to assess content can be epistemically beneficial while 
being morally questionable. Once social information is taken into account to rate the 
quality of content, the door is open for social biases, prejudices and discrimination, 
which are as prevalent in science and on the Web as in the societies that have developed 
and maintained these socio-technical epistemic systems. These problems are not new 
and have long been identified for science and other epistemic fields by feminist 
epistemologists. In addition to raising awareness about these problems, various scholars 
have also developed tools and strategies to counter these epistemic injustices (Fricker 
2007, Scheman 2001, Alcoff 2001). Miranda Fricker, for instance, distinguishes 
between testimonial and hermeneutic injustices as two instances in which someone is 
wronged in his capacity as a knower based on his social position. According to her 
―testimonial injustice occurs when prejudice causes a hearer to give a deflated level of 
credibility to a speaker‘s word, whereas hermeneutic injustice ―[...] occurs at a prior 
stage, when a gap in collective interpretative resources puts someone at an unfair 
disadvantage when it comes to making sense of their social experience‖ (Fricker 2007) 
1). Clearly, both forms of injustice are easily conceivable when reputational cues and 
their epistemic usage are not critically reflected upon and kept open for constant scrutiny 
and revision.  
The second problem concerns the limits of the epistemic usefulness of reputational 
information itself and can be further split into two types of concerns. The first question 
is how you calculate the reputation of someone else in the first place, resp. which 
proxies you use. Do you use the person‘s academic development, his institutional 
background, some form of communal evaluation, such as ratings or recommendations 
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that he has received from other people as a cue to assess someone‘s reputation? Do you 
rely on your own experience with her? Or some indicator of the quality of her former 
research? On her track record of different academic achievements? Her H-index or 
impact factor? Which of these proxies are valid and which are not? The second crucial 
question concerns the stability of reputation, i.e. the way you deal with evidence that 
supports or contradicts your view on the reputation of others. When, under which 
conditions, and up to which degree of counter-evidence are you warranted in keeping 
your reputation value for someone or something? If we want to explore the utility of 
reputation for epistemic purposes, we have to analyze the potentials and possible 
dangers very carefully. That reputation is used to assess information and epistemic 
claims goes without saying – and it comes with benefits as much as with problems. So 
the question should be less how to avoid using reputation cues for epistemic purpose, 
but rather how to use them wisely. 
9.4 Implications for the Analysis and Design of Socio-Technical 
Epistemic Systems 
9.4.1 Trust & Authority in Wikipedia  
Given the relevance of trust for knowledge creation in everyday life and in science, it 
should not come as a surprise that trusting to know is crucial on the Web as well. The 
Web is an enormous conglomeration of information of varying quality. If we pursue 
epistemic goals, it is therefore crucial to extract valuable information from the 
overabundance of existing information. And again: in many cases we have to trust 
because we cannot check everything for ourselves. In the following I apply some of the 
insights obtained before to Wikipedia.  
65 million people use Wikipedia each month. If there is one conclusion to be drawn 
from this number, it is that many people use Wikipedia for epistemic purposes. Yet can 
you trust Wikipedia? And if so for what reasons? Different answers have been given to 
these questions (Magnus 2009, Tollefsen 2009, Wray 2009) and some of Wikipedia‘s 
critics keep insisting that one should not trust it at all (Waters 2007, Keen 2008). Indeed, 
many of the proxies that we usually use to assess the trustworthiness of information are 
missing: due to its openness, people can edit who would not be considered experts on 
the topic. Due to the anonymity of contributions we can neither assess the competency 
nor the honesty of contributors. The reason for trusting Wikipedia must thus be a 
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different one than trusting a person. I argue that the reason why people trust the content 
of Wikipedia is that they trust the processes of Wikipedia. It is a form of procedural 
trust, not a trust in persons.  
If people know how Wikipedia works and trust it, then they trust it, because they 
attribute some epistemic authority, some trustworthiness to the process by which 
Wikipedia generates information. They do not trust specific persons; they trust 
Wikipedia as a system that is based on a distinct process of information provision. This 
process is characterized by a multitude of users that can edit and change information 
immediately, combined with a mechanism to undo revisions easily and quickly as well 
as a system for tracking these changes and making them visible. It is a system enforcing 
open access with minimal entry barriers, combined with mechanism of making editing 
patterns transparent.  
The rationale behind this openness of Wikipedia is scale. More people can provide more 
information faster. However, a second point is crucial: the more people scrutinize and 
can easily change content, the less likely errors and biases remain undetected. Please 
note that there is no guarantee that an error or bias gets detected. It is only more likely, if 
a multitude of diverse people participate in this process. This is a probabilistic statement.  
Wikipedia provides a lot of information on many topics due to the multitude of 
volunteers, due to its diversity and the ability to pool abilities, competencies and socially 
distributed knowledge and information. Yet if Wikipedia did not provided good 
information, it would not be used to the extent it is used. On average, Wikipedia works 
well as a source of information. However, the problem lies exactly in the term on 
average. Since Wikipedia is a dynamic system, information can be changed by anyone 
anytime. Hence, there is no guarantee that the information provided at the moment one 
accesses Wikipedia is correct or a blatant lie. While Wikipedia might be trusted as a 
system because of certain characteristics, this overall trustworthiness does not help us to 
assess the trustworthiness of a specific claim in Wikipedia. This is the crux of statistical 
reasoning: it works well on average, but we can never be certain about a specific 
instantiation. To improve this assessment of specific claims, various tools have been 
developed to empower users to make more informed decisions about which information 
to trust and where to be skeptical. In the following I depict two of them briefly, the 
WikiScanner and the WikiDashboard. While both of them empower users to assess the 
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trustworthiness of information, they function very differently – and require different 
forms of trust themselves. I conclude this section with sketching yet another example of 
a tool that can empower users and make them more careful and responsible knowers: 
traffic lights of trustworthiness.  
WikiScanner: Which IP-Address Does Not Belong to a Gentleman?  
In 2007, a tool called WikiScanner
146
 has received quite a lot of attention and media 
coverage. WikiScanner is a search tool that traces IP addresses of those who change 
Wikipedia entries anonymously. The tool was developed by Virgil Griffith, a graduate 
student at CalTech. Griffith says that the inspiration for this tool has been the revelation 
that the offices of Congress members had been editing their own Wikipedia entries 
(Borland 2007). He wanted to find out whether other companies and organizations also 
edit entries in ways that served their interests. By tracking the IP addresses of 
anonymous editors, this tool unveiled that this was indeed the case. Numerous 
organizations edited Wikipedia articles to serve their interests. On his website, Griffith 
concludes: ―Overall - especially for non-controversial topics - Wikipedia seems to work. 
For controversial topics, Wikipedia can be made more reliable through techniques like 
this one.‖147 What is the epistemic and ethical utility of a tool like WikiScanner? 
Referring back to the insights obtained from Shapin, one may argue that WikiScanner 
helps to find out which IP-addresses do not belong to gentlemen Shapin 1994. 
Disinterestedness is an important proxy for honesty and the flipside of the coin is that if 
we can reasonably assume bias, because those who edited an entry do have an interest in 
it, we should re-assess the amount of trust we place in this particular information 
accordingly.  
WikiDashboard: Using Editing Patterns to Assess Trustworthiness 
WikiDashboard is another tool which aims at raising the trustworthiness of Wikipedia 
by making things transparent. Yet the rationale is quite different. Instead of revealing the 
identity of anonymous contributors, WikiDashboard "[...] visualizes the social dynamics 
and editing patterns of every article and editor of Wikipedia" (Chi, Suh et al. 2008). The 
basic idea behind the development of this tool is that the fact that anyone can edit any 
Wikipedia article is not necessarily a threat to reliability. Although WikiScanner reveals 




 FAQ of WikiScanner: http://virgil.gr/31 
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that people sometimes consciously and purposefully introduce error into Wikipedia and 
by doing this exploit Wikipedia‘s openness, the same openness can also be a source for 
its reliability. Using science as a point of reference, Suh et al. (Suh, Chi et al. 2008) 
argue that it is precisely the possibility to put ideas into discussion, to examine and 
challenge each other‘s claims, that is crucial for knowledge generation in science and 
that similar processes also occur on the Web. Reliability and growth of knowledge 
might thus be advanced by discussions and mutual criticism in combination with 
practices that increase social transparency, such as attribution, indication of past 
performance and provision of sources.  
 
Figure 15: Screenshot of WikiDashboard for the article “Knowledge”148 
WikiDashboards exist for users and for articles.
149
 Thus the editing activity of a specific 
user or a specific article is visualized and can be used as a cue for assessing the 
trustworthiness of an article at a given moment or as a proxy for the trustworthiness of a 
user. The WikiDashboard embedded within each article of Wikipedia is intended to 
make the user aware of interesting editing patterns he or she might otherwise not notice. 
In the case of articles, examples would be sudden bursts of editorial activity due to 
recent events. WikiDashboards on user sites might indicate the user‘s specific editing 
                                                 
148
 http://wikidashboard.parc.com/wiki/Knowledge [date of access: 28.11.2009] 
149
 Please confer the screenshots I have provided for both cases.  
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habits as well as the range and variety of topics she contributes to. Such editing patterns 
could thus be used as proxies to assess the user‘s competency and honesty. If he has 
edited many pages with similar content, this may be a proxy for his competence on the 
topic. If his editing patterns reveal frequent repetitive revisions, he may have been 
involved in flame wars, which in turn may be a proxy for his dishonesty.  
 
Figure 16: Screenshot of WikiDashboard for the User “Snowded”150 
To conclude, by unveiling the evolvement of articles and the role and amount of conflict 
therein, WikiDahsboard aims at raising the social transparency and accountability of 
Wikipedia. More specifically, the overall trustworthiness of Wikipedia is supposed to be 
raised by an increase of transparency on the level of individual articles and users. Thus, 
WikiDashboard may decrease the trust of users in an article by revealing an editing 
pattern that is indicative of a flame war and therefore warns the user not to trust the 
information provided. By doing this, WikiDashboard empowers the user in giving him 
reasons to distrust. Yet the existence of such a tool increases the overall trustworthiness 
of Wikipedia, because it amends the information with an indicator of its trustworthiness. 
To use a statistical comparison: it is as if Wikipedia would not only deliver a measure, 
but also the confidence interval. One problem with WikiDashboard concerns the 
interpretation of these visualized editing patterns: to what extent are they useful to assess 
                                                 
150
 http://wikidashboard.parc.com/wiki/User:Snowded [date of access: 28.11.2009] 
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the trustworthiness of users and pages? After all, the user involved in the flame war may 
just as well be the one who introduces error as the one who devotes time to correct it. 
The editing pattern alone may not be able to tell the difference. The second problem 
concerns the accessibility of WikiDashboard. The interface of WikiDashboard it quite 
complex and some users may refrain from using it, because they do not understand it. 
This leads us to the relationship between simplicity and complexity in making things 
transparent. 
Transparency, Simplicity and Traffic Lights of Trustworthiness 
In the case of WikiScanner and WikiDashboard transparency is used to support critical 
assessment and attribution of trustworthiness. Rendering the sources and editing patterns 
visible enables rational assessment of information provided on Wikipedia. However, 
transparency is often a matter of degree and how transparent something is depends on 
someone‘s abilities. The question therefore is: what is how transparent for whom? 
For instance, the discussion and history pages of Wikipedia, which serve as input data 
for Chi et al.'s tool (Chi, Suh et al. 2008) are in principle already accessible to all users 
of Wikipedia. However, many people do not look at these pages. Maybe because it is 
too much effort; maybe because they do not want to be bothered; maybe because they do 
not understand the interface or how information about revisions might be useful to 
assess the quality of information. It is especially for this very last fraction of users that 
the WikiDashboard might be interesting. However, even some of those from the 'I don't 
care'-category might be turned into 'Well, now-I'm-interested', if the indication of 
trustworthiness is a salient feature of the website and if it had proven useful to them in 
their first trials.  
WikiDashboard is not simply another Web2.0 widget, but a tool for empowerment, a 
tool that raises awareness about the functioning - and possible malfunctioning - of one 
of the major information sources on the Web. However, I also think that its interface is 
quite complex and difficult to interpret. Users may still feel overwhelmed by the huge 
amount of data provided even in this aggregated format and therefore they might not use 
it. An interesting question therefore is whether there might be even simpler tools that 
still raise the epistemological and ethical reflexivity of many differently skilled and 
interested users.  
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Let's assume we have an algorithm that translates the editing patterns into the three 
different signals of a traffic light: Depending on the editing patters, the traffic light 
embedded on top of each Wikipedia site would be in red, yellow or green. Wouldn't this 
make you stop and wonder for a second what this signal is trying to tell you? Whether 
you should treat the information of the article differently depending on whether the 
lights are on red or green? The traffic lights are simply a much more condensed and 
intuitive format than the rather complex interface of the WikiDashboard. The traffic 
light signal would be a dynamic, automatically generated indicator of the controversies 
which preceded the temporal fixation of the Wikipedia article the moment you read it. 
This indicator can then be used as a proxy for the trustworthiness of the current state of 
the article. That this indicator is dynamic and automatically generated based on the 
editing patterns is crucial for assessing the trustworthiness of any dynamic website. If 
the traffic lights cannot potentially change with each revision of the article, they would 
soon be rendered unreliable and thus useless as indicators of trustworthiness of a 
potentially constantly changing article. Yet this is exactly what users are interested in: a 
quick assessment of the quality of the article they see at the moment they see it.  
However, simplicity comes with a price. If we use the traffic lights as proxies to assess 
the trustworthiness of information provided on Wikipedia, we only shift the locus of 
trust: Instead of trusting the content on Wikipedia, we now have to trust the mechanism 
assessing its trustworthiness. That is, instead of trusting the mechanism by which 
information is created on Wikipedia, we now have to trust the algorithm that simplifies a 
multitude of complex editing patterns into a tripartite signal. And as we will see in the 
next chapter, decisions embedded into algorithms are even less subject to critical 
scrutiny than Wikipedia articles – because they are less visible. Yet once we realize the 
epistemological and ethical relevance of seemingly minor programming decisions, it 
becomes obvious that we have to maintain and possibly even increase a critical stance 
when delegating the assessment of trustworthiness to algorithms. And again, a crucial 
prerequisite of such critical assessment is transparency.  
9.4.2 Social Norms, Diversity & Authority in Socio-Technical 
Epistemic Systems 
In this section I argue for the fertility of using Helen Longino‘s Critical Contextual 
Empiricism to analyze and develop socio-technical epistemic systems. I start with a brief 
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reminder of her approach before using her four social norms for social knowledge to 
assess socio-epistemic practices on the Web as well as the question of how scientific 
publishing may be changed through the use of Web2.0.  
As noted before, Helen Longino‘s Critical Contextual Empiricism aims at reconciling 
philosophical accounts of science with insights from the social studies of science by 
dissolving a dichotomous understanding of the social and the rational. Departing from a 
decided feminist position, she acknowledges that the sociality of knowledge in its three 
senses allows for biases and distortions in science and scientific knowledge (Longino 
2002c, Longino 2005, Longino 1996, Longino and Lennon 1997). However, sociality is 
not only a biasing factor – it can also deliver the means to counter such biases. The role 
of a social epistemologist therefore is to show ―[...] how the social dimensions of 
cognition have resources for the correction of those epistemically undermining 
possibilities‖ (Longino 2002c: 205). And these resources for correction lie within a 
combination of epistemic diversity with shared standards of evaluation. 
In contrast to Philip Kitcher (Kitcher 1993), Longino does not consider science to 
sufficiently employ and exploit beneficial social mechanisms to counter biases. Hence, 
in order to make sure that ―[t]he social is not a corrupting but a validating element in 
knowledge‖ (Longino 2002c: 122), Longino proposes four social norms for social 
knowledge. These norms were portrayed before, but given their relevance for the 
following analyses I quote them again (cf. Longino 2002c: 129ff): 
―1. Venues. There must be publicly recognized forums for the criticism of 
evidence, of methods, and of assumptions and reasoning. […] 
2. Uptake. There must be uptake of criticism. The community must not 
merely tolerate dissent, but its beliefs and theories must change over time in 
response to the critical discourse taking place within it. […] Uptake is what 
makes criticism part of a constructive and justificatory practice. […] 
3. Public Standards. […] Participants in a dialogue must share some 
referring terms, some principles of inference, and some values or aims to be 
served by the shared activity of discursive interaction. […] A community‘s 
standards are themselves subordinated to its overall cognitive aims […] 
Finally, standards are not a static set but may themselves be criticized and 
transformed […] There is no particular act of adopting or establishing 
standards. […] 
4. Tempered Equality. Finally, communities must be characterized by 
equality of intellectual authority.‖ 
326 
 
These four norms are more than just ethical or political nice-to-have‘s. If knowledge 
involves justification, if knowledge as an epistemological status has to be attributed to a 
claim by a group of people, then knowledge fundamentally rests on communities and the 
social mechanisms and procedures they employ. As Longino states, ―[w]hile 
intersubjective interaction is a necessary feature of scientific cognition, not just any form 
of interaction will do.‖(Longino 1994: 144). Rather, interaction has to be effective to 
yield in knowledge. And the four norms exemplify those criteria that have to be met for 
effective criticism, for checks and balances to take place. It is only through such 
effective criticism that the subjective can be transformed into the objective, ―[...] not by 
canonizing one subjectivity over others, but by assuring that what is ratified as 
knowledge has survived criticism from multiple points of view‖ (Longino 2002c: 129). 
Thus effective criticism is a prerequisite of knowledge, and not just an addendum.  
Longino considers her four norms as recommendations for the design and constitution of 
scientific communities. An ideal scientific community would fulfill all these four 
standards to a maximum. In such a community all hypotheses and theories would be 
subject to the broadest range of valid criticism by fostering epistemic diversity, by 
encouraging dissenting voices instead of silencing them, and by listening and 
responding to criticism in ways that will further increase knowledge. The effect of such 
transformative criticism will be that the ―[…] theories and hypotheses accepted in the 
community will not incorporate the idiosyncratic biases (heuristic or social) of an 
individual or subgroup‖ (Longino 2002c: 134). Given that these norms represent an 
ideal epistemic community, real epistemic communities will hardly ever fulfill all those 
norms completely, the quality of epistemic communities rather comes in degrees 
(Longino 2002c: 134). However, the fact that ideals might never be attained does not 
diminish their value as ideals to strive for. After all, the possibility that truth may not be 
attained has never hindered people to strive for it.  
The utility of Longino‘s norms for this thesis should be evident. If those norms can 
guide and amend scientific knowledge creation by giving concrete recommendations of 
how to design interaction in scientific communities, then the same norms may well be 




If we were to design socio-technical systems for epistemic purposes that aim at fulfilling 
Longino‘s standards, how should we go about? In other words: what are the 
characteristics of systems that support transformative criticism and which features of 
Web tools might be useful? As should be obvious from my remarks in Chapter 3 on 
Science and Technology Studies (STS), I do not assume that one can design socio-
technical systems like machines that function according to plan. According to a more 
performative view, socio-technical assemblages evolve over time and change with 
practice. However, by designing systems just as much as by designing technical 
artifacts, one sets parameters that imply certain limits and affordances, that make some 
forms of usage more likely than others. This also means that while I might design 
systems to support transformative criticism, there is no guarantee whatsoever that my 
system will actually fulfill this task. Even if I set the parameters right, the success or 
failure of my system – with respect to the goal of being a system that supports 
transformative criticism - will depend on other factors, such as the motivation of the 
users, etc. But let‘s take a look at how one might set the parameters so as to increase the 
likelihood that a system will support transformative criticism.  
The Need for Publicly Recognized Venues for Criticism 
The first norm concerns the need for publicly recognized venues for criticism. These 
venues could of course be physical places as well. Given the topic of this thesis, 
however, I focus on new possibilities offered on the Web. As noted before, the demand 
for publicly recognized venues for criticism actually implies two demands: not only do 
we need to devote space to criticism, criticism and the venues should also be publicly 
recognized.  
The issue of space is quite easily solved on the Web. In contrast to print publications, 
where space was a precious resource, space is not a substantial expense factor on the 
Web. Gaining attention rather is the crucial factor (Franck 1996; Goldhaber 1996a; 
Goldhaber 1996b, Nielsen 1999). And since it has been argued that science itself also 
functions according to attention economics, there might be one more commonality 
between scientific practices and epistemic practices on the Web (Kerres, Euler et al. 
2005). If we use the example of scientific publishing, economically nothing would speak 
against devoting as much space to original research as to critical responses to it.  
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The problem of recognition is harder to tackle. For a long time, original research has 
been considered to be much more important than critical analyses of other people‘s 
work. Just think about the perceived value difference of publishing a study versus a 
book review. Clearly, appraisal and refutation is in principle an essential part of 
research. Looking at scientific papers, there is always reference to those works one is 
building his research upon, as well as those one strives to refute. Nonetheless, such 
reference may remain superficial and direct replications of work are much rarer than one 
might expect given the alleged importance of replicability in science. One reason for this 
is that replication is not much valued in science. Maybe this is the case because the 
initial act of creativity is missing when an experiment is replicated. Not only do 
replications hardly receive funding, the chances that those results will be published are 
also lower. Given the space restrictions of journals, an editorial policy that favors 
original research might make sense. If one recapitulates Goldman‘s recommendations 
for editors, the newsworthiness of articles should play a role for selection (Goldman 
2003: 263ff). Put more bluntly, replicating something that has been done has no 
newsworthiness. The only exception are replications of highly surprising original 
research. Hence, the reputation of replications is low. If one sticks to the criterion of 
newsworthiness, then maybe their value indeed is low. If a replication of the 
experimental design leads to the same results this results supports the original finding, 
but adds nothing new. However, this judgment can only be made after the replication 
has shown a difference and the low reputation of replications might diminish the 
likelihood of replications in the first place.  
A second related problem concerns results which are not significant. Non-significant 
results are usually also not published or at least are less likely published, although they 
indeed are results. The result is negative, i.e. there is no difference before and after an 
intervention or there is no difference between two different treatments, etc. Given the 
space constraints of paper journals studies that have positive results, i.e. that can show 
significant differences, are usually favored. This selection practice however, has lead to 
a significant bias in published results. Assume you are interested in the effectiveness of 
two different methods of teaching French. You can conduct a meta-analysis of all 
published articles that compare these two methods and the result is that in 60 out of 80 
studies method A has lead to better results. Let‘s assume further that method A is only 
moderately more expensive than method B. Than this result would probably lead you to 
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the conclusion that method A should be preferred. Imagine however, that these 80 
studies are only the significant tip of an iceberg of 1000 unpublished studies, which 
showed no difference between the two methods. How would the knowledge about this 
relation between published and unpublished material affect your judgment?  
One possibility to counter this problem of bias would be to publish all studies 
irrespective of whether they have obtained significant results as long as they meet the 
standards of their disciplines. Recently, the journal Rejecta Mathematica has been 
launched that publishes papers that have been rejected from peer-reviewed journals. The 
reasons behind the introduction of such a ―second-chance-journal‖ for mathematical 
papers are well worth quoting at length. The initiators of Rejecta Mathematica argue 
that the value of publishing rejected papers lies in the following aspects:  
'―mapping the blind alleys of science‖: papers containing negative results 
can warn others against futile directions;  
―reinventing the wheel: papers accidentally rederiving a known result may 
contain new insight or ideas;  
―squaring the circle": papers discovered to contain a serious technical flaw 
may nevertheless contain information or ideas of interest;  
―applications of cold fusion": papers based on a controversial premise may 
contain ideas applicable in more traditional settings;  
―misunderstood genius‖: other papers may simply have no natural home 
among existing journals.‖'151 
Other journals exist that publish negative results only.
152
 A possible downside of 
publishing all rejected material may lie in the risk of increasing the noise. The more 
papers get published, the more resources we need to process to find what we are 
searching for. Whether this fear of information overload is a reason enough to refrain 
from such a change in publishing would have to be debated. However, another 
possibility would be to develop a database in which all results – and only the results of 
studies which meet the methodological standards of their discipline - are saved. Such a 
database of results would not only have a positive epistemic effect, because it could be 
the basis for unbiased meta-analyses. It would also allow researchers to receive credit 
for relevant work they have done - that just usually would not have been published. 
                                                 
151
 http://math.rejecta.org/about-rejecta-mathematica [date of access: 26.01.2010]. 
152
 E.g. the Journal of Negative Results, http://www.jnr-eeb.org/index.php/jnr , NOGO, the Journal of 
Negative Observations in Genetic Oncology [date of access: 26.01.2010]. 
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Such a policy would also have positive effects on the distribution of research efforts 
within scientific communities. If all results - irrespective of whether they were 
significant of not - were known, unnecessary duplication of work could be avoided. As 
long as non-significant results are less likely to be published, money and time may be 
wasted by researchers conducting studies that have repeatedly been shown to lead to 
non-significant results. The point I hope to have made clear is that publication practices 
and the space we devote and the value we ascribe to studies critically assessing others‘ 
work is crucial for science and epistemic practices more generally. The Web enables us 
to devote more space to various forms of critique. The tools are thus not the problem. 
The crucial task will be to change the differential valuation of original research and 
critical assessment and responses. This process can only be tackled if evaluation 
procedures in academia are changed accordingly. New models to evaluate scientists may 
need to be developed to account for and foster this change in perception: reviews and 
critical responses need to be sanitized and valorized. New methods may also be needed 
to account for and encourage more granular forms of critical practice: ratings & 
rankings
153
, brief comments on papers should also be considered valuable contributions 
to science as an epistemic endeavor. Since scientists‘ careers depend on their 
evaluations, it is only if such engagement in mutual criticism receives attention and is 
given credit that a change in attitude may occur. On platforms, such as Slashdot.org, 
reviewers, i.e. people engaged in critical practice, are evaluated and receive more 
―Karma‖, for writing good comments. Positive Karma means that a user has posted 
more good comments than bad ones and this evaluation gives him benefits, i.e. he is 
only eligible to moderate with good Karma.
154
 These comments are critical responses 
and they provide new meta-information about the quality of content at the same time. 
Users of Slashdot.org have clear incentives for critically assessing other people‘s initial 
postings or their comments – because their reputation, their Karma, improves and they 
are eligible to advance a step and become moderators, even if only temporarily. To my 
mind, science, and scientific publishing in particular, can only learn from such 
innovative practices on the Web.  
                                                 
153
 I conceive ratings and rankings as instances of ES: Aggregation. Hence they are depicted in more detail 
in the next chapter.  
154
 http://slashdot.org/faq/com-mod.shtml [date of access: 13.11.2009] 
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Uptake of Criticism 
That criticism is futile if it is not heard and does not have any effect should be obvious. 
Thus, for criticism to be effective, it is crucial that valid criticism is actually accounted 
for and leads to changes in belief. In scientific publishing, the mode of letting authors 
reply to critical reviews is one example where uptake is fostered. Given that on the Web 
not only space, but also speed ceased to be a problem, we can imagine much faster 
rounds of original contributions, criticism and uptake. Indeed, we do not need to 
imagine this - examples of almost immediate critique and responses are numerous on the 
Web. To the same extent to which real-time debates have long been only possible at 
conferences, immediate responses, replies of the authors and comments on comments 
are now feasible in a multitude of different ways on the Web.  
However, uptake is not primarily a matter of time, but of attitude. Whether or not 
criticism will have an effect depends on whether I am willing to accept criticism as valid 
and change my beliefs and convictions accordingly. The likelihood with which I change 
my beliefs – or rather reveal that I have changed my beliefs - will also depend on the 
attitude towards change in my scientific community. There may be very well individual 
differences between people with respect to their responsiveness to criticism. Yet these 
differences may even be furthered by disciplinary standards. If consistency over time is 
valued higher than responsiveness to criticism, people will probably rather stick to their 
theories and beliefs as long as possible. If one is accused of weak-mindedness instead of 
being applauded for one‘s ability to learn and advance, uptake of criticism will be 
hindered. Thus, the extent to which Longino‘s second norm will be fulfilled in different 
scientific communities will depend on their attitude towards criticism, receptiveness and 
change – and this attitude may be more difficult to change. Thus, while the Web will be 
helpful in providing space for criticism, the crucial aspect of uptake will rather require 
shared norms of responsiveness and these cannot simply be technically implemented but 
need negotiations and rethinking in academia.  
Public Standards of Evaluation 
The third norm proposed by Longino concerns shared standards, which are temporarily 
binding but may change over time due to continuous scrutiny and revision. That means 
that these standards are developed and changed in the course of scientific practices. To 
use Karen Barad‘s terminology, they are enacted (Barad 2003). Although Longino does 
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not use this terminology, I consider her account of epistemic standards to be 
performative. The performativity of these standards, the fact that they are enforced and 
changed through practice however, does not diminish their temporal relevance and 
binding force.  
Clearly, without standards it is impossible to distinguish valid criticism from mere 
assault or nonsense. These standards mark the reference points for the evaluation of 
knowledge claims and the validity of criticism. Different communities may have 
different standards. In interdisciplinary teams that start working together for the first 
time, shared standards may still have to be developed, because the standards between 
disciplines differ. This need for shared standards to be developed is one of the reasons 
why interdisciplinary work needs a lot of time and shared space as well as initial respect 
and trust to work out well. For the common task they have to solve, new standards have 
to be developed. These norms may be explicitly discussed or implicitly enacted and 
performed within interactions and practices. Examples of these explicit and implicit 
processes have been outlined for Wikipedia as well as the Project LiquidPub before. 
Many norms and standards do never get explicitly declared, but rather emerge through 
shared practices. Despite this performative and often implicit nature of standards and 
norms, at times they need to be made explicit and subject to scrutiny, to be adapted and 
changed. This is where interdisciplinarity, or diversity more broadly conceived, looms 
large. Prevailing standards and the problems they might entail almost only come to the 
fore when different standards or norms collide. Only in encountering different norms 
and standards do we become aware of our own – and can make them subject to scrutiny 
and change.  
Tempered Equality of Intellectual Authority 
The final requirement concerns tempered equality of intellectual authority. While the 
inclusion of multiple voices and the fostering of epistemic diversity within science is a 
crucial goal of Longino‘s social epistemology, the word tempered indicates that for 
epistemic endeavors intellectual authority is not uniformly distributed. In Longino‘s 
initial declaration of the four social norms, the word ―tempered‖ was not yet added to 
temper the request for equality (Longino 1990). Only later on, the word ―tempered‖ was 
introduced (Longino 2002c). This seemingly innocuous change has high significance. I 
read this modification to denote that, despite all requests for open access and equal 
333 
 
chances for participation in epistemic endeavors, expertise still matters and should be 
used to weight different epistemic agents. It is a request to recognize ability and to make 
epistemic use of adequate indicators of epistemic trustworthiness. This point of view is 
also characteristic of Scott E. Page‘s argument concerning the superiority of cognitive 
diversity (Page 2007). In computer simulations as well as in numerous empirical cases, 
he shows that diversity trumps individual ability over and over again. Nonetheless and 
despite various contradictory claims, Page convincingly argues that ability and diversity 
complement each other. While ability is a characteristic of an individual, diversity is a 
characteristic of a group and trading one for the other is like comparing apples with fruit 
baskets (Page 2007: xxix).  
If we take a look at the Web, we can see that more people than ever before have the 
chance to take part in collaborative epistemic endeavors. Wikipedia, the open source 
movement, Slashdot.org are only some well-known examples of probably millions of 
epistemic communities that have formed on the Web. Of course the chances for people 
to take part in epistemic communities are not equal for everyone. Just looking at the 
digital divide between countries, between different regions within a country, between 
different income groups in a region should make us aware that there still are crucial 
differences in access that need to be adjusted. The gender ratio in different communities, 
such as the open source community would be another example in which differences in 
access may be caused less by technical access to the Internet itself than other barriers to 
participation. Nonetheless, joining epistemic communities, getting into intellectual 
exchange with others and collaborating on epistemic tasks has clearly become easier due 
to Web and information and communication technologies more generally.  
Now that access is improved, the question of how to temper equality has to be tackled as 
well. Equality is tempered constantly by various means on the Web – several of which 
are outlined in the next chapter on ES:Aggregation. Indeed, I would argue that despite 
frequent allusion to epistemic democracy on the Web, most systems are meritocratic, if 
not aristocratic – or sometimes even bluntly dictatorial. As noted before, the Wikipedia 
predecessor Nupedia relied on academic credentials to select contributors – and failed 
with this strategy. Its successor Wikipedia then opened the door and allowed everyone 
who had access to the Internet to participate. In this case, the intellectual authority has 
not been tempered a priori, but quality control was introduced by different social and 
technical mechanisms. The ease of revision as well as the history pages are technical 
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features that enable easy revision, the introduction of administrators with rights to block 
users as well as the Neutral Point of View Policy are more social mechanisms to ensure 
quality control.  
Philpapers.org, a depository of philosophical articles from a variety of sources asks the 
users whether they have a PhD in philosophy to distinguish between professional 
philosophers and others. While the user‘s access to the articles depends on the personal 
or institutional access to the articles, the possibility of posting content depends on this 
difference between professional and non-professional users. Thus, the postings are 
tempered by the academic credentials of a user, while his access is not restricted by 
Philpapers.org, but only by the copyrights of the paper and the access rights of the user. 
Slashdot.org would be an example of a website that works quite differently in the 
selection of content. All users are permitted to post comments on this platform and other 
readers can rate these comments. These ratings are aggregated into collective judgments 
about the quality of these comments and those can then used by the other users to filter 
comments (cf. for instance Benkler 2002). As such Slashdot.org and other similar 
applications combine human judgment with various algorithms to evaluate content and 
by this ―temper‖ the intellectual authority of the content providers. 155  
What should be obvious by now is that Helen Longino‘s norms can well serve as 
guidance for the development of socio-technical epistemic systems. In the process of 
design, it is possible to ask for each feature to what extent a solution supports or hinders 
the emergence of transformative criticism. How exactly and by which mechanism each 
norm has to be approached may have to be decided case by case. Yet that one should try 
to operationalize these norms for epistemic systems and interaction design is not only 
desirable but also feasible with the new information and technologies that are at our 
command. 
Longino‘s approach and her four norms for transformative criticism in particular clearly 
demonstrate the potential fertility of social epistemology for the evaluation and the 
design of socio-technical epistemic systems on the Web. Her emphasis on actual 
epistemic practices in general and her request for local and situated modes of tempering 
intellectual authority makes her approach well suited to inform interaction design of 
socio-technical systems for epistemic purposes. Epistemology can be of use for the 
                                                 
155
 I return to Slashdot.org and various aggregational means to temper authority in the next chapter.  
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design of such systems by epistemically assessing the different features of the system. 
However, such collaboration does not have to stop at the stage of analysis and 
evaluation. A fruitful collaboration between philosophers and system designers can also 
lead to the development of entirely new approaches. However, the uptake of criticism 
and change due to new experiences should go into both directions. Not only can 
epistemology inform systems design – taking a closer look at different socio-epistemic 
mechanisms embedded in these socio-technical systems can clearly also deliver 
inspiration for new social-epistemic accounts of how to rationally attribute intellectual 
authority. I therefore conclude that applying Longino‘s approach is only one example 
for the potential fertility of bridging the gap between epistemology and systems design.  
9.5 Conclusions on ES:Integration 
What conclusions can be drawn from my outline of ES:Integration as a way of 
characterizing socio-technical epistemic systems by their mechanisms of closure? I have 
started with the most obvious observation, namely that systems employing this type of 
epistemic sociality are not only extremely prevalent, but also that they are epistemically 
beneficial for different reasons and in a variety of different respects and contexts. 
Information and Communication Technologies play a crucial role for ES
I
 in their ability 
to enable socio-epistemic processes of often enormous scale and range.  
Referring to theories from social epistemology and beyond, I have outlined some key 
characteristics of ES
I
 and bundled my analysis along different topics: I have emphasized 
specificities of ES
I
 with respect to the structure of epistemic tasks and the diversity of 
human epistemic agents. I have further addressed the relationship between trust, 




From the three types of epistemic sociality distinguished in this thesis, ES
I
 is the most 
common, the broadest and the most internally diversified socio-epistemic mechanism: it 
comes in different sizes and forms and serves various purposes. Nonetheless, it differs 
from the other two types which are outlined the next two chapters in various ways: they 
do not only function differently, they also depend on different prerequisites, they have 
different strengths and weaknesses, they are suited best for different epistemic tasks.  
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A crucial strength of systems employing ES
I
 and a major reason for its ubiquity is that it 
saves time. If a task can be split up into subtasks to be fulfilled by several people 
simultaneously, the overall result can be expected sooner. It is as simple as that: if two 
people each clean up one half of the apartment, the work will be finished earlier. 
Cleaning a house is an easy separable task, one person may do kitchen and the living 
room, the other the bath room and the bed room. Moreover, there is no problem of 
integration – if each task is fulfilled, the overall goal – a clean apartment – is fulfilled. 
Unfortunately, the tasks of division and integration are not always that easy and 
straightforward. Hence, system designers have to make sure that the gains in efficiency 
by distributing tasks over multiple epistemic agents is not annihilated by time and costs 
of division and integration.  
Secondly, certain tasks require a diversity of skills and expertise. If there is no one to be 
found that possesses all these skills, the second-best solution would be to employ two 
people, who each possess part of the skills needed to fulfill the task. However, there are 
reasons to believe that employing two people with different skills may not only be the 
second-best, but actually the best solution to a problem. As Scott Page has shown, 
cognitive diversity repeatedly trumps individual ability in problem solving (Page 2007). 
The employment of diverse groups of people appears to be superior than searching for 
the one person who possesses all the skills needed for a task. This logic becomes 
particularly convincing if one considers that while a multi-talented genius may be well 
suited for the problem x, the problem she was hired for, she might be utterly unsuited for 
the next occurring problem y. Indeed her excellence in skills A & B might prevent her 
from recognizing that skill C might be needed to solve the problem y. In a cognitively 
diverse group of people by contrast, there may be different people who either excel in 
skill A, B or C – and the choice for the right strategy is more likely. Hence in that case – 
and in most cases – a group of people with diverse cognitive abilities and preferences, 
i.e. with different perspectives, interpretations, heuristics and predictive models, are 
more likely to find solutions for problems than individual experts (Page 2007: 7ff).  
ES
I
 is particularly well suited for problem solving, as opposed to making predictions, 
where ES:Aggregation excels. Moreover, it is best at projects that require different skills 
and expertise to solve problems and that take considerable effort. Concerning the three 
central epistemic tasks, content production, evaluation and dissemination, ES
I
 can take 
place and be invaluable at all stages. In contrast to the other two types, it seems to be 
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utile for content production. Many people can produce a lot more content than a single 
person and if this content gets combined intelligently, the epistemic benefits can be 
immense. ES
I
 clearly can also be extremely valuable for evaluation and distribution as 
has been shown by various examples in this chapter, but it is in content production that 
this type of epistemic sociality excels.  
Several prerequisites for ES
I
 have also been outlined before. First of all, as all forms of 
epistemic sociality, it depends on trust. However, trust should not be blind and cases of 
scientific fraud are examples where too much trust was put into collaborators while 
scrutiny would have been needed. Yet without some basic trust in your collaborators, 
ES
I
 makes no sense. If one were to cross-check every result of one‘s collaborator – 
given that one possesses the skills to do so – the time savings of distributed labor would 
be annihilated. In fact, the working hours would double because each task would be 
done twice. Moreover, less measureable danger of open distrust and its detrimental 
effects on the working climate should be obvious and have been documented by various 
scholars (Shapin 1994, Kusch 2002: 75, Baier 1986).  
Further, despite frequent claims to the contrary, ES
I
 depends on expertise, even if the 
employment of statistical, automated control mechanisms may diminish the risk and 
effect of non-experts in certain systems, such as the ones to be portrayed in the next 
chapter. This expertise does not have to correspond to academic credentials. As is shown 
exceptionally well in the case of Wikipedia, a sufficiently large number of uncertified 
volunteers can provide astonishing results. Nonetheless, the fact that Wikipedia is 
created and maintained by volunteers does not imply that they have no expertise. This 
expertise may be very specific and targeted, i.e. they may have a lot of knowledge about 
the motor of the Citroën 2CV, about the geological properties of a certain extinct 
volcano in the German countryside, about a certain poem by T.S. Eliot, etc. Thus, they 
may not need to be certified experts on cars, geology or English literature. Smartly 
combining the very specific pieces of knowledge of many individuals, coupling it with 
efficient technical or social quality control mechanisms seems to be more efficient for 
many epistemic tasks than searching for more general experts on wider fields of 
knowledge. Distributed expertise, abilities of varying form and degree are essential for 





Obviously, ability and expertise matter. But as Page (Page 2007) asserts – so does 
diversity. ES
I
 depends on diversity. Heterogeneous groups outperform homogenous 
groups and individuals. Different people perceive problems from different perspectives, 
they have different interpretations, use different heuristics and employ different 
predictive models. By combining them, the space for problem solutions is increased, 
groupthink and incubation effects are less likely and the chances that a diverse group 
will come up with a solution for a given problem are higher than for individual experts 
or homogeneous groups (Page 2007).  
That cognitive diversity is epistemically beneficial has already been defended by Mill 
(Mill 1859) and various philosophers of science (cf. Longino 2002c). Using Mill‘s 
arguments as a point of departure, it has been in particular Helen Longino (Longino 
2002c) who has developed a social epistemology that not only stresses the necessity of 
cognitive diversity, but also offers normative-prescriptive guidelines on how to ensure 
its proper functioning.  
Helen Longino‘s four social norms for social knowledge can serve as guidelines for 
structuring interaction and communication for epistemic purposes. They can be used to 
design platforms for interaction that enable transformative criticism and make sure that 
the epistemic benefits of diversity can be tapped to their full potential. Clearly, neither 
diverse groups in which only some members are heard and taken serious do fulfill these 
criteria nor groups in which everyone can speak, but no one listens. One of Longino‘s 
norms concerns the necessity of shared standards. This aspect corresponds to Page‘s 
notion of ―fundamental preference‖ (Page 2007: 11). People need some basic agreement 
on a goal and the means of evaluating its achievement, i.e. some quality indicators and 
some shared vocabulary. To develop such shared standards, to be able to speak to each 
other and understand the other, time, shared space and trust are needed. The extent to 
which these prerequisites are met in different projects often decides upon the success or 
failure of systems depending on integrative mechanisms of closure, such as 
interdisciplinary projects in science.  
I conclude this chapter on ES
I
 with a summary of the main criteria that should be 
fulfilled to ensure the proper functioning of systems employing ES
I
. Hence, these 
criteria are criteria for systems analysis as much as recommendations for systems 
design. These recommendations are the direct result from my analyses in this chapter. 
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However, one has to keep in mind that there are many different instantiations of ES
I
 for 
various purposes and of different scale, with different parameters for different epistemic 
tasks. Therefore, my recommendations should rather be considered as general 
guidelines, while their concretization needs to be specified for each case.  
 






 Tasks should be modular and granular: The larger a projects gets, 
the more essential it is that the tasks are easily divisible. Varying 
size and content of tasks may be conducive to the attractiveness to 
participate and the more flexible a system is to cater to people‘s 
needs and wishes, the more likely they will contribute – and keep 
contributing over time.  
 Ease of integration is crucial. Various combinations of different 
integration mechanisms are possible and should be combined. 
Indeed, aggregative mechanisms depicted in the next chapter could 







 Ability matters. Hence, making differences between epistemic 
agents depending on their abilities, weighting their contributions 
may well be epistemically beneficial. 
 Yet diversity matters as well. Therefore, systems should be as 
open as possible to enable the constitution of heterogeneous 
communities of cognitively diverse people who work together on 
epistemic tasks.  
 Despite their differences – or rather because of them, agents must 
be willing and able to communicate with one another. These 
interactions need time and space as well as an atmosphere of 
openness and receptiveness to difference, all of which need to be 
provided and fostered.  
 Despite and because of these differences, some shared goals, 
norms and standards for evaluation are needed. Especially the 
goals may be explicitly debated and agreed upon. However, many 
norms and standards evolve rather implicitly through practices. 
Nonetheless, they need to be made subject to scrutiny and this is 
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where diversity looms large again. When agents with different 
implicit norms and standards interact, they become aware of these 
implicit norms and standards because they are at odds with the 
others‘ norms and standards. It is through such a clash of norms, 
that the norms themselves become visible and addressable.  
 Critical discursive interaction is needed, Longino‘s four social 






 Trust is indispensable for any form of epistemic sociality. In ESI it 
is crucial at all instances and phases within socio-epistemic 
systems and processes.  
 Yet trust should not be blind. Loci of trust, the criteria of 
trustworthiness and the differential attribution of authority have to 
be possible subjects of scrutiny as well.  
 In order to be responsible knowers we have to make sure that we 
place trust correctly. Especially for trust in non-human epistemic 
agents and for forms of procedural trust transparency is crucial.  
 With respect to human epistemic agents we have to watch out for 
signs of incompetence and dishonesty. 
 Yet we also must be aware of the dangers of epistemic injustices 
that come with the differential attribution of authority.The α-error 
and the β-error of attributing epistemic authority.  
Motivation   Especially for voluntary projects: Choose noble goals. 
 Especially for voluntary projects: Make sure there is no unilateral 
appropriation.  
 Especially for voluntary projects: Ensure transparency of 
processes.  
 Make credit more modular if tasks are more modular. That is, 
enable the attribution of credit for tasks of different size. 
 Make sure that Recommendations 1-16 are fulfilled 




10 Epistemic Sociality 2: Closing Socio-Epistemic 
Processes Through Aggregation  
10.1 Epistemic Sociality: Aggregation (ESA) 
One of the probably most well-known affirmations of the epistemic relevance of 
aggregational mechanisms of closure has been provided outside of social epistemology: 
it is James Surowiecki‘s book on the wisdom of the crowds (Surowiecki 2004). I have 
introduced his work in Chapter 8. Since some of the examples he uses to elucidate the 
wisdom of the crowds are indicative not only of central features, but also of central 
differences between various modes of aggregation, I use two of them to introduce my 
second type of epistemic sociality: ES:Aggregation (ES
A
). These two examples offered 
by Surowiecki to elucidate the epistemic success of aggregation are Galton‘s fair visit 
and the story about the lost submarine. 
As a reminder: Francis Galton observed the weight-judging competition when visiting a 
country fair. In this competition people are placing bets on the weight of an ox and the 
one who comes closest wins a prize. For rather political reasons, namely the question of 
whether people should be allowed to vote in politics, Galton was interested in the 
abilities of the average person. Hence, he used the competition to assess the average 
person‘s ability to judge oxen. This average ability to judge the weight of an ox could 
then be used as an indicator of the average cognitive capabilities of people more 
generally. To assess this average ability he collected about 800 bets and calculated the 
average of all the bets. Here the wonder happened: the averaged guess, the collective 
judgment of the crowd was 1,197 pounds – and the real weight of the ox was 1,198 
pounds. Surowiecki cites Galton stating that ―[t]he result seems more creditable to the 
trustworthiness of a democratic judgment than might have been expected‖ (Surowiecki 
2004: xiii).  
In the second example, the U.S. submarine Scorpion disappeared somewhere in the 
North Atlantic. Given the last reported location, the Navy specified a circle of about 20 
miles in which the submarine probably was to be found. Surowiecki reports the story as 
follows (Surowiecki 2004: xxi). A naval officer construed different scenarios of what 
had happened to the submarine. Yet instead of having people debate these scenarios, he 
asked them to bet on different relevant aspects: the reasons for the trouble, the speed, the 
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steepness of descent, etc. He then used Bayes‘ Theorem to aggregate these bets into a 
collective judgment about the location of the lost submarine -and indeed, this judgment 
turned out to be just 220 yards away from the spot where the ship was found months 
later.  
What is crucial about both examples is that the collective prediction differed from all the 
individual predictions. The collective result was not obtained by choosing among 
individuals predictions, which would be an example of ES:Selection.
156
 Nor was it 
obtained by integrating the results in an ES
I
-mode, e.g. by debating and combining 
them. It followed a very different rationale, the rationale of ES
A
.  
Surowiecki states that while the two problems differ profoundly in their complexity, the 
basic principle to solve them is the same (Surowiecki 2004: xx). The commonality 
between these two examples is that in both cases, judgments of independent individuals 
were aggregated by statistical means to calculate ―common‖ or ―collective‖ results. This 





 to work out, for collective judgement formed via aggregation to be 
superior to individual judgments – even of experts, several prerequisites have to be met 
concerning scale, diversity, independence and the means of aggregation. That is, for ES
A
 
to be successful, one needs a large enough number of independent and diverse epistemic 
agents in combination with adequate aggregational mechanisms. If this is the case, ES
A
 
will trump other modes of epistemic sociality when it comes to making predictions. The 
rationale behind this superiority is entirely statistical. As noted before, Surowiecki 
describes it as a mathematical truism. ―If you ask a large enough group of diverse, 
independent people to make a prediction or estimate a probability, and then average 
those estimates, the errors each of them makes in coming up with an answer will cancel 
themselves out. Each person‘s guess, you might say, has two components: Information 
and error. Subtract the error, and you‘re left with the information‖ (Surowiecki 2004: 
10). 
However, despite this basic commonality, the examples above differ to a crucial respect: 
While in the case of Galton, every judgment, every vote received the same weight, in the 
case of the sunken submarine, different factors proposed by different people were 
weighted differently to judge its location. These two cases of two forms of ES
A
: 
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weighted versus unweighted aggregation. In the case of the ox, this mechanism was 
simple averaging. In the case of the sunken submarine Bayes‘ Theorem was employed. 
While simple averaging is an example of an unweighted aggregational mechanism, 
Bayes‘ Theorem is a classic example of an algorithm to weight judgments differently. 
This weighting, making a difference, was already portrayed in Chapter 5, where 
Goldman proposed Bayes‘ Theorem as a means to weight others‘ testimony by their 
honesty and competence. , weighted algorithms outnumber unweighted simple 
averaging processes by far on the Web. This ratio between unweighted and weighted 
mechanisms is interesting because the term wisdom of the crowd often seems to imply 
some form of epistemic democracy where everybody on the Web has the same rights 
and weights. Taking a look at the actual mechanisms it becomes obvious that the Web 
by no means is an epistemic democracy, where every person has the same epistemic 
rights. Hence, it is crucial to analyze how exactly this weighting, this making of 
differences that matter, happens. Further below I outline one example for different 
weighting schemes in the case of recommender systems, but before I portray some 
examples of different systems on the Web which employ ES
A
.  
10.2 ES:Aggregation: Rating, Ranking, Tagging, Recommending 
and Betting on the Web 
On the Web, there are numerous examples of systems using statistical aggregation for 
epistemic purposes. While some of them employ unweighted procedures, e.g. simple 
averaging, the majority of systems makes use of more complex algorithms to weight 
epistemic agents and their judgments. In the following I briefly introduce four examples 
of how the wisdom of the crowds is tapped via statistical aggregation on the Web: rating 
and ranking systems, social tagging and recommender systems and decision markets. 
10.2.1 Ratings and Rankings 
One of the most straightforward exploitations of ES:Aggregation are rating and ranking 
mechanisms. Ranking and ratings are means to evaluate information - or items more 
generally - and in doing this they create new meta-information about the quality of these 
items. In arguing that a reputation age is about to replace an information age, Origgi has 
noted, that the Web‘s epistemic relevance is not so much being a ―potentially infinite 
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system of information storage, but [rather being] a giant network of ranking and rating 
systems‖ (Origgi to appear: 2).  
However, not only content itself, but also the providers of this content can be rated and 
ranked. That is, ratings and ranking provide means of classifying and assessing the 
quality of epistemic content and epistemic agents. Quite often, the processes of rating 
content and rating agents are combined. Reputational systems weight the content which 
agents provide by the reputational values of the agent. The ratings people provide for 
content, for instance, may be weighted by the ratings they have received as agents from 
others. Numerous examples of rating and ranking systems are embedded in various 
socio-technical systems: the rating of books on Amazon.com, the karma system of 
Slashdot.org, rating sellers on eBay.com, rating of products on Epinions.com. Rating 
and ranking mechanisms are also used on social news sites, such as Digg.com and 
Reddit.com, where people can submit links to articles, videos, blog entries from other 
sources and vote for them. The votes a story receives decide upon its position on the 
website. Such systems therefore link to content provided elsewhere on the Web and their 
own relevance lies in attributing relevance to content only by exploiting the wisdom of 
the crowds via ratings. 
Such ranking and ratings provide a way of evaluating epistemic content and epistemic 
agents. As such, they are an alternative to other mechanism of communal quality 
control, such as peer review. Various tools for quality assessment exist and can and are 
combined in different ways on the Web and elsewhere. Yet rankings and ratings on the 
Web also rely on a wisdom-of-the-crowd logic, by arguing that bias gets eliminated 
through sheer scale. There are crucial differences between peer review and rating 
mechanisms and for each epistemic task the pros and cons of each type as well as of 
possible combinations have to be assessed. For instance, ratings on Amazon.com have a 
very different distribution than distributions of peer review judgments on abstract 
submission to conferences (Casati, Marchese et al. 2009). More specifically, Amazon 
ratings tend to the extreme ends of the distribution (Hu, Pavlou et al. 2009). This 
tendency stems from the fact that people rather rate products that they particularly liked 
or disliked, while mediocre products obviously do not seem worth assessing. Moreover, 
classical peer review of conference or journal submissions and ratings on the Web often 
differ with respect to exhaustion. Due to different allocation processes, i.e. self-
allocation versus assignment, in peer review processes for journals, proceedings or 
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project proposals, each submission is evaluated, while on the Amazon only a certain 
percentage of items get evaluated. I return to these issues as well as to the pros and cons 
of rating and ranking mechanisms in the next chapter.  
10.2.2 Social Tagging 
―Just as the internet allows users to create and share their own media, it is also enabling 
them to organize digital material their own way, rather than relying on pre-existing 
formats of classifying information‖ (Rainie 2007). This is how the PEW-Report on 
Tagging starts. Social tagging is another way to tap the wisdom of the crowd on the 
Web. Tagging refers to adding key words to content of the Web. 
There are innumerous things that can be tagged on the Web: books (Amazon.com), 
articles (CiteUlike.org), pictures (Flickr.com), websites (Delicious), videos 
(Youtube.com), blog entries (Technorati.com), short text messages (Twitter.com), music 
(last.fm). Tagging provides a means to classify and categorize information for later 
information retrieval. In contrast to top-down classifications where categories into which 
material can then be sorted are predefined, tagging is a bottom-up approach. The users 
choose the tags not from a fixed set of possibilities, but by using a phrase that they think 
classifies the content to their requirements.  
In direct reference to the Dewey Decimal System, a library classification system, the 
PEW stresses that tagging is rather ―tailored to individual needs and not designed to be 
the all-inclusive system that Melvil Dewey tried to create with his decimal-based 
scheme for cataloguing library materials‖ (Rainie 2007). Yet in most systems tagging is 
not a purely individual activity, but has a clear social component. Think of tags as public 
keywords. In epistemic social software your tags are added to the tags others have used 
to describe content. They are used to build up a repository of second-order information 
about content on the Web, often referred to as folksonomies. By doing this, they help 
organizing knowledge in a quite different way than conceived in traditional knowledge 
organization. As David Weinberg puts it in an interview, ―[f]olksonomies reveal how 
the public is making sense of things, not just how expert cataloguers think we ought to 
be thinking‖ (Rainie 2007).  
Moreover, by tagging content systems often create recommendations on how to tag 
content for other users by offering the ―most popular‖-tags for a given website, picture 
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or whatever content you wish to tag. Whenever users want to save a website on their 
Delicious-account, they are offered the popular and recommended tags. Popular tags are 
calculated by the tags others have applied to content, while recommended tags are a 
combination of tags one has used to tag other content and tags that other people have 
used
157
. On Flickr, popularity of tags is indicated by a tag cloud, in which the font size 
of the word for the same content indicates the frequency by which this tag has been 
used.
158
 This tag cloud thus visualizes the popularity of tags and enables users to search 
for content which was tagged by these most popular tags. Flickr, a website to store and 
share pictures, has another interesting feature to classify content, namely the category of 
interestingness. Here is how Flickr defines interestingness:  
―There are lots of elements that make something 'interesting' (or not) on 
Flickr. Where the clickthroughs are coming from; who comments on it and 
when; who marks it as a favorite; its tags and many more things which are 
constantly changing. Interestingness changes over time, as more and more 
fantastic content and stories are added to Flickr.‖159 
Interestingness is a new category based on the assessment of content through users. It 
combines the number of tags, which are content qualifiers, with other criteria, which are 
rather quality qualifiers. Hence while the content of the tags refers to the picture‘s 
content, the number of tags together with the number of clickthroughs, the number of 
comments and times it has been marked as favorite offers yet another way of classifying 
content, namely by its interestingness.  
Another aspect of Flickr‘s calculation of interestingness is worth mentioning. Its 
description quoted above implies that not only the number of tags, clickthroughs and 
markings as favorite matter, but also who performs this action: Interestingness is a 
feature of content that depends also on ―[w]here the clickthroughs are coming from; who 
comments on it and when; who marks it as a favorite‖.160 Thus, although the concrete 
algorithm of how interestingness is calculated is not outlined on Flickr, its description 
seems to imply the interestingness-feature makes use of reputational mechanisms, of 
making differences between users that have an effect on the weight of their tags, marks 
and clicks.  
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10.2.3 Recommender Systems 
Another example that relies crucially on aggregation of data from a multitude of 
different people are recommender systems (RS) based on collaborative filtering. 
Recommender systems suggest items to a user of a system that he or she may be 
interested in. A classical example are recommendations you get on Amazon.com. Based 
on your previous purchases, the items that are on your wish list and those you may have 
rated, Amazon.com sends you emails with books or other products you may be 
interested in. While one may well argue that the only reason why Amazon.com is using 
such a system is because they want to sell more books, for the user there may be an 
epistemic advantage of recommender systems. Recommender systems are an automated 
form of giving advice that is based on different criteria, amongst others the aggregation 
of quality judgments obtained from numerous agents.  
As noted before, there is a clear epistemic benefit in finding information one is looking 
for fast and reliably. That is the logic behind the epistemic utility of good search 
engines. However, there may be an even bigger epistemic benefit, if a system can satisfy 
an epistemic need that one was not even aware of. If a recommender system draws my 
attention to something that is relevant for my interests, but that I was not even looking 
for or considered to be relevant before. Collaborative filtering processes and different 
statistical procedures may be particularly useful in providing such unexpected, relevant 
information. Therefore, RSs can be considered socio-technical systems that serve 
epistemic purposes. The social part of this socio-epistemic mechanism lies in the fact 
that for collaborative filtering to make recommendations for you, your data are 
compared to that of other users in order to find out which patterns resemble yours. The 
epistemic part resides in the fact that they are trying to predict your interests – and in the 
possibly epistemically beneficial consequences of being able to offer something of 
interest one was not aware of before, but may need for your epistemic inquiry. A special 
type of RSs, trust-aware recommender systems exploit epistemic sociality in even 
another respect. Trust-aware RSs also make recommendations, but they are based on 
even more social information. ―While traditional RSs exploit only ratings provided by 
users about items, Trust-aware Recommender Systems let the user express also trust 
statements, i.e. their subjective opinions about the usefulness of other users‖ (Massa and 
Avesani 2006). I return to trust-aware RSs in more detail in my case study below.  
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10.2.4 Prediction Markets 
Bragues, who addresses the socio-epistemological aspects of prediction markets, defines 
them as ―[...] venues in which individuals trade securities whose value is tied to the 
outcome of a future event (Bragues 2009: 93).
161
 By structuring prediction markets as 
betting exchanges, the existing market price can be interpreted as a prediction of the 
probability of an event. Numerous prediction markets exist on the Web. One of them is 
the Hollywood Stock Exchange
162
, in which actors, directors or films can be traded and 
bets can be placed on the next Bond girl. Another prominent example is the Iowa 
Electronic Markets, which describes itself as ―an on-line futures market where contract 
payoffs are based on real-world events such as political outcomes, companies' earnings 
per share (EPS), and stock price returns‖.163 An overview over the most important 
prediction markets is given by Bragues (Bragues 2009). 
However, to interpret the prediction market prices as probabilities, several prerequisites 
have to be met, such as liquidity, i.e. the ability to attract enough participants (Bragues 
2009). Moreover, the participants should possess diverse opinions and cognitive 
strategies (Page 2007) and should act independently to avoid information cascades 
(Coady 2006, Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer et al. 1992). These prerequisites are hence quite 
similar to Surowiecki‘s prerequisites for a ―wisdom of a crowds‖ (Surowiecki 2004): 
diversity, independence, decentralization and modes of aggregation. Another factor that 
affects the validity of interpreting market prices as probabilities concerns the risk-
aversion of the traders. According to (Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2007), ―[g]reater risk-
aversion leads to a bias toward more extreme prices, while lesser risk aversion leads 
prices to be biased toward $0.50‖. Nonetheless, they conclude that ―[i]n most cases [...] 
prediction market prices aggregate beliefs very well. Thus, if traders are typically well-
informed, prediction market prices will aggregate information into useful forecasts. The 
efficacy of these forecasts may however be undermined somewhat for prices close to $0 
or $1, when the distribution of beliefs is either especially disperse or when trading 
volumes are somehow constrained, or motivated by an unusual degree of risk-
acceptance‖ (Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2007). 
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 Bragues‘ (2009) analyses are depicted in Chapter 6.  
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 http://www.hsx.com/ [date of access: 21.03.2010] 
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 http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/index.cfm [date of access: 21.03.2010] 
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In comparing the utility of this ES:A-based form of prediction with traditional expert-
based predictions, Bragues concludes that while ―[...] in non-empirical disciplines like 
literature and philosophy, it has long been customary to rely on individual geniuses to 
provide illumination, [...] prediction markets disclose that there is much knowledge to be 
gained by analyzing the fruits produced by the combined efforts of many people seeking 
to comprehend the same problems ―(Bragues 2009: 103). 
10.3 ES:Aggregation and Social Epistemology 
While topics related to ES:Integration have been widely addresses in social 
epistemology, aggregational mechanisms have been of lesser concern. Nonetheless, 
there are socio-epistemological analyses on how to use aggregational mechanisms for 
epistemic purposes. One of the most important ones has been introduced before: Lehrer 
and Wagner‘s rational model of consensus. In Chapter 6 I have introduced Keith 
Lehrer‘s model in some detail within the section on consensus as a socio-rational 
mechanism. In this chapter, I want to argue that this model is a prime example of 
ES:Aggregation in a dual sense, because it applies aggregational mechanisms to 
epistemic agents and to epistemic content. Aggregational mechanisms are first used to 
assess the reputational weights of epistemic agents by letting epistemic agents assess 
and re-assess their peers‘ epistemic trustworthiness in several feedback loops. Once 
these reputational weights are obtained, they are used to weight the answers which 
epistemic agents have given on some question in dispute. These weighted judgments are 
then aggregated to form a collective result. Hence, Lehrer‘s model is an excellent 
example of process in which a weighted form of aggregation is applied to content and 
agents – a process which is highly similar to the function of reputational mechanisms on 
the Web. 
10.3.1 Lehrer’s Consensus Model as Epistemic 
Sociality2:Aggregation2 
Recall the basic idea of Lehrer & Wagner‘s model (Lehrer and Wagner 1981): At first 
you let a community of peers collectively assess and consent about the intellectual 
authority of each peer within this community with respect to a specific topic. Each 
expert is asked to make a judgment concerning the perceived level of expertise her 
fellows have with respect to a specific question at hand. This judgment is a quantitative 
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indicator summarizing all her information about the other‘s expertise and reliability 
concerning the issue at stake, in other words: it gives a quantitative indicator of what she 
considers to be the reputation of each scientist with respect to a topic. Then the average 
reputation values for each scientist are calculated with a specific algorithm and send 
back to all members. In a second round, all experts have to reassess their initial 
judgment taking into account the averages indicating the amount of intellectual authority 
that their fellows ascribe to each other.  
The idea is that the less secure someone is about a peer, the more likely it will be that he 
corrects his judgment towards the group average. If he is very sure about the 
competencies – or lack thereof – of a peer, the average will not influence his decision 
too much, because he considers his own information to be more important. If these 
processes were repeated endlessly, the values would finally stabilize and a consensual 
weight for each member of a community would be achieved. This consensual weight 
would be a quantitative indicator of the intellectual authority that the community as a 
whole ascribes to each member; it is a quantitative indicator of someone‘s reputation164. 
Once this value is there, it can then be applied to weigh the judgment of each member 
on a factual matter. In other words: after having asked the community members to assess 
each other repeatedly, one finally asks them about their opinion on the question of 
interest. Then these judgments are aggregated weighed by the reputation score of those 
who made the judgments.  
Although this process is similar to Delphi methodology (Linestone and Turoff 2002), 
there is one crucial difference. In Lehrer‘s model, topic matters are not assessed right 
away. Instead, he develops a reputational map of an epistemic community first, which is 
then used to weigh the answers to topic matters. Aggregation serves the epistemic 
purpose of making decision making more rational and is done at two stages: first an 
aggregational mechanism is used for assessing the reputation values of the experts (or 
the consensual weights in Lehrer‘s terminology) and then the judgments on the topic of 
concern are also being aggregated. After having used ES:Aggregation to assess the 
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 While I adopt the term reputation here, other authors have offered different terms to label Lehrer‘s 
social information. Goldman (2003: 76) for instance, uses the terms respect and trust. Clearly, all these 
terms have something in common, namely that they are evaluative information about other people. 
However, trust, reputation, respect, or social information are not used consistently within or between 
different fields of research. Thus, a clearer terminology of the differences between these notions would be 
a first step in improving the discussions about these topics. 
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reputation of each epistemic agent, one uses ES:Aggregation again to aggregate their 
judgments on a topic matter to form a collective result.  
This model of rational consensus thus is a socio-rational mechanism in which both 
sociality and aggregation are doubly represented. It is a case of ―ES2:Aggregation2‖. Not 
only does this model employ a social mechanism to achieve consensus on a factual 
matter. To decide on the factual matter this model makes use of social information 
defined as the opinions experts have of each other. Moreover, Lehrer‘s model is an 
example of the epistemic use of aggregation, also in a dual sense. Not only are the 
community members‘ opinions of each other aggregated. In the end, their opinions on a 
topic matter are also being aggregated - weighed by the reputation they have been 
ascribed by their peers. Hence, Lehrer‘s model can serve as a prime example of 
ES:Aggregation: it uses social information and aggregational mechanisms for epistemic 
purposes. An interesting aspect of Lehrer‘s model concerns the fact that it provides an 
example in which experts are being aggregated. Thus, it delivers a model in which 
expertise is not in contrast with aggregational mechanisms, quite to the contrary: 
expertise itself is assessed by aggregating experts‘ judgments. 
One central insight to be obtained from Lehrer‘s analyses is that reputation, information 
about other people‘s quality as knowers, about their competence and honesty, is of 
epistemic value. It is not only frequently being used to assess the epistemic claims of 
epistemic agents, it can also be useful. Of course, not all epistemic usage of reputational 
cues has to follow such a formal method. Mostly we use reputational cues rather 
implicitly. Nonetheless, reputational mechanisms are formalized and embedded in the 
majority of Web2.0 applications. Ratings, rankings and other reputational tools are used 
in a variety of different ways on the Web, and Lehrer & Wagner‘s model delivers one 
early formalization of how to use reputation for epistemic tasks (Lehrer and Wagner 
1981). 
Nonetheless, there are certain problems with Lehrer‘s model, some of which have been 
outlined in Chapter 6. Indeed, Alvin Goldman, who not only advocates for the use of 
reputation to weight others testimony, but also proposes a statistical mechanism for this 
consideration, has outlined two major points of critique from a socio-epistemological 
perspective.
165
 The first question concerns the adequacy of Lehrer‘s model as a social 
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 Confer Part 2 of this thesis for a depiction of Goldman‘s Bayesian account of testimony.  
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epistemology; the second concerns the origin of the initial weights. Concerning the first 
issue Goldman argues that as an example of pure proceduralism, Lehrer‘s model does 
not provide an adequate basis for a comprehensive social epistemology and states: 
―Many important social activities performed by scientific and other communities cannot 
be addressed within this framework, such as coordinated evidence gathering, proposing 
and rebutting arguments, allocating speech opportunities, and creating incentives for 
research and investigation. In short, the vast majority of social practices that belong 
under social epistemology fall outside the purview of this approach‖ (Goldman 2003: 
77). This critique refers to the fact that neither Lehrer‘s model - nor ES:Aggregation in 
generally – exhausts the realm of epistemic sociality. This is exactly the reason why I 
am proposing a tripartite notion of epistemic sociality to form the basis of any 
comprehensive social epistemology. In such a view it is possible to assess the merits of 
different theories for explaining different socio-epistemic mechanisms even if they do 
not deliver full-fledged accounts of epistemic sociality. Thus, Lehrer‘s model can be put 
in place and be evaluated only with respect to its utility of exploiting ES
A
. After all, only 
few theories, if any, aim at accounting for the sociality of knowledge in all possible 
forms. Indeed, one crucial argument of this thesis is that most social epistemologists 
focus only on certain socio-epistemic practices while neglecting others. My tripartite 
notion of epistemic sociality delivers a framework for classifying and assessing the 
respective merits of these theories for different epistemic tasks. The fact, that neither 
Lehrer‘s consensus model nor Goldman‘s own account exhaust the realm of epistemic 
sociality does not imply that they are not epistemically useful.  
Goldman‘s second point of critique is more crucial and refers to a blind spot of Lehrer‘s 
model that has been mentioned before: the origin of the initial reputation values. 
Lehrer‘s model ―does not address the general question of how to assess the expertise or 
competence of others, but simply adopts subjectively chosen assessments as givens‖ 
(Goldman 2003: 77)). As any mathematical procedure it depends on the quality that is 
fed into it. Yet, while Goldman rightly points out the neglected origin of the initial 
weights in Lehrer‘s model, Goldman‘s own account of the origin of initial values needed 
for Bayesian inference in his model of testimony is not too convincing either (Goldman 
2003: 123f). While he notes that hearers may use track records to assess speaker‘s 
competence and honesty, he also acknowledges the limits of track records when he 
writes: ―The significance of track records, however, should not be exaggerated. 
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Although Jones never lied before, perhaps he never had as strong an incentive to lie as 
he does now‖ (Goldman 2003: 124). 
Nonetheless, with his critique Goldman points to an important issue: taking a close look 
at the initial data which are fed into reputational systems and at the algorithms that are 
employed to process these data should therefore be a crucial task for any socio-
epistemological analysis of socio-technical epistemic systems using reputation tools. 
Unfortunately, these algorithms are not visible to the average user or even not disclosed 
by the system developers at all for better (e.g. to avoid system attacks) or worse reasons. 
However, considering the substantial effect that such reputational mechanisms have on 
the information we receive and the weight that is attributed to different users, that is the 
differential effects they have on epistemic content and epistemic agents, these 
mechanisms need to be made transparent and subject to close scrutiny.  
10.4 Key Topics 
10.4.1 ESA & Epistemic Tasks 
From the examples outlined in this chapter we can see that aggregational mechanisms 
are employed for numerous tasks on the Web. More specifically, they are employed for 
the following epistemic tasks: 
a) to select and filter content by aggregating quality judgments about epistemic 
content and agents in the case of ratings and rankings as well as recommender 
systems; 
b) to weight epistemic agents and their judgments by aggregation quality judgments 
about epistemic agents and the content they provide; 
c) to save and retrieve information and create bottom-up classification systems 
(folksonomies) by aggregating content qualifiers in the case of tags; 
d) to make predictions by aggregating judgments either directly on events or on 
topics relevant for this event in the case of prediction markets. 
Given these specificities, ES
A
 is suited for different epistemic tasks than ES
I
. Its 
capacity to create new knowledge is restricted to very specific forms of knowledge, such 
as predictions, or second-order knowledge, such as classification systems. Closure 
through aggregation does not result in new epistemic products that depend on the 
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creation and integration of diverse epistemic content, as was the case for ES
I
. Its 
strength lies rather in assessing content with respect to various possible criteria such as 
quality, adequacy, type, topic, etc. For each of these tasks, the merits of ES
A
 have to be 
compared with those of other mechanisms. One reasonable rationale for this comparison 
could be Goldman‘s five standards of epistemic appraisal: reliability, power, fecundity, 
speed and efficiency (Goldman 1992: 195).  
With respect to classificatory work, folksonomies could be compared to top-down-
classification systems regarding their reliability, power, fecundity, speed and efficiency. 
Indeed, there is considerable work on folksonomies in the library and information 
sciences and the field of knowledge organization.
166
 While speed, efficiency and 
fecundity may clearly be advantages of folksonomies, the issues of reliability and power 
are harder to tackle and subject to much debate (e.g. Shirky 2005). Different authors 
have therefore worked on intermediary solutions that try to combine tagging with top-
down classification systems (e.g. Hidderley and Rafferty 2006).  
Concerning the tasks of filtering and selecting content, ES
A
-based processes could be 
compared with different forms of peer review. Indeed, analyses on peer review often use 
similar criteria to assess the merits and flaws of different peer review processes. (Casati, 
Marchese et al. 2009) analyze double-blind peer review processes with respect to their 
ability to select high quality papers in a process that is fair and efficient. Hence, speed 
and efficiency play a crucial role while reliability is even more central. Indeed, it is the 
reliability of peer review that is currently being questioned by different researchers. 
Having analyzed blind peer reviews of conference submissions, Casati, Marchese et al. 
(Casati, Marchese et al. 2009) conclude, for instance, that the review process has 
performed very poorly if future citations of the papers are used as a criterion for their 
quality. According to them a random selection would have had ―the same quality in 
approximating the citation-based ranking‖ (Casati, Marchese et al. 2009). Moreover, 
their research shows that the selection process is crucially influenced by rating biases of 
the reviewers, i.e. the difference between raters who consistently give higher or lower 
marks than their colleagues when assessing proposals. I return to this topic in the next 
chapter in more detail. It is in particular because of such critical analyses of the merits of 
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 Confer for instance, the proceedings of the numerous international and national conferences organized 
by the International Society for Knowledge Organization. Further information on http://www.isko.org/ 
[date of access: 23.01.2010]. 
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peer review that alternative methods of selecting for quality in general and methods that 
employ ES
A
 in particular are currently being assessed. Some work on comparing ES
A
-
style selection mechanisms in science with traditional peer review is currently being 
conducted within the Project LiquidPub
167
, but the results are not yet clear. To my mind, 
the future of quality assessment in science will lie in combined methods rather than in a 
replacement of traditional peer review with rating or ranking mechanisms. This is not 
only the case because peer review serves different quality control functions beyond 
selection (such as detection of fraud, making suggestions for improvement or future 
research). It is also not yet clear how it is possible to distinguish quality assessment from 
mere popularity – and how this difference should be conceptualized in the first place. 
Hence, there are many issues that have to be addressed to assess the comparative merits 
of ratings and ranking mechanisms and of ES
A
 for selecting content for its quality. What 
can be said at the very least is that aggregational mechanisms provide a fast way of 
assessing content.  
Finally, ES
A
 not only provides a fast way of assessing content, it also provides fast 
mechanisms of taking decisions – and making predictions. As compared to possibly 
protracted deliberative processes, simple betting or voting procedures provide faster 
ways of reaching results. With respect to making prediction, aggregational mechanisms 
are not only faster, but also more accurate than other mechanisms as has been shown for 
prediction markets. Prediction markets, by interpreting prices as probabilities of future 
events frequently outperform expert judgments. Hence, there seems to be a clear 
epistemic benefit of employing ES
A
 for epistemic tasks that involve simple predictions 
(e.g. the ox weight) as well as more complex predictions (e.g. the lost submarine 
(Surowiecki 2004)), which may include the weighing of different factors. This 
superiority of ES
A
, however, is bound to certain prerequisites andin contrast to expert 
judgments, these prerequisites are not characteristics of the individual epistemic agents 
(e.g. their competence), but characteristics of the sum of all epistemic agents: the 
number, diversity and independence of epistemic agents.  
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10.4.2 ESA: Numbers, Diversity, Independence & A Statistical 
Style of Reasoning 
The proper functioning of ES
A
 depends on several prerequisite. Thinking back to the 
rationale of Surowiecki‘s wisdom of the crowd (Surowiecki 2004), these prerequisites 
can be summarized as follows: You need numerous, diversely skilled and informed 
epistemic agents, who act independently before their epistemic content (e.g. quality 
judgments, content classifiers, etc.) gets aggregated with an appropriate aggregation 
mechanism. If these prerequisites are not met, different types of problems occur. 
If the epistemic agents involved in ES
A
 are not acting independently, information 
cascades can be the consequence.
168
 The problem with information cascades is that error 
can be spread if people rely on others‘ information more than they do on their own 
information. The basic rationale behind aggregation as an epistemic mechanism is that, 
if a large enough number of people is asked the same question, their error may be 
cancelled out and one is left with the information - to use information theoretical 
terminology. However, if people do not rely on their own information, but on the error 
provided by others, this rationale is violated. In laboratory situations, people may be 
asked to place their bets simultaneously to avoid information cascades. However, such 
simultaneity may be difficult to achieve outside of laboratory settings and other means 
may have to be employed to avoid information cascades (Coady 2006). 
The second problem concerns groups in which epistemic agents may act independently, 
but lack the necessary diversity. Similar people, who use the same information or the 
same heuristics and cognitive strategies, may induce error into the averaging process, 
because they are all biased in the same way. In statistical terms this means that one 
crucial prerequisite for classical test theory is violated, namely that error is random. If 
error is not random, the process of cancelling it out via statistical means does not 
function anymore. It has to be noted that the notion of bias that is used here is an entirely 
statistical notion of bias. Hence, it has to be distinguished from other types of bias to be 
found in ICT, such as the differentiation into societal, technical of emergent bias 
proposed by (Friedman and Nissenbaum 1997). This characterization of bias as 
statistical bias brings us to a more general issue: the relationship between ES
A
 and 
statistics. Ian Hacking has introduced the term statistical style of reasoning (Hacking 
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1992a) and I want to argue that a) ES
A 
is indicative of such a statistical style of 
reasoning and b) that the utilization of ES
A
-type mechanisms in many socio-technical 
epistemic systems on the Web leads to a reinforcement and amplification of this 
statistical style of reasoning. 
What is a style of reasoning? Hacking does not precisely define what it is, but only 
refers to its metaphysical and performative nature by stating that a style of reasoning is 
―an irrevocably metaphysical idea, yet styles like all else human, come into being 
through little local interactions― (Hacking 1992a: 131f). Due to this lack of a definition, 
taking a look at the examples of different styles of reasoning he distinguishes as well as 
the effects he is ascribing to them is more illuminating.  
In the development of his concept of styles of reasoning, Hacking refers to two 
predecessors: A.C. Crombie styles of scientific thinking, based on historical analyses of 
scientific practices (Crombie 1994, Crombie 1988), as well as Ludwik Fleck‘s thought 
styles (‗Denkstile‘), which result from his sociological analyses in medicine (Fleck 
1980). Since Hacking‘s style concept can be considered as a philosophical counterpart to 
Crombie‘s historical concept, Crombie‘s six styles should be mentioned. Hacking 
summarizes them as follows:  
―(a) The simple postulation established in the mathematical sciences. 
(b) Experimental exploration and measurement of more complex observable 
relations. 
(c) Hypothetical construction of analogical models. 
(d) Ordering of variety by comparison and taxonomy. 
(e) Statistical analysis of regularities of populations, and the calculus of 
probabilities. 
(f) Historical derivation of genetic development.‖ (Hacking 1992b: 132). 
Hacking adds to this list the laboratory style of reasoning, which is ―characterized by 
the building of apparatus in order to produce phenomena to which hypothetical 
modelling may be true or false, but using another layer of modelling, namely models of 
how the apparatus and instruments themselves work‖ (Hacking 1992b: 6). However, for 
the purpose of this thesis, it is the statistical style of reasoning is the central style of 
reasoning which is also the one Hacking has developed in most detail based on his 
analyses on the historical development of statistics (Hacking 1992a, Hacking 1975; 
Hacking 1990).  
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Yet why introduce a concept of style? What is supposed to be explained by it? Hacking 
and his predecessors use the concept of styles to shed some light on knowledge creation 
in science. To my mind, the style concept is a way to describe different epistemic 
practices and explain how they function. It offers a way of grasping the relationship 
between epistemic practices and epistemic content and as such it is helpful to understand 
the performative relationship between epistemic practices on the Web, the epistemic 
content that gets created by those practices and the epistemic norms and standards that 
evolve within and through epistemic practices. This relevance becomes obvious when 
taking a look at three core characteristics of styles.  
First of all, a style of reasoning according to Hacking introduces „new sentences with 
new meanings, new truth-conditions, new objects, new classifications, and new criteria 
for verification― (Hacking 1992a: 142). That is, each style of reasoning, for example the 
statistical or the laboratory style of reasoning, creates its own objects of studies, new 
classes, types of propositions, laws and explanations, etc. Secondly, styles of reasoning 
are self-authenticating. They define their own criteria of validity and objectivity, their 
set of propositions that can be true or false. Hacking states that ―each style of reasoning 
introduces its own criteria of proof and demonstration, and that it determines the truth 
conditions appropriate to the domain to which it can be applied. [...] A style of reasoning 
is more than a group of techniques for bringing new kinds of facts into our awareness, 
into our living, mental, social world. I say it creates the very criteria of truth. It is, as I 
like to say, self-authenticating‖ (Hacking 2002: 4). For the statistical style of reasoning 
this means for instance that measurements of accuracy, reliability and even validity are 
based on statistics itself (Hacking 1992a: 144). 
Third, styles are also self-stabilizing, i.e. they develop their own techniques, by which 
they stabilize themselves. In that sense styles are validated through their application. 
This aspect is crucial for my argument that currently a statistical style of reasoning gets 
amplified by the sheer ubiquity of statistical mechanisms on the Web. Different styles 
have different techniques of stabilizing themselves and these techniques are also 
differently successful, but their commonality is that ―they enable a self-authenticating 
style to persist, to endure‖ (Hacking 1992b: 15). Hacking has analyzed these techniques 
for three styles he distinguishes: the statistical, the laboratory and the mathematical 





 The statistical style has been particularly successful in stabilizing itself and 
Hacking notes:  
―the statistical style is so stable that it has grown its own word that gives a 
hint about its most persistent techniques: ‗robust‘. In the case of statistics 
there is an almost too evident version of self-authentication (the use of 
probabilities to assess probabilities). But that is only part of the story, for I 
emphasize the material, institutional requirements for the stability of 
statistical reasoning. Indeed, if my accounts deserve to be pegged by any one 
familiar philosophical ‗-ism‘, then it is materialism.‖(Hacking 1992b: 15f).  
I would like to add that when it comes to the Web, this materialization takes place by 
inscribing statistical mechanisms into socio-technical epistemic systems. It is by this 
materialization that the statistical style of reasoning is performed and boosted.  
The statistical style of reasoning has long left the realm of science and arrived in the 
midst of our daily life. According to Hacking this statistical style of reasoning ―has 
totally changed our feel of the daily world in which we live, a world in which everything 
is cloaked in probabilities, sex, sports, disease, politics, electrons, cosmic collision, the 
wave function. The triumph of probability was engineered in the nineteenth century and 
perfected in the twentieth. Now it is inescapable‖ (Hacking 2002: 3). I argue that the 
Web2.0 environment has given this development yet another spin: the sheer ubiquity of 
tools that employ statistical aggregation has boosted the perceived value of statistical 
aggregation. That is, a statistical style of reasoning is being reinforcing through its 
ubiquity in various fields of our daily life in general as well as through its embeddedness 
in many socio-technical epistemic systems in particular. Some support for this claim can 
also be found in debates about the end of expertise on the Web and beyond, which is 
either welcomed (e.g. Surowiecki 2004) or feared (e.g. Keen 2008). Numerous books 
have become bestsellers in the last years, which can be interpreted as promoting or 
assessing the merits or shortcomings of statistical reasoning (e.g. Ayres 2007, Anderson 
2006, or Taleb 2007 for a different perspective).  
By referring in particular to prediction markets and evidence concerning the 
comparative advantages of statistical mechanisms over individual expert judgments, 
several authors from primarily economic or technical backgrounds have argued for the 
replacement of expert judgments with statistical techniques (Surowiecki 2004, Ayres 
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2007). In the following I use Ian Ayres‘s bestseller ―Super crunchers: why thinking-by-
numbers is the new way to be smart‖ (Ayres 2007) as an example to show not only how 
a statistical style of reasoning is defended, but also how this defense is related to ICT.  
Ian Ayres delivers an account of how large-scale, statistical, data-driven procedures can 
solve Surowiecki‘s cognition problems (Surowiecki 2004). The title ―Super Crunchers‖ 
refers to data set analysts who process huge amounts of data for decision and prediction 
making: which baseball team is going to win this season? How good – and expensive - 
will a wine be that has just been harvested? Which teaching model is superior? What 
illness is a patient suffering from? The bottom line of Ayres argument is that each of 
these questions can better be answered by using statistical mechanism than by asking 
experts.  
Ayres lists numerous examples in which statistical predictions based on large data sets 
outperform expert judgments based solely on intuition and observational experience and 
concludes: ―For decades, social scientists have been comparing the predictive accuracies 
of Super Crunchers and traditional experts. In study after study, there is a strong 
tendency for the Super Crunchers to come out on top‖ (Ayres 2007: 108). The reason for 
this superiority lies in the fact that in contrast to algorithms, humans often falls prey to 
certain cognitive biases, irrespective of whether they are experts or not (Ayres 2007: 
115f): we often put too much weight on unusual events, we have a tendency to cling to 
beliefs we have formed even if they turn out to be false, and we are overconfident in our 
cognitive abilities. Moreover, we are not particularly good in putting weights to different 
causal factors – and this is a task in which quantitative data analyses are much superior 
to our intuitions. Since algorithms do not have an ego, they also neither cling to 
mistaken beliefs not do they overrate their own abilities. The main conclusion that Ayres 
draws from these observations is that ―we should strip experts of at least some of their 
decision-making authority‖ (Ayres 2007: 116). Instead of making decision, the role of 
experts should rather be elsewhere: someone has to come up with hypotheses to be 
statistically tested, data needs to be collected, created and interpreted. Yet when it comes 
to deciding and predicting, it is the algorithm that should have the last say, because 
―[h]umans too often wave off the machine predictions and cling to their misguided 
personal convictions‖ (Ayres 2007: 117). Ayres is explicitly arguing to shift authority 
from human epistemic agents to algorithms and in the next section on trust, authority 
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and transparency I will show that this shift, this change towards algorithm authority 
(Shirky 2009) has already been executed on the Web.  
According to Ayres, there are two crucial prerequisites for Super Crunching to emerge: 
statistical techniques and information and communication technologies to provide and 
process data. While several of the statistical techniques have existed since centuries, it is 
the technological change, the availability of ICT, which has enabled Super Crunching – 
and has thus boosted a statistical style of reasoning. Indeed, many of examples that 
Ayres uses to explain the merits of Super Crunching are taken from the Web.  
With respect to the statistical basis, Ayres refers to two basic techniques and one 
theorem: randomization and regression analysis as the basic techniques for making 
predictions and Bayes’ Theorem as a tool for updating predictions over time. Regression 
analysis produces an equation that best fits a set of given data. However, once the 
equation is there, it can then also be used for making predictions. One example that 
Ayres uses to explain how regression analysis functions is the online dating service E-
harmony.
170
 Based on analyzing various traits of married couples, E-harmony has 
created a model of twenty-nine variables with different weights that should predict the 
match between two singles in the E-harmony database (Ayres 2007: 22ff). In principle, 
this model draws conclusions about the relevance of different personality factors for the 
compatibility of partners based on the sample of 5000 married couples, i.e. successful 
examples, to make predictions for those singles still waiting for their match. That is, 
historical, existing data from married couples are used to make predictions for the 
singles. In contrast to many recommender systems, decision making and predictions in 
the case of this dating service does not depend on explicit, conscious preferences. 
Rather, the model seeks to reveal some underlying and unknown factors (Ayres 2007: 
27). Another crucial characteristic of regression analyses are confidence intervals. 
Confidence intervals describe the range into which a value falls with a likelihood of 
95% (or 99%). That means that regression analyses deliver for each value also an 
indicator of the reliability of this value. Depending on the quality of the input data, this 
confidence interval can be larger or smaller. The narrower a confidence interval is, the 
more precise the prediction is.  
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 http://www.eharmony.com/ [date of access: 19.11.2009] 
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Randomization is the second technique that Ayres refers to as the gold standard for data-
driven decision making. Let‘s assume that you want to find out whether a drug is 
effective in treating a certain disease.
171
 You may use two groups: the experimental 
group, which receives the treatment, and the control group, which receives a placebo. In 
order to prove that differential results are really due to your treatment, you have to make 
sure that there are no other variables that could explain for the difference. One 
possibility for this is to match the groups, i.e. you would have to make sure that the 
people in the two groups are similar with respect to all other variables that may have an 
effect of the outcome other than your treatment. With randomization you avoid difficult 
matching procedures. After all, you would have to know which ones are the relevant 
variables necessary for matching, and even if you knew them, this would pose additional 
problems for acquiring participants for your study. Thus, instead of matching, one uses 
randomization, which relies on the same logic that Surowiecki has proposed for his 
wisdom of the crowds: if you ask a large enough group of diverse, independent people, 
then their errors will cancel each other out (Surowiecki 2004: 10). Size reduces bias if 
certain prerequisites are met. The same is true for the different variables affecting the 
outcome of a test. If the sample size is large enough, randomization makes these groups 
identical. Instead of matching individuals, distributions are matched. Ayres concludes: 
―Since the distribution of both groups becomes increasingly identical as the sample size 
increases, then we can attribute any differences in the average group response to the 
difference in treatment (Ayres 2007: 51). So all we need for number crunching are 
sufficiently large sample sizes, i.e. large data sets.
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The final tool that Ayres emphasizes has been introduced before: the Bayes’ Theorem as 
a model of how to update probabilities in the light of new evidence. Ayres argues that 
―the Bayes equation is the science of learning. [...] If the Super Cruncher of the future is 
really going to dialectically toggle back and forth between her intuitions and her 
statistical predictions, she‘s going to have to know how to update her predictions and 
intuitions over time as she gets new information. Bayes‘ equation is crucial to this 
updating process‖ (Ayres 2007: 212).  
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 For the sake of simplicity, I am only portraying a much simplified version of actual clinical test trials 
of course.  
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 However, it should be noted that the utility of statistical significance, i.e. the ubiquitous p.05 and p. 01, 
for large-scale data analyses has recently become under dispute. Confer (Sterne and Smith 2001) or 
http://www.hastac.org/blogs/cathy-davidson/statistical-significance-v-substantive-significance for further 
literature [date of access: 23.03.2010]  
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As stated before, these statistical techniques are not at all new, the Bayes‘ theorem for 
instance was formulated in the 18
th
 century (Bayes 1764). It is not techniques, but 
technology, and more specifically computer technology, that makes the difference in two 
respects. First of all, the exponential increase in processing and storage capacity has lead 
to more data that can be processed faster. Thus, it is not due to new statistical methods, 
but due to the availability of data and means of processing them that Super Crunching 
has emerged. Moreover, in the Web2.0 environment there are not only applications that 
create data, but many applications process these data themselves and use them for a 
variety of different purposes. That is, ICT and computer technology more generally 
serve as prerequisites, amplifiers and playground for Super Crunching. Indeed, as has 
been shown throughout this chapter, many socio-technical epistemic systems employ 
aggregational mechanisms. These mechanisms range from simple averaging processes 
to numerous more complex algorithms embedded in different types of systems: the 
filtering, selection and evaluation of epistemic agents and content, classifications, 
recommendations, search results – on the Web all of them depend on statistical 
mechanisms. 
What conclusions can be drawn from my analyses of the statistical style of reasoning in 
this section? I would argue that statistical reasoning forms the basis of ES
A
 and of many 
epistemic practices in the socio-technical epistemic systems of the Web2.0. Taking into 
account the performative nature of styles, their power of self-authentication, it can 
reasonably be assumed that the sheer ubiquity and pervasiveness of systems employing 
statistical mechanisms has led to a further strengthening of an already dominant mode of 
reasoning. We have to keep in mind, however, that there are other forms of reasoning, 
other types of epistemic sociality that may be as valid as ES
A
 – and superior to ESA 
depending on the epistemic tasks and goals at hand. ES
A
 has its merits and accounts, 
such as Ayres ―Super Crunchers‖ deliver valid arguments for these merits. Clearly, 
given that epistemology strives for identifying mechanisms that are epistemically 
beneficial, such analyses are relevant for any epistemology comparing different socio-
epistemic mechanisms of decision making and predictions.  
Yet there are limits to this type of epistemic sociality. ES
A
 might be superior for certain 
epistemic tasks, but it is clearly not suited for others, as has been argued in the previous 
section. Statistical reasoning can only be applied to quantifiable questions. Some 
questions may not – or at least not as easily or usefully be quantified. In other words, 
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―[i]f you can‘t measure what you‘re trying to maximize, you‘re not going to be able to 
rely on data-driven decisions‖ (Ayres 2007: 150). A crucial question therefore is what 
gets lost when a statistical style of reasoning becomes too dominant: Which questions 
can be asked, which can be answered by employing ES
A
? Which questions might 
disappear? If one type of epistemic sociality becomes too dominant, there is a danger 
that questions which cannot be answered with the mechanisms offered may be rendered 
irrelevant. 
Finally, while statistical procedures may be superior methods for decision making and 
predictions, this superiority is bound to certain prerequisites concerning independence 
and diversity outlined above. The message is ―garbage-in, garbage-out‖: if you do not 
have good data, no statistical test will tell you anything useful. What it true for the data, 
is also true for the hypotheses and the assumptions that have informed a study. If they 
are faulty, the use of statistical procedures is even more problematic, as even Ayres 
admits: ―[s]tatistical analysis casts a patina of scientific integrity over a study that can 
obscure the misuse of mistaken assumptions‖ (Ayres 2007: 187). Given the high 
salience of statistical data and the trust we place in numbers (Porter 1995), we have to 
make very sure that the data and mechanisms we employ are valid. Otherwise, we may 
place trust into processes and procedures that are not trustworthy, which brings us to the 
topic of trust, authority and transparency.  
10.4.3 ESA: Procedural Trust, Algorithmic Authority & The 
Need for Transparency 
In the previous chapter I have outlined the relationship between trust and knowledge and 
how it figures for ES
I
. In this chapter, I argue that while trust is as crucial for 
aggregational epistemic practices as it was for integrative, the forms and loci of trust 
differ between these two types of epistemic sociality. Moreover, while the basic 







 is characterized by the emergence of a new type of authority: algorithmic 
authority. I conclude this section with a request for transparency in socio-technical 
epistemic systems.  
To recapitulate: I have argued that trust is indispensable for epistemic practices and thus 
for knowledge. Without knowledge there can only be blind trust, without trust, there can 
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be no knowledge. I adopted a definition of trust as an attitude towards people, 
information or mechanisms we hope will be trustworthy. Yet as the word hope indicates, 
we can never be sure that what we trust really will prove to have been trustworthy in the 
end (Mcleod 2006). Since trust is not being certain, trusting by definition contains the 
risk of being let down, the risk of having placed trust wrongly. Hence a crucial question 
concerns the conditions under which trust is warranted. The question of warrant relates 
to the fact that we do not - and should not - distribute trust evenly over all epistemic 
agents, content and processes. Rather, we attribute differential amounts of epistemic 
authority to them, depending on how trustworthy we consider them to be. Authority 
implies epistemic trust, by trusting someone to know, we attribute authority to this 
person with respect to the issue at hand. When we trust others to know, we delegate 




While trust is an attitude of a trusting epistemic agent to other agents, content or 
processes, trustworthiness is a characteristic of those who are trusted. That is a crucial, 
but often neglected difference in debates around trust on the Web and elsewhere. Only 
because of this difference it is possible to talk about misplaced trust: agents, content of 
processes that have been considered trustworthy turn out to be untrustworthy, hence 
trust was ill-placed. Or the other way around: a trustworthy epistemic agent may be 
denied trust. Both cases are epistemically detrimental. In the first case error may spread, 
in the second case, growth or spread of knowledge may be hampered.  
As was the case for ES
I
, we assess epistemic trustworthiness by using various proxies. 
We may assess the trustworthiness of those who provided us information by using their 
status or their institutional affiliation as proxies. Based on this assessment of 
trustworthiness we attribute or deny authority to epistemic agents or content. Hence we 
use reputational cues, some of which are more valid than others. Yet since proxies are 
heuristics to assess the trustworthiness of others, they are fallible and need to be 
scrutinized themselves. Two types of errors can occur: we can trust when we should not 
or we can distrust when we should have trusted: these are the α-error and the β-error of 
using reputational cues to assess trustworthiness of epistemic agents.  
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In cases when the provider of epistemic content is not known, we may use knowledge 
about the process of its creation to assess whether or not, resp. to what extent we can 
reasonably trust this content. On the Web this form of trust, trust in processes, is quite 
frequent, because the providers of content often are not known or because we do not 
have indicators to assess their trustworthiness. I label this form of trust procedural trust. 
In the previous chapter Wikipedia is already an example of procedural trust. People trust 
or distrust the information provided on Wikipedia because they trust or distrust the 
epistemic mechanism underlying Wikipedia. Trusting Wikipedia differs from trust in 
specific human epistemic agents. Indeed, not only is the person providing content often 
not known. Without reference to the history page it is also not possible to find out which 
agent is responsible for which part of the content. Different tools have been developed to 
make these processes transparent, the WikiScanner as an example to make potential bias 
due to interests visible, WikiDashboard as an example to make editing patterns visible. 
If procedural trust is already at work for Wikipedia, this is even more so when it comes 
to different systems employing aggregational mechanisms.  
With reference to Wikipedia, but also to Google and Twitter, Shirky notes that people 
seem to ―trust new classes of aggregators and filters‖ (Shirky 2009) and calls this 
tendency algorithmic authority. He explains the concept as follows: If someone tells me 
that Khotyn is a town in Moldova, on which grounds do I trust or distrust this 
information? In line with my previous analyses on the relevance of social proxies for the 
prognosis of trustworthiness and the attribution of authority, Shirky notes that we may 
make use of formal or informal social judgments. An example of a formal social 
judgment may be a university certificate in geography; an informal one may be that 
other people have vouched for the trustworthiness, that they trust him. These two 
examples are reminiscent of Kitcher‘s distinction of direct and indirect ways of 
calibrating earned and unearned authority (Kitcher 1993: 314ff).  
Since Khotyn is not in Moldova, but in Ukraine, it would have been an example of 
misplaced trust, if we had trusted this person. Yet this false information was also to be 
found in the Encyclopedia Britannica until it was corrected. Is there a difference 
between being wrong by trusting some person you do not know on the Internet and the 
Encyclopedia Britannica, Shirky asks? There is a difference: because Encyclopedia 
Britannica is considered to be an authoritative source for geographic information, one 
would feel less silly if it turns out that one has misplaced trust in it.  
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Shirky concludes that ―[a]uthority thus performs a dual function; looking to authorities 
is a way of increasing the likelihood of being right, and of reducing the penalty for being 
wrong. An authoritative source isn‘t just a source you trust; it‘s a source you and other 
members of your reference group trust together. [...] It‘s impossible to be right all the 
time, but it‘s much better to be wrong on good authority than otherwise, because if 
you‘re wrong on good authority, it‘s not your fault‖ (Shirky 2009). This quote stresses a 
crucial aspect of attributing authority: its socio-epistemic nature. Indeed, Shirky notes: 
―The social characteristic of deciding who to trust is a key feature of authority — were 
you to say ‗I have it on good authority that Khotyn is a town in Moldova‘, you‘d be 
saying that you trust me to know and disclose that information accurately, not just 
because you trust me, but because some other group has vouched, formally or 
informally, for my trustworthiness‖ (Shirky 2009). Epistemic authority is shared 
epistemic trust. 
So far this has been a general characterization of authority as a socio-epistemic 
construct, which corresponds to the analyses on authority delivered in the previous 
chapter. The crucial innovation, the change that Shirky observes, however, refers to the 
emergence on a new form of authority: algorithmic authority. This form of authority 
differs from authority ascribed to epistemic agents. He describes the formation of 
algorithmic authority as follows (Shirky 2009): First material from multiple sources, 
which themselves are not vetted for their trustworthiness, has to be combined in a 
process that is not supervised by some editor before being made available. Second, this 
mode of providing information must lead to good results so that people start to trust it. 
Yet only once people realize that others trust this source as well, it turns into an 
authoritative source of information for this community of people. This means that the 
attribution of authority is a decidedly socio-epistemic process.  
Referring back to my previous conclusions on the relationship between trust, 
trustworthiness and authority in ES
A
, this development implies that on the Web, in 
applications that employ ES
A
, people start trusting aggregational mechanisms because 
they a) delivered some good results (direct verification) and b) others trust these 
mechanisms as well (indirect calibration of authority). They place trust in certain 
processes and mechanisms, a form of trust which I have labeled procedural trust to 
distinguish it from trust in epistemic agents. In trusting these processes, they collectively 
attribute authority to aggregational mechanisms. Trust is placed in the aggregational 
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mechanism of closure and not in the individual epistemic agents. Indeed, Shirky seems 
to directly refer to my considerations concerning the statistical rationale behind ES
A
 
when he concludes:  
―But the core of the idea is this: algorithmic authority handles the ―Garbage 
In, Garbage Out‖ problem by accepting the garbage as an input, rather than 
trying to clean the data first; it provides the output to the end user without 
any human supervisor checking it at the penultimate step; and these 
processes are eroding the previous institutional monopoly on the kind of 
authority we are used to in a number of public spheres [...]‖ (Shirky 2009).  
What conclusions can be drawn from Shirky‘s ―speculative post on the idea of 
algorithmic authority‖ [...]‖ (Shirky 2009)? First of all, I would argue that it is a key 
characteristic of ES
A
 that there is a concentration of trust on the aggregation mechanism. 
While for ES
I
 about equal trust was needed in all components of the epistemic process, 
trust in ES
A
 is much more skewed. Below is the model which I have sketched to indicate 
all the instances and processes which need to be trusted within ES
I
. Trust needs to be 
placed in epistemic agents, in their interaction, in the integration processes as well as in 
knowledge as a result of these epistemic processes if it is to be fed back into a process of 
knowledge creation.  
 
Figure 17: Trust in ES:Integration 
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This is different for aggregational mechanisms as I have indicated in the next picture. 
Here much less trust is needed in the individual agents. One needs to place some trust in 
the collectivity of epistemic agents, namely that they are diverse and independent, but 
the competence and honesty of the individual epistemic agents are of lesser concern. 
The reason for this is that according to the ES
A
 rationale, error will cancel itself out as 
long as there is a large enough number of epistemic agents who are independent and 
diverse. Hence, less trust needs to be placed in the individual epistemic agents, while 
more trust needs to be placed in the aggregational mechanisms. This trust in the methods 
of aggregation is what Clay Shirky refers to as algorithmic authority.  
However, the problem with this algorithmic authority is that the underlying heuristics 
and techniques frequently are inaccessible or incomprehensible for users. Hence, they 
are in the very vulnerable position of having to rely on sources whose heuristics they 
cannot control and which biases they cannot assess. Since many algorithms, such as 
Flickr‘s interestingness, Google‘s PageRank, or the algorithms underlying different 
recommender systems, are either unknown or imcomprehensible to most if not all users, 
users of such systems cannot be reponsible knowers, because they do not even 
understand the processes upon which they rely. This issue is of particular concern in 
reputational algorithms, because of the effects these algorithms has not only on 
epistemic content, but also on epistemic agents. The general pros and cons of using 
reputation for epistemic purpose have been outlined in the previous chapter. The 
specificity of reputation in ES
A
 lies in the fact that reputation is formalized through 
algorithms and as such embedded – and often rendered invisible – within socio-technical 
epistemic systems. If reputational tools on the Web have to be scrutinized by 
epistemically responsible users who do not want to accept too naïvely the outcome of a 
process they do not control, the basics of these tools need to be made transparent. That 
is, the responsibility to scrutinize socio-technical epistemic systems can only be fulfilled 
if it is possible to access the underlying techniques and heuristics, the algorithms in the 
first place. Moreover, it must be possible to make sense of them. This implies a duty for 
designers of such systems to make the algorithms that they use transparent in order to 
empower users to become responsible knowers. One example of how such transparency 




Figure 18: Trust in ES:Aggregation 
10.5 Implications for the Analysis and Design of Socio-Technical 
Epistemic Systems: An example 
10.5.1 Trust, Authority and Transparency in Trust-Aware 
Recommender Systems 
Trust-aware recommender systems as a specific type of recommender systems (RSs) 
have already been briefly introduced in Chapter 2. In this chapter I want to return to 
these systems to elucidate the relationship between knowledge, trust, authority and 
transparency in ES
A
. A brief reminder: besides trust-based systems, there are different 
types of classical RSs: content-based, collaborative-filtering as well as different hybrid 
systems. They have in common that they all serve the purpose of suggesting content of 
interest to users. From a socio-epistemological perspective, collaborative-filtering 
systems are of greater interest than content-based systems, because here the 
recommendations are based on judgments provided by the community of users, by 
multiple epistemic agents of a socio-technical epistemic system. Hence, collaborative-





Classical RS techniques have several shortcomings, including the so-called cold start 
problem, i.e. the difficulty to generate recommendations for new users (Massa and 
Bhattacharjee 2004). When a new user enters a system, the system does not ―know‖ 
anything about this new user and this ignorance makes it difficult to generate 
appropriate recommendations for her. To counteract this problem, traditionally, new 
users have been asked to rate a few items so that the system can ―learn‖ something about 
the user in order to provide personalized information on interesting items for her. 
However, especially in large databases necessary correlations are scarce and thus, this 
procedure often turns out to be quite ineffective. In consequence, algorithms have been 
developed that bootstrap the system not by feeding in judgements on content, but 
judgements on other users. Systems employing such algorithms are trust-based 
recommender system. Numerous trust-based RS have been proposed, such as Advogato 
by Levien (Levien and Aiken 1998), Appleseed by Ziegler and Lausen (Ziegler and 
Lausen 2004), MoleTrust by Massa and Avesani (Avesani, Massa et al. 2005, Massa 




In the following I portray the works of Paolo Avesani, Bobby Bhattachcharjee and Paolo 
Massa as an exemplar. I have chosen their model, because the authors highlight several 
issues of high socio-epistemological interest. These issues include the epistemic 
relevance of trust, the relationship between trust and authority, and finally the 
relationship between trust, different forms of bias, and (in-)transparency. Massa & 
Bhattachasjee have developed an algorithm for ―Trust-aware Recommender Systems‖, 
arguing that the cold-start problem can be solved by implementing a notion of trust 
between users into the system (Massa and Bhattacharjee 2004). The difference between 
traditional RSs and trust-aware RSs is quite simple: ―While traditional RSs exploit only 
ratings provided by users about items, Trust-aware Recommender Systems let the user 
express also trust statements, i.e. their subjective opinions about the usefulness of other 
users‖ (Massa and Avesani 2006). This seemingly minor change proves to be highly 
effective to remedy the cold start problem because ―it is able to exploit trust propagation 
over the trust network by means of a trust metric‖ (Massa and Avesani 2006). 
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With respect to the relationship between knowledge, trust and reputation this example 
implies that assessing one‘s peer and placing differential amounts of trust in them is 
epistemically useful, because it enables better predictions within RS. This means that 
reputational mechanisms, mechanisms in which trust is placed in some agents but not in 
others, have epistemic merits. However, a second point is interesting and it concerns our 
trust in the algorithms themselves. As Shirky has noted, there seems to be an increasing 
willingness to attribute epistemic authority to algorithms (Shirky 2009). While we have 
seen the epistemic merits of aggregational mechanisms throughout this chapter, the 
limits of these mechanisms as well as the problems that occur, if certain prerequisites are 
not met, have also been outlined. Hence, to be epistemically responsible users of such 
mechanisms or systems that employ such mechanisms, we would need to make sure that 
the prerequisites are met and that appropriate aggregational mechanisms are employed. 
Only then can we place trust responsibly. Unfortunately, we often trust these algorithms 
blindly and we frequently are even forced to, because algorithms are hidden within a 
system. In most cases we are not aware how they work and we cannot assess their 
impact on the information we receive. In other words: algorithms are black-boxed. Once 
a system is released the way it works seems without alternatives - and the negotiations 
and decisions that have taken place in its development become invisible (Pinch and 
Bijker 1987).  
To get an idea of the relevance of such invisible decisions it is instructive to compare the 
effects different algorithms have when being applied to the same data set. As an 
example, I briefly compare two types of trust metrics: local and global trust metrics 
(Massa and Avesani 2007). Trust metrics are techniques for answering questions such as 
―Should I trust this person?‖ in virtual communities. Hence they are means to estimate 
the trustworthiness of information providers. Depending on the metric, on the algorithm 
you choose, you will receive different values of trustworthiness for each user. That 
means that even if a distinct value of a user existed (her ―true‖ trustworthiness), the 
predictions of different metrics would be dispersed around this true value. This is a basic 
effect of using statistical methods for predictions. However, the problem may be even 
more profound. What if there is no such thing as a true value of trustworthiness of a 
user? What if the user A‘s trustworthiness was different for user B and user C? This is 
the rationale behind local trust metrics: while ―[g]lobal trust metrics assign to a given 
user a unique trust score, the same independently of the user that is evaluating the other 
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user‘s trustworthiness […], a local trust metric provides a personalized trust score that 
depends on the point of view of the evaluating user‖ (Massa and Avesani 2007: 40). 
From the perspective of local trust metrics, the trustworthiness of a user is not an 
intrinsic value of that user, but lies in the eyes of the beholder. This difference should be 
reminiscent of certain debates in epistemology: while some argue that knowledge is 
always situated and contingent, others adhere to universal knowledge claims.  
Moreover, different algorithms have differential effects on users as becomes obvious for 
controversial users. Controversial users are users who are trusted and distrusted by 
many other users of the system. By using a global trust metric that calculates an average 
trust value for each user, these users would simply be ―averaged out‖. They would be 
rendered irrelevant by receiving the weight ―zero‖. It is of epistemological and ethical 
interest that controversial users are valued very differently in these two different metrics. 
Local trust metrics explicitly stress and appreciate the individuality and situatedness of 
every trust statement and state that controversial users by definition do not have a global 
trust value for the whole community. By contrast, global trust metrics suggest a 
fictitious consensus between users by calculating an averaged trust value for each user. 
Through this process, the controversial user is rendered ―unreliable‖ and gets 
statistically eliminated.  
These different types of trust metrics do not only have different underlying assumptions 
about the value of those users and about deviation from the mean - or norm - more 
generally. They also have an impact on the information one receives and whose opinions 
are included. They might even retroact on cultural and societal values on how to deal 
with minority views. Averaging out controversial users by means of statistics has a 
similar effect as other mechanisms of ―sorting out‖ (Bowker and Star 1999) and 
silencing: they exclude those from participation that deviate too much from the norms or 
do not fit in ready-made categories. To conclude, local trust and global trust metric are 
based on very different epistemological and ethical premises. Not only do they differ 
with respect to their stance towards universality versus situatedness of trustworthiness. 
They also value different user types differently and have differential effects on the 
importance of such users. In Nissenbaum and Friedman‘s terms, RSs employing global 
trust metrics entail bias: they systematically and unfairly discriminate against certain 
individuals, namely controversial users, in favor of others, namely all non-controversial 
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users (Friedman and Nissenbaum 1997: 23).
175
 In Friedman and Nissenbaum‘s 
systematization, this would be technical bias, because it arises within the process of 
technology design, when the developers decide upon the algorithms they choose to 
employ. However, I do not think it is entirely clear that this technical bias can be 
completely separated from pre-existing and emergent biases. Given the fact that global 
and local trust metrics correspond nicely to different epistemological positions, it cannot 
be precluded that at the very least implicit societal values are being inscribed into RSs 
by opting for one algorithm and not the other. Moreover, emergent bias can surely 
evolve and hence can also not be excluded. This is not to imply that local trust metrics 
are generally preferable or that they cannot entail biases. Depending on the purpose 
global trust-metrics may indeed be useful as shall be outlined below.  
What conclusions can be drawn from my analyses? We have seen that different 
algorithms in trust-aware RSs lead to different recommendations and affect users of the 
system differently. Moreover, these processes are usually black-boxed and therefore not 
assessed critically. What if we made such algorithms visible? What if we left it up to the 
user to decide whether he prefers to use local or global trust metrics? All that would be 
needed to increase the transparency of RSs and to empower its users is a dual search-
button and a way to visualize the differences between the different algorithms. In the 
following I sketch a simple, yet epistemologically and ethically relevant extension to 
trust-aware RSs. I have labeled my thought experiment ―MyChoice‖. I chose this name 
for two reasons. First it is supposed to indicate that epistemologically and ethically 
relevant choices are constantly being made in the course of developing software. Thus, 
by the label MyChoice, users should be made aware that these decisions are built into 
software and have certain effects. Secondly, MyChoice is a tool that empowers users to 
make informed choices of their own where it is normally the programmer who has 
decided for them.  
Basically, MyChoice has two distinct features. One is a dual search button, by which 
you can choose between two different trust metrics to generate recommendations. The 
labels that I have chosen are ―Search... personalized for me‖ versus ―Search... the golden 
mean‖. They correspond to the local and global trust metrics as described in (Massa and 
Avesani 2007). One can set one of the trust metrics as one‘s default. However, by 
                                                 
175
 Please confer Chapter 3 for further information.  
375 
 
clicking on one of the two buttons one can change this for each new query. The second 
feature is an ―open-eye‖-button. If you click on this button, the differences between the 
two trust metrics will be visualized.
176
  
As noted before, there are two differences: different recommendations and different 
effects on the users of the system, who are given different weights. The different 
recommendations could be indicated simply by listing them next to each other. Users 
would see the recommendations based on global trust metrics on the right half of the 
page and those based on local trust metrics on the left. The differences would be visible 
at a glance. And by seeing two different lists of recommendations users would become 
aware of the effects algorithms have on the information they obtain – effects that they 
were formerly not aware of, simply because they were not visible.  
MyChoice would also empower users to decide which algorithm works better for them. 
The dual search button enables users to make more informed decisions about the 
information she wants to receive. For instance, it would be possible to switch between 
the global and the local metric depending on the context. Users might opt for the more 
situated, local option when looking for movie recommendations, but for the rather 
universalist, global one when they want to learn something basic about computing, 
statistics or gardening. In fields where users are novices or for certain reasons more 
interested in mainstream recommendations, they might press the ―Golden Mean‖-button. 
For other questions in fields where they are either more knowledgeable or interested in 
certain niches, they might prefer the ―Personalized For Me‖-search. In the end this 
decision is up to the user. Yet simply by using MyChoice, users will learn about the 
functioning and the consequences of different metrics and algorithms and this will have 
positive epistemological and ethical consequences by making them more responsible 
and reflective knowers. 
As was shown in the case of the controversial user, different algorithms also value users 
differently. To make these differential effects of local and global trust metrics on users 
visible, one might use social network graphics. One could again place two social 
network graphics next to each other and indicate the different weights of users by 
different color codes. Depending on the algorithm, the color of users may change, 
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 I have drafted an interface for MyChoice below. I have superimposed my draft on a screenshot of the 
website Epinions.com, because the analyses by Massa and Avesani (2007) were based on a data set from 
this Website: http://www.epinions.com/ [date of access: 30.11.2009].  
376 
 
indicating a differential treatment by the two algorithms. Highlighting those groups of 
users who are most affected by changes in trust metrics will render the discriminative 
consequences of different metrics visible. Moreover, this information about different 
users and user types might not only be illuminative for the users, but also for developers 
trying to improve their metrics and algorithms. 
What would be the utility of a tool such as MyChoice? First of all, such a system 
empowers the user, because it offers her the chance to decide upon which algorithms she 
prefers for different purposes. Moreover, people using this system would become much 
more aware of how implicit assumptions and values of the programmers are inscribed 
into technology. Users would realize the impact of certain programming decisions on the 
retrieval of information and on different user groups. This effect would already be 
triggered by the dual search option, but it would be amended by the visualization of the 
different search mechanism and differences of retrieved information.  
 
Figure 19: Draft of an Interface for MyChoice
177 
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 Superimposed on a screenshot of the Epinions.com website. 
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10.6 Conclusions on ES:Aggregation 
In this chapter I have outlined another type of epistemic sociality by which multiple 
epistemic agents together achieve epistemic goals: ES:Aggregation. I have argued that 




 and describes a distinct mode of epistemic 
sociality. It differs from ES:Integration because the agents do not need to communicate, 
coordinate their activities or even interact. Indeed such interaction can be harmful, 
because their judgments need to be independent before being aggregated. And it differs 
from ES:Selection, because no epistemic agent alone can achieve the desired results - 
without the aggregation process, there is no epistemic result. The input from various 
epistemic agents needs to be aggregated for this type of epistemic sociality to come to 
the fore.  
I have discussed the specificities of ES
A




 with respect to 
several key topics. Yet one major distinction which was emphasized throughout this 
chapter referred to the fact that aggregational mechanisms can be applied to judgments 
about epistemic content or to epistemic agents. If both happens – as often is the case on 
the Web - one could speak of ―Epistemic Sociality2: Aggregation2‖, because the 
mechanisms are both social and aggregational in a dual sense.  
This means that the basic mechanism of ES
A
 consists in the statistical aggregation of 
judgments from epistemic agents that are independent and diverse. It is social because 
information provided by multiple epistemic agents is used in aggregated form to provide 
a collective result. If this mechanism is applied to epistemic agents, this process 
becomes doubly social: not only is information aggregated – it is social information 
(Lehrer and Wagner 1981) that is being aggregated. This social information, information 
about one‘s peers is aggregated to assess the reputation of epistemic agents, which then 
can serve as a weight for their judgments in the further process of judgment aggregation. 
This is where it becomes doubly aggregational: first aggregation is used to achieve 
consensual weights of trustworthiness of epistemic agents, then aggregation is used to 
decide upon topic matters weighted and the judgments of epistemic agents are weighted 
by their reputation.  
Therefore, conclusions have to be drawn about two issues:  
1) The basic mechanism of aggregating judgments from multiple epistemic agents:  
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This aspect refers to the pros and cons of statistical reasoning. We have to ask to 
what extent such aggregational mechanisms are epistemically useful and where 
potential dangers lie. Here two issues are crucial. One concerns the problems that 
occur when either the prerequisites for the data are not met or the algorithms are 
not useful. The second concerns the issue of algorithmic authority, i.e. the 
question of how much trust we should put into algorithms and how much 
transparency is needed to be justified in trusting algorithms.  
 
2) The application of aggregational mechanisms to social information:  
This question refers to the use and misuse of reputational cues to weight the 
judgments of epistemic agents. First of all, the weights that are ascribed to 
others, even if numbers look so convincing, are initially based on idiosyncratic 
assessments and subjective judgments of peers. This human subjectivity is 
decisive at various stages: the initial input values for reputational mechanisms in 
Lehrer‘s model, the subjective judgments in recommender systems, the 
subjective decisions of programmers for and against certain formalizations and 
algorithms. This implies that pre-existent as well as technical and emergent bias 
become relevant. A crucial danger resides in the possibility of epistemic 
injustice: the problems that occur when inappropriate proxies are used to assess 
the trustworthiness of epistemic agents. The problem of epistemic injustice is not 
unique to ES
A
, it exists for all types of epistemic sociality. However, the problem 
with using reputational measures in systems employing ES
A
 consists in the fact 
that these proxies are rendered invisible by being inscribed into technology, by 
being hardwired into systems and by being blackboxed if the algorithms and the 
input data are not made transparent. Hence, a crucial requirement for reputational 
mechanisms in socio-technical epistemic systems concerns their transparency.  
As was the case for the previous chapter, I conclude my considerations on this type of 
epistemic sociality with a summary of the main criteria that should be fulfilled to ensure 
the proper functioning of systems employing ES
A
. Again, these criteria for systems 











 The tasks that individual epistemic agents conduct tend to be 





. Hence motivation is less of a concern.  
 With respect to the overall epistemic tasks of content 
production versus content evaluation, ES
A
 is mostly rather 
employed for content evaluation, filtering and selection. 
 However, ESA is useful and used for the creation of two 
specific types of epistemic content: 
o second-order knowledge such as bottom-up 
classification systems (folksonomies). 
o collective predictions and collective decisions.  
 One possibility to ensure independence on the level of the task 
structure is to offer tasks simultaneously to multiple agents.  
 ESA is well suited for epistemic tasks with singular, 
quantitative outcome (single values, orders or likelihoods). 
Numbers, Diversity, 
Independence & a 
Statistical Style of 
Reasoning  
 
 Human epistemic agents should be numerous to enable a 
statistical averaging out of error.  
 They should be diverse to avoid bias. Diversity here follows a 
statistical rationale of ensuring statistical variance.  
 They should act independently to avoid information cascades 
and the spreading of error. 
 They need to have some private information, some knowledge 
about the issue at hand. The rationale of cancelling out error to 
be left with information depends on the existence of some 
information in the first place.  
 Agents need to be less motivated than for ESI, because 
individual tasks tend to be either smaller (e.g. a vote on some 
content) or embedded into practices done for oneself (e.g. 
tagging something on Delicious). For prediction markets there 
can be additional financial incentives. 
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 Be aware of the limits of statistical reasoning!  
 Care about the data input and remember: Garbage in-Garbage 
out! 
 Beware of patina of scientific integrity through statistics that 





 Be aware of and try to avoid different types of bias (e.g. 
statistical, pre-existing, technical and emergent bias). 
 Raise awareness about unconscious and implicit use of 
reputational cues to assess epistemic trustworthiness of 
epistemic agents and about the danger of epistemic injustices, 
i.e. the use of invalid social proxies to assess epistemic 
trustworthiness.  
 Be transparent! Make functionalities, implicit assumptions, 
design decisions & effects of different algorithms visible. 




11 Epistemic Sociality 3: Closing Socio-Epistemic 
Processes Through Selection  
11.1 Epistemic Sociality: Selection (ESS) 
In this chapter I outline my third and final type of epistemic sociality: ES: Selection. It is 
a distinct form of epistemic sociality, with its own rationale, benefits and problems. 
Instead of integrating or aggregation epistemic results provided by different epistemic 
agents via the various mechanisms portrayed in the last two chapters, ES
S
 selects among 







because the individual results among which one chooses do not have to be re-combined 
in one way or another. However, ES
S
 is particularly suited to elucidate one aspect of my 
three types of epistemic sociality which I have so far brushed under the carpet: the 
possibility to combine and nest different types of epistemic sociality in socio-technical 
epistemic system and processes. How and when such nesting can take place in ES
S
 
becomes obvious when taking a closer look at the temporal structure of ES
S
-type socio-
epistemic processes. For selection to be a socio-epistemic closure mechanism, at first 





, these epistemic agents however, aim at fulfilling the same epistemic goal. 
They may employ different methods or follow different approaches, but the goal is the 
same. This is the first moment in time when types of epistemic sociality can be nested, 
because to reach an epistemic goal, different forms of epistemic sociality can be 
employed: Agents can collaborate with each other to fulfill the epistemic task (ES
I
), they 
can use aggregational mechanisms (ES
A
), or they can individually pursue different tasks. 
All these options are possible as indicated by the picture below.  
Once these singular epistemic results, obtained through different individual or socio-
epistemic mechanisms, are presented, a judgment has to be formed on how to 
distinguish them. Here again, different integrative or aggregational mechanisms can be 
used, and therefore this is the second moment in which different types of epistemic 
sociality can be combined. In principle there are three generic forms of judgment 
formation.  
a) dictatorial: one epistemic agent alone judges epistemic content or epistemic 
agents provided by others.  
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b) aggregational (ESA): multiple epistemic agents vote on content or other agents, 
these votes are aggregated, different possibilities of weighted and unweighted 
aggregation are possible.  
c) integrative (ESI): multiple epistemic agents deliberate on content or other agents, 
the individual judgments are integrated, different possibilities of weighted and 
unweighted integration are possible. 
Finally, the selection has to be made. It could be random, i.e. without prior differential 
assessment of the submission – or it can be based on any of the modes of judgment 
formation proposed above. It can also take different forms: picking one; picking some, 
i.e. drawing a line and distinguishing between accepted and unaccepted epistemic 
content (e.g. selecting submissions for a conference) or agents (e.g. selection fellowship 
applications); ordering or ranking content or agents.  
 
Figure 20: Distribution and Selection for ES:Selection 
To understand ES
S
 and the possible nesting of types of epistemic sociality, imagine the 
following situation. A price is announced for the best introductory book on social 
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epistemology. Numerous social epistemologists submit their books. Now the choice has 
to be made among these submissions and different options are available to take this 
decision. It could be that the donor of the price money wants to choose the winner 
herself. Whether or not this is an advisable and epistemically beneficial strategy may 
depend on certain characteristics of the donor: Is she competent? Biased? Epistemically 
trustworthy? It is also possible that a committee of different people discusses and 
consents upon the selection. Here not only the characteristics of the individuals involved 
in the process are of interest, but also how they come up with their collective decision. 
Which mechanisms are chosen to integrate the different judgments and opinions into the 
collective decision? Is everyone‘s point of view taken into account? Does everyone‘s 
judgment have the same impact on the outcome or are different agents dominant? Is this 
dominance justified because the agent is considered to be the most competent? Or is he 
simply the loudest? Finally, it is also possible to have a random mass of people vote on 
the different proposals and pick the one with the most votes. Here questions arise 
concerning the aggregation mechanism: Is a weighted or unweighted procedure 
employed, if so for what reasons, etc. 
In processes involving multiple epistemic agents who either deliberate or vote, 
integrative or aggregational mechanisms are employed to obtain a collective judgment 
upon which the selection can be based. This is what I mean by saying that ES
S





. In these two examples ES
S
 is socio-epistemic, because it 
employs social mechanisms of combining epistemic judgments of multiple agents in 
ways outlined in the previous two chapters. Due to this possible nesting of types of 
epistemic sociality, all topics, merits and problems raised in the previous two chapters 
become relevant for ES
S
 whenever integrative or aggregational mechanisms are 
employed. In order not to repeat myself, I focus only on some additional issues that are 
specific to ES
S
 in this chapter. 
Concerning the sociality of ES
S
, it is crucial to understand that even the first case, the 
dictatorial selection has a socio-epistemic component. It is social in the sense of offering 
a macro-perspective on the distribution of epistemic labor within a community. If it is 
possible to choose between different epistemic results for the same question, different 
agents must have worked – possibly in different ways - to come up with these results. 
Selection is the closure mechanisms, but the process that proceeds this closure is 
distributed epistemic labor. This distribution can take the forms characterized in the 
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, but work can also be distributed over different 
individuals who are in competition with each other to fulfill the same task. The crucial 





 pursue the same epistemic goal by different means.
178
 This 
process of letting different agents try our different methods and approaches, hoping that 
one of them finds the solution is epistemically advisable, because before the problem is 
solved, one does not know which strategy will succeed. Therefore if different strategies 
are pursued in parallel, the solution to a problem is expected to be found earlier. This is 
the perspective of Kitcher‘s philosopher-monarch (Kitcher 1993: 305), the perspective 
of Solomon‘s more social epistemology (Solomon 1994), the macroscopic perspective 
of science policy: how and by what means to structure an epistemic field so that at least 
one epistemic agent succeeds in fulfilling an epistemic goal. 
11.2 ESS & Social Epistemology: Diversity and the Distribution of 
Epistemic Labor in Science 
In social epistemology, issues related to ES:Selection have been addressed primarily 
under two headings: the division of cognitive labor (Solomon 2001, Kitcher 1993) and 
epistemic diversity (Solomon 2006). Since many social epistemologists are also 
philosophers of science, their analyses have primarily focused on science. We will see 
that there are some crucial differences between exploiting ES
S
 in science and the Web. 
While it is often stressed that science creates new knowledge, whereas on the Web 
knowledge is primarily distributed, I argue that this is not the crucial difference here. 
After all, one of the examples of epistemic social software introduced in Chapter 2, 
Innocentive.com, explicitly encourages the creation of new knowledge. I return to 
Innocentive.com below. The more relevant difference concerns size: the number of 
available epistemic agents and their diversity. Many social epistemologists and 
philosophers of science have advocated diversity when discussing the optimal 
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 It is possible that for certain epistemic problems, individuals alone can propose answers; singular 
epistemic agents can provide solutions. Although according to the socio-epistemological position adopted 
in this thesis, individual epistemic agents alone can never produce knowledge, because knowledge is a 
social status that depends upon its ascription through a community, individuals can of course submit 
epistemic content into this process of communal assessment. That even these individual submissions are 
social in the sense of building upon knowledge created by others, etc., has been outlined before and is of 
course still considered valid. Hence, epistemic content of different forms can be produced by singular 
agents who are nonetheless related to other epistemic agents in various ways. And for epistemic content to 
be considered knowledge, is has to be vouched for by a community of knowers bound together by a set of 
entitlements and commitments (Kusch 2002). 
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distributions of cognitive labor in science. In this chapter, this question concerns the 
distribution of cognitive labor over different theories or approaches within a scientific 
field as opposed to the distribution of tasks within research teams. The latter topic has 
been addressed in Chapter 9 on ES:Integration. Thus, the focus is more macroscopic and 
looks at overall fields of research rather than at specific research teams. While the 
benefits of diversity are widely acknowledged in social epistemology, there is little 
consensus on whether and if so by which means diversity should be reinforced in 
science.  
In a paper on ―Norms of Epistemic Diversity‖ Miriam Solomon argues that diversity is 
valuable because it produces dissent which in turn produces four valuable outcomes: 1) 
worthwhile criticism, 2) division of labor, 3) social distribution of knowledge and 4) 
creativity (Solomon 2006). To my mind the logic is a bit different. The social 
distribution of knowledge as well as potential increases in creativity are two reasons to 
support diversity, while worthwhile criticism may be a result. The division of cognitive 
labor in turn is a cause as well as a result of diversity and dissent. With respect to 
knowledge, diversity and dissent finally are mutually related: cognitive diversity, i.e. 
different ways of reasoning based on the employment of different perspectives, 
heuristics, interpretations and predictive models (Page 2007) may lead to dissent; while 
dissent may lead to epistemic diversity, i.e. the pursuit of different epistemic approaches. 
Here, I use cognitive diversity in Page‘s sense as referring to different perspectives, 
heuristics, interpretations and predictive models (Page 2007). Epistemic diversity as 
understood here encompasses cognitive diversity but goes beyond it by including 
epistemic practices, such as the knowledge-productive practices described by Longino 
(Longino 2002c).  
In the same article, Solomon also distinguishes three different philosophical stances 
towards diversity in science (Solomon 2006). The first one is a laissez-faire view, 
according to which there is enough diversity in science and that for various reasons there 
should be no intervention into science. Solomon attributes this view amongst others to 
Philip Kitcher, whose perspective is depicted below. Solomon contrasts this laissez-faire 
or invisible hand model with feminist positions that demand explicit encouragement and 
support of more diversity, which propose specific kinds of reconfiguring the scientific 
field by supporting non-mainstream research. Solomon refers to Longino (Longino 
1990) and Evelyn Fox Keller (Keller 1985) as two proponents of such interventionist 
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models, who argue that more research using complex linear models as opposed to 
research following hierarchical linear models should be encouraged. While Solomon 
agrees that there should be more diversity in science, she refrains from making claims 
about which type of diversity might be needed. More specifically, she asserts that 
―diversity is a blunt epistemic tool‖ (Solomon 2006: 26). That is, instead of promoting 
more research with feminist values one should rather manipulate the distribution of bias 
that works in favor or against different theories to make dissent appropriate. 
11.2.1 Solomon’s Position on Diversity: Manipulate the 
Vectors 
The idea of manipulating bias is rooted in Solomon‘s own social epistemology, which 
she has labeled Social Empiricism. It was described in detail in Chapter 5. To 
understand how she relates dissent, diversity, bias, let me recapitulate the main features 
of her approach (Solomon 2001, Solomon 1994). Solomon‘s Social Empiricism is 
intended to be a more social epistemology (Solomon 1994). Instead of focusing on how 
research is conducted in teams, Solomon adopts a macroscopic perspective that focuses 
on the distribution of cognitive labor within research communities. The guiding question 
is how many, which and for how long different research strategies should be pursued. 
She argues that consensus is a special case of dissent, namely zero degree of dissent and 
that it is normatively appropriate only in very few cases. Analyzing case studies from 
the history of science, she rejects the idea that consensus is intrinsically valuable or the 
ultimate goal of science. Indeed, premature consensus can hamper science by precluding 
the pursuance of alternative approaches and according to her case studies, such 
premature consensus has frequently occurred in history of science. Moreover, there are 
not only cases in which consensus was premature, but also cases in which it was kept up 
for too long despite evidence against a consensual theory. Solomon analyses the role 
various social factors play for consensus formation, retention, and dissolution in science 
and the effects that these patterns had on the development of science in different fields. 
Instead of considering social factors as biases, she introduces the term decision vector – 
as a neutral placeholder for various social effects. She distinguishes between empirical 
and non-empirical decision vectors
179
 and argues that not the single vectors, but their 
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 While empirical decision vectors are ―[…] causes of preference for theories with empirical success‖ 
(Solomon 2001: 56), non-empirical decision vectors lack this connection to empirical success. Examples 
that Solomon gives for non-empirical decision vectors include social and political (e.g., ideology, peer 
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distribution affected the welfare or stagnation in different scientific disciplines at various 
stages in history.  
The core of her Social Empiricism lies in providing recommendations on when 
consensus, dissent and the dissolution of consensus should take place. While consensus 
is only appropriate if one theory can account for all empirical evidence, her conditions 
for dissent are necessary to understand her recommendations concerning diversity to be 
outlined below. According to Solomon‘s Social Empiricism, dissent is appropriate when 
the following three conditions are met. 
―1. Theories on which there is dissent should each have associated empirical 
success. 
2. Empirical decision vectors should be equitably distributed, i.e. in 
proportion to empirical success. 
3. Non-empirical decision vectors should be equally distributed (the same 
number for each theory‖ (Solomon 2006: 117f). 
She assumes that the first two prerequisites are easily satisfied and that therefore any 
attempt to increase dissent - and thereby epistemic diversity – must lie in manipulating 
the non-empirical decision vectors. If these are equally distributed, dissent is legitimate 
and the distribution of research effort over several alternatives in justified. Hence, if we 
want to raise epistemic diversity, i.e. the pursuance of different approaches, we must 
make sure that the non-empirical decision vectors, all those biases that are not related to 
the empirical data affect alternative theories equally.  
To elucidate her claim, Solomon portrays an example of an unequal distribution of 
decision vectors in science, which to her mind has hampered diversity. She depicts the 
―story of a novel scientific theory and its rejection (so far) by both the science and the 
technology communities‖ (Solomon 2006: 28). This theory of concern is Luca Turin‘s 
theory of smell, according to which smell detectors work by distinguishing the 
vibrational frequencies of molecules (Solomon 2006: 28). This theory is in opposition to 
the mainstream theories according to which smell is detected by receptors recognizing 
the shape of odorant molecules. Based on the analysis of a biography of Turin, a book 
written by Turin about his theory, as well as some of his papers she concludes that there 
were three non-empirical decision vectors working against Turin‘s theory: the 
                                                                                                                                               
pressure), motivational (e.g., pride, conservativeness) and cognitive factors (heuristics) as well as 
theoretical values (e.g. elegance, simplicity). 
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conservativeness of the academic community, the protectiveness of the perfume industry 
and Turin‘s unprofessional behavior resulting in a lack of respect granted to him.  
Only later did two non-empirical decision vectors emerge that shifted the distribution of 
decision vectors in favor of Turin‘s theory: the publication of his biography and the fact 
that he became the CTO of a company that successfully synthesized molecules 
according to his theory. For Solomon this adds up to a 3:2-relationship of non-empirical 
decision vectors working against Turin. In the case of this unequal distribution of non-
empirical decision vectors dissent is not normatively appropriate. It were appropriate if 
the distribution was equal. Since Solomon seems convinced that Turin‘s theory is worth 
being pursued she therefore argues for manipulating the distribution of non-empirical 
decision vectors to become equal. And the easiest form to do this is to add a decision 
vector that pushes the distribution towards Turin. Solomon also has some suggestions of 
how this could happen: she imagines a BBC documentary, the publication of his book in 
the US as well as some public support of some prominent scientist. If one of those 
means succeeds, the goal would be fulfilled: the distribution of non-empirical decision 
vectors would be equal, dissent would become appropriate and the funds could be re-
arranged to fund some of Turin‘s research.  
To my mind, there are several problems with such an account of the distribution of 
cognitive labor, of dissent and diversity. First of all, as I have argued in detail in Part 2, 
the idea of simply adding up decision vectors seems to overly simplistic and misleading. 
Secondly, I am not sure whether Turin‘s role of a CTO that successfully produces 
molecules according to his theory is a non-empirical decision vector. After all, this 
success is an empirical support for his theory. Thirdly, it is left utterly untouched what 
would happen if there were two decision vectors in favor of Turin‘s theory (a BBC 
documentary and some big name supporting him). This would make the distribution 
unequal again and would imply that there should be no dissent anymore. Yet what 
instead? Consent on Turin‘s theory? This is clearly not very likely to happen just 
because Turin publishes his book in the US combined with a BBC documentary. I think 
that taking Solomon‘s examples serious, as I do here, shows the invalidity of a 
procedure of simply adding up unweighted decision vectors.  
Moreover, it is also not quite clear why randomly chosen decision vectors are needed 
altogether to address the issue of diversity even within Solomon‘s own approach. After 
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all, she rightly asserts that as long as more than one theory can account for empirical 
data that the mainstream approach cannot explain all those theories should be funded as 
well. An interesting question would refer to the exact distribution of funding, to the 
percentage of money that should be given to competing approaches. Yet for this crucial 
question Solomon does not give an answer. I agree this is a difficult, maybe even an 
impossible task. However, if it is not even tackled, it remains unclear why we would 
have to quantify decision vectors and manipulate them in the first place.  
Further, I see epistemological - as well as ethical - problems in her recommendations of 
how to manipulate the non-empirical decision vectors. While I certainly do not question 
the importance and merits of scientists writing popular science books and engaging in 
TV documentaries, I wonder whether these activities should be decidedly recommended 
as means of encouraging epistemic diversity by changing the distribution of non-
empirical decision vectors. After all, you can make all sorts of documentaries and write 
books of varying quality on various topics. Yet I do not see how this should raise the 
fundability of a particular theory of their authors. It would have to be assessed to what 
extent such maneuvers are positively or negatively affecting the distribution of research 
money over competing approaches. Any social epistemology aiming at informing 
science policy should do better than simply offering the recommendation to give money 
to those who make the most noise.  
Finally, seeking alliances with big names to gain power may well be a successful 
strategy of changing the distribution of decision vectors to one‘s favor. Indeed, the 
relevance of alliances has been stressed in particular by many STS scholars. However, 
this acknowledgment of such strategic alliances has been attacked quite vehemently by 
several analytic social epistemologists. (cf. for instance Goldman‘s critique of Latour‘s 
―political-military account of science‖ (Goldman 2003: 225f). How then did such 
strategies and power games suddenly get rehabilitated? Sure enough, such strategies 
often prove helpful. Yet whether they are epistemically – and ethically – justified and 
should be recommended, is – or at least should be - a whole different story. 
11.2.2 Kitcher’s Laissez-Faire Position 
Another author who has addressed the distribution of epistemic labor is Philip Kichter. I 
have portrayed his analyses in some detail in Chapter 6. The main question concerning 
the topics raised in this section reads as follows: ―[W]hat is the optimal division of labor 
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within a scientific field, and in what ways do personal epistemic and non-epistemic 
interests lead us toward or away from it?‖ (Kitcher 1990: 22).  
To elucidate why Solomon considers Kitcher‘s approach to be laissez-faire and to 
understand how and why it differs from invasive accounts, let me recapitulate his main 
claims. Kitcher develops different scenarios of how a scientific community may 
distribute itself if there were several rivaling methods or theories on a given topic. One 
example that he chooses is finding the structure of the DNA either with the help of X-
ray cristallography (method 1) or by a second method involving ―guesswork and the 
building of tinker-toy models‖ (Kitcher 1993: 11). He argues that before the DNA-
structure has been discovered, everybody agreed that the likelihood to discover the 
structure of the DNA with the help of X-ray cristallography was assumed to be far 
greater than by using method 2. Hence, from the perspective of each individual scientist 
it seems most rational to pursue method 1, because this is the more promising theory. 
However, if every scientist acted like this, all scientists would use method 1 and none 
would use method 2. As it turned out, method 2 was successful in the end, thus it would 
have been detrimental for science if no one had pursued it. Kitcher argues that in this 
case, individual rationality and the community rationality are at odds: what is rational 
for the individual has negative consequences for the attainment of the community goal. 
Kitcher offers in principle three solutions to solve the problem of suboptimal 
distribution of cognitive labor: a philosopher-monarch who assigns tasks to scientists 
and two modes of self-allocation: altruistic and egoistic. In the case of the philosopher-
monarch, someone with complete control over scientific workforce could allocate 
scientists to different approaches, if he or she knew the likelihoods with which each 
approach would be successful. Since neither philosophical monarchy nor centrally 
planned economy has yet been successfully installed for science policy, Kitcher opts for 
self-allocation. Yet to make sure that a premature consensus on the most promising 
theory or method is avoided one may need some altruistic scientists to pursue the less 
promising approaches for the good of the community. Altruism, however, may not be 
needed to ensure a distribution of cognitive labor over different approaches and Kitcher 
asks how a Hobbesian community of completely self-interested egoists would distribute 
its labor. What if the person who discovered the structure of the DNA was promised an 
attractive price? Kitcher argues that ―the probability of your winning is the probability 
that someone in your group wins, divided by the number of group members‖ (Kitcher 
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1990: 15). Hence, if being first is a goal, e.g. because one is offered a price, this 
motivation can lead to better distributions of labor than if everyone only strived for truth 
and hence chose the most-likely theory. This implies that epistemically sullied agents, 
credit-driven agents that rather aim at being first and being rewarded are actually 
beneficial for science as a whole. A scientist‘s quest for reputation and personal glory 
would be a necessary condition to avoid premature consensus in science and enable 
better distributions of cognitive labor. Kitcher concludes that ―[s]ocial structures within 
the scientific community can work to the advantage of the community epistemic projects 
by exploiting the personal motives of individuals‖ (Kitcher 1990: 21) 
Solomon interprets Kitcher‘s perspective as laissez-faire, because being credit-driven 
appears to be sufficient to enable an optimal distribution of cognitive labor. Hence, there 
is no need to interfere with science by exerting influence on the distribution of labor. As 
if an invisible hand was at work, scientists allocate themselves to different approaches in 
adequate ways by simply following their grubby motives. This assertive, ―realist vision 
of science‖ has earned critique not only from feminist philosophers of science, but also 
from philosophers of science and social epistemologists more broadly. First of all, it has 
been noted that while there may be no philosopher-monarch, science funding indeed 
does have an impact on the distribution of labor, an impact that gets neglected in 
Kitcher‘s perspective. Moreover, the assumption that science works just fine or even as 
good as it possibly could has been disputed (Leplin 1994 1994: 666f, or Fuller 1994). 
Moreover, not only Solomon‘s reference to cases of premature consensus, but also 
feminist analyses concerning the detrimental effects of biases on the funding of non-
mainstream research should give enough reason to the contention that a pure laissez-
faire model may not suffice in enabling a sufficient amount of diversity in science (e.g. 
Harding 1991, Tuana 1989). Hence, diversity may have to be supported via science 
funding, non-mainstream research has to explicitly be encouraged and scientific 
pluralism should be promoted. Yet to what extent and how exactly funding should be 
distributed over different approaches is by no means clear.  
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11.3 Key Topics & Examples  
11.3.1 ESS & Epistemic Tasks: Tapping Diversity to Find & 
Create Knowledge  
ES:Selection is crucially based on the acknowledgement that knowledge and skills are 
distributed over epistemic agents. To tap this distributed knowledge and skills it is 
necessary to attract many diversely equipped epistemic agents, which is a commonality 
with the other two types of epistemic sociality and ES
A





 not only with respect to its form of closure, but also with respect to the 
epistemic tasks for which it is suited. 
ES
S
 can be employed for two quite generic epistemic tasks: finding existing knowledge 
and creating new knowledge. Quite often the knowledge one needs exists somewhere – 
one simple does not know where. The best way to find it is to ask as many people as 
possible about it. And ICT and the Web in particular are well suited to enable the bi-
directional communication to large numbers of people needed for this task. Two 
examples should suffice to illustrate the merits of ICT to find existing knowledge.  
Example 1: My notebook started to make strange sounds few weeks ago. I assumed 
there must be something wrong with the fan, but I was not sure how to solve this 
problem. I posted a question on facebook.com, describing the problem and asking for 
advice. I not only knew that some of my facebook-contacts have the same computer, 
many of them were also computer scientists or quite technically literate. Sure enough, 
after a few hours I got several replies and a link to some software. I installed this free 
software and was able to reduce the noise. Then I reported about the benefits of this 
intervention on facebook as a feedback to those who offered help and as further 
evidence for those with potentially the same problem.  
Example 2: On one of the philosophical mailing lists I have subscribed to people 
frequently pose questions, such as: Who coined the phrase "coal pit of induction"? 
Where did Foucault comment on others classifying him as a poststructuralist?
180
 Often 
sources for quotes of references are asked for. An example is the inquiry below.  
                                                 
180
 These questions were asked and replied upon on the PHILOS-L@liverpool.ac.uk – mailing list.  
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―Gilbert Ryle is said to have considered Zeno's paradoxes as representing 
the quintessential philosophical problem. Can anybody provide me with the 
reference to where he said this as a full bibliography reference? ― 
This question was asked on the mailing list PHILOS-L@liverpool.ac.uk on 15.01.2010. 
In three hours after the posting the inquirer reported back to the mailing list that the 
reference has been located and shared this reference. In other cases, people inquire for 
suggestions on good introductory literature on various topics. Usually, those who post 
the inquiry receive replies off the list. Afterwards they often thank their respondents and 
provide either the result or a summary of the replies to the list.  
In both examples, an epistemic need existed: I needed knowledge about the possible 
sources of noise coming out of my computer. Someone else needed knowledge about the 
origin and source of a quote or recommendations about introductory literature. In both 
cases, this epistemic need could be satisfied by tapping the distributed knowledge of 
those agents that received the request and felt inclined to reply. Referring to a tapping of 
the wisdom of the crowds may seem appropriate to characterize this epistemic use of 
ICT. However, it should be noted that in Surowiecki‘s usage of the term, wisdom of the 
crowd implies a form of aggregation (Surowiecki 2004). But for ES
S
 such aggregation is 
not needed. The epistemic content that is searched for already exists; it does not have to 
be created via aggregation. The knowledge is out there, all we need is to find it.  
However, ES
S
 is not only at work when we want to find or distribute existing epistemic 
content. It can also be employed to create new knowledge. In this case it is not only the 
distribution of existing knowledge, but also the distribution of different skills that is 
crucial for the epistemic merits of ES
S
. As noted before, the paradigmatic example for 
ES
S
 for the creation of knowledge is the distribution of effort within scientific 
communities and the role that science funding plays for this process. Within a specific 
scientific domain, a crucial goal of science funding is to distribute money over different 
approaches, because it is unknown which approach, which method, which theory will 
lead to the desired results. Or think about a patient group for diabetes. Assume that they 
want to use the money they have raised to fund research. They only have a certain 
amount of money to spend and several alternative approaches exist. Some of them are 
more promising than others. Should they donate all the money on the most promising 
approach? Or distribute it over several approaches? If so, what would be a 
recommended distribution? Questions like these have been discussed by several social 
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epistemologists, as outlined before. A different solution to questions concerning the 
distribution of epistemic labor is offered by price-based mechanisms that rely on self-
allocation and the most prominent example of a system employing such mechanisms for 
the creation of knowledge has been offered on the Web: Innocentive.com. 
11.3.2 ESS on the Web: The Case of InnoCentive 
As noted in Chapter 2, InnoCentive describes itself as a ―prime example of open 
innovation‘s crowd sourcing model.‖181 It is based on the idea that the knowledge and 
the skills to solve so-far unsolved problems exist but are distributed over different, 
unknown agents. Hence, the epistemic benefit of a socio-technical epistemic system like 
InnoCentive lies in its ability to attract a large amount of epistemic agents who possess 
different skills and abilities. InnoCentive serves as a broker between those who have 
identified a problem and want it to be solved and those who possess the means to solve 
it. The epistemic goal of InnoCentive is to create new knowledge, solutions to pressing 
scientific, technical or medical problems. In this sense, InnoCentive is the example of 
epistemic social software portrayed in this thesis which in its mechanisms and goals is 
closest to science – and it is a prime example of ESS. Recall the main characteristics of 
InnoCentive:
182
 InnoCentive is a price-based system, which means that one or several 
solutions to a problem posed will be awarded with a price. To be awarded with this price 
the problem solution has to be submitted in time and the specified criteria for success 
have to be fulfilled. The selection mechanism involves the problem seeker as well as the 
InnoCentive staff as a mediator. They decide whether the criteria were satisfied. If 
several proposals were submitted, they decide which or how many submissions will 
receive the price or a share of it. The exact mechanism of selection differs between 
different challenges and is not outlined in detail. The criteria for selection also differ but 
are outlined in the challenge description.  
The requirements are lowest and least specific for Ideation Challenges. Since these 
function primarily to brainstorm new ideas and require often only few written pages the 
barrier for participation and submission is low. Two examples introduced in Chapter 2 
concerned finding ways to motivate people to use public transportation to reduce 
greenhouses gases in Chicago as well as ideas about how to improve banking processes 
                                                 
181
 www.Innocentive.com/_.../InnoCentive_Corporate_Overview.pdf [date of access: 15.02.2010] 
182
 For a more detailed description please confer Chapter 2.  
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in the developing world. These questions are clearly crucial and as important, if not 
more important, than solving a more specific questions, such as finding a statistical 
approach for glucose monitoring. However, the questions are rather broad and meant to 
induce a brainstorming of ideas that do not have to be well developed. Often a 2-3 page 
description is sufficient for submissions to such Ideation Challenges. At the time of 
selection, the merits of the proposals cannot be based on a direct verification, which 
means that the selection criteria and the selection process are more subjective.  
This is different for Theoretical Challenges and Reduction to Practice Challenges. 
Theoretical Challenges require more than just a short description of an idea. The 
examples provided in Chapter 2 were finding new methods to analyze consumer 
emotions and the above mentioned statistical approach to deal with the variability of 
data collected during continuous blood glucose monitoring. In the first example a 
detailed description of an experimental design is required for submission, in the second 
a statistical method has to be explained and a source code had to be provided. A design 
of the solution is required and since more effort and more skills are required, there are 
fewer submissions to be expected for Theoretical Challenges than for Ideation 
Challenges. However, the selection process becomes less subjective, because scientific 
standards for the statistical methods and experimental designs exist according to which 
the submissions can be assessed.  
Finally, Reduction to Practice Challenges are the challenges for which most effort and 
most skills are needed. Here problem solvers need to provide evidence, i.e. empirical 
data or physical samples. They need to provide proof for their claims and neither the 
idea nor the design of a solution is enough. Instead the proposal needs to be validated by 
the solver and this validating must be replicable by the problem seeker. As a result, there 
will in all probability be even less submissions to Reduction to Practice Challenges than 
for other types of challenges, simply because more skills and efforts are required to 
submit a proposal. Moreover, the selection process is highly specified. The fewer the 
submissions and the clearer and more easily verifiable the success criteria are, the easier 
the selection process is. The validation in the case of Reduction to Practice Challenges 
comes closest to quality control mechanisms in the sciences. The difference is that on 
InnoCentive it is not the peers who assess the quality of a submission, but those who 
announced the challenge. Yet to make sure that they do not shirk paying the price 
money, this process is supervised by the InnoCentive staff.  
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By posting a challenge on InnoCentive and offering a price for those who can solve it 
problem seekers aim at tapping the distributed knowledge and skills of the more that 
200.000 problem solvers from more than 200 countries which are registered at 
InnoCentive.
183
 The exact solution to their challenges is probably not out there; at least it 
is not as easily trackable as the source of a quote or the solution to computer noise. 
Hence, InnoCentive is not about finding knowledge, but about creating knowledge. 
Nonetheless, existing knowledge and skills are needed to create this new knowledge. 
This existing knowledge and the skills are distributed and hence may be found in 
unknown epistemic agents which are part of the InnoCentive pool. The task is to find the 
right person to solve the problem, to find the needle in the haystack. The likelihood that 
a person with the knowledge and skills needed exists increases with the number of 
potential problem solvers and their diversity. And the likelihood that the problem will be 
solved depends on this size and diversity of the pool of problem solvers as well as on the 
incentives for tackling the challenge. The former issue depends upon the visibility of 
InnoCentive, the latter on the price structure.  
In its selection mechanism, InnoCentive is a prime example of ES
S
. One or several 




 can play 




-type mechanisms be 
employed to create the solution that is going to be submitted to InnoCentive. The 
selection mechanisms itself, the judgment about the respective merits of the submissions 
can be based upon ES
A
, e.g. by voting on the proposals, or on ES
I
, e.g. by deliberating 
on the proposals.  
11.3.3 ESS: Mechanisms & Criteria for Selection & Validation 
ES
S
 is employed to find existing knowledge or to create new knowledge by making use 
of distributed knowledge and skills. Although the selection mechanisms can be based on 




, no method of re-combination is essentially needed 
for this type of epistemic sociality. ES
S
 is social, because if selects among the results 
that different epistemic agents provide for the same task. Selection still refers to a 
variety of different processes, such as the differences between dictatorial, consensual or 
voting-based selections. Taking a look at all the examples provided before it becomes 
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obvious that not only the mechanisms of selection differ. The criteria of selection, the 
criteria for validation or verification of the selection also differ. The comparative merits 
of these different mechanisms of and criteria for selection, their respective pros and 
cons, the interaction between different types of epistemic sociality for selection, etc. 
should be of central interest for social epistemology.  
While issues related to different integrative and aggregational mechanisms have been 
discussed in the previous two chapters, the question concerning the criteria for selection 
leads us back to the debates about shared norms and standards of evaluation (Longino 
2002c), to the criteria for technical or empirical success (Solomon 2001), to the 
questions of how epistemic content may be ascribed the social status of being 
knowledge (Kusch 2002). I have positioned myself with those accounts which consider 
knowledge to be a social status and an honorific term, a qualifier which can be ascribed 
to some content and rejected for other content (Kusch 2002, Longino 2002c). In such a 
view, the creation of knowledge depends upon a community to ascribe the status of 
knowledge to epistemic content and this process implies deciding upon and selecting 
content for quality. However, what is meant by quality and how it can be assessed varies 
between different communities: for standards to be binding, they have to be shared 
within a community, but they may differ between communities. Accordingly, there are 
different views on what is meant by quality and how it can be assessed. Indeed, the topic 
of quality seems to have become a hot topic recently. One example is a conference on 
QualityCommons, which was held in Paris in January 2010.
184
 On this two-day 
workshop, different positions on quality and what this term may mean in science, arts 
and on the Web were discussed. One of the questions was whether quality is an 
objective characteristic of objects or whether it always lies in the eye of the beholder. In 
line with what has been argued throughout this thesis, I consider quality to lie in the 
eyes of a community of evaluators who share standards and criteria. Hence quality 
assessment is relative and contingent to those communities – but this does not imply that 
it is completely arbitrary.  
The relationship between the availability of shared standards and the ease by which 
quality assessments and selections can be made has also been documented by Michèle 
                                                 
184
 The workshop QualityCommons has been organized by the Centre for Research in Social Simulation 
(University of Surrey, UK) and the Centre d'Analyse et Mathématique Sociales (EHESS/CNRS, France). 
Further information can be found at http://cress.soc.surrey.ac.uk/web/events/qualitycommons-workshop/ 
[date of access 21.03.2010] 
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Lamont‘s comparison of peer review processes in the social science and humanities 
(Lamont 2009). Analyzing grant review panels in different disciplines she shows that 
while in some disciplines there seems to be a consensus about definitions of excellence, 
e.g. history and economics, other disciplines lack such consensus on criteria for 
excellence. One of the conclusions to be drawn from her analyses seems to be that the 
clearer the methodological standards and methods of a discipline are, the easier it is to 
reach consensus on the quality of epistemic content and epistemic agents and hence to 
select among them. 
Taking a look the examples of ES
S
 used before, it becomes obvious that different criteria 
for selection and validation of proposed solutions have been employed. In the case of the 
inquiries for the sources of quotes verification is easiest. If available or accessible, one 
only needs to check the proposed source to verify the proposal. In the case of the 
computer problems, verification is also possible, albeit not as directly as is the case for 
the quotes. In comparing the noise level before and after the proposed intervention one 
can infer that the intervention caused this change and use this to draw conclusions about 
the validity of the intervention.  
Things get already more difficult in the case of the best book on social epistemology, 
because there is no independent reality with which the selection can be compared to 
ensure its validity. Here, the selection is a matter of comparative quality assessment and 
not a matter of match. The same is true when people ask for good introductory books on 
philosophical mailing lists. There is no official list or ranking of books to which the 
results can be compared to. Yet the recommendations received can be more or less 
useful. At the very least they may have the epistemic benefit of offering a pre-selection 
of epistemic content and by doing this save the inquirer time to search for them. They 
function similar to recommender systems – it is the yet un-automated form of advice and 
this form of advice may exhibits the same epistemic merits and dangers as those 
outlined for RSs in the previous chapter. This lack of a direct means to assess the 
validity of recommendations refers to an inherent problem of quality assessment of 
epistemic content and I return to this topic below in a section on the selective function of 
peer review and ratings.  
Finally, when it comes to creating new epistemic content, new knowledge, as is the case 
of science or on InnoCentive, different criteria for selection can be proposed. I have 
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shown for InnoCentive that depending on the type of challenge the criteria for success 
are more or less specified imposing more or less restrictions on the selection process. 
The framework from social epistemology that seems to be best suited to understand the 
validation of the selection process seems to be Longino‘s notion of conformation 
(Longino 2002c: 116ff). As outlined in more detail in Chapter 5, conformation is an 
umbrella term for the empirical success of epistemic content of which notions such as 
truth, isomorphism, homomorphism, fit, similarity or approximation are just special 
instantiations of. Crucially, conformation depends on the purpose of an epistemic task, it 
comes in degrees and it allows for epistemic pluralism.  
11.4 Implications for the Analysis and Design of Socio-Technical 
Epistemic Systems 
11.4.1 Epistemic Diversity: Laissez-Faire for the Web, 
Intervention in Science 
An important question for the analysis and the design of socio-technical epistemic 
systems concerns the distributed epistemic processes that take place before their 
termination through selection and the role that diversity plays for them. Hence, one may 
ask what implications can be drawn from Kitcher‘s (Kitcher 1993) and Solomon‘s 
(Solomon 2006) analyses of socio-epistemic processes in science for the relationship 
between diversity and the distribution of epistemic labor on the Web. Although for the 
reasons outlined in the section on ES
S
 and Social Epistemology, I consider Kitcher‘s 
laissez-faire approach insufficient to ensure diversity in science, it seems much better 
suited to describe the relationship between diversity and the distribution of epistemic 
labor on the Web. The two points concern the difference between task attribution and 
self-allocation as well as the role of prices to motivate people.  
As Benkler has noted, self-allocation is one of the main strengths of commons-based 
peer production (Benkler 2006) and the Web seems to be an environment in which 
systems that allow for self-allocation flourish, because they tap a large and already 
diverse pool of people. Hence, Kitcher‘s invisible hand model of pure self-allocation 
might work better in a Web environment than in science, simply because there are more 
people that can allocate themselves to tasks. Therefore, the likelihood that someone will 
end up pursuing an approach that will be successful is higher, because the sheer number 
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of people involved can be higher. The challenge here lies in attracting a large enough 
number of people to work on the problem posed. Here, prices come into play. Although 
financial incentives may not play a great role for the more modular and granular tasks 
that Benkler refers to, financial incentives may play a role if bigger chunks of work need 
to be done, if less modular challenges have to be met. As we have seen in the case of 
InnoCentive, some of the problems for which solutions were sought required not only 
substantial knowledge and skills, but also considerable effort, effort which cannot be as 
easily distributed as writing a Web encyclopedia or a source code. Also, financial 
incentives may play a role, if solutions to a problem are for commercial organizations. 
InnoCentive hence seems to perfectly exploit ES
S
 on the Web by harvesting a large 
number of diversely skilled epistemic agents and by combining financial incentives with 
self-allocation to encourage them to tackle the problems posed.  
To my mind, a laissez-faire-approach, such as the one proposed by Kitcher may be 
suited for socio-epistemic practices on the Web, but less so in science. Given the 
potential epistemic agents that can be addressed on the Web, there is enough diversity. 
One only needs to tap it by being visible and combining self-allocation of tasks with a 
price structure that serves as an incentive for participation. Hence, tapping ES
S 
on the 
Web depends less on actively increasing diversity, but more on finding the means to tap 
it. In science by contrast, and within certain scientific fields in particular, diversity 
should be actively supported to avoid biased research funding and premature consensus. 
To my knowledge no explicit model has been proposed to give advice on how exactly 
diversity should be supported via science funding. Although Solomon‘s Social 
Empiricism is meant to deliver such a model it fails to do so for the reasons outlined 
before. Hence, for the moment we may have to settle for the acknowledgement that 
epistemic diversity and scientific pluralism should be supported by funding approaches 
that are perceived to have lower chances to succeed. Yet the percentages, the exact 
distribution of research funds may be impossible to assess beforehand.  
Finally, the likelihood that someone will pursue the ultimately successful approach is 
not the only reason to support diversity in science or on the Web. Although Kitcher 
(Kitcher 1990: 11) presents the example of the x-ray cristallography and the method of 
tinkering and guessing as a choice between two methods, the discovery of the DNA 
structure was rather a result of a combination of different methods. The discovery of the 
DNA was the result of differently skilled, diverse people collaborating on solving a 
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problem. It was an interdisciplinary team of a zoologist, two physicists and a chemist, 
trained in x-ray cristallography that solved this puzzle.
185
 Hence, the ―true story‖ of the 
DNA discovery is rather an example of ES:Integration, although Kitcher‘s abstraction 
seems to imply that it is a case of ES:Selection.  
To conclude, diversity seems to be as beneficial for ES
S





when it comes to problem solving, the more diverse seems to be the better. However, 
there are some differences between the notions of diversity employed in different types 
of epistemic sociality. In the case of systems employing aggregational mechanisms, 




 is not reduced to 
such a statistical necessity. Yet while in the case of ES
I
, diversity was addressed on the 
level of research teams, diversity in ES
S
 is crucial on the level of communities as a 
whole. Finally, for ES
I
, diversity has limits, because epistemic agents need to 
communicate with each other. For ES
S
 this common ground is much less needed.  
11.4.2 Peer Review: A Case of Nested ES – Using ESA and ESI for 
ESS 
In the previous chapter I have shown that on the Web, rating and ranking mechanisms 
often serve to filter content. In science, there is one classic mechanism of filtering and 
quality control: peer review. It should be noted that peer review serves epistemic 
purposes other than just selecting content. Its quality-enhancing relevance also lies in 
error detection (e.g. in identifying error in theories, data or methods), readability 
improvement (e.g. tips to improve language, identification of grammar and spelling 
mistakes, identification of missing or inaccurate references, etc), making suggestions for 
future research, as well as the detection of scientific fraud, etc. However, given the topic 
of this chapter, in the following I focus on the characteristics and relevance of peer 
review as a mechanism to select high-quality content only. From this perspective the 
following questions are of interest:  
a) How do peer review processes function as a socio-epistemological process of 
selection? 
b) How can peer review in science be grasped with the help of my tripartite model 
of epistemic sociality? 
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 Please confer for instance: http://www.chemheritage.org/classroom/chemach/pharmaceuticals/watson-
crick.html [date of access: 15.12.2009].  
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c) How does peer review differ from rating and ranking mechanisms on the Web? 
d) Comparing different socio-epistemic selection processes, which ones are better 
suited to select for quality? 
e) Could peer review as currently practiced in academia be improved by employing 
forms of open rating and ranking similar to those employed on the Web? 
These questions are hard to tackle and even harder to answer. Hence, in the brevity of 
this section I cannot answer them to any satisfying extent. Instead I outline issues that 
need to be addressed if these questions should be tackled as well as problems that need 
to be solved to analyze the respective merits of different socio-epistemic processes of 
selecting content for quality control.  
The first problem that arises when attempting to answer the questions posed above is 
that peer review refers to a wide variety of different practices.
186
 First of all, peer review 
can be open, blind or double-blind, depending on whether the reviewer and/or the 
reviewed are aware about who is taking part in the process. It can be done with respect 
to different objects: epistemic content (e.g. journal papers, conference proceedings 
submission, grant proposals) or to epistemic agents (e.g. scholarships, fellowships, 
awards) can be assessed. Further, different selection criteria are being employed, which 
can be more or less explicit. And finally, different mechanisms of judgment formation 
can be employed: varying numbers of peers can assess the merits of epistemic content or 
epistemic agents via rating them or via deliberating on them, combinations are of course 
possible.  
From the perspective of this thesis, these two forms of collective judgment formation 
refer to the difference between aggregational and integrative mechanisms: in other 













 is at work, when human epistemic agents rank or rate 
other epistemic agents or the epistemic content they have provided with the goal to 




 is at work, if human epistemic agents deliberate 
about the merits of different other epistemic agents or the epistemic content they have 
provided to select some, but not others. Due to this nesting of different types of 
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 For a review on peer review in academic please confer the state of the art report of the EU-project 
LiquidPub: available at https://dev.liquidpub.org/svn/liquidpub/papers/deliverables/LP_D1.1.pdf [date of 
access: 30.03.2010].  
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epistemic sociality, various issues raised in this chapter as well as the two previous ones 
may be more or less relevant to scrutinize different peer review mechanism. 
ESI for ESS 
Michèle Lamont‘s before-mentioned analyses of peer review processes involved in 





(Lamont 2009 :2). In these competitions, multidisciplinary panels decided about the 
distribution of fellowships and grants in the social science and humanities. To analyze 
what she calls evaluative cultures and how they may differ between disciplines, she 
observed the deliberations taking place in the panel meetings and conducted interviews 
with the panelists. Two key insights that can be obtained by her analyses concern the 
differences and similarities between different disciplines. Lamont shows that while 
disciplines differ with respect to the clarity and bindingness of criteria for excellence, 
they share rules of deliberation, which facilitate consensus formation (Lamont 2009: 6). 
Lamont also argues that for grant review, as opposed to reviews for selecting conference 
or journal submissions, face-to face meetings and deliberation are favoured over 
quantitative techniques, such as citation counts. These meetings then are characterized 
by ES
I
-type socio-epistemic processes and that all those issues on trust, authority, shared 
norms and values raised in Chapter 9 are relevant to understand and evaluate the socio-
epistemic processes involved in this type of peer review can be documented by the 
following quote:  
―Debating plays a crucial role in creating trust: fair decisions emerge from a 
dialogue among various types of experts, a dialogue that leaves room for 
discretion, uncertainty, and the weighing of a range of factors and competing 
forms of excellence. It also leaves room for flexibility and for groups to 
develop their own shared sense of what defines excellence—that is, their 
own group style, including speech norms and implicit group boundaries. 
Personal authority does not necessarily corrupt the process: it is constructed 
by the group as a medium for expertise and as a ground for trust in the 
quality of decisions made‖ (Lamont 2009: 7). 





, but also that the framework I have proposed is well 
suited to point to important issues that deserve critical scrutiny in these processes. 
Hence, while Lamont asserts that in her case studies authority did not corrupt the 
process of consensual decision making, she thereby also indicates that whether or not 
authority corrupts consensual decision making is a valid and important question for 
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analyses of peer review processes in general. It has to be analyzed whether fair decisions 
emerge from dialogue or not, whether weighting of criteria as well as differential 
weights given to the judgments of different participants have been conducive for 
selecting quality or not, etc. And although Lamont claims that ―deliberation is viewed as 
a better tool for detecting quality than quantitative techniques such as citation counts‖, it 
is indeed a matter of further empirical assessment to show whether and under what 
conditions this perception is justified.  
ESA for ESS 
Citation counts are one quantitative way of approximating quality without peer review. 
However, there are also peer review processes that quantify their judgment formation by 
using rating and ranking mechanisms. As opposed to the deliberative processes 




. In the following I 
focus on such rating and ranking-based peer review processes, but before, I need to 
address a question that is crucial for both deliberative and aggregational procedures: the 
concept of quality itself. I am addressing this topic at this point, because it is central to 
understand the problems that occur when trying to assess the comparative merits of peer 
review and although this problem becomes more lucid when trying to assess peer review 
quantitatively, it is as relevant for qualitative analysis. 
A Note on Quality 
One of the crucial goals of peer review is selecting the best content, selecting the best 
agents. This implies an assessment of quality. However, as argued before, quality is by 
no means a clear concept. Quite to the contrary, while its relevance for selection is 
uncontested, its meaning, whether it is an objective characteristic of objects or lies in the 
eye of the beholder is a hotly debated topic not only in science, but also in art and on the 
Web. One aspect of this debate that is of crucial relevance on the Web, but not only on 
the Web, refers to the relationship between quality and popularity. What is the 
relationship between the two of them? Can popularity be an indicator of quality or is 
popularity the same as quality? Are popularity and quality completely unrelated, as 
objectivist understandings of quality could imply? Topics like these ones have been 





 Different positions can be taken and I consider workshops like the one 
mentioned to be an indicator of the pressing need to assess questions concerning quality. 
My stance towards quality is related to my socio-epistemological position more 
generally. I consider quality to neither reside in the objects to be reviewed nor in the 
individual subjects, but to lie in the eyes of a community of evaluators who share certain 
standards and criteria. This implies that quality assessment fundamentally depends on 
those communities and may differ between communities. It does not imply, however, 
that quality is completely arbitrary, because its assessment is based on such shared 
standards and criteria, which may change over time and be subject to scrutiny 
themselves. Nonetheless, they are temporarily binding. This understanding of quality as 
a community-based qualifier is based on Longino‘s concept of shared standards for the 
assessment of knowledge claims in science (Longino 2002c) and related to Kusch‘s 
analyses on the performativity involved in epistemic practices (Kusch 2002).  
Keeping these difficulties in specifying quality in mind we can take a look at empirical 
studies trying to assess the merits of different forms of peer review. A crucial task with 
which such studies are confronted with consists in operationalizing an external indicator 
of quality with which the results of peer review processes can be compared. If we want 
to assess whether peer review can filter quality, can distinguish quality from junk, we 
have to define and operationalize quality in the first place.  
Different studies on peer review use different indicators of quality with which they 
compare the review results. And unsurprisingly, they come to different results 
concerning the overall merits of peer review. For instance in an analyses of peer review 
in the case of three conferences in computer science, Casati and his colleagues compare 
the ranking of conference submissions with the number of citations that these papers 
received in the six years following their publication in the conference proceedings 
(Casati, Marchese et al. 2009). Hence, they used citation counts as the external, 
quantitative indicator of quality, as the criteria for validating the review process.  
They find that with respect to this measure, the review process performs very poorly. 
Indeed they write that ―the review process and the random selection process have the 
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same quality in approximating the citation-based ranking‖ (Casati, Marchese et al. 
2009). Moreover, they have analyzed the extent to which the selection process was 
influenced by various types of biases. Since the review process was double blind, certain 
types of biases could be avoided, such as affiliation, country or gender bias.
188
 However, 
the selection was influenced by rating bias. Rating bias, as conceived in their analyses 
refers to the reviewers‘ tendency to either give consistently high or consistently low 
marks. More specifically, ―[r]eviewers are positively biased if they consistently give 
higher marks than their colleagues who are reviewing the same proposal. The same 
definition applies for the opposite case, when we talk about negatively biased reviewers‖ 
(Casati, Marchese et al. 2009). The authors conclude their analyses by stating that in 
their analyses they found more randomness in peer review processes than presumed, that 
rating biases affect the selection process and that peer review needs to be improved 
overall. In specific, they propose to amend peer review with additional quality control 
mechanisms that are more open, transparent and efficient.  
A different project by Marcel Weber and his colleagues analyzes the merits of peer 
review for science funding in biology and medicine.
189
 In their analyses on the decision 
of grant funding conducted by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF), the 
researchers come to quite different conclusions concerning the reliability, validity and 
fairness of peer review. They find no major biases, a high level on agreement on funding 
decisions between reviewers as well as ―evidence that the decisions of a public funding 
organization for basic project-based research are in line with the future publication 
success of applicants‖(Reinhart 2009: 789).  
To assess the validity of peer review, the researchers compare the number of 
publications (in the four years after the granting decision 1999-2002) and citations (in 
the subsequent four years 2003-2006) that the main investigator achieved between 
projects that were funded and those which were not funded. The results they obtained by 
this comparison indicate ―that average numbers for all included variables are 
significantly different between rejected and accepted applicants, confirming that those 
researchers who are successful in applying for grants from the SNSF continue to publish 
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more successfully than those who applied unsuccessfully. The authors conclude that 
based on these results the review procedure seems valid. However, this difference may 
simple be the result of being funded or not as the researchers acknowledge. Indeed, their 
further analyses showed that there are ―not many significant correlations between 
assessments during the review procedure and the ensuing publication success‖ (Reinhart 
2009: 805). Here, an interesting methodological aspect of this study becomes relevant. 
Besides recommending a rejection or acceptance of the proposal, the reviewers were not 
obliged to grade the applications numerically. Hence, the assessment of quality beyond 
the recommendation of acceptance or rejection had to be inferred, the textual 
recommendations had to be quantified. The researchers did this by inductively 
developing a code book with 19 quality criteria supplemented with a 5-point ranking 
scale (++,+,0,-,--).
190
 Hence, a qualitative process was retrospectively transformed into a 
ESA-type process to be analyzed quantitatively.  
What conclusions can be drawn from these two studies? First of all, different studies on 
peer review come to very different results concerning the validity of peer review as a 
means to select and filter quality. This difference can be partly explained by the fact that 
peer review refers not only to different processes (blind, double-blind, open, etc), but 
also can be applied to different selection processes. Selecting papers for a conference 
has different implications than selecting project proposals. The validity of the 
acceptance versus rejection decision cannot be assessed by comparing it with the 
citation counts. In the case of the conference, rejection makes citation impossible. In the 
case of the project funding, rejection makes publications of the epistemic agents less 
likely, because they do not have the funds to even conduct their research. This problem 
sheds some light on the more general problem of finding relevant proxies for quality 
with which peer review results can be compared to assess their validity. Moreover, how 
should peer review processes be compared if different proxies are used? Since there is 
no definite answer of what the quality of scientific papers amounts to, this quality has to 
be approximated by various measures, all of which come with their own shortcomings.  
This leads us to the final question concerning the comparative merits of peer review 
versus web-based mechanisms to select and filter quality content. An important socio-
epistemological question would be whether academic peer review systems work better 
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or worse in selecting high-quality content than web-based mechanisms such as the ones 
proposed in the previous chapter. To answer this question, we first need to understand 
how academic and web-based mechanisms of quality control differ. Once this analysis is 
done, we could also ask whether different traditional peer review could be combined 
with web-based mechanisms of post-publication control and if so, how exactly such a 
combination could look like. 
From what was outlined before, it seems plausible to start by comparing selecting 
mechanisms that employ similar mechanisms, namely ratings and rankings. Rating and 
ranking systems on the Web serve as mechanism to filter epistemic content as well as 
epistemic agents. As such, they have a similar function as peer review has in academia. 
It is the major mechanism to filter epistemic content in scholarly communication for the 
assessment of grant proposals or as well as to filter epistemic agents when it comes to 
scholarships or fellowships. Hence it should be of socio-epistemic interest to compare 
the respective merits of peer review and different types of weighted (i.e. reputation-
based) and unweighted (e.g. Amazon ratings) ratings systems. However, comparing 
these processes is not an easy task and so far there seem to be no conclusive results 
concerning the comparative merits of these different mechanisms.
191
 There are several 
reasons for this. One cluster of problems is related to the difficulty of defining and 
operationalizing quality. Since quality can only be approximated by using different 
indicators of quality, comparisons will always depend on such operationalizations. Other 
problems concern the differences between web-based ratings and ratings in peer review 
processes more specifically. For instance, open ratings on the Web, such as Amazon 
ratings, and ratings on conference submissions differs with respect to the distributions of 
rankings as well as with respect to exhaustion.  
The distributions of product ratings, such as the ratings on Amazon.com often have a 
distinct J-shape, i.e. many high marks (five stars), some low marks (one star) and very 
few ratings in between (Hu, Pavlou et al. 2009). The explanation for this distribution is 
that user tend to rate only products that they particularly liked or disliked, while 
mediocre products seems less worthy to be rated. Ratings of conference submissions do 
not have this characteristic distribution, they often have more rankings in the middle as 
the figure below visualizes exemplarily. 
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Figure 21: Mark Distribution for the Overall Evaluation Criterion in a Conference
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Moreover, due to different allocation processes, exhaustion is another factor according 
to which ratings in peer review and ratings on the Web often differ. While in peer 
review processes for journals, proceedings or grant proposals, each submission is 
evaluated, on the Web only a certain percentage of items get evaluated. A crucial 
question that needs to be answered in order to compare or combine the selective power 
of web-based ratings with aggregational peer review therefore concerns the assessment 
of the relevance of these differences in distribution and exhaustion. What are the 
epistemic benefits and dangers of different distributions? How to account for the lack of 
exhaustion in open rating systems? With all these insights in mind, a simple answer on 
how to compare and how exactly to combine different selection mechanisms seems 
futile. Rather, more research is needed on the respective merits and shortcomings of 
different selection mechanisms on the Web and beyond. One of the crucial challenges of 
employing aggregational mechanisms for selection resides in tackling the relationship 
between quality and popularity – a difference that is particularly crucial for the 
assessment of epistemic content.  
11.5 Conclusions on ES:Selection 
In this chapter I have outlined my third and final type of epistemic sociality: 





 as a distinct mechanism of closing socio-epistemic processes. 
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Instead of integrating or aggregating content provided by different epistemic agents, ES
S
 
selects content or agents. ES
S
 therefore shares with ES
A
 the characteristic that the 
closure of the socio-epistemic process is done by agents other than the ones involved in 
the process itself: those who select are not the ones who are being selected or whose 
content is being chosen. Those who aggregate are usually not the ones whose content is 
being aggregated. Integration by contrast is often done by those who provide the content 
to be integrated themselves. This puts the selectors and the aggregators into a very 
powerful position. I have outlined the implications for ES
A
 in the last chapter by 
demanding close scrutiny of the aggregational mechanisms. The same is true for the 
selection mechanisms: the process of collective judgment formation upon which the 




In this chapter, I have also addressed the possibility of nesting different types of 
epistemic sociality for the first time. I have shown that ES
S










 can be combined. This possibility of nesting is only more common and 







. Just think about the different peer review models which are 







, those issues addressed in the previous chapters become relevant. In 
the following table I therefore only add additional aspects that should be taken into 
consideration when analyzing or developing socio-technical epistemic systems that 




Setting the Parameters for ES:Selection 
 




 Be aware of the possibility of nesting different types of ES: Within 
socio-technical epistemic systems different types of epistemic sociality 
can be employed. This is particularly visible and prevalent in the case 
of ES
S




 as well. 
 If types of ES are nested, their respective role as well as their interplay 
has to be analysed.  
Diversity  
 
 Tap distributed knowledge and skills on the Web. A crucial 
requirement to tap this diversity concerns the visibility of the web 
platform as well as adequate means to motivate epistemic agents to 
participate. For tasks which come in bigger chunks or require profound 
knowledge, skills and effort, financial incentives may be needed.  
 Actively induce and support cognitive and epistemic diversity in 
science: Cognitive diversity can be enhanced by interdisciplinary 
exchanges, by encounters with people who use different perspectives, 
heuristics, interpretations and predictive models (Page 2007). Epistemic 
diversity concerns the pursuance of different methods, approaches and 





 Selection for quality depends on defining and operationalizing quality. 
According to the perspective adopted in this thesis, quality neither lies in 
the content or agents to be assessed, nor in the evaluator only. Rather 
quality resides on the eye of the community which discursively enacts and 
performs – or challenges and changes – shared standards of evaluation.  
 Selection processes differ with respect to the criteria and mechanisms 
employ.  
 The clearer the standards and the criteria, the easier it is to reach 
consensus in deliberative processes of ES
S
. The transparency of 
standards and criteria makes it possible to refer to them, to address them 
– and to change them if necessary.  
 As was the case for the other types of epistemic sociality, transparency is 
a crucial requirement for socio-technical epistemic systems. 
Transparency here refers to the visibility of mechanisms, criteria and 
standards for selection.  




12 Conclusions, Limits & Future Research 
In this thesis I have outlined a socio-epistemological framework to analyze epistemic 
social software applications, i.e. social software with a decided epistemic function. The 
reason for developing a new model was that although social epistemology appeared to 
provide an appropriate frame of reference for the analysis of such systems, none of the 
comprehensive social epistemologies provided so far appears to be sufficient. Clearly, 
none of them had the intention of being able to analyze epistemic social software and 
most of them were explicitly designed to analyze socio-epistemic practices and 
processes in science (e.g. Solomon 2001, Longino 2002c). Nonetheless, if one considers 
epistemic social software to have induced an important change in our epistemic 
environments, then it should be possible to analyze them from an epistemological 
perspective. And since the key characteristic of these systems concerns the inclusion and 
orchestration of multiple epistemic agents, a socio-epistemological analysis should be 
most appropriate.  
12.1 Positioning within Social Epistemology  
Throughout this thesis I have therefore tried to make insights from various social 
epistemologies fruitful for such an analysis. Almost all of the social epistemologies 
portrayed did find their way into my own framework. The main reason for this is that 
while none of them seems sufficient for understanding all socio-epistemic processes in 
socio-technical epistemic systems, all social epistemologies highlight crucial issues 
related to different aspects of such socio-technical epistemic systems and practices. 
Hence, my model is to a certain degree eclectic in making use of insights from different 
social epistemologies, which may well contradict each other with respect to certain 
aspects. Yet, despite this openness towards insights from all these approaches in order to 
understand different aspects of epistemic social software or socio-technical epistemic 
systems more broadly conceived, I have critically assessed and compared different 
social epistemologies with respect to the adequacy and fruitfulness with which they can 
apprehend the social nature of knowledge.  
I have been particularly critical of approaches in social epistemology which neglect 
processes of knowledge creation in favor of processes of mere transmission or 
distribution. This focus on knowledge transmission seems to be related to certain narrow 
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conceptions of testimony in epistemology. I agree with Kusch that any comprehensive 
account of testimony should account for the performative aspects of testimony and 
hence for its knowledge-creative function (Kusch 2002). Nonetheless, narrow 
conceptions of testimony as mere distribution of knowledge may be helpful to 
understand distributive practices on the Web.  
Moreover, I have outlined the distortive dangers that reside in unreflective use of 
quantification in several social epistemologies. Based on the insight that a lot of trust is 
placed in numbers in our current society (Porter 1995), I have argued that we have to be 
very careful when quantifying the qualitative. For this reason I have criticized especially 
Goldman‘s application of Bayesian inference to testimonial evidence (Goldman 2003) 
as well as Solomon‘s counting of decision vectors (Solomon 2001). Quantifying the 
qualitative always entails the risk of bias (Friedman and Nissenbaum 1997). This risk 
does not imply that quantification is useless or should be avoided. It does imply 
however, that we have to be very careful in our processes of quantification, and more 
specifically, that we have to lay open these processes of quantification, its limits and the 
assumptions that they relied upon. In the case of Goldman and Solomon, quantification 
runs the risk of hiding the highly subjective nature of the information fed into the 
quantitative process, of casting a patina of scientific integrity over possibly quite faulty 
assumptions. How dangerous this can be has been also addressed extensively in my 
assessment of different types of epistemic social software.  
I have argued that approaches which consider knowledge to be a social status that 
crucially depends upon communities, upon communication and critical interaction 
among epistemic agents are to be preferred. In particular, I have sided here with the 
approaches brought forward by Helen Longino (Longino 2002c) and Martin Kusch 
(Kusch 2002), being aware that there are crucial differences between the two models 
they propose.  
A further aspect which I share with both Kusch and Longino concerns the receptiveness 
towards historical and sociological analyses of knowledge and science. While I agree 
that social epistemologies should not remain purely descriptive, any normative social 
epistemology has to take insights from empirical fields into account, because to my 
mind normative appropriateness depends upon empirical adequacy. Only once we 
415 
 
understand socio-technical epistemic systems and practices we can start thinking about 
amending or improving them.  
Concerning the issue of complementarity, I consider social epistemology not to be an 
addendum to individualistic epistemologies. Agreeing that knowledge is a social status 
implies that individuals cannot know and that hence, that knowledge only comes into 
existence though communal vetting of epistemic content. In this sense, social 
epistemology is not complementary to individual epistemologies, but a successor 
discipline. Nonetheless, while singular epistemic agents may not be able to know, they 
can surely believe, see, infer, etc. And for those processes that proceed or succeed these 
communal knowledge creation insights from individualistic epistemologies may be as 
much of use as insights from psychology or cognitive science.  
Understanding knowledge to be a social status implies that knowledge fundamentally 
depends upon communities. I have further agreed that epistemic standards differ 
between communities. Hence, if the attribution of knowledge depends on such shared 
local standards, knowledge is always relative to these standards and the communities in 
which they are being enacted. I have accordingly sided with Kusch‘s relativist position 
(Kusch 2007, Kusch 2002). According to him relativism denotes that truth and falsity 
depend on a community‘s interests, exemplars and goals. It does not imply however, 
that all statements are only ―relatively true‖ or that one can make a theory true by simply 
wanting it to be true. Relativity here means relative to standards and goals, not complete 
arbitrariness.  
I have emphasized that trust is fundamental for all epistemic practices and that every 
socio-epistemological theory has to account for this fundamental entanglement of 
knowledge and trust and for its epistemological – and ethical – consequences. 
Acknowledging this entanglement does not imply that trusting is always justified. 
Instead of advocating blind trust, the notion of epistemic vigilance, as introduced by 
Sperber and his colleagues, seems to be more adequate to describe the relationship 
between knowing and trusting: we need to trust others to know, but humans seem to 
―have a suite of cognitive mechanisms for epistemic vigilance, targeted at the risk of 
being misinformed by others‖ (Sperber, Clément et al. to appear). To understand these 
mechanisms is of vital interest not only for the analysis of epistemic practices on the 
Web, but for any social epistemology.  
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A crucial issue that has been addressed throughout this thesis concerns the distribution 
of epistemic labor. This distribution can take place on different levels. To use a 
comparison with science: Distribution of epistemic labor takes place between two 
people, within research groups as well as within overall scientific fields. My socio-
epistemological framework is a framework to understand different forms of such 
distribution through the way in which such distributed labor is terminated. My model 
proposes a tripartite classification of different mechanisms of closure terminating socio-
epistemic processes in which multiple epistemic agents fulfill epistemic tasks and reach 
epistemic goals in a distributed fashion. In social epistemology, closure has primarily 
been analyzed in the context of theories on consensus formation. I have agreed with 
several social epistemologists that consensus is not intrinsically valuable or functions as 
the ultimate goal of science, and that epistemic pluralisms and diversity to avoid 
premature consensus should rather be advocated (Solomon 2001, Longino 2002c). 
However, even if consensus it not needed, closure of epistemic practices is essential for 
the creation of epistemic products. This is the difference between analyses on consensus 
formation and my account on mechanisms of closure: mechanisms of closure as 
conceived in this thesis refer to the process of temporarily terminating distributed labor 
to create an epistemic product which can then be shared. This closure can be achieved 
via the three different mechanisms I have proposed as the basis of my socio-
epistemological framework: integration, aggregation and selection. Such mechanisms 
of closure function on a different level than consensus as conceived in most socio-
epistemological accounts. Closure is the process by which epistemic products get 
finalized. It is neither the same nor does it depend upon macro-level consensus on 
scientific theories or methods.  
12.2 A Social Epistemology for Socio-Technical Epistemic Systems 
So far there have been only few attempts to analyze social software from a socio-
epistemological perspective. While they offer some interesting insights, they can at best 
serve starting points for a comprehensive analysis of such socio-technical epistemic 
systems for several reasons. First of all, most analyses have focused on the distributive 
functions of ICT, while neglecting creative processes. With respect to social software 
more specifically, only few examples have been analyzed, Wikipedia being the most 
extensively studied system. Moreover, given the limited number of analyses, only few 
socio-epistemic aspects of epistemic social software have so far been addressed. My 
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model is therefore an attempt to widen the perspective, to expand the frames (Suchman 
2007/2009) for socio-epistemological analyses of epistemic social software.  
This reference to Lucy Suchman‘s notion of expanding frames leads me to a more 
fundamental critique of previous socio-epistemological analyses of ICT: their 
inadequate models of technology. I have argued that social epistemology has not yet 
addressed the entanglement of the social, the technical and the epistemic to a satisfying 
degree and should therefore rely on insights from the field of Science and Technology 
Studies (STS) to shed some light on this relationship. More precisely, I have criticized 
the sharp distinction between human agents and technologies that often seems inherent 
in socio-epistemological analyses of socio-technical epistemic systems. Technology 
often seems to be conceived as completely predictable and controllable tool in the hands 
of fully rational human agents. This perspective on technology seems inappropriate to 
understand socio-technical epistemic processes within epistemic social software. 
Instead, epistemic social software should better be understood as socio-technical 
epistemic systems in which multiple human and non-human epistemic agents interact in 
creating epistemic content. I have relied on insights from numerous major accounts in 
STS, feminist STS as well as the field of Values in Design and the main insights that 
found their way into my own socio-epistemological framework concerned the 
acknowledgement of the entangled nature of the social, the technical and the epistemic; 
an assessment of the differences and similarities between human and non-human actors, 
a focus on the role of values in technology design, and the adoption of a performative 
conception of socio-epistemic practices and systems. My own model is therefore 
informed not only by social epistemology, but also quite crucially by my readings in the 
field of STS and its neighbouring disciplines.  
Any socio-epistemological framework needs to set some premises with respect to the 
fundamental epistemic concepts it employs. I have adopted Longino’s tripartite notion 
of knowledge as well as her concept of conformation as a criterion for the validation of 
epistemic content as a basis for my own model (Longino 2002c). I consider her 
differentiation into knowledge as content from knowledge as a set of knowledge-
productive practices and knowledge as cognitive agency, i.e. as a state of a person 
(‗knowing‘) to be a useful basis for analyzing socio-epistemic practices in socio-
technical epistemic systems. More specifically, I have argued that knowledge as content 
can serve as input and output of knowledge-productive practices in which situated 
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epistemic agents are involved. Longino‘s notion of conformation appeared also to be the 
most useful framework for analyzing socio-epistemic practices and products on the Web 
for several reasons: conformation can be applied to non-propositional content and to 
epistemic practices, it comes in degrees and it can be assessed for different dimensions 
depending on the epistemic goals.  
12.3 Key Insights 
As a result of my analyses and readings, I have proposed a socio-epistemological 
framework that is based on a classification of three important types of epistemic 
sociality. These types of epistemic sociality are distinguished and named after the 
mechanisms they employ to close socio-epistemic processes which are distributed over 







systems employing ES:Integration, the singular epistemic results accomplished by 
different epistemic agents need to be integrated to achieve the overall epistemic goal. In 
systems employing ES:Aggregation, these individual contributions need to be 
aggregated. Finally, in systems employing ES:Selection neither aggregation nor 
integration needs to take place. Instead some epistemic agents, usually none of those 
who have provided the singular results, choose among those results. This process can be 
doubly social, if it is based on aggregational or integrative mechanism. Yet even in cases 
of dictatorial decision making, this process is socio-epistemic in exploiting socially 
distributed knowledge and skills.  
This classification is not meant to imply that the closure mechanism is all that matters 
when it comes to assessing socio-technical epistemic systems. This is clearly not true 
and my analyses of the different socio-epistemic processes and stages throughout this 
thesis would clearly belie such an assumption. However, this classification functions as 
an analytical tool which not only sheds light on important differences between systems, 
it also highlights which issues are of particular relevance for the socio-epistemological 
analyses of such socio-technical epistemic systems. First of all, these three types of 
epistemic sociality differ with respect to their prerequisites, their strengths and 
weaknesses. Secondly, they differ with respect to several central topics of socio-
epistemological interest which I have outlined for each of the types of epistemic 
sociality. While some topics are relevant for each type, e.g. diversity or trust, their 
relevance, form and loci differ between the three types of epistemic sociality. For 
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instance, while diversity plays a role in all three types of epistemic sociality, the 
rationale behind this request for diversity differs between them. While for ES
I
, diversity 
needs to be coupled with shared standards to make the integration of results possible, no 
shared standards are needed for ES
A
. Here diversity refers to statistical variance which is 
needed to avoid systematic bias in the aggregation process.  
Moreover, I have argued that trust is crucial in all socio-technical epistemic systems, 
irrespective of which mechanism of closure they employ. Nonetheless, the loci of trust 
differ between such systems. In selective and especially in aggregative systems, there is 
a concentration of trust on the aggregation and selection mechanisms themselves. This 
trust in the aggregational mechanisms has been addressed in the discourse around 
algorithmic authority (Shirky 2009). I have argued that algorithmic authority is a 
specification of procedural trust, of trusting a procedure, a mechanism instead of a 
person or institution. This form of trust is not new. Trust in different methods in science 
- be it in specific scientific methods or in general methods of quality control such as 
double-blind peer review - is also a form of procedural trust. The novelty lies in the fact 
that these mechanisms are often unknown to the users of systems which puts them in the 
vulnerable position of having neither knowledge nor control over the mechanisms they 
employ to know. Algorithms are often black-boxed within socio-technical epistemic 
system; they are either inaccessible or incomprehensible for the users of such systems. 
These users are therefore either forced to blindly trust these systems and the mechanisms 
they employ or to withdraw from using systems whose underlying processes they cannot 
comprehend. A crucial conclusion that I have drawn from this observation was my 
request for transparency in socio-technical epistemic systems. Only in transparent 
systems can we be responsible, epistemically vigilant knowers.  
However trust cannot only be placed and authority not only be ascribed to the 
mechanisms of closure themselves, but also to different epistemic agents. Hence, a 
crucial topic in this thesis concerns the differential assessment of human epistemic 
agents. We have seen that despite all contrary rhetoric, the Web is by no means an 
epistemic democracy where everybody‘s vote has the same weight. There are examples 
of unweighted mechanisms, such as the ratings on Amazon.com, where no difference is 
being made between different users. However, these examples are rare. In the majority 
of socio-technical epistemic systems, epistemic agents are weighted. Therefore, a crucial 
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socio-epistemological task consists in analyzing these processes of weighting and their 
consequences.  
I have argued that the use of reputational cues to assess the epistemic trustworthiness of 
epistemic agents is not only common practice, but also epistemically useful. If we do not 
want to trust blindly, we have to assess epistemic agents differentially for their 
competency or honesty – or rather for signs of dishonesty and incompetence. In cases 
where we cannot assess others competence or honesty directly, we may have to rely on 
proxies of what Kitcher has labelled unearned authority, i.e. the ―authority that stems 
from the scientist‘s social position (either within the community of scientists or in the 
wider society)‖ (Kitcher 1993: 315). These indicators related to someone‘s social 
positions may sometimes indeed be epistemically useful. Yet as proxies they are only 
heuristics and as such they are fallible.  
Especially feminist scholars have stressed the epistemological and ethical problems that 
can arise if inadequate proxies for the assessment of trustworthiness are used and 
epistemic authority is distributed accordingly (e.g. Alcoff 2001, Code 1987, Fricker 
2007, Scheman 2001). Hence, although there are epistemic benefits in making 
differences between epistemic agents, in attributing different amounts of epistemic 
authority to different agents based on their perceived epistemic trustworthiness, social 
epistemology has to assess which proxies are valid indicators of epistemic 
trustworthiness and which ones are not; which reputational cues should be used when 
ascribing epistemic authority and which ones should not be used. Social epistemology 
has to assess the relevant criteria and the extent to which the social identity of epistemic 
agents is relevant for the assessment of their capacities as a knower. It is with respect to 
these questions, that the entanglement of ethical and epistemological aspects within 
social epistemology comes to the fore most clearly.  
Finally, I have shown that within socio-technical epistemic systems, different closure 
mechanisms can be combined. Different mechanisms can be employed to end different 
processes at different stages. Peer review has served as one important example to show 
this nesting of different types of epistemic sociality: peer review can have a selective 
function (ES
S
), while employing integrative (ES
I
) and aggregational mechanisms (ES
A
) 
for the formation of a collective judgment. Hence, a crucial field of analysis for future 
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research concerns the ways in which different socio-epistemic mechanisms can best be 
combined within different socio-technical epistemic systems.  
12.4 Limits of this Thesis 
The benefits of this thesis are to a certain extent also its limits: its generality and its 
interdisciplinarity. In this thesis I am offering a new framework for the analysis of 
epistemic social software – or of socio-technical epistemic systems more generally. It is 
a framework fundamentally based on works from social epistemology, but combines 
them with insights from other fields, such as STS and computer ethics. The framework 
was specifically designed for the analyses of epistemic social software conceived as 
socio-technical epistemic systems in which numerous human and non-human epistemic 
agents interact in different forms to reach epistemic goals and produce epistemic 
products through different mechanisms of closure. Given the socio-epistemological 
basis of this model, many insights were based on socio-epistemological analyses of 
socio-epistemic practices in the sciences. Hence, frequent reference and comparisons 
were made between socio-epistemic practices on the Web and in science. This proximity 
is one of the reasons why I consider the model I propose suitable for analyses of socio-
technical epistemic systems other than epistemic social software. The points made, the 
questions asked and the issues raised throughout this thesis are as applicable to science 
as they are to epistemic social software, although the answers may differ. As such, the 
model proposed can serve as a general socio-epistemological framework that can be 
fruitfully applied to all socio-epistemological processes that involve multiple agents, 
although it was developed and is particularly well suited for the analysis of socio-
technical epistemic systems, such as epistemic social software.  
A shortcoming of such a generic proposal is that there are many blanks. Indeed, I have 
raised more issues than I have answered. I consider this to be a sign of the fruitfulness of 
my proposal. However, others may find that the analyses I offer might not go far 
enough. I agree and hope to be able to continue work on the topics raised in the years to 
come. 
A second related aspect concerns the interdisciplinary nature of this thesis. This comes 
as well with pros and cons. One of the major shortcomings of such an interdisciplinary 
work concerns its omissions. Clearly more could be said about social epistemology, 
about STS, about information and communication technology. This thesis lies at an 
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intersection. Hence, its value lies in making connections, in relating research from 
different fields to open up new research questions. Its flaw may lie in not going far 
enough into each direction. Here again I hope to follow some of the routes into the 
different disciplines touched in more detail in the next years. 
Proposing a new frame of reference differs from making an argument within a frame of 
reference. Hence, despite all my emphasis on processes of closure, this thesis is rather an 
opening than a closure. With the model I have proposed, I aim at opening a field of 
research which yet has to be explored: the socio-epistemological analysis of socio-
technical epistemic systems. Proposing a comprehensive framework for a new field of 
research differs from delivering a rigid argument. And if there is one thing I have 
learned about philosophical method it is that rigor of argumentation is one of the key 
criteria of quality. If there are any singular arguments which I deliver in this thesis they 
are the following:  
1. Given their prevalence, ubiquity and relevance for contemporary epistemic 
practices, epistemic social software is an important field to analyze from a socio-
epistemological perspective. 
2. Social epistemology, while delivering valuable and important insights on 
numerous aspects of epistemic social software has fallen short of delivering a 
full-fledged, comprehensive framework for such analyses. 
3. Such a framework has to account for insights obtained in different academic 
fields, most notably from STS, and has to combine an epistemological with an 
ethical perspective.  
These arguments are the red threads that run through this thesis and the model I propose 
is intended to be such a new framework. I have build this framework upon literature 
research in different fields and started to validate it with different case studies proposed 
in the last three chapters. Whether my model will continue to be heuristically fruitful is 
to be shown in the years to come.  
12.5 Future Research 
The goal of this thesis was to develop a socio-epistemological framework to assess 
epistemic social software. So far, there have been only few previous attempts to analyze 
social software from a socio-epistemological perspective and no comprehensive 
framework for such an analysis has existed so far. Further, previous analyses have been 
hampered by a neglect of the crucial role of technology for epistemic practices. 
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Epistemic practices nowadays are socio-technical epistemic practices. Therefore, 
approaches which neglect the role of technology are inadequate to describe our 
contemporary epistemic environment.  
Accordingly, with this thesis I am opening up a new field of research: the socio-
epistemological analysis of epistemic social software. Throughout this thesis, but in 
particular in Part 3, I have sketched directions for future research and I shall return to 
these issues to conclude this thesis.  
With respect to epistemic social software, the most straightforward request concerns the 
analyses of more and different types of epistemic social software. While Wikipedia 
clearly is an important case study from a socio-epistemological perspective, other types 
of software have to be scrutinized. We have to assess their functionalities, their strengths 
and weakness, the prerequisites upon which their proper functioning depends, the 
possible dangers if such prerequisites are not met. We also have to ask different 
questions. In particular questions concerning the creative and generative function of 
epistemic social software. The restrictive focus on ICT as a means of knowledge 
transmission has narrowed the realm of questions that were asked. Hence, we need to 
broaden our frames again and ask in which ways which types of epistemic content, 
which types of knowledge, are being created on the Web.  
An important research topic concerns the interplay between technical constraints and 
social norms in socio-technical epistemic systems, the emergence of socio-technical 
constraints. We also have to apprehend the performative nature of this relationship, the 
question how such social-technical constraints are enacted, fostered or changed over 
time.  
Another topic of crucial relevance concerns the notion of trust, and the interplay 
between epistemic trust and epistemic vigilance. Here, empirical questions of how 
people trust on the Web, whom they trust and for which reasons, have to be combined 
with normative concerns about the validity of such practices. We have to analyze 
characteristics of procedural trust, how it differs from trust in persons and institution, its 
pros and cons. Issues around algorithmic authority have to be assessed, how it functions 
and where it malfunctions. Trust in algorithms renders the problem of black-boxing, of 
accountability and responsibility central. I have argued for transparency in socio-
technical epistemic systems. Yet, how transparency can be increased without 
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overburdening the users is a question that yet has to be explored. Different forms of 
visualizations have to be conceived, tested and compared to develop new systems that 
enable their users to be more responsible and accountable knowers.  
When it comes to human epistemic agents, we have to assess the processes by which we 
place trust in them. Whom do we trust for which reasons? Which proxies do we use to 
assess others‘ epistemic trustworthiness? Are these processes valid? What are the 
consequences of using different proxies? What are the pros and cons of ascribing 
different amounts of trustworthiness to different agents? With respects to these 
questions, the relationship between ethics and epistemology has to be fathomed.  
Epistemic social software is a rich field of research that yet needs to be explored and the 
questions outlined above merely point into different directions of future research. 
However, the model I propose is not restricted to epistemic social software. Rather, it is 
generic enough to deliver a framework for the analysis of socio-technical epistemic 
systems more broadly conceived. One clear candidate for probing my model is science, 
because the same questions which I have asked above can also be used to assess 
epistemic practices within science. This also implies that my model can be compared to 
other socio-epistemological approaches with respect to its fertility in opening up 
research questions for the analysis of science. The utility of my framework to analyze 
issues related to scholarly communication is most straightforward. Hence, I have made 
reference to projects such as LiquidPub
193
, which assess the impact of Web2.0-
technologies for scholarly communication and I used topics such as peer review to 
elucidate the relevance of my model. However, issues of trustworthiness, (procedural) 
trust, diversity, transparency in socio-technical epistemic systems are not only important 
to understand scientific publishing and communication, but also to apprehend the 
knowledge-creative processes within science, the interplay between human and non-
human agents in the processes of knowledge creation. Indeed, one may ask whether and 
to what extent the differentiation into knowledge creation, evaluation and dissemination 
has to be reconceived to account for epistemic practices in science and beyond.  
Finally, it has to be noted that epistemic social software and science are just two very 
prominent examples of socio-technical epistemic systems. The educational system or 
industry can also be understood in terms of the interplay between the social, the 
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epistemic and the technical. Hence, several questions raised in this thesis can certainly 
also be applied to other societal domains. The field is wide open - the work is yet to be 
done.  
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In recent years new applications emerged on the Web which received the labels Web2.0 
or social software. In many of these applications people are engaged in epistemic 
activities, such as the dissemination, organization or creation of knowledge. The goal of 
this thesis is to analyze the epistemological relevance of such epistemic social software. 
Because communication and interaction between multiple agents seems to be the key to 
understand the epistemic processes within such systems, social epistemology, the 
philosophical discipline exploring the ways and the extent to which knowledge is social, 
was chosen as a theoretical framework. However, none of the existing comprehensive 
social epistemologies delivers a sufficient framework to analyze epistemic social 
software. Therefore, I have developed a new socio-epistemological framework to 
analyze epistemic social software which is rooted in socio-epistemological discourse, 
but amends it with insights from the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS).  
My framework is founded on a tripartite classification of socio-technical epistemic 
system based on the mechanisms they employ to close socio-epistemic processes. These 
three mechanisms are integration, aggregation and selection. With this classification I 
do not aim at reducing the differences between systems to their mechanisms of closure. 
However, I argue that the classification based on this indicator is heuristically fruitful. 
Systems employing different mechanisms of closure depend on different social, 
technical and epistemic prerequisites, have different strengths and weaknesses and are 
optimal for different epistemic tasks. My model puts a fact into the focus that has been 
neglected so far in social epistemology: the technical and its relationship to the social 
and the epistemic. Since most epistemic practices are nowadays pervaded by 
technologies, such a consideration of the role of technologies in these practices seems to 
be indispensable for any social epistemology that aims at being not only normatively 






In den letzten Jahren sind eine Reihe neuer Anwendungen im Internet entstanden, die 
zumeist als Web2.0 oder social software bezeichnet werden. Viele dieser Anwendungen 
sind gekennzeichnet durch die Einbindung mehrerer Agenten in Prozesse zur 
Verbreitung, Organisation und Herstellung von Wissen. Das Ziel der vorliegenden 
Dissertation besteht in der Analyse der epistemologischen Relevanz dieser 
epistemischen social software Anwendungen. Da die Kommunikation und Interaktion 
zwischen mehreren Agenten deren Schlüsselmerkmal darstellt, bildet die Soziale 
Erkenntnistheorie als philosophische Disziplin, welche die Weisen untersucht, in denen 
Wissen sozial bedingt ist, die theoretische Grundlage für die Analyse der epistemischen 
Prozesse innerhalb dieser Systeme. Weil bisher keine soziale Erkenntnistheorie eine 
ausreichende Theorie für die Analyse epistemischer social software zur Verfügung 
stellen konnte, habe ich die Grundlagen für ein neues sozio-epistemisches Model 
entwickelt, welches zwar im sozio-epistemologischen Diskurs verankert ist, jedoch um 
Erkenntnisse aus dem Feld der Science and Technology Studies (STS) erweitert wurde. 
Dieses Model gründet in der Klassifikation von sozio-technischen epistemischen 
Systemen anhand unterschiedlicher Mechanismen der Schließung, welche zur 
Beendigung sozio-epistemischer Prozesse verwendet werden. Diese Klassifikation 
anhand der drei Schließungsmechanismen Integration, Aggregation und Selektion zielt 
nicht auf die Einebnung der Differenzen zwischen sozio-technischen epistemischen 
Systemen, vielmehr liegt ihr Wert in ihrer heuristischen Fruchtbarkeit, darin Differenzen 
aufzumachen. Systeme, welche unterschiedliche Schließungsmechanismen nutzen, sind 
gebunden an unterschiedliche soziale, technische und epistemische Voraussetzungen, sie 
haben unterschiedliche Stärken und Schwächen und eignen sich daher für 
unterschiedliche epistemische Aufgaben. Das von mir entwickelte Modell lenkt dabei 
die Aufmerksamkeit auf ein bislang weitgehend in der sozialen Erkenntnistheorie 
vernachlässigtes Thema: das Technische und seine Beziehung zum Sozialen und zum 
Epistemischen. Da die meisten epistemischen Praktiken heute durchdrungen sind von 
Technologie, ist deren Berücksichtigung von entscheidender Bedeutung für jede soziale 
Erkenntnistheorie, die beansprucht, nicht nur normativ angemessen, sondern auch 
empirisch adäquat zu sein.  
